mirror of
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* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity * fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls * fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls * fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls * fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls * fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls * fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls * chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions) * fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes * docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança, CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos. Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket, suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas. Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última atividade. * fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted * fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field * docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely. That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and `/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits. Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT, Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>` attribution. Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note, and 41 i18n translations. * fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'. Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models, validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message. Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth is OK. Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers. * test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429), network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers. * feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading 'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning. Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers (same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the provider registry without any warning, since all registered models are functional via POST /chat/completions. * refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test - Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory - Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md * fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup * feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback Hybrid approach: - gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models - gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern * i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json * feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision (lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22). * fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth) Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow: - Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path - Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation Spec only - no code changes yet. * docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan 10 tasks covering: - TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses - Provider switch to import_token - Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback - OAuthModal UI override - i18n sync - Verification + PR steps * fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404 post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token. - windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token - generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli - tests: assert flowType + disabled stub * fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged. Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex regression check. * refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl, codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl, showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately. * fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6: - src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test. - Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md to satisfy the env/docs sync contract. * fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow. The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy. * fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes `providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with `mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as `accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it crashed with: SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second `if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the second block was unreachable but identical to the first. Adds two regression tests asserting that `provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate instead of the SQLite bind error in production. * feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows * test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894) Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6: - Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes through resolvePublicCred per rule #11. - Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not apply (false positive). * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895) * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877): - docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6) and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section. Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading. - any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any` (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly. - pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files" (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning. * feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868) * feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT) * fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections --------- Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute> * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool New providers: - huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription) - phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent - poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie) - venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie) - v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie) - kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie) - doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie) Additional: - Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md - Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073 - Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers - Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup) - All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials Closes #2885 * fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules * feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899) Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity. It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id + daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking, claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect: - token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON) - auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token) - browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow) - bulk / ZIP import New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}. Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml, ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration, the token parser, and route auth-hardening. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896) Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11). * Pr 2871 (#2897) * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure. * docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly. --------- Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local> Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local> Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se> Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me> Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru> Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br> Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com> Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
720 lines
26 KiB
TypeScript
720 lines
26 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { BaseExecutor, type ExecuteInput } from "./base.ts";
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import { sanitizeErrorMessage } from "../utils/error.ts";
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const INNER_AI_CHAT_URL = "https://chatapi.innerai.com/chat";
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const INNER_AI_PROFILE_URL = "https://platformapi.innerai.com/api/v1/users/profile";
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const INNER_AI_MODELS_URL = "https://platformapi.innerai.com/api/v1/ai_models";
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const INNER_AI_USER_AGENT =
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"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36";
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const MODELS_CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
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// ── Types ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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interface InnerAiModel {
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id: string; // UUID from platformapi
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llm_model: string;
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name?: string;
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enable?: boolean;
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visible?: boolean;
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unavailable_api?: boolean;
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pro_only?: boolean;
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ultra_only?: boolean;
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}
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interface CredentialCache {
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email: string;
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deviceId: string;
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}
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// ── In-memory caches ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// Keyed by sha256(token). Using a prefix slice of the JWT collides across
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// tokens that share the same algorithm header (the first ~36 chars of any
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// HS256/RS256 token are identical), which previously caused cross-tenant
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// credential cache hits.
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//
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// LRU bound: a long-running server with many Inner.ai accounts would otherwise
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// grow these maps without bound. Map iteration order is insertion order, so
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// re-inserting on read approximates LRU and the eviction loop trims to cap.
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const CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES = 1000;
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const credentialCache = new Map<string, CredentialCache>();
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const modelsCache = new Map<string, { models: InnerAiModel[]; expiresAt: number }>();
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function lruTouch<V>(map: Map<string, V>, key: string): V | undefined {
|
|
const value = map.get(key);
|
|
if (value === undefined) return undefined;
|
|
map.delete(key);
|
|
map.set(key, value);
|
|
return value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function lruSet<V>(map: Map<string, V>, key: string, value: V): void {
|
|
if (map.has(key)) map.delete(key);
|
|
map.set(key, value);
|
|
while (map.size > CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES) {
|
|
const oldest = map.keys().next().value;
|
|
if (oldest === undefined) break;
|
|
map.delete(oldest);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SHA-256 here derives an in-memory cache key from the session token — it is NOT
|
|
// password-at-rest storage. The slow KDFs CWE-916 recommends (bcrypt/scrypt/Argon2)
|
|
// are salted and non-deterministic, so they cannot be used as a stable Map key and
|
|
// would defeat the cache entirely. CodeQL js/insufficient-password-hash flags this as
|
|
// a false positive (dismissed); a fast cryptographic digest is the correct primitive
|
|
// for keying an ephemeral, process-local cache.
|
|
function tokenCacheKey(token: string): string {
|
|
return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
/** Decode JWT payload without verifying signature. */
|
|
function decodeJwtPayload(token: string): Record<string, unknown> | null {
|
|
try {
|
|
const parts = token.split(".");
|
|
if (parts.length < 2) return null;
|
|
const b64 = parts[1].replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
|
|
const padded = b64 + "=".repeat((4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4);
|
|
return JSON.parse(atob(padded));
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parse the credential string.
|
|
*
|
|
* Accepted formats:
|
|
* "eyJhbG..." — token only (no email, chat will try without USER-EMAIL)
|
|
* "eyJhbG... user@example.com" — token + email (recommended)
|
|
* "token=eyJhbG... user@example.com" — same with token= prefix
|
|
*/
|
|
function parseCredential(rawApiKey: string): { token: string; credEmail: string } {
|
|
const trimmed = rawApiKey.trim();
|
|
// Strip "token=<value>" prefix if present
|
|
const eqIdx = trimmed.indexOf("=");
|
|
const stripped =
|
|
eqIdx > 0 && !trimmed.startsWith("eyJ") ? trimmed.slice(eqIdx + 1).trim() : trimmed;
|
|
|
|
// Split by the LAST space; if the last part looks like an email it's the credential email
|
|
const lastSpace = stripped.lastIndexOf(" ");
|
|
if (lastSpace > 0) {
|
|
const possibleEmail = stripped.slice(lastSpace + 1).trim();
|
|
if (possibleEmail.includes("@")) {
|
|
return { token: stripped.slice(0, lastSpace).trim(), credEmail: possibleEmail };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return { token: stripped, credEmail: "" };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function makeErrorResult(status: number, message: string, body: unknown) {
|
|
return {
|
|
response: new Response(
|
|
JSON.stringify({
|
|
error: {
|
|
message: sanitizeErrorMessage(message),
|
|
type: "upstream_error",
|
|
code: `HTTP_${status}`,
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
{ status, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
|
|
),
|
|
url: INNER_AI_CHAT_URL,
|
|
headers: {} as Record<string, string>,
|
|
transformedBody: body,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Build request headers for Inner.ai API calls. */
|
|
function buildHeaders(token: string, email: string, deviceId: string): Record<string, string> {
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
|
"User-Agent": INNER_AI_USER_AGENT,
|
|
// Cookie-based auth — the token cookie is scoped to .innerai.com so all
|
|
// *.innerai.com subdomains expect it via Cookie header.
|
|
Cookie: `token=${token}`,
|
|
"USER-TOKEN": token,
|
|
"DEVICE-ID": deviceId,
|
|
Origin: "https://app.innerai.com",
|
|
Referer: "https://app.innerai.com/",
|
|
};
|
|
if (email) headers["USER-EMAIL"] = email;
|
|
return headers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Credential resolution (email + deviceId from JWT + profile API) ───────────
|
|
|
|
async function resolveCredentials(
|
|
token: string,
|
|
credEmail: string,
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal | null
|
|
): Promise<CredentialCache> {
|
|
const key = tokenCacheKey(token);
|
|
const cached = lruTouch(credentialCache, key);
|
|
if (cached) return cached;
|
|
|
|
// Decode device_id from JWT payload (accept multiple field names)
|
|
const payload = decodeJwtPayload(token);
|
|
const deviceId = String(
|
|
payload?.device_id ?? payload?.deviceId ?? payload?.["device-id"] ?? payload?.did ?? ""
|
|
).trim();
|
|
|
|
// Build profile request headers — include cookie auth + custom headers
|
|
const profileHeaders: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
Cookie: `token=${token}`,
|
|
"USER-TOKEN": token,
|
|
"User-Agent": INNER_AI_USER_AGENT,
|
|
Origin: "https://app.innerai.com",
|
|
Referer: "https://app.innerai.com/",
|
|
};
|
|
if (deviceId) profileHeaders["DEVICE-ID"] = deviceId;
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to fetch email from profile API — non-fatal if it fails
|
|
let email = "";
|
|
try {
|
|
const profileResp = await fetch(INNER_AI_PROFILE_URL, {
|
|
headers: profileHeaders,
|
|
signal: signal ?? undefined,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (profileResp.ok) {
|
|
const body = await profileResp.json().catch(() => null);
|
|
const b = body as Record<string, unknown> | null;
|
|
email = String(
|
|
(b?.data as Record<string, unknown>)?.email ??
|
|
(b?.user as Record<string, unknown>)?.email ??
|
|
(b?.profile as Record<string, unknown>)?.email ??
|
|
b?.email ??
|
|
""
|
|
).trim();
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// Profile fetch failed — proceed without email
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fallback 1: use the email provided directly in the credential string
|
|
if (!email && credEmail) email = credEmail;
|
|
|
|
// Fallback 2: extract email from JWT sub if it looks like one
|
|
if (!email && typeof payload?.sub === "string" && payload.sub.includes("@")) {
|
|
email = payload.sub;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const creds: CredentialCache = { email, deviceId };
|
|
lruSet(credentialCache, key, creds);
|
|
return creds;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Model resolution (dynamic fetch + cache) ──────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
class InnerAiModelsError extends Error {
|
|
constructor(
|
|
public readonly status: number,
|
|
public readonly responsePreview: string
|
|
) {
|
|
super(`Inner.ai /ai-models returned HTTP ${status}`);
|
|
this.name = "InnerAiModelsError";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveModels(
|
|
token: string,
|
|
deviceId: string,
|
|
email: string,
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal | null
|
|
): Promise<InnerAiModel[]> {
|
|
const key = tokenCacheKey(token);
|
|
const cached = lruTouch(modelsCache, key);
|
|
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) return cached.models;
|
|
|
|
const resp = await fetch(INNER_AI_MODELS_URL, {
|
|
headers: buildHeaders(token, email, deviceId),
|
|
signal: signal ?? undefined,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (!resp.ok) {
|
|
// Don't silently fall through to an empty list — the synthetic model entry
|
|
// built downstream sends ai_model.id: undefined to chat, which Inner.ai
|
|
// responds to with a confusing "invalid model id" error keyed on a
|
|
// different message than the real root cause (auth or upstream outage).
|
|
const bodyPreview = await resp.text().catch(() => "");
|
|
const err = new InnerAiModelsError(resp.status, bodyPreview.slice(0, 200));
|
|
if (resp.status === 401 || resp.status === 403) {
|
|
// Auth failed on the models endpoint — drop the credential cache so the
|
|
// next request re-resolves the email/deviceId from /profile.
|
|
credentialCache.delete(tokenCacheKey(token));
|
|
}
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const body = await resp.json().catch(() => null);
|
|
let raw: InnerAiModel[] = [];
|
|
if (Array.isArray(body)) {
|
|
raw = body as InnerAiModel[];
|
|
} else if (Array.isArray((body as Record<string, unknown>)?.data)) {
|
|
raw = (body as Record<string, unknown>).data as InnerAiModel[];
|
|
} else if (Array.isArray((body as Record<string, unknown>)?.ai_models)) {
|
|
raw = (body as Record<string, unknown>).ai_models as InnerAiModel[];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Resolve user plan tier from the JWT to gate pro_only / ultra_only models.
|
|
// Best-effort: Inner.ai JWTs carry `plan` / `tier` / `subscription` under a
|
|
// few field names; default to "free" if nothing matches so callers see the
|
|
// helpful "model unavailable for your plan" filter rather than upstream 4xx.
|
|
const planRaw = String(
|
|
decodeJwtPayload(token)?.plan ??
|
|
decodeJwtPayload(token)?.tier ??
|
|
decodeJwtPayload(token)?.subscription ??
|
|
""
|
|
).toLowerCase();
|
|
const isUltra = planRaw.includes("ultra") || planRaw.includes("enterprise");
|
|
const isPro = isUltra || planRaw.includes("pro") || planRaw.includes("plus");
|
|
|
|
// Keep only text/chat models that are enabled and available for this account.
|
|
// Prefer the ai_model_categories field; fall back to llm_model heuristic.
|
|
const nonTextPattern =
|
|
/image|video|audio|img|vid|sound|music|voice|tts|stt|track|clip|avatar|cartoon|flux|stable.diff|recraft|ideogram|leonardo|magnific|bria|seedream|luma|kling|pika|veo|wan-|heygen|did-|vidu|pixverse|sora-|gen-[0-9]|playground|gemini-fal|gamma|lyria|clothes|whisper/i;
|
|
const models = raw.filter((m) => {
|
|
if (m.enable === false || m.unavailable_api) return false;
|
|
if (m.ultra_only && !isUltra) return false;
|
|
if (m.pro_only && !isPro) return false;
|
|
const cats = Array.isArray((m as Record<string, unknown>).ai_model_categories)
|
|
? ((m as Record<string, unknown>).ai_model_categories as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (cats && cats.length > 0) {
|
|
return cats.some((c) => String(c.unique_identifier ?? c.name ?? "").toLowerCase() === "text");
|
|
}
|
|
return !nonTextPattern.test(m.llm_model);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
lruSet(modelsCache, key, { models, expiresAt: Date.now() + MODELS_CACHE_TTL_MS });
|
|
return models;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Find the Inner.ai model entry matching the requested OmniRoute model ID.
|
|
*
|
|
* Matching strategy (first match wins):
|
|
* 1. Exact `llm_model` match
|
|
* 2. Case-insensitive `llm_model` match
|
|
* 3. `llm_model` contains the requested ID
|
|
* 4. Fallback: first model in list
|
|
*/
|
|
function findModel(models: InnerAiModel[], requestedId: string): InnerAiModel | null {
|
|
if (models.length === 0) return null;
|
|
const lower = requestedId.toLowerCase();
|
|
return (
|
|
models.find((m) => m.llm_model === requestedId) ??
|
|
models.find((m) => m.llm_model.toLowerCase() === lower) ??
|
|
models.find((m) => m.llm_model.toLowerCase().includes(lower)) ??
|
|
models[0]
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── Message building ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
/** Convert an OpenAI messages array to Inner.ai's single message string.
|
|
*
|
|
* Inner.ai accepts a single `message` field. For multi-turn conversations we
|
|
* include previous turns with labelled prefixes.
|
|
*/
|
|
function buildMessageContent(messages: Array<Record<string, unknown>>): string {
|
|
const parts: string[] = [];
|
|
|
|
for (const msg of messages) {
|
|
const content =
|
|
typeof msg.content === "string"
|
|
? msg.content
|
|
: Array.isArray(msg.content)
|
|
? (msg.content as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
|
|
.filter((c) => c?.type === "text")
|
|
.map((c) => String(c.text ?? ""))
|
|
.join("")
|
|
: "";
|
|
if (!content.trim()) continue;
|
|
|
|
if (msg.role === "system") {
|
|
parts.push(`[Instructions]\n${content}`);
|
|
} else if (msg.role === "assistant") {
|
|
parts.push(`[Assistant]\n${content}`);
|
|
} else {
|
|
parts.push(content);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parts.join("\n\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── SSE transformation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
/** Transform Inner.ai SSE stream to OpenAI-compatible SSE stream.
|
|
*
|
|
* Inner.ai format: `data: {"type":"text","item":"chunk"}`
|
|
* `data: {"type":"end_stream","item":"end"}`
|
|
*
|
|
* Error event types: `missing_credits`, `reached_limit`, `rate_limit_reached`,
|
|
* `rate_limit_longer_reached`
|
|
* Ignored event types: `status` (e.g. `code: "provider_timeout_retry"`)
|
|
*/
|
|
function transformInnerAiSSE(upstream: ReadableStream, model: string): ReadableStream {
|
|
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
|
|
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
|
|
const id = `chatcmpl-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
|
|
const created = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
|
|
let buffer = "";
|
|
let emittedRole = false;
|
|
|
|
const chunkEvent = (delta: Record<string, unknown>, finishReason?: string | null) =>
|
|
`data: ${JSON.stringify({
|
|
id,
|
|
object: "chat.completion.chunk",
|
|
created,
|
|
model,
|
|
choices: [{ index: 0, delta, finish_reason: finishReason ?? null }],
|
|
})}\n\n`;
|
|
|
|
return new ReadableStream({
|
|
async start(controller) {
|
|
const reader = upstream.getReader();
|
|
try {
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
|
|
if (done) break;
|
|
|
|
buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
|
|
const lines = buffer.split("\n");
|
|
buffer = lines.pop() ?? "";
|
|
|
|
for (const line of lines) {
|
|
if (!line.startsWith("data:")) continue;
|
|
const jsonStr = line.slice(5).trim();
|
|
if (!jsonStr || jsonStr === "[DONE]") continue;
|
|
|
|
let data: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
try {
|
|
data = JSON.parse(jsonStr) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const type = String(data.type ?? "");
|
|
const item = String(data.item ?? "");
|
|
|
|
if (type === "text") {
|
|
if (!item) continue;
|
|
if (!emittedRole) {
|
|
emittedRole = true;
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ role: "assistant", content: "" })));
|
|
}
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ content: item })));
|
|
} else if (type === "end_stream") {
|
|
if (!emittedRole) {
|
|
emittedRole = true;
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ role: "assistant", content: "" })));
|
|
}
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({}, "stop")));
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n\n"));
|
|
controller.close();
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if (
|
|
type === "missing_credits" ||
|
|
type === "reached_limit" ||
|
|
type === "rate_limit_reached" ||
|
|
type === "rate_limit_longer_reached"
|
|
) {
|
|
const errorMsg =
|
|
type === "missing_credits"
|
|
? "Inner.ai: not enough credits"
|
|
: type === "reached_limit"
|
|
? "Inner.ai: usage limit reached"
|
|
: "Inner.ai: rate limit reached — try again later";
|
|
controller.enqueue(
|
|
encoder.encode(
|
|
`data: ${JSON.stringify({
|
|
error: { message: errorMsg, type: "rate_limit_error", code: type },
|
|
})}\n\n`
|
|
)
|
|
);
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n\n"));
|
|
controller.close();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
// type === "status" (e.g. provider_timeout_retry) → ignore
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err: unknown) {
|
|
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err || "Stream error");
|
|
controller.enqueue(
|
|
encoder.encode(
|
|
`data: ${JSON.stringify({
|
|
error: { message: sanitizeErrorMessage(message), type: "upstream_error" },
|
|
})}\n\n`
|
|
)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Stream ended without explicit end_stream
|
|
if (!emittedRole) {
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({ role: "assistant", content: "" })));
|
|
}
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(chunkEvent({}, "stop")));
|
|
controller.enqueue(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n\n"));
|
|
controller.close();
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
class InnerAiStreamError extends Error {
|
|
constructor(
|
|
public readonly status: number,
|
|
public readonly code: string,
|
|
message: string
|
|
) {
|
|
super(message);
|
|
this.name = "InnerAiStreamError";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Collect Inner.ai SSE stream into a single content string (non-streaming path).
|
|
* Mirrors the event taxonomy in transformInnerAiSSE so credits/rate-limit
|
|
* events become a thrown error instead of being silently discarded (which
|
|
* produced HTTP 200 + empty body and tricked clients into retrying against
|
|
* an exhausted account).
|
|
*/
|
|
async function collectContent(upstream: ReadableStream): Promise<string> {
|
|
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
|
|
const reader = upstream.getReader();
|
|
let buffer = "";
|
|
let content = "";
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
|
|
if (done) break;
|
|
|
|
buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
|
|
const lines = buffer.split("\n");
|
|
buffer = lines.pop() ?? "";
|
|
|
|
for (const line of lines) {
|
|
if (!line.startsWith("data:")) continue;
|
|
const jsonStr = line.slice(5).trim();
|
|
if (!jsonStr || jsonStr === "[DONE]") continue;
|
|
|
|
let data: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
try {
|
|
data = JSON.parse(jsonStr) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const type = data.type;
|
|
if (type === "text" && typeof data.item === "string") {
|
|
content += data.item;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
type === "missing_credits" ||
|
|
type === "reached_limit" ||
|
|
type === "rate_limit_reached" ||
|
|
type === "rate_limit_longer_reached"
|
|
) {
|
|
const errorMsg =
|
|
type === "missing_credits"
|
|
? "Inner.ai: not enough credits"
|
|
: type === "reached_limit"
|
|
? "Inner.ai: usage limit reached"
|
|
: "Inner.ai: rate limit reached — try again later";
|
|
throw new InnerAiStreamError(429, String(type), errorMsg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return content;
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}
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|
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// ── Executor ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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|
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export class InnerAiExecutor extends BaseExecutor {
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constructor() {
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super("inner-ai", { id: "inner-ai", baseUrl: "https://chatapi.innerai.com" });
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}
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async execute(input: ExecuteInput) {
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const { body, credentials, signal, stream: wantStream } = input;
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const bodyObj = (body || {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
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const rawToken = String(credentials?.apiKey ?? "").trim();
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if (!rawToken) {
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return makeErrorResult(
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401,
|
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"Missing Inner.ai token — paste your token cookie from DevTools → Application → Cookies → .innerai.com",
|
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body
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);
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}
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const { token, credEmail } = parseCredential(rawToken);
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|
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// Resolve email + deviceId (decoded from JWT + profile API)
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let creds: CredentialCache;
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try {
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creds = await resolveCredentials(token, credEmail, signal);
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} catch (err: unknown) {
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const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Failed to authenticate with Inner.ai";
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credentialCache.delete(tokenCacheKey(token));
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return makeErrorResult(401, message, body);
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|
}
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|
const { email, deviceId } = creds;
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|
|
// Resolve model from Inner.ai models API (dynamic, cached 1h)
|
|
const requestedModel = String(bodyObj.model ?? "").trim() || "gpt-4o";
|
|
let models: InnerAiModel[] = [];
|
|
try {
|
|
models = await resolveModels(token, deviceId, email, signal);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
// Auth failures on /ai-models are surfaced explicitly so operators don't
|
|
// chase a "Inner.ai invalid model" downstream symptom when the real cause
|
|
// is the user's token expiring on the models endpoint.
|
|
if (err instanceof InnerAiModelsError && (err.status === 401 || err.status === 403)) {
|
|
return makeErrorResult(
|
|
err.status,
|
|
"Inner.ai /ai-models authentication failed — re-paste your token cookie",
|
|
body
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
// Non-auth failures (5xx, network): proceed with empty list and let the
|
|
// synthetic-model fallback try. Log so the operator sees the upstream blip.
|
|
// No `log` accessor in this executor scope — propagate via a runtime warning.
|
|
console.warn(
|
|
`[InnerAI] /ai-models fetch failed (status=${
|
|
err instanceof InnerAiModelsError ? err.status : "n/a"
|
|
}) — falling back to synthetic model entry`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const modelEntry: InnerAiModel = findModel(models, requestedModel) ?? {
|
|
id: "",
|
|
llm_model: requestedModel,
|
|
};
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|
|
// Build message content from OpenAI messages array
|
|
const rawMessages = Array.isArray(bodyObj.messages) ? bodyObj.messages : [];
|
|
const messages = rawMessages as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
|
|
const messageContent = buildMessageContent(messages);
|
|
if (!messageContent.trim()) {
|
|
return makeErrorResult(400, "No message content to send", body);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const innerAiBody = {
|
|
message: messageContent,
|
|
session_id: crypto.randomUUID(),
|
|
context_type: "no_context",
|
|
ai_model: {
|
|
id: modelEntry?.id || undefined,
|
|
llm_model: modelEntry?.llm_model ?? requestedModel,
|
|
},
|
|
is_extension: false,
|
|
env: "production",
|
|
temporary: true,
|
|
use_web_search: false,
|
|
knowledge_list: [],
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const reqHeaders = buildHeaders(token, email, deviceId);
|
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|
|
// POST to Inner.ai chat API
|
|
let upstream: Response;
|
|
try {
|
|
upstream = await fetch(INNER_AI_CHAT_URL, {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: reqHeaders,
|
|
body: JSON.stringify(innerAiBody),
|
|
signal: signal ?? undefined,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (err: unknown) {
|
|
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Request failed";
|
|
return makeErrorResult(
|
|
502,
|
|
`Inner.ai request failed: ${sanitizeErrorMessage(message)}`,
|
|
body
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (upstream.status === 401 || upstream.status === 403) {
|
|
credentialCache.delete(tokenCacheKey(token));
|
|
return makeErrorResult(
|
|
upstream.status,
|
|
"Inner.ai authentication failed — re-paste your token cookie",
|
|
body
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!upstream.ok) {
|
|
const errText = await upstream.text().catch(() => "");
|
|
return makeErrorResult(
|
|
upstream.status,
|
|
`Inner.ai returned HTTP ${upstream.status}: ${sanitizeErrorMessage(errText)}`,
|
|
body
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!upstream.body) {
|
|
return makeErrorResult(502, "Inner.ai returned an empty response", body);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const resolvedModel = modelEntry?.llm_model ?? requestedModel;
|
|
|
|
if (wantStream !== false) {
|
|
return {
|
|
response: new Response(transformInnerAiSSE(upstream.body, resolvedModel), {
|
|
headers: {
|
|
"Content-Type": "text/event-stream",
|
|
"Cache-Control": "no-cache",
|
|
Connection: "keep-alive",
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
url: INNER_AI_CHAT_URL,
|
|
headers: reqHeaders,
|
|
transformedBody: innerAiBody,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Non-streaming: collect content and return as JSON
|
|
let content: string;
|
|
try {
|
|
content = await collectContent(upstream.body);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
// Inner.ai SSE error events (missing_credits, rate_limit_reached, …)
|
|
// surface here as thrown errors. Translate into a proper HTTP error so
|
|
// the client sees the failure instead of an empty 200 body.
|
|
if (err instanceof InnerAiStreamError) {
|
|
return makeErrorResult(err.status, err.message, body);
|
|
}
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
const completionId = `chatcmpl-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
|
|
return {
|
|
response: new Response(
|
|
JSON.stringify({
|
|
id: completionId,
|
|
object: "chat.completion",
|
|
created: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
|
model: resolvedModel,
|
|
choices: [
|
|
{
|
|
index: 0,
|
|
message: { role: "assistant", content },
|
|
finish_reason: "stop",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
usage: { prompt_tokens: 0, completion_tokens: 0, total_tokens: 0 },
|
|
}),
|
|
{ headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
|
|
),
|
|
url: INNER_AI_CHAT_URL,
|
|
headers: reqHeaders,
|
|
transformedBody: innerAiBody,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|