Files
OmniRoute/open-sse/executors/inner-ai.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza f59f8daa94 Release v3.8.6 (#2804)
* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity

* fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls

* fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls

* fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls

* chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions)

* fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes

* docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem

Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança,
CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em
VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos.

Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket,
suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo
tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas.

Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem
cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última
atividade.

* fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted

* fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field

* docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers

Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely.
That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and
`/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors
and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits.

Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT,
Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com
emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>`
attribution.

Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note,
and 41 i18n translations.

* fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe

GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models
endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe
and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'.

Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the
same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models,
validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message.
Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth
is OK.

Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers.

* test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators

Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429),
network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers.

* feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning

GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per
provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic
fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading
'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning.

Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers
(same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the
provider registry without any warning, since all registered models
are functional via POST /chat/completions.

* refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test

- Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory
- Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md

* fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup

* feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback

Hybrid approach:
- gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models
- gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully
Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern

* i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json

* feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md

Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision
(lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in
package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22).

* fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth)

Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow:
- Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote
  import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path
- Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from
  fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation

Spec only - no code changes yet.

* docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan

10 tasks covering:
- TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses
- Provider switch to import_token
- Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback
- OAuthModal UI override
- i18n sync
- Verification + PR steps

* fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow

The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404
post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the
only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token.

- windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token
- generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli
- tests: assert flowType + disabled stub

* fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions

start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now
return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit
runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being
permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged.

Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex
regression check.

* refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG

No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl,
codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and
exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl,
showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately.

* fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env

Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6:
- src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared
  requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the
  cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test.
- Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
  to satisfy the env/docs sync contract.

* fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli

Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key
mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so
no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow.

The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token
via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy.

* fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch

The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes
`providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the
cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with
`mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as
`accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it
crashed with:

  SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null

Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller
and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second
`if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the
second block was unreachable but identical to the first.

Adds two regression tests asserting that
`provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for
both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate
instead of the SQLite bind error in production.

* feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows

* test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894)

Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6:

- Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec
  embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web
  API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is
  gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips
  secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes
  through resolvePublicCred per rule #11.

- Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses
  SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for
  password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not
  apply (false positive).

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895)

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact)

Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877):

- docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above
  "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6)
  and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section.
  Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading.
- any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any`
  (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which
  matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly.
- pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files"
  (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack
  policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the
windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning.

* feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868)

* feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT)

* fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections

---------

Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool

New providers:
- huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription)
- phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent
- poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie)
- venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie)
- v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie)
- kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie)
- doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie)

Additional:
- Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
- Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073
- Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers
- Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup)
- All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials

Closes #2885

* fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules

* feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899)

Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity.
It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id +
daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own
model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking,
claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect:

- token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON)
- auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token)
- browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow)
- bulk / ZIP import

New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}.
Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml,
ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration,
the token parser, and route auth-hardening.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896)

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal
trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6
(PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11).

* Pr 2871 (#2897)

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index

Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep
documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure.

* docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest

Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local>
Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local>
Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me>
Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru>
Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
2026-05-29 12:44:29 -03:00

720 lines
26 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
import { BaseExecutor, type ExecuteInput } from "./base.ts";
import { sanitizeErrorMessage } from "../utils/error.ts";
const INNER_AI_CHAT_URL = "https://chatapi.innerai.com/chat";
const INNER_AI_PROFILE_URL = "https://platformapi.innerai.com/api/v1/users/profile";
const INNER_AI_MODELS_URL = "https://platformapi.innerai.com/api/v1/ai_models";
const INNER_AI_USER_AGENT =
"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36";
const MODELS_CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
// ── Types ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
interface InnerAiModel {
id: string; // UUID from platformapi
llm_model: string;
name?: string;
enable?: boolean;
visible?: boolean;
unavailable_api?: boolean;
pro_only?: boolean;
ultra_only?: boolean;
}
interface CredentialCache {
email: string;
deviceId: string;
}
// ── In-memory caches ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Keyed by sha256(token). Using a prefix slice of the JWT collides across
// tokens that share the same algorithm header (the first ~36 chars of any
// HS256/RS256 token are identical), which previously caused cross-tenant
// credential cache hits.
//
// LRU bound: a long-running server with many Inner.ai accounts would otherwise
// grow these maps without bound. Map iteration order is insertion order, so
// re-inserting on read approximates LRU and the eviction loop trims to cap.
const CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES = 1000;
const credentialCache = new Map<string, CredentialCache>();
const modelsCache = new Map<string, { models: InnerAiModel[]; expiresAt: number }>();
function lruTouch<V>(map: Map<string, V>, key: string): V | undefined {
const value = map.get(key);
if (value === undefined) return undefined;
map.delete(key);
map.set(key, value);
return value;
}
function lruSet<V>(map: Map<string, V>, key: string, value: V): void {
if (map.has(key)) map.delete(key);
map.set(key, value);
while (map.size > CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES) {
const oldest = map.keys().next().value;
if (oldest === undefined) break;
map.delete(oldest);
}
}
// SHA-256 here derives an in-memory cache key from the session token — it is NOT
// password-at-rest storage. The slow KDFs CWE-916 recommends (bcrypt/scrypt/Argon2)
// are salted and non-deterministic, so they cannot be used as a stable Map key and
// would defeat the cache entirely. CodeQL js/insufficient-password-hash flags this as
// a false positive (dismissed); a fast cryptographic digest is the correct primitive
// for keying an ephemeral, process-local cache.
function tokenCacheKey(token: string): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
}
// ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Decode JWT payload without verifying signature. */
function decodeJwtPayload(token: string): Record<string, unknown> | null {
try {
const parts = token.split(".");
if (parts.length < 2) return null;
const b64 = parts[1].replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
const padded = b64 + "=".repeat((4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4);
return JSON.parse(atob(padded));
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** Parse the credential string.
*
* Accepted formats:
* "eyJhbG..." — token only (no email, chat will try without USER-EMAIL)
* "eyJhbG... user@example.com" — token + email (recommended)
* "token=eyJhbG... user@example.com" — same with token= prefix
*/
function parseCredential(rawApiKey: string): { token: string; credEmail: string } {
const trimmed = rawApiKey.trim();
// Strip "token=<value>" prefix if present
const eqIdx = trimmed.indexOf("=");
const stripped =
eqIdx > 0 && !trimmed.startsWith("eyJ") ? trimmed.slice(eqIdx + 1).trim() : trimmed;
// Split by the LAST space; if the last part looks like an email it's the credential email
const lastSpace = stripped.lastIndexOf(" ");
if (lastSpace > 0) {
const possibleEmail = stripped.slice(lastSpace + 1).trim();
if (possibleEmail.includes("@")) {
return { token: stripped.slice(0, lastSpace).trim(), credEmail: possibleEmail };
}
}
return { token: stripped, credEmail: "" };
}
function makeErrorResult(status: number, message: string, body: unknown) {
return {
response: new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message: sanitizeErrorMessage(message),
type: "upstream_error",
code: `HTTP_${status}`,
},
}),
{ status, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
),
url: INNER_AI_CHAT_URL,
headers: {} as Record<string, string>,
transformedBody: body,
};
}
/** Build request headers for Inner.ai API calls. */
function buildHeaders(token: string, email: string, deviceId: string): Record<string, string> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": INNER_AI_USER_AGENT,
// Cookie-based auth — the token cookie is scoped to .innerai.com so all
// *.innerai.com subdomains expect it via Cookie header.
Cookie: `token=${token}`,
"USER-TOKEN": token,
"DEVICE-ID": deviceId,
Origin: "https://app.innerai.com",
Referer: "https://app.innerai.com/",
};
if (email) headers["USER-EMAIL"] = email;
return headers;
}
// ── Credential resolution (email + deviceId from JWT + profile API) ───────────
async function resolveCredentials(
token: string,
credEmail: string,
signal?: AbortSignal | null
): Promise<CredentialCache> {
const key = tokenCacheKey(token);
const cached = lruTouch(credentialCache, key);
if (cached) return cached;
// Decode device_id from JWT payload (accept multiple field names)
const payload = decodeJwtPayload(token);
const deviceId = String(
payload?.device_id ?? payload?.deviceId ?? payload?.["device-id"] ?? payload?.did ?? ""
).trim();
// Build profile request headers — include cookie auth + custom headers
const profileHeaders: Record<string, string> = {
Cookie: `token=${token}`,
"USER-TOKEN": token,
"User-Agent": INNER_AI_USER_AGENT,
Origin: "https://app.innerai.com",
Referer: "https://app.innerai.com/",
};
if (deviceId) profileHeaders["DEVICE-ID"] = deviceId;
// Attempt to fetch email from profile API — non-fatal if it fails
let email = "";
try {
const profileResp = await fetch(INNER_AI_PROFILE_URL, {
headers: profileHeaders,
signal: signal ?? undefined,
});
if (profileResp.ok) {
const body = await profileResp.json().catch(() => null);
const b = body as Record<string, unknown> | null;
email = String(
(b?.data as Record<string, unknown>)?.email ??
(b?.user as Record<string, unknown>)?.email ??
(b?.profile as Record<string, unknown>)?.email ??
b?.email ??
""
).trim();
}
} catch {
// Profile fetch failed — proceed without email
}
// Fallback 1: use the email provided directly in the credential string
if (!email && credEmail) email = credEmail;
// Fallback 2: extract email from JWT sub if it looks like one
if (!email && typeof payload?.sub === "string" && payload.sub.includes("@")) {
email = payload.sub;
}
const creds: CredentialCache = { email, deviceId };
lruSet(credentialCache, key, creds);
return creds;
}
// ── Model resolution (dynamic fetch + cache) ──────────────────────────────────
class InnerAiModelsError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly status: number,
public readonly responsePreview: string
) {
super(`Inner.ai /ai-models returned HTTP ${status}`);
this.name = "InnerAiModelsError";
}
}
async function resolveModels(
token: string,
deviceId: string,
email: string,
signal?: AbortSignal | null
): Promise<InnerAiModel[]> {
const key = tokenCacheKey(token);
const cached = lruTouch(modelsCache, key);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) return cached.models;
const resp = await fetch(INNER_AI_MODELS_URL, {
headers: buildHeaders(token, email, deviceId),
signal: signal ?? undefined,
});
if (!resp.ok) {
// Don't silently fall through to an empty list — the synthetic model entry
// built downstream sends ai_model.id: undefined to chat, which Inner.ai
// responds to with a confusing "invalid model id" error keyed on a
// different message than the real root cause (auth or upstream outage).
const bodyPreview = await resp.text().catch(() => "");
const err = new InnerAiModelsError(resp.status, bodyPreview.slice(0, 200));
if (resp.status === 401 || resp.status === 403) {
// Auth failed on the models endpoint — drop the credential cache so the
// next request re-resolves the email/deviceId from /profile.
credentialCache.delete(tokenCacheKey(token));
}
throw err;
}
const body = await resp.json().catch(() => null);
let raw: InnerAiModel[] = [];
if (Array.isArray(body)) {
raw = body as InnerAiModel[];
} else if (Array.isArray((body as Record<string, unknown>)?.data)) {
raw = (body as Record<string, unknown>).data as InnerAiModel[];
} else if (Array.isArray((body as Record<string, unknown>)?.ai_models)) {
raw = (body as Record<string, unknown>).ai_models as InnerAiModel[];
}
// Resolve user plan tier from the JWT to gate pro_only / ultra_only models.
// Best-effort: Inner.ai JWTs carry `plan` / `tier` / `subscription` under a
// few field names; default to "free" if nothing matches so callers see the
// helpful "model unavailable for your plan" filter rather than upstream 4xx.
const planRaw = String(
decodeJwtPayload(token)?.plan ??
decodeJwtPayload(token)?.tier ??
decodeJwtPayload(token)?.subscription ??
""
).toLowerCase();
const isUltra = planRaw.includes("ultra") || planRaw.includes("enterprise");
const isPro = isUltra || planRaw.includes("pro") || planRaw.includes("plus");
// Keep only text/chat models that are enabled and available for this account.
// Prefer the ai_model_categories field; fall back to llm_model heuristic.
const nonTextPattern =
/image|video|audio|img|vid|sound|music|voice|tts|stt|track|clip|avatar|cartoon|flux|stable.diff|recraft|ideogram|leonardo|magnific|bria|seedream|luma|kling|pika|veo|wan-|heygen|did-|vidu|pixverse|sora-|gen-[0-9]|playground|gemini-fal|gamma|lyria|clothes|whisper/i;
const models = raw.filter((m) => {
if (m.enable === false || m.unavailable_api) return false;
if (m.ultra_only && !isUltra) return false;
if (m.pro_only && !isPro) return false;
const cats = Array.isArray((m as Record<string, unknown>).ai_model_categories)
? ((m as Record<string, unknown>).ai_model_categories as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
: null;
if (cats && cats.length > 0) {
return cats.some((c) => String(c.unique_identifier ?? c.name ?? "").toLowerCase() === "text");
}
return !nonTextPattern.test(m.llm_model);
});
lruSet(modelsCache, key, { models, expiresAt: Date.now() + MODELS_CACHE_TTL_MS });
return models;
}
/** Find the Inner.ai model entry matching the requested OmniRoute model ID.
*
* Matching strategy (first match wins):
* 1. Exact `llm_model` match
* 2. Case-insensitive `llm_model` match
* 3. `llm_model` contains the requested ID
* 4. Fallback: first model in list
*/
function findModel(models: InnerAiModel[], requestedId: string): InnerAiModel | null {
if (models.length === 0) return null;
const lower = requestedId.toLowerCase();
return (
models.find((m) => m.llm_model === requestedId) ??
models.find((m) => m.llm_model.toLowerCase() === lower) ??
models.find((m) => m.llm_model.toLowerCase().includes(lower)) ??
models[0]
);
}
// ── Message building ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Convert an OpenAI messages array to Inner.ai's single message string.
*
* Inner.ai accepts a single `message` field. For multi-turn conversations we
* include previous turns with labelled prefixes.
*/
function buildMessageContent(messages: Array<Record<string, unknown>>): string {
const parts: string[] = [];
for (const msg of messages) {
const content =
typeof msg.content === "string"
? msg.content
: Array.isArray(msg.content)
? (msg.content as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
.filter((c) => c?.type === "text")
.map((c) => String(c.text ?? ""))
.join("")
: "";
if (!content.trim()) continue;
if (msg.role === "system") {
parts.push(`[Instructions]\n${content}`);
} else if (msg.role === "assistant") {
parts.push(`[Assistant]\n${content}`);
} else {
parts.push(content);
}
}
return parts.join("\n\n");
}
// ── SSE transformation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Transform Inner.ai SSE stream to OpenAI-compatible SSE stream.
*
* Inner.ai format: `data: {"type":"text","item":"chunk"}`
* `data: {"type":"end_stream","item":"end"}`
*
* Error event types: `missing_credits`, `reached_limit`, `rate_limit_reached`,
* `rate_limit_longer_reached`
* Ignored event types: `status` (e.g. `code: "provider_timeout_retry"`)
*/
function transformInnerAiSSE(upstream: ReadableStream, model: string): ReadableStream {
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
const id = `chatcmpl-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
const created = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
let buffer = "";
let emittedRole = false;
const chunkEvent = (delta: Record<string, unknown>, finishReason?: string | null) =>
`data: ${JSON.stringify({
id,
object: "chat.completion.chunk",
created,
model,
choices: [{ index: 0, delta, finish_reason: finishReason ?? null }],
})}\n\n`;
return new ReadableStream({
async start(controller) {
const reader = upstream.getReader();
try {
while (true) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) break;
buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
const lines = buffer.split("\n");
buffer = lines.pop() ?? "";
for (const line of lines) {
if (!line.startsWith("data:")) continue;
const jsonStr = line.slice(5).trim();
if (!jsonStr || jsonStr === "[DONE]") continue;
let data: Record<string, unknown>;
try {
data = JSON.parse(jsonStr) as Record<string, unknown>;
} catch {
continue;
}
const type = String(data.type ?? "");
const item = String(data.item ?? "");
if (type === "text") {
if (!item) continue;
if (!emittedRole) {
emittedRole = true;
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ role: "assistant", content: "" })));
}
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ content: item })));
} else if (type === "end_stream") {
if (!emittedRole) {
emittedRole = true;
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ role: "assistant", content: "" })));
}
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({}, "stop")));
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n\n"));
controller.close();
return;
} else if (
type === "missing_credits" ||
type === "reached_limit" ||
type === "rate_limit_reached" ||
type === "rate_limit_longer_reached"
) {
const errorMsg =
type === "missing_credits"
? "Inner.ai: not enough credits"
: type === "reached_limit"
? "Inner.ai: usage limit reached"
: "Inner.ai: rate limit reached — try again later";
controller.enqueue(
encoder.encode(
`data: ${JSON.stringify({
error: { message: errorMsg, type: "rate_limit_error", code: type },
})}\n\n`
)
);
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n\n"));
controller.close();
return;
}
// type === "status" (e.g. provider_timeout_retry) → ignore
}
}
} catch (err: unknown) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err || "Stream error");
controller.enqueue(
encoder.encode(
`data: ${JSON.stringify({
error: { message: sanitizeErrorMessage(message), type: "upstream_error" },
})}\n\n`
)
);
}
// Stream ended without explicit end_stream
if (!emittedRole) {
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ role: "assistant", content: "" })));
}
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({}, "stop")));
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n\n"));
controller.close();
},
});
}
class InnerAiStreamError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly status: number,
public readonly code: string,
message: string
) {
super(message);
this.name = "InnerAiStreamError";
}
}
/** Collect Inner.ai SSE stream into a single content string (non-streaming path).
* Mirrors the event taxonomy in transformInnerAiSSE so credits/rate-limit
* events become a thrown error instead of being silently discarded (which
* produced HTTP 200 + empty body and tricked clients into retrying against
* an exhausted account).
*/
async function collectContent(upstream: ReadableStream): Promise<string> {
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
const reader = upstream.getReader();
let buffer = "";
let content = "";
while (true) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) break;
buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
const lines = buffer.split("\n");
buffer = lines.pop() ?? "";
for (const line of lines) {
if (!line.startsWith("data:")) continue;
const jsonStr = line.slice(5).trim();
if (!jsonStr || jsonStr === "[DONE]") continue;
let data: Record<string, unknown>;
try {
data = JSON.parse(jsonStr) as Record<string, unknown>;
} catch {
continue;
}
const type = data.type;
if (type === "text" && typeof data.item === "string") {
content += data.item;
continue;
}
if (
type === "missing_credits" ||
type === "reached_limit" ||
type === "rate_limit_reached" ||
type === "rate_limit_longer_reached"
) {
const errorMsg =
type === "missing_credits"
? "Inner.ai: not enough credits"
: type === "reached_limit"
? "Inner.ai: usage limit reached"
: "Inner.ai: rate limit reached — try again later";
throw new InnerAiStreamError(429, String(type), errorMsg);
}
}
}
return content;
}
// ── Executor ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export class InnerAiExecutor extends BaseExecutor {
constructor() {
super("inner-ai", { id: "inner-ai", baseUrl: "https://chatapi.innerai.com" });
}
async execute(input: ExecuteInput) {
const { body, credentials, signal, stream: wantStream } = input;
const bodyObj = (body || {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
const rawToken = String(credentials?.apiKey ?? "").trim();
if (!rawToken) {
return makeErrorResult(
401,
"Missing Inner.ai token — paste your token cookie from DevTools → Application → Cookies → .innerai.com",
body
);
}
const { token, credEmail } = parseCredential(rawToken);
// Resolve email + deviceId (decoded from JWT + profile API)
let creds: CredentialCache;
try {
creds = await resolveCredentials(token, credEmail, signal);
} catch (err: unknown) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Failed to authenticate with Inner.ai";
credentialCache.delete(tokenCacheKey(token));
return makeErrorResult(401, message, body);
}
const { email, deviceId } = creds;
// Resolve model from Inner.ai models API (dynamic, cached 1h)
const requestedModel = String(bodyObj.model ?? "").trim() || "gpt-4o";
let models: InnerAiModel[] = [];
try {
models = await resolveModels(token, deviceId, email, signal);
} catch (err) {
// Auth failures on /ai-models are surfaced explicitly so operators don't
// chase a "Inner.ai invalid model" downstream symptom when the real cause
// is the user's token expiring on the models endpoint.
if (err instanceof InnerAiModelsError && (err.status === 401 || err.status === 403)) {
return makeErrorResult(
err.status,
"Inner.ai /ai-models authentication failed — re-paste your token cookie",
body
);
}
// Non-auth failures (5xx, network): proceed with empty list and let the
// synthetic-model fallback try. Log so the operator sees the upstream blip.
// No `log` accessor in this executor scope — propagate via a runtime warning.
console.warn(
`[InnerAI] /ai-models fetch failed (status=${
err instanceof InnerAiModelsError ? err.status : "n/a"
}) — falling back to synthetic model entry`
);
}
const modelEntry: InnerAiModel = findModel(models, requestedModel) ?? {
id: "",
llm_model: requestedModel,
};
// Build message content from OpenAI messages array
const rawMessages = Array.isArray(bodyObj.messages) ? bodyObj.messages : [];
const messages = rawMessages as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
const messageContent = buildMessageContent(messages);
if (!messageContent.trim()) {
return makeErrorResult(400, "No message content to send", body);
}
const innerAiBody = {
message: messageContent,
session_id: crypto.randomUUID(),
context_type: "no_context",
ai_model: {
id: modelEntry?.id || undefined,
llm_model: modelEntry?.llm_model ?? requestedModel,
},
is_extension: false,
env: "production",
temporary: true,
use_web_search: false,
knowledge_list: [],
};
const reqHeaders = buildHeaders(token, email, deviceId);
// POST to Inner.ai chat API
let upstream: Response;
try {
upstream = await fetch(INNER_AI_CHAT_URL, {
method: "POST",
headers: reqHeaders,
body: JSON.stringify(innerAiBody),
signal: signal ?? undefined,
});
} catch (err: unknown) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Request failed";
return makeErrorResult(
502,
`Inner.ai request failed: ${sanitizeErrorMessage(message)}`,
body
);
}
if (upstream.status === 401 || upstream.status === 403) {
credentialCache.delete(tokenCacheKey(token));
return makeErrorResult(
upstream.status,
"Inner.ai authentication failed — re-paste your token cookie",
body
);
}
if (!upstream.ok) {
const errText = await upstream.text().catch(() => "");
return makeErrorResult(
upstream.status,
`Inner.ai returned HTTP ${upstream.status}: ${sanitizeErrorMessage(errText)}`,
body
);
}
if (!upstream.body) {
return makeErrorResult(502, "Inner.ai returned an empty response", body);
}
const resolvedModel = modelEntry?.llm_model ?? requestedModel;
if (wantStream !== false) {
return {
response: new Response(transformInnerAiSSE(upstream.body, resolvedModel), {
headers: {
"Content-Type": "text/event-stream",
"Cache-Control": "no-cache",
Connection: "keep-alive",
},
}),
url: INNER_AI_CHAT_URL,
headers: reqHeaders,
transformedBody: innerAiBody,
};
}
// Non-streaming: collect content and return as JSON
let content: string;
try {
content = await collectContent(upstream.body);
} catch (err) {
// Inner.ai SSE error events (missing_credits, rate_limit_reached, …)
// surface here as thrown errors. Translate into a proper HTTP error so
// the client sees the failure instead of an empty 200 body.
if (err instanceof InnerAiStreamError) {
return makeErrorResult(err.status, err.message, body);
}
throw err;
}
const completionId = `chatcmpl-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
return {
response: new Response(
JSON.stringify({
id: completionId,
object: "chat.completion",
created: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
model: resolvedModel,
choices: [
{
index: 0,
message: { role: "assistant", content },
finish_reason: "stop",
},
],
usage: { prompt_tokens: 0, completion_tokens: 0, total_tokens: 0 },
}),
{ headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
),
url: INNER_AI_CHAT_URL,
headers: reqHeaders,
transformedBody: innerAiBody,
};
}
}