Files
OmniRoute/tests/unit/electron-main.test.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza f59f8daa94 Release v3.8.6 (#2804)
* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity

* fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls

* fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls

* fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls

* chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions)

* fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes

* docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem

Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança,
CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em
VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos.

Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket,
suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo
tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas.

Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem
cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última
atividade.

* fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted

* fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field

* docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers

Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely.
That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and
`/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors
and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits.

Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT,
Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com
emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>`
attribution.

Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note,
and 41 i18n translations.

* fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe

GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models
endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe
and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'.

Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the
same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models,
validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message.
Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth
is OK.

Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers.

* test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators

Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429),
network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers.

* feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning

GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per
provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic
fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading
'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning.

Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers
(same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the
provider registry without any warning, since all registered models
are functional via POST /chat/completions.

* refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test

- Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory
- Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md

* fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup

* feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback

Hybrid approach:
- gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models
- gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully
Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern

* i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json

* feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md

Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision
(lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in
package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22).

* fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth)

Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow:
- Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote
  import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path
- Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from
  fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation

Spec only - no code changes yet.

* docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan

10 tasks covering:
- TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses
- Provider switch to import_token
- Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback
- OAuthModal UI override
- i18n sync
- Verification + PR steps

* fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow

The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404
post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the
only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token.

- windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token
- generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli
- tests: assert flowType + disabled stub

* fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions

start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now
return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit
runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being
permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged.

Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex
regression check.

* refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG

No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl,
codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and
exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl,
showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately.

* fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env

Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6:
- src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared
  requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the
  cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test.
- Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
  to satisfy the env/docs sync contract.

* fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli

Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key
mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so
no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow.

The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token
via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy.

* fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch

The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes
`providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the
cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with
`mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as
`accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it
crashed with:

  SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null

Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller
and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second
`if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the
second block was unreachable but identical to the first.

Adds two regression tests asserting that
`provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for
both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate
instead of the SQLite bind error in production.

* feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows

* test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894)

Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6:

- Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec
  embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web
  API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is
  gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips
  secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes
  through resolvePublicCred per rule #11.

- Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses
  SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for
  password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not
  apply (false positive).

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895)

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact)

Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877):

- docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above
  "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6)
  and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section.
  Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading.
- any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any`
  (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which
  matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly.
- pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files"
  (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack
  policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the
windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning.

* feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868)

* feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT)

* fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections

---------

Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool

New providers:
- huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription)
- phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent
- poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie)
- venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie)
- v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie)
- kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie)
- doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie)

Additional:
- Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
- Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073
- Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers
- Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup)
- All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials

Closes #2885

* fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules

* feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899)

Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity.
It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id +
daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own
model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking,
claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect:

- token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON)
- auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token)
- browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow)
- bulk / ZIP import

New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}.
Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml,
ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration,
the token parser, and route auth-hardening.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896)

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal
trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6
(PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11).

* Pr 2871 (#2897)

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index

Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep
documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure.

* docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest

Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local>
Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local>
Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me>
Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru>
Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
2026-05-29 12:44:29 -03:00

455 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Tests for Electron main process (electron/main.js)
*
* Covers:
* - URL validation & RCE prevention
* - IPC channel security
* - Server readiness polling logic
* - Restart timeout + SIGKILL
* - Port change lifecycle
* - CSP header structure
* - Platform-conditional window options
*/
import { describe, it } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { createRequire } from "node:module";
const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
function raceDelays(firstMs, secondMs) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
let settled = false;
const first = setTimeout(() => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
clearTimeout(second);
resolve(firstMs);
}, firstMs);
const second = setTimeout(() => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
clearTimeout(first);
resolve(secondMs);
}, secondMs);
});
}
// ─── URL Validation Tests ────────────────────────────────────
describe("Electron URL Validation", () => {
function validateExternalUrl(url) {
try {
const parsedUrl = new URL(url);
if (["http:", "https:"].includes(parsedUrl.protocol)) {
return { allowed: true, url };
}
return { allowed: false, reason: `Blocked protocol: ${parsedUrl.protocol}` };
} catch {
return { allowed: false, reason: "Invalid URL" };
}
}
it("should allow http URLs", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("http://example.com").allowed, true);
});
it("should allow https URLs", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute").allowed, true);
});
it("should block file:// protocol (RCE risk)", () => {
const result = validateExternalUrl("file:///etc/passwd");
assert.equal(result.allowed, false);
assert.match(result.reason, /Blocked protocol/);
});
it("should block javascript: protocol (XSS risk)", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("javascript:alert(1)").allowed, false);
});
it("should block custom protocol handlers", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("vscode://extensions/install?name=malware").allowed, false);
});
it("should block data: URIs", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>").allowed, false);
});
it("should reject empty string", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("").allowed, false);
});
it("should reject malformed URL", () => {
const result = validateExternalUrl("not a url");
assert.equal(result.allowed, false);
assert.match(result.reason, /Invalid URL/);
});
it("should allow localhost URLs", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("http://localhost:20128/dashboard").allowed, true);
});
it("should allow URLs with paths and query params", () => {
assert.equal(validateExternalUrl("https://example.com/path?q=test&page=1#hash").allowed, true);
});
});
// ─── Window Open Handler Tests ───────────────────────────────
describe("Electron Window Open Handler", () => {
function windowOpenHandler({ url }) {
try {
const parsedUrl = new URL(url);
if (["http:", "https:"].includes(parsedUrl.protocol)) {
return { action: "allow-external" };
}
return { action: "deny" };
} catch {
return { action: "deny" };
}
}
it("should deny all windows (external links go to browser)", () => {
const result = windowOpenHandler({ url: "https://example.com" });
assert.ok(result.action);
});
it("should deny file:// URLs", () => {
assert.equal(windowOpenHandler({ url: "file:///etc/passwd" }).action, "deny");
});
});
// ─── IPC Channel Validation Tests ────────────────────────────
describe("IPC Channel Validation", () => {
const VALID_CHANNELS = {
invoke: ["get-app-info", "open-external", "get-data-dir", "restart-server"],
send: ["window-minimize", "window-maximize", "window-close"],
receive: ["server-status", "port-changed"],
};
function isValidChannel(channel, type) {
return VALID_CHANNELS[type]?.includes(channel) ?? false;
}
it("should allow valid invoke channels", () => {
assert.equal(isValidChannel("get-app-info", "invoke"), true);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("open-external", "invoke"), true);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("get-data-dir", "invoke"), true);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("restart-server", "invoke"), true);
});
it("should allow valid send channels", () => {
assert.equal(isValidChannel("window-minimize", "send"), true);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("window-maximize", "send"), true);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("window-close", "send"), true);
});
it("should allow valid receive channels", () => {
assert.equal(isValidChannel("server-status", "receive"), true);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("port-changed", "receive"), true);
});
it("should block unknown channels", () => {
assert.equal(isValidChannel("execute-arbitrary-code", "invoke"), false);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("delete-all-data", "send"), false);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("malicious-event", "receive"), false);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("", "invoke"), false);
});
it("should handle undefined type gracefully", () => {
assert.equal(isValidChannel("get-app-info", "nonexistent"), false);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("test", undefined), false);
});
it("should block prototype pollution attempts", () => {
assert.equal(isValidChannel("constructor", "invoke"), false);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("__proto__", "invoke"), false);
assert.equal(isValidChannel("toString", "invoke"), false);
});
});
// ─── Server Port Validation Tests ────────────────────────────
describe("Server Port Management", () => {
it("should have valid default port", () => {
const DEFAULT_PORT = 20128;
assert.ok(DEFAULT_PORT > 0 && DEFAULT_PORT <= 65535);
});
it("should validate port numbers", () => {
function isValidPort(port) {
return Number.isFinite(port) && port > 0 && port <= 65535;
}
assert.equal(isValidPort(20128), true);
assert.equal(isValidPort(3000), true);
assert.equal(isValidPort(8080), true);
assert.equal(isValidPort(0), false);
assert.equal(isValidPort(-1), false);
assert.equal(isValidPort(70000), false);
assert.equal(isValidPort(NaN), false);
});
it("should generate correct server URL", () => {
const port = 20128;
assert.equal(`http://localhost:${port}`, "http://localhost:20128");
});
});
// ─── Server Readiness Tests (#1) ─────────────────────────────
describe("Server Readiness Logic", () => {
it("waitForServer should timeout and return false", async () => {
// Simulate the polling logic with an always-failing fetch
async function waitForServer(url, timeoutMs = 100) {
const start = Date.now();
while (Date.now() - start < timeoutMs) {
try {
const res = await fetch(url);
if (res.ok || res.status < 500) return true;
} catch {
/* not ready */
}
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 30));
}
return false;
}
// Should timeout immediately since nothing is running on that port
const result = await waitForServer("http://localhost:59999", 100);
assert.equal(result, false);
});
// #2460: on a slow first launch (long DB migrations) the initial readiness probe can
// time out. The window must not be left on a hanging connection — a background retry
// must keep polling and reload the window once the server finally responds.
it("reloads the window once the server becomes ready after an initial timeout (#2460)", async () => {
let serverUp = false;
// Server "comes up" after ~60ms, simulating long first-launch migrations.
const upTimer = setTimeout(() => {
serverUp = true;
}, 60);
async function waitForServer(_url, timeoutMs) {
const start = Date.now();
while (Date.now() - start < timeoutMs) {
if (serverUp) return true;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 15));
}
return false;
}
try {
// Initial probe with a short budget times out (server not up yet).
const initialReady = await waitForServer("http://localhost/api/monitoring/health", 20);
assert.equal(initialReady, false);
let reloaded = false;
const mainWindow = {
isDestroyed: () => false,
loadURL: (_url?: string) => {
reloaded = true;
},
};
// Background retry with a generous budget should succeed and reload the window.
const retryReady = await waitForServer("http://localhost/api/monitoring/health", 5000);
if (retryReady && mainWindow && !mainWindow.isDestroyed()) {
mainWindow.loadURL("http://localhost");
}
assert.equal(retryReady, true);
assert.equal(reloaded, true, "window should reload once the server is ready");
} finally {
clearTimeout(upTimer);
}
});
});
// ─── Restart Timeout Tests (#2) ──────────────────────────────
describe("Restart Timeout Logic", () => {
it("should resolve even if process doesn't exit", async () => {
// Simulate the timeout race
const start = Date.now();
await raceDelays(100000, 50);
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
assert.ok(elapsed < 200, "Should resolve in ~50ms via timeout");
});
it("should resolve immediately if process exits first", async () => {
const start = Date.now();
await raceDelays(10, 5000);
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
assert.ok(elapsed < 200, "Should resolve in ~10ms via exit");
});
});
// ─── CSP Tests (#15) ─────────────────────────────────────────
describe("Content Security Policy", () => {
it("should have all required CSP directives", () => {
const directives = [
"default-src",
"connect-src",
"script-src",
"script-src-attr",
"style-src",
"font-src",
"img-src",
"media-src",
"object-src",
"frame-src",
"child-src",
];
const csp = [
"default-src 'self'",
"base-uri 'self'",
"object-src 'none'",
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
"frame-src 'none'",
"child-src 'none'",
"form-action 'self'",
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' blob:",
"script-src-attr 'none'",
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com",
"font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com data:",
"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:",
"media-src 'self' data: blob:",
"connect-src 'self' http://localhost:* http://127.0.0.1:* ws://localhost:* ws://127.0.0.1:*",
"worker-src 'self' blob:",
"manifest-src 'self'",
].join("; ");
for (const directive of directives) {
assert.ok(csp.includes(directive), `CSP should contain ${directive}`);
}
});
it("should not allow unsafe script sources from external domains", () => {
const scriptSrc = "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' blob:";
assert.equal(scriptSrc.indexOf("http://"), -1, "Should not allow external http scripts");
assert.equal(scriptSrc.indexOf("*"), -1, "Should not wildcard script sources");
assert.equal(scriptSrc.indexOf("'unsafe-eval'"), -1, "Production CSP should not allow eval");
});
});
// ─── Platform-Conditional Tests (#9) ─────────────────────────
describe("Platform-Conditional Window Options", () => {
it("should return hiddenInset for macOS", () => {
const platform = "darwin";
const options =
platform === "darwin"
? { titleBarStyle: "hiddenInset", trafficLightPosition: { x: 16, y: 16 } }
: { titleBarStyle: "default" };
assert.equal(options.titleBarStyle, "hiddenInset");
assert.deepEqual(options.trafficLightPosition, { x: 16, y: 16 });
});
it("should return default for Windows/Linux", () => {
for (const platform of ["win32", "linux"]) {
const options =
platform === "darwin" ? { titleBarStyle: "hiddenInset" } : { titleBarStyle: "default" };
assert.equal(options.titleBarStyle, "default");
}
});
});
// ─── SQLite Credential Inspection Tests ─────────────────────
// Mock node:sqlite for older Node.js versions where it's not built-in
let DatabaseSync;
try {
DatabaseSync = require("node:sqlite").DatabaseSync;
} catch {
const Database = require("better-sqlite3");
class MockDatabaseSync {
db: any;
constructor(dbPath, options) {
const dbOpts: any = {};
if (options && typeof options.readOnly === "boolean") {
dbOpts.readonly = options.readOnly;
}
this.db = new Database(dbPath, dbOpts);
}
exec(sql) {
return this.db.exec(sql);
}
prepare(sql) {
const stmt = this.db.prepare(sql);
return {
run: (...args) => stmt.run(...args),
get: (...args) => stmt.get(...args),
};
}
close() {
return this.db.close();
}
}
DatabaseSync = MockDatabaseSync;
const Module = require("node:module");
const originalRequire = Module.prototype.require;
Module.prototype.require = function (id) {
if (id === "node:sqlite") {
return { DatabaseSync: MockDatabaseSync };
}
return originalRequire.apply(this, arguments);
};
}
describe("Electron SQLite credential inspection", () => {
const {
hasEncryptedCredentials,
openNodeSqliteReadOnly,
} = require("../../electron/sqlite-inspection.js");
function withTempDb(fn) {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "omniroute-electron-db-"));
const dbPath = join(dir, "storage.sqlite");
const db = new DatabaseSync(dbPath);
try {
db.exec(`
CREATE TABLE provider_connections (
access_token TEXT,
refresh_token TEXT,
api_key TEXT,
id_token TEXT
)
`);
fn(dbPath, db);
} finally {
db.close();
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
it("should inspect encrypted credentials with node:sqlite fallback", () => {
withTempDb((dbPath, db) => {
db.prepare("INSERT INTO provider_connections (api_key) VALUES (?)").run("enc:v1:test");
assert.equal(hasEncryptedCredentials(dbPath, openNodeSqliteReadOnly), true);
});
});
it("should return false when credentials are not encrypted", () => {
withTempDb((dbPath, db) => {
db.prepare("INSERT INTO provider_connections (api_key) VALUES (?)").run("plain-text-key");
assert.equal(hasEncryptedCredentials(dbPath, openNodeSqliteReadOnly), false);
});
});
it("should return false when the database file does not exist", () => {
assert.equal(hasEncryptedCredentials(join(tmpdir(), "missing-omniroute.sqlite")), false);
});
});