Files
OmniRoute/open-sse/services/tokenLimitCounter.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza f59f8daa94 Release v3.8.6 (#2804)
* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity

* fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls

* fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls

* fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls

* chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions)

* fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes

* docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem

Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança,
CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em
VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos.

Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket,
suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo
tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas.

Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem
cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última
atividade.

* fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted

* fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field

* docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers

Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely.
That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and
`/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors
and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits.

Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT,
Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com
emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>`
attribution.

Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note,
and 41 i18n translations.

* fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe

GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models
endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe
and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'.

Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the
same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models,
validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message.
Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth
is OK.

Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers.

* test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators

Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429),
network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers.

* feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning

GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per
provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic
fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading
'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning.

Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers
(same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the
provider registry without any warning, since all registered models
are functional via POST /chat/completions.

* refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test

- Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory
- Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md

* fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup

* feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback

Hybrid approach:
- gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models
- gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully
Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern

* i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json

* feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md

Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision
(lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in
package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22).

* fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth)

Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow:
- Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote
  import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path
- Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from
  fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation

Spec only - no code changes yet.

* docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan

10 tasks covering:
- TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses
- Provider switch to import_token
- Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback
- OAuthModal UI override
- i18n sync
- Verification + PR steps

* fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow

The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404
post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the
only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token.

- windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token
- generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli
- tests: assert flowType + disabled stub

* fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions

start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now
return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit
runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being
permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged.

Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex
regression check.

* refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG

No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl,
codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and
exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl,
showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately.

* fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env

Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6:
- src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared
  requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the
  cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test.
- Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
  to satisfy the env/docs sync contract.

* fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli

Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key
mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so
no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow.

The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token
via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy.

* fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch

The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes
`providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the
cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with
`mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as
`accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it
crashed with:

  SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null

Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller
and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second
`if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the
second block was unreachable but identical to the first.

Adds two regression tests asserting that
`provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for
both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate
instead of the SQLite bind error in production.

* feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows

* test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894)

Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6:

- Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec
  embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web
  API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is
  gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips
  secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes
  through resolvePublicCred per rule #11.

- Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses
  SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for
  password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not
  apply (false positive).

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895)

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact)

Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877):

- docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above
  "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6)
  and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section.
  Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading.
- any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any`
  (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which
  matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly.
- pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files"
  (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack
  policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the
windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning.

* feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868)

* feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT)

* fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections

---------

Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool

New providers:
- huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription)
- phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent
- poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie)
- venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie)
- v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie)
- kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie)
- doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie)

Additional:
- Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
- Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073
- Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers
- Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup)
- All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials

Closes #2885

* fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules

* feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899)

Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity.
It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id +
daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own
model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking,
claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect:

- token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON)
- auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token)
- browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow)
- bulk / ZIP import

New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}.
Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml,
ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration,
the token parser, and route auth-hardening.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896)

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal
trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6
(PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11).

* Pr 2871 (#2897)

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index

Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep
documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure.

* docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest

Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local>
Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local>
Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me>
Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru>
Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
2026-05-29 12:44:29 -03:00

343 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Token Limit Counter — in-memory write-through accelerator.
*
* The DB (api_key_token_counters) is the source of truth for enforcement.
* This module keeps a short-lived in-memory mirror of the current window's
* usage per limit to avoid a DB round-trip on every hot-path read, and seeds
* a cold window by SUMming usage_history for the active window when no counter
* row exists yet.
*
* Steps 006/007 (checkTokenLimits / recordTokenUsage) build on top of this.
*
* @module services/tokenLimitCounter
*/
import { getDbInstance } from "../../src/lib/db/core.ts";
import {
resetWindowIfElapsed,
getWindowUsage,
incrementWindowTokens,
getTokenLimitsForRequest,
logTokenLimitReset,
type TokenLimit,
} from "@/lib/localDb";
interface CacheEntry {
windowStart: string;
tokensUsed: number;
/** epoch-ms when this cache entry was last synced from / written to the DB */
syncedAt: number;
}
/** key = `${limitId}` ; value tracks the *current* window only */
const cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();
/** Cache entries older than this are re-validated against the DB on read. */
const CACHE_TTL_MS = 5_000;
/**
* Sum billable tokens recorded in usage_history for this limit's API key within
* the active window, filtered by scope (model / provider / global). Used to seed
* a cold counter so enforcement is correct even before the first write-through.
*
* Returns the windowed total (>= 0). DB-authoritative point-in-time read.
*/
export function seedWindowUsageFromHistory(limit: TokenLimit, now = Date.now()): number {
const { periodStartAt } = resetWindowIfElapsed(limit, now);
const lowerBound = new Date(periodStartAt).toISOString();
const db = getDbInstance();
// Canonical billable total = input + output + reasoning. tokens_cache_read and
// tokens_cache_creation are a BREAKDOWN already inside tokens_input (see migration
// 012_fix_token_input_cache_tokens.sql) — summing them again would double-count.
// This must mirror computeBillableTokens() in chatCore.ts.
const tokenSum = `COALESCE(SUM(
COALESCE(tokens_input, 0) + COALESCE(tokens_output, 0)
+ COALESCE(tokens_reasoning, 0)
), 0) AS total`;
let row: unknown;
if (limit.scopeType === "model") {
row = db
.prepare(
`SELECT ${tokenSum} FROM usage_history
WHERE api_key_id = ? AND model = ? AND timestamp >= ?`
)
.get(limit.apiKeyId, limit.scopeValue, lowerBound);
} else if (limit.scopeType === "provider") {
row = db
.prepare(
`SELECT ${tokenSum} FROM usage_history
WHERE api_key_id = ? AND provider = ? AND timestamp >= ?`
)
.get(limit.apiKeyId, limit.scopeValue, lowerBound);
} else {
row = db
.prepare(
`SELECT ${tokenSum} FROM usage_history
WHERE api_key_id = ? AND timestamp >= ?`
)
.get(limit.apiKeyId, lowerBound);
}
const total = row && typeof row === "object" ? (row as { total?: unknown }).total : 0;
const n = typeof total === "number" ? total : Number(total);
return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? Math.floor(n) : 0;
}
/**
* Current-window usage for a limit. DB is authoritative; the in-memory cache is
* a read accelerator only. On a fresh window with no DB counter row, seeds the
* value from usage_history so enforcement is correct immediately.
*
* `forceFresh` bypasses the cache (used by the authoritative enforcement read).
*/
export function getCurrentWindowUsage(
limit: TokenLimit,
now = Date.now(),
forceFresh = false
): number {
const { windowStart } = resetWindowIfElapsed(limit, now);
const cached = cache.get(limit.id);
if (
!forceFresh &&
cached &&
cached.windowStart === windowStart &&
now - cached.syncedAt < CACHE_TTL_MS
) {
return cached.tokensUsed;
}
// DB point-read (authoritative for the window).
let dbUsage = getWindowUsage(limit, now);
// Cold window: no counter row yet → seed from usage_history and PERSIST the
// seed to the counter row so a subsequent recordTokenUsage increment does not
// forget the existing historical usage in this window (force-fresh read then
// first record must accumulate on top of history, not restart from 0).
if (dbUsage === 0 && (!cached || cached.windowStart !== windowStart)) {
const seeded = seedWindowUsageFromHistory(limit, now);
if (seeded > 0) {
// UPSERT creates the row at `seeded`; safe because there is no row yet
// (dbUsage === 0). Returns the new authoritative total.
dbUsage = incrementWindowTokens(limit.id, windowStart, seeded);
}
}
cache.set(limit.id, { windowStart, tokensUsed: dbUsage, syncedAt: now });
return dbUsage;
}
/**
* Atomically add `tokens` to the DB counter for the limit's current window and
* update the in-memory cache to the new authoritative total. Returns the total.
*
* NOTE: callers that need transactional reset-detection (step 007) should call
* the DB increment inside their own transaction; this helper is the simple
* write-through used outside a transaction.
*/
export function addWindowTokens(limit: TokenLimit, tokens: number, now = Date.now()): number {
const { windowStart } = resetWindowIfElapsed(limit, now);
const delta = tokens > 0 ? Math.floor(tokens) : 0;
const newTotal = incrementWindowTokens(limit.id, windowStart, delta);
cache.set(limit.id, { windowStart, tokensUsed: newTotal, syncedAt: now });
return newTotal;
}
/** Overwrite the cache entry for a limit (e.g. after a transactional increment in step 007). */
export function syncCache(limitId: string, windowStart: string, tokensUsed: number): void {
cache.set(limitId, { windowStart, tokensUsed, syncedAt: Date.now() });
}
/** Drop a single limit's cache entry (e.g. on limit delete/update). */
export function invalidateLimit(limitId: string): void {
cache.delete(limitId);
}
/** Clear the whole cache (tests / config reload). */
export function clearTokenLimitCache(): void {
cache.clear();
}
/**
* Breach detail returned when an applicable token limit is exceeded. `remaining`
* is `limitValue - tokensUsed` (clamped at 0). The breach with the SMALLEST
* remaining is the most-restrictive and is the one returned by checkTokenLimits.
*/
export interface TokenLimitBreach {
limitId: string;
scopeType: TokenLimit["scopeType"];
scopeValue: string;
limitValue: number;
tokensUsed: number;
remaining: number;
windowStart: string;
nextResetAt: number;
}
/**
* Enforcement check. Loads every enabled limit applicable to (apiKeyId, provider,
* model) — model-scoped, provider-scoped, and global — reads DB-authoritative
* window usage for each (forceFresh, bypassing the read cache), and returns the
* most-restrictive breach (smallest remaining tokens) or null if none breach.
*
* A limit is breached when window usage is at or above the configured limit
* (tokensUsed >= limitValue), i.e. there is no remaining budget for more tokens.
*
* @param apiKeyId the API key id (required)
* @param provider resolved upstream provider id (optional; "" matches no provider scope)
* @param model resolved model id (optional; "" matches no model scope)
*/
export function checkTokenLimits(
apiKeyId: string,
provider = "",
model = "",
now = Date.now()
): TokenLimitBreach | null {
if (!apiKeyId) return null;
const limits = getTokenLimitsForRequest(apiKeyId, provider, model);
if (!limits || limits.length === 0) return null;
let worst: TokenLimitBreach | null = null;
for (const limit of limits) {
if (limit.enabled === false) continue;
const limitValue = limit.tokenLimit;
if (!Number.isFinite(limitValue) || limitValue <= 0) continue;
// Authoritative read (bypass the in-memory accelerator).
const tokensUsed = getCurrentWindowUsage(limit, now, true);
if (tokensUsed < limitValue) continue; // within budget
const { windowStart, nextResetAt } = resetWindowIfElapsed(limit, now);
const remaining = Math.max(0, limitValue - tokensUsed);
const breach: TokenLimitBreach = {
limitId: limit.id,
scopeType: limit.scopeType,
scopeValue: limit.scopeValue,
limitValue,
tokensUsed,
remaining,
windowStart,
nextResetAt,
};
// Most-restrictive wins: smallest remaining. Tie-break: smaller limitValue.
if (
worst === null ||
breach.remaining < worst.remaining ||
(breach.remaining === worst.remaining && breach.limitValue < worst.limitValue)
) {
worst = breach;
}
}
return worst;
}
/**
* Record token consumption against every applicable token limit for a request.
*
* FIRE-AND-FORGET: scheduled on a microtask so it NEVER blocks the SSE stream.
* The DB work runs inside a synchronous better-sqlite3 transaction so the
* reset-detection + reset-log + atomic increment for all matching limits commit
* atomically. The in-memory cache is updated to the new authoritative totals.
*
* A rollover (window reset) is detected when the current window has no counter
* row yet but a prior window row for the same limit still holds usage; in that
* case a reset-log row is written before incrementing the new window.
*
* @param apiKeyId API key id (no-op if falsy)
* @param provider resolved upstream provider id
* @param model resolved model id
* @param tokens billable tokens consumed by this request (no-op if <= 0)
*/
export function recordTokenUsage(
apiKeyId: string,
provider: string,
model: string,
tokens: number
): void {
if (!apiKeyId) return;
const delta = Number.isFinite(tokens) && tokens > 0 ? Math.floor(tokens) : 0;
if (delta <= 0) return;
// Schedule off the hot path; never await, never block the stream.
Promise.resolve()
.then(() => {
const now = Date.now();
const limits = getTokenLimitsForRequest(apiKeyId, provider || "", model || "");
if (!limits || limits.length === 0) return;
const db = getDbInstance();
const applied: Array<{ limitId: string; windowStart: string; total: number }> = [];
const tx = db.transaction(() => {
for (const limit of limits) {
if (limit.enabled === false) continue;
const { windowStart } = resetWindowIfElapsed(limit, now);
const currentRow = db
.prepare(
"SELECT tokens_used FROM api_key_token_counters WHERE limit_id = ? AND window_start = ?"
)
.get(limit.id, windowStart) as { tokens_used?: number } | undefined;
// First write to a new window? Detect rollover from the prior window.
if (!currentRow) {
const priorRow = db
.prepare(
`SELECT window_start, tokens_used FROM api_key_token_counters
WHERE limit_id = ? AND window_start < ?
ORDER BY window_start DESC LIMIT 1`
)
.get(limit.id, windowStart) as
| { window_start?: string; tokens_used?: number }
| undefined;
const prevTokens =
priorRow && typeof priorRow.tokens_used === "number" ? priorRow.tokens_used : 0;
if (prevTokens > 0) {
logTokenLimitReset(limit.id, prevTokens, windowStart);
}
// Cold window with no counter row: seed from usage_history so the
// running total reflects prior usage already recorded in this window
// before applying the new delta. Synchronous (better-sqlite3) — safe
// inside this transaction. Mirrors getCurrentWindowUsage seed-on-miss.
const seeded = seedWindowUsageFromHistory(limit, now);
if (seeded > 0) {
incrementWindowTokens(limit.id, windowStart, seeded);
}
}
const total = incrementWindowTokens(limit.id, windowStart, delta);
applied.push({ limitId: limit.id, windowStart, total });
}
});
try {
tx();
// Update the read accelerator to the new authoritative totals.
for (const a of applied) {
syncCache(a.limitId, a.windowStart, a.total);
}
} catch (err) {
// better-sqlite3 auto-rolls-back on throw; verify we are not stuck mid-txn.
if (db.inTransaction) {
try {
db.exec("ROLLBACK");
} catch {
// already rolled back
}
}
// Swallow — usage recording must never surface to the request path.
}
})
.catch(() => {
// Microtask scheduling/setup failure — non-fatal, never blocks the stream.
});
}