mirror of
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* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity * fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls * fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls * fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls * fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls * fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls * fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls * chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions) * fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes * docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança, CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos. Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket, suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas. Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última atividade. * fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted * fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field * docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely. That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and `/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits. Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT, Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>` attribution. Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note, and 41 i18n translations. * fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'. Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models, validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message. Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth is OK. Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers. * test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429), network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers. * feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading 'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning. Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers (same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the provider registry without any warning, since all registered models are functional via POST /chat/completions. * refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test - Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory - Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md * fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup * feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback Hybrid approach: - gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models - gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern * i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json * feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision (lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22). * fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth) Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow: - Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path - Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation Spec only - no code changes yet. * docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan 10 tasks covering: - TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses - Provider switch to import_token - Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback - OAuthModal UI override - i18n sync - Verification + PR steps * fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404 post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token. - windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token - generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli - tests: assert flowType + disabled stub * fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged. Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex regression check. * refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl, codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl, showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately. * fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6: - src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test. - Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md to satisfy the env/docs sync contract. * fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow. The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy. * fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes `providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with `mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as `accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it crashed with: SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second `if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the second block was unreachable but identical to the first. Adds two regression tests asserting that `provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate instead of the SQLite bind error in production. * feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows * test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894) Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6: - Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes through resolvePublicCred per rule #11. - Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not apply (false positive). * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895) * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877): - docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6) and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section. Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading. - any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any` (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly. - pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files" (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning. * feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868) * feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT) * fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections --------- Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute> * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool New providers: - huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription) - phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent - poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie) - venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie) - v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie) - kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie) - doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie) Additional: - Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md - Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073 - Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers - Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup) - All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials Closes #2885 * fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules * feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899) Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity. It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id + daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking, claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect: - token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON) - auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token) - browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow) - bulk / ZIP import New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}. Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml, ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration, the token parser, and route auth-hardening. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896) Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11). * Pr 2871 (#2897) * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure. * docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly. --------- Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local> Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local> Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se> Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me> Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru> Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br> Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com> Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
1372 lines
45 KiB
TypeScript
1372 lines
45 KiB
TypeScript
import test from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-sse-auth-"));
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process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR;
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process.env.API_KEY_SECRET = process.env.API_KEY_SECRET || "sse-auth-test-secret";
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const core = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
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const providersDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/providers.ts");
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const settingsDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/settings.ts");
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const apiKeysDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/apiKeys.ts");
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const auth = await import("../../src/sse/services/auth.ts");
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const quotaCache = await import("../../src/domain/quotaCache.ts");
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async function resetStorage() {
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core.resetDbInstance();
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apiKeysDb.resetApiKeyState();
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fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
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fs.mkdirSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true });
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}
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function futureIso(ms = 60_000) {
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return new Date(Date.now() + ms).toISOString();
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}
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async function seedConnection(provider: string, overrides: any = {}) {
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return providersDb.createProviderConnection({
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provider,
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authType: overrides.authType || "apikey",
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name: overrides.name || `${provider}-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 8)}`,
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email: overrides.email,
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apiKey: overrides.apiKey || "sk-test",
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accessToken: overrides.accessToken,
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refreshToken: overrides.refreshToken,
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isActive: overrides.isActive ?? true,
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testStatus: overrides.testStatus || "active",
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priority: overrides.priority,
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rateLimitedUntil: overrides.rateLimitedUntil,
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lastError: overrides.lastError,
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lastErrorType: overrides.lastErrorType,
|
|
lastErrorSource: overrides.lastErrorSource,
|
|
errorCode: overrides.errorCode,
|
|
backoffLevel: overrides.backoffLevel,
|
|
providerSpecificData: overrides.providerSpecificData || {},
|
|
lastUsedAt: overrides.lastUsedAt,
|
|
consecutiveUseCount: overrides.consecutiveUseCount,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function msUntil(timestamp) {
|
|
return new Date(timestamp).getTime() - Date.now();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function flushWrites() {
|
|
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
test.beforeEach(async () => {
|
|
await resetStorage();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test.after(async () => {
|
|
core.resetDbInstance();
|
|
apiKeysDb.resetApiKeyState();
|
|
fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("extractApiKey parses bearer headers and isValidApiKey validates persisted keys", async () => {
|
|
const created = await apiKeysDb.createApiKey("auth-check", "machine-auth-check");
|
|
|
|
const request = new Request("http://localhost/v1/chat/completions", {
|
|
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${created.key}` },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(auth.extractApiKey(request), created.key);
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
auth.extractApiKey(
|
|
new Request("http://localhost/v1/chat/completions", {
|
|
headers: { Authorization: "Basic abc123" },
|
|
})
|
|
),
|
|
null
|
|
);
|
|
assert.equal(await auth.isValidApiKey(created.key), true);
|
|
assert.equal(await auth.isValidApiKey("sk-missing"), false);
|
|
assert.equal(await auth.isValidApiKey(""), false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials reports rate limiting when only inactive suppressed records remain", async () => {
|
|
const retryAfter = futureIso();
|
|
await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "inactive-rate-limited",
|
|
isActive: false,
|
|
rateLimitedUntil: retryAfter,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(result.retryAfter, retryAfter);
|
|
assert.match(String(result.retryAfterHuman), /reset after/i);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("codex session account affinity is opt-in and honors TTL", async () => {
|
|
const affinityDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/sessionAccountAffinity.ts");
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "least-used" });
|
|
await seedConnection("codex", { name: "codex-affinity-a", priority: 1 });
|
|
await seedConnection("codex", { name: "codex-affinity-b", priority: 2 });
|
|
|
|
const withoutAffinityA = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-without-affinity",
|
|
});
|
|
const withoutAffinityB = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-without-affinity",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(typeof withoutAffinityA.connectionId, "string");
|
|
assert.equal(typeof withoutAffinityB.connectionId, "string");
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("session-without-affinity", "codex", 60_000),
|
|
null
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000 });
|
|
|
|
const withAffinityA = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-with-affinity",
|
|
});
|
|
const withAffinityB = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-with-affinity",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(withAffinityB.connectionId, withAffinityA.connectionId);
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("session-with-affinity", "codex", 60_000)?.connectionId,
|
|
withAffinityA.connectionId
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("session account affinity expires when TTL has passed", async () => {
|
|
const affinityDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/sessionAccountAffinity.ts");
|
|
const now = Date.now();
|
|
|
|
affinityDb.upsertSessionAccountAffinity("expiring-session", "codex", "conn-a", now, 1000);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("expiring-session", "codex", 1000, now + 500)
|
|
?.connectionId,
|
|
"conn-a"
|
|
);
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("expiring-session", "codex", 1000, now + 1001),
|
|
null
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials returns last error metadata when active accounts are all rate limited", async () => {
|
|
const retryAfter = futureIso();
|
|
await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "active-rate-limited",
|
|
rateLimitedUntil: retryAfter,
|
|
lastError: "provider rate limit",
|
|
errorCode: 429,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(result.retryAfter, retryAfter);
|
|
assert.equal(Number(result.lastErrorCode), 429);
|
|
assert.equal(result.lastError, "provider rate limit");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials enforces generic quota policy unless explicitly bypassed", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-policy",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
limitPolicy: {
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 75,
|
|
windows: ["daily"],
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
const resetAt = futureIso();
|
|
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(connection.id, "openai", {
|
|
daily: { remainingPercentage: 10, resetAt },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
|
|
bypassQuotaPolicy: true,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.lastErrorCode, 429);
|
|
assert.match(blocked.lastError, /configured quota threshold/i);
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.retryAfter, resetAt);
|
|
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight skips exhausted preflight accounts and selects the next healthy one", async () => {
|
|
const blocked = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-preflight-blocked",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-preflight-blocked",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
quotaPreflightEnabled: true,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
const healthy = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-preflight-healthy",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-preflight-healthy",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
quotaPreflightEnabled: true,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
|
|
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async (connectionId) => ({
|
|
used: connectionId === blocked.id ? 100 : 40,
|
|
total: 100,
|
|
percentUsed: connectionId === blocked.id ? 1.0 : 0.4,
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal((selected as any).connectionId, healthy.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight returns allRateLimited when a forced connection is blocked by preflight", async () => {
|
|
const blocked = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-preflight-forced",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-preflight-forced",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
quotaPreflightEnabled: true,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
|
|
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async (connectionId) => ({
|
|
used: connectionId === blocked.id ? 100 : 20,
|
|
total: 100,
|
|
percentUsed: connectionId === blocked.id ? 1.0 : 0.2,
|
|
resetAt: futureIso(120_000),
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai", null, null, null, {
|
|
forcedConnectionId: (blocked as any).id,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(selected.lastErrorCode, 429);
|
|
assert.match(selected.lastError, /quota preflight/i);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight skips the upstream fetcher when no limits are configured", async () => {
|
|
// Latency gate regression test. When a connection has no per-window
|
|
// overrides AND its provider has no per-(provider, window) defaults seeded
|
|
// AND the legacy quotaPreflightEnabled flag isn't set, the dispatch loop
|
|
// must NOT call the registered quota fetcher. We assert by registering a
|
|
// fetcher that throws if invoked — any invocation surfaces as a test
|
|
// failure either via the thrown error or via the connection getting
|
|
// skipped (we expect it to pass through cleanly).
|
|
const conn = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-preflight-no-limits",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-no-limits",
|
|
// Crucially: no quotaPreflightEnabled flag, no overrides.
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
|
|
let fetcherCalls = 0;
|
|
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
|
|
fetcherCalls++;
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
"quota fetcher must not run when no per-window overrides or provider defaults are set"
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal((selected as any).connectionId, conn.id);
|
|
assert.equal(fetcherCalls, 0, "fetcher should not have been invoked");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight invokes the fetcher when the global default is restrictive", async () => {
|
|
// No per-connection override and no provider-window defaults — but the
|
|
// operator has raised the global default cutoff above the factory no-op
|
|
// level (2% remaining). Preflight must run so the tighter floor applies.
|
|
const conn = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-preflight-restrictive-global",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-restrictive-global",
|
|
});
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
resilienceSettings: {
|
|
quotaPreflight: {
|
|
defaultThresholdPercent: 20, // stop at 20% remaining = 80% used
|
|
warnThresholdPercent: 30,
|
|
providerWindowDefaults: {},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
|
|
let fetcherCalls = 0;
|
|
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
|
|
fetcherCalls++;
|
|
return null;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
fetcherCalls,
|
|
1,
|
|
"fetcher should run when global default is stricter than the factory no-op level"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Reset settings so subsequent tests see factory defaults.
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ resilienceSettings: {} });
|
|
// Verify the gate immediately returns to skip mode.
|
|
fetcherCalls = 0;
|
|
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
|
|
fetcherCalls++;
|
|
throw new Error("must not run with factory global default");
|
|
});
|
|
await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
|
|
assert.equal(fetcherCalls, 0, "fetcher should not run after settings reset to factory default");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight invokes the fetcher when an override IS set", async () => {
|
|
// Counterpart to the no-limits test: if the connection has a
|
|
// quotaWindowThresholds override, preflight must run.
|
|
const conn = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-preflight-with-override",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-with-override",
|
|
});
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(conn.id, {
|
|
quotaWindowThresholds: { primary: 50 },
|
|
});
|
|
// Sanity: the override must be readable on the connection row (this is
|
|
// what the dispatch loop reads through getProviderCredentials).
|
|
assert.deepEqual(
|
|
(updated as any)?.quotaWindowThresholds,
|
|
{ primary: 50 },
|
|
"override must be persisted on the connection row"
|
|
);
|
|
const refetched = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(conn.id);
|
|
assert.deepEqual(
|
|
(refetched as any)?.quotaWindowThresholds,
|
|
{ primary: 50 },
|
|
"override must round-trip through getProviderConnectionById"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
|
|
let fetcherCalls = 0;
|
|
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
|
|
fetcherCalls++;
|
|
return null; // null → preflight proceeds, no skip
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
|
|
assert.equal(fetcherCalls, 1, "fetcher should have been invoked exactly once");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight: explicit quotaPreflightEnabled:false bypasses preflight even when provider has global window defaults (#2831)", async () => {
|
|
// Regression: when a provider has providerWindowDefaults set AND a connection
|
|
// carries quotaWindowThresholds, the AND-of-negations gate in auth.ts would
|
|
// proceed to preflight even if the connection explicitly opted out with
|
|
// providerSpecificData.quotaPreflightEnabled === false.
|
|
const conn = await seedConnection("github", {
|
|
name: "github-explicit-opt-out",
|
|
apiKey: "ghp-opt-out-test",
|
|
providerSpecificData: { quotaPreflightEnabled: false },
|
|
});
|
|
// Give the connection per-window overrides (simulates a user-configured
|
|
// threshold) — this is the field that previously caused the gate to keep going.
|
|
await (await import("../../src/lib/db/providers.ts")).updateProviderConnection(conn.id, {
|
|
quotaWindowThresholds: { primary: 50 },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Seed provider-level window defaults so providerHasDefaults === true.
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
resilienceSettings: {
|
|
quotaPreflight: {
|
|
defaultThresholdPercent: 2,
|
|
warnThresholdPercent: 20,
|
|
providerWindowDefaults: { github: { primary: 10 } },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
|
|
let fetcherCalls = 0;
|
|
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("github", async () => {
|
|
fetcherCalls++;
|
|
// Return a quota that would block if preflight actually ran.
|
|
return { used: 98, total: 100, percentUsed: 0.98 };
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("github");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
fetcherCalls,
|
|
0,
|
|
"fetcher must NOT run when connection explicitly opts out with quotaPreflightEnabled: false"
|
|
);
|
|
assert.equal(
|
|
(selected as any).connectionId,
|
|
conn.id,
|
|
"opted-out connection must be returned directly without being blocked by preflight"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Cleanup: reset settings so subsequent tests see factory defaults.
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ resilienceSettings: {} });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials keeps separate codex affinity per session", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
|
|
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 10,
|
|
codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000,
|
|
});
|
|
const first = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
name: "codex-affinity-a",
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 20_000).toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
const second = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
name: "codex-affinity-b",
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 10_000).toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const sessionA1 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-a",
|
|
});
|
|
const sessionB1 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-b",
|
|
});
|
|
const sessionA2 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-a",
|
|
});
|
|
const sessionB2 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-b",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(sessionA1.connectionId, first.id);
|
|
assert.equal(sessionB1.connectionId, second.id);
|
|
assert.equal(sessionA2.connectionId, first.id);
|
|
assert.equal(sessionB2.connectionId, second.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials rebinds codex session when affinity connection is excluded", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
|
|
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 10,
|
|
codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000,
|
|
});
|
|
const first = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
name: "codex-affinity-excluded-a",
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 20_000).toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
const second = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
name: "codex-affinity-excluded-b",
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 10_000).toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const initial = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-excluded",
|
|
});
|
|
const rebound = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", first.id, null, "gpt-5.5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-excluded",
|
|
});
|
|
const sticky = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
|
|
sessionKey: "session-excluded",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(initial.connectionId, first.id);
|
|
assert.equal(rebound.connectionId, second.id);
|
|
assert.equal(sticky.connectionId, second.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("resolveQuotaLimitPolicy normalizes Codex windows, thresholds, and defaults", () => {
|
|
const normalized = auth.resolveQuotaLimitPolicy("codex", {
|
|
limitPolicy: {
|
|
windows: [" Session (5h) ", "weekly (7d)", "custom-window", "", 42],
|
|
thresholdPercent: "250",
|
|
},
|
|
codexLimitPolicy: {
|
|
use5h: false,
|
|
useWeekly: true,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
const defaults = auth.resolveQuotaLimitPolicy("codex", {});
|
|
const generic = auth.resolveQuotaLimitPolicy("openai", {
|
|
limitPolicy: {
|
|
enabled: "maybe",
|
|
thresholdPercent: "0",
|
|
windows: [" Daily ", "", null],
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.deepEqual(normalized, {
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 100,
|
|
windows: ["weekly", "custom-window"],
|
|
});
|
|
assert.deepEqual(defaults, {
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 99,
|
|
windows: ["session", "weekly"],
|
|
});
|
|
assert.deepEqual(generic, {
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 1,
|
|
windows: ["daily"],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("evaluateQuotaLimitPolicy aggregates reasons and keeps the earliest valid future reset", () => {
|
|
const connection = {
|
|
id: "quota-eval-connection",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
limitPolicy: {
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 75,
|
|
windows: ["weekly", "session", "daily"],
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
const earliestReset = futureIso(90_000);
|
|
|
|
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(connection.id, "openai", {
|
|
weekly: { remainingPercentage: 20, resetAt: "not-a-date" },
|
|
session: { remainingPercentage: 5, resetAt: earliestReset },
|
|
daily: { remainingPercentage: 90, resetAt: futureIso(180_000) },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const evaluation = auth.evaluateQuotaLimitPolicy("openai", connection as any);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(evaluation.blocked, true);
|
|
assert.deepEqual(evaluation.reasons, ["weekly usage 80%", "session usage 95%"]);
|
|
assert.equal(evaluation.resetAt, earliestReset);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials round-robin stays on the current account while below the sticky limit", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
|
|
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 3,
|
|
});
|
|
const current = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "round-robin-current",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
});
|
|
const other = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "round-robin-other",
|
|
priority: 2,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(current.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
consecutiveUseCount: 1,
|
|
});
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(other.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString(),
|
|
consecutiveUseCount: 0,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(current.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, current.id);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.consecutiveUseCount, 2);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials returns null when only inactive non-rate-limited records remain", async () => {
|
|
await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "inactive-no-limit",
|
|
isActive: false,
|
|
testStatus: "active",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result, null);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials honors allowedConnections filters", async () => {
|
|
const skipped = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "allowed-skip",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-skip",
|
|
});
|
|
const selectedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "allowed-select",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-selected",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, [(selectedConn as any).id]);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, selectedConn.id);
|
|
assert.equal(selected.apiKey, "sk-selected");
|
|
assert.notEqual(selected.connectionId, skipped.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials honors forcedConnectionId even when another account is preferred", async () => {
|
|
await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "forced-default",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-default",
|
|
});
|
|
const forcedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "forced-target",
|
|
priority: 99,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-forced",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
|
|
forcedConnectionId: (forcedConn as any).id,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, forcedConn.id);
|
|
assert.equal(selected.apiKey, "sk-forced");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials intersects forcedConnectionId with allowedConnections", async () => {
|
|
const allowedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "forced-allowed",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-allowed",
|
|
});
|
|
const blockedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "forced-blocked",
|
|
apiKey: "sk-blocked",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials(
|
|
"openai",
|
|
null,
|
|
[(allowedConn as any).id],
|
|
null,
|
|
{
|
|
forcedConnectionId: (blockedConn as any).id,
|
|
}
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected, null);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials retains rate-limited accounts when allowSuppressedConnections is enabled", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "suppressed-rate-limit",
|
|
rateLimitedUntil: futureIso(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
|
|
allowSuppressedConnections: true,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials retains rate-limited accounts when allowRateLimitedConnections is enabled", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "allow-rate-limit-option",
|
|
rateLimitedUntil: futureIso(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
|
|
allowRateLimitedConnections: true,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials retains terminal accounts for combo live tests", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "suppressed-terminal",
|
|
testStatus: "banned",
|
|
backoffLevel: 4,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
|
|
allowSuppressedConnections: true,
|
|
});
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(blocked, null);
|
|
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials skips codex scope-limited accounts unless suppression is allowed", async () => {
|
|
const retryAfter = futureIso();
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
authType: "oauth",
|
|
name: "codex-scope-limited",
|
|
email: "scope-limited@example.com",
|
|
apiKey: null,
|
|
accessToken: "scope-access",
|
|
refreshToken: "scope-refresh",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
codexScopeRateLimitedUntil: {
|
|
spark: retryAfter,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "codex-spark-mini");
|
|
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "codex-spark-mini", {
|
|
allowSuppressedConnections: true,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.retryAfter, retryAfter);
|
|
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials reports allRateLimited when every account is model-locked", async () => {
|
|
const first = await seedConnection("gemini", {
|
|
name: "gemini-model-lock-first",
|
|
});
|
|
const second = await seedConnection("gemini", {
|
|
name: "gemini-model-lock-second",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await auth.markAccountUnavailable(first.id, 429, "too many requests", "gemini", "gemini-2.5-pro");
|
|
await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
second.id,
|
|
429,
|
|
"too many requests",
|
|
"gemini",
|
|
"gemini-2.5-pro"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("gemini", null, null, "gemini-2.5-pro");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(Number(blocked.lastErrorCode), 429);
|
|
assert.ok(typeof blocked.retryAfter === "string" && blocked.retryAfter.length > 0);
|
|
assert.match(String(blocked.retryAfterHuman), /reset after/i);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials auto-decays stale backoff metadata for recovered accounts", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "stale-backoff",
|
|
testStatus: "unavailable",
|
|
rateLimitedUntil: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString(),
|
|
lastError: "old error",
|
|
errorCode: 429,
|
|
backoffLevel: 3,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
await flushWrites();
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.backoffLevel, 0);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials falls back to a five-minute retry window when quota policy has no reset", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-no-reset",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
limitPolicy: {
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 50,
|
|
windows: ["daily"],
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(connection.id, "openai", {
|
|
daily: { remainingPercentage: 0, resetAt: null },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
assert.equal(result.lastErrorCode, 429);
|
|
assert.match(result.lastError, /configured quota threshold/i);
|
|
assert.ok(msUntil(result.retryAfter) > 240_000);
|
|
assert.ok(msUntil(result.retryAfter) <= 305_000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials prioritizes accounts that still have quota available", async () => {
|
|
const exhausted = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-exhausted",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-exhausted",
|
|
});
|
|
const available = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "quota-available",
|
|
priority: 9,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-available",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(exhausted.id, "openai", {
|
|
daily: { remainingPercentage: 0, resetAt: futureIso() },
|
|
});
|
|
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(available.id, "openai", {
|
|
daily: { remainingPercentage: 65, resetAt: futureIso() },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, available.id);
|
|
assert.equal(selected.apiKey, "sk-available");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials round-robin switches to the least recently used account after the sticky limit", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
|
|
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 2,
|
|
});
|
|
const current = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "round-robin-limit-current",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
});
|
|
const fallback = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "round-robin-limit-fallback",
|
|
priority: 2,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(current.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
consecutiveUseCount: 2,
|
|
});
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(fallback.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 120_000).toISOString(),
|
|
consecutiveUseCount: 0,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(fallback.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, fallback.id);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.consecutiveUseCount, 1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials round-robin fallback mode excludes the failed account and picks the LRU peer", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
|
|
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 2,
|
|
});
|
|
const failed = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "round-robin-failed",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
});
|
|
const fallback = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "round-robin-fallback",
|
|
priority: 2,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(failed.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
consecutiveUseCount: 3,
|
|
});
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(fallback.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 120_000).toISOString(),
|
|
consecutiveUseCount: 0,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", failed.id);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(fallback.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, fallback.id);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.consecutiveUseCount, 1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
for (const strategy of ["random", "p2c", "least-used", "cost-optimized", "strict-random"]) {
|
|
test(`getProviderCredentials supports the ${strategy} selection strategy`, async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: strategy });
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: `strategy-${strategy}`,
|
|
priority: 7,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials least-used prefers accounts that were never used", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "least-used" });
|
|
const recentlyUsed = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "least-used-recent",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
});
|
|
const neverUsed = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "least-used-never",
|
|
priority: 9,
|
|
});
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(recentlyUsed.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(neverUsed.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: null,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, neverUsed.id);
|
|
assert.notEqual(selected.connectionId, recentlyUsed.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials least-used prefers the oldest timestamp when all accounts were used", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "least-used" });
|
|
const oldest = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "least-used-oldest",
|
|
priority: 9,
|
|
});
|
|
const newest = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "least-used-newest",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(oldest.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 120_000).toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(newest.id, {
|
|
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, oldest.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials cost-optimized selects the lowest priority account", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "cost-optimized" });
|
|
const cheapest = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "cost-low",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
});
|
|
await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "cost-high",
|
|
priority: 8,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, cheapest.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials p2c prefers the account with more quota headroom over raw priority", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "p2c" });
|
|
const nearLimit = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "p2c-near-limit",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-p2c-near-limit",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
limitPolicy: {
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 80,
|
|
windows: ["daily"],
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
const healthy = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "p2c-healthy-headroom",
|
|
priority: 9,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-p2c-healthy",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
limitPolicy: {
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
thresholdPercent: 80,
|
|
windows: ["daily"],
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(nearLimit.id, "openai", {
|
|
daily: { remainingPercentage: 12, resetAt: futureIso(180_000) },
|
|
});
|
|
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(healthy.id, "openai", {
|
|
daily: { remainingPercentage: 78, resetAt: futureIso(180_000) },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, healthy.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials p2c deprioritizes accounts with recent rate-limit/backoff signals", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "p2c" });
|
|
await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "p2c-rate-limited-history",
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-p2c-rate-limited",
|
|
lastError: "rate limit",
|
|
lastErrorType: "rate_limited",
|
|
errorCode: 429,
|
|
backoffLevel: 3,
|
|
});
|
|
const healthy = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "p2c-clean-account",
|
|
priority: 8,
|
|
apiKey: "sk-p2c-clean",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, healthy.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials resolves the nvidia special alias pool", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("nvidia_nim", {
|
|
name: "nvidia-special-alias",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("nvidia");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("getProviderCredentials exposes copilotToken when present in providerSpecificData", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
authType: "oauth",
|
|
name: "codex-copilot-token",
|
|
email: "copilot@example.com",
|
|
apiKey: null,
|
|
accessToken: "codex-access",
|
|
refreshToken: "codex-refresh",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
copilotToken: "copilot-token-value",
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
|
|
assert.equal(selected.copilotToken, "copilot-token-value");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable uses configured cooldowns for local 404 model lockouts", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
providerProfiles: {
|
|
apikey: {
|
|
transientCooldown: 250,
|
|
rateLimitCooldown: 125,
|
|
maxBackoffLevel: 3,
|
|
circuitBreakerThreshold: 60,
|
|
circuitBreakerReset: 5000,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "local-openai",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1",
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
404,
|
|
"model not found",
|
|
"openai",
|
|
"local-model"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 250);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.lastErrorType, "not_found");
|
|
assert.equal(Number(updated.errorCode), 404);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable applies a model-only lockout for Gemini 429 responses", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("gemini", {
|
|
name: "gemini-model-limit",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
429,
|
|
"too many requests",
|
|
"gemini",
|
|
"gemini-2.5-pro"
|
|
);
|
|
await flushWrites();
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.lastErrorType, "rate_limited");
|
|
assert.equal(Number(updated.errorCode), 429);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable applies a model-only lockout for compatible provider 429 responses", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai-compatible-custom-node", {
|
|
name: "compatible-model-limit",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
429,
|
|
"The upstream compatible service exhausted its capacity",
|
|
"openai-compatible-custom-node",
|
|
"custom-model-a"
|
|
);
|
|
await flushWrites();
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.lastErrorType, "rate_limited");
|
|
assert.equal(Number(updated.errorCode), 429);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable honors configured api-key rate-limit cooldowns", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
|
|
providerProfiles: {
|
|
apikey: {
|
|
transientCooldown: 125,
|
|
rateLimitCooldown: 125,
|
|
maxBackoffLevel: 3,
|
|
circuitBreakerThreshold: 60,
|
|
circuitBreakerReset: 5000,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "configured-rate-limit-cooldown",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
429,
|
|
"too many requests",
|
|
"openai",
|
|
"gpt-4o-mini"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 125);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable stores Codex scope-specific cooldowns without a global rate limit", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
authType: "oauth",
|
|
name: "codex-scope",
|
|
email: "codex@example.com",
|
|
apiKey: null,
|
|
accessToken: "codex-access",
|
|
refreshToken: "codex-refresh",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
429,
|
|
"quota reached",
|
|
"codex",
|
|
"codex-spark-mini"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "codex-spark-mini");
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "unavailable");
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
|
|
assert.ok(updated.providerSpecificData.codexScopeRateLimitedUntil.spark);
|
|
assert.equal(selected.allRateLimited, true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable returns without fallback on bad requests", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "bad-request-no-fallback",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
400,
|
|
"schema mismatch",
|
|
"openai",
|
|
"gpt-4o"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.deepEqual(result, { shouldFallback: false, cooldownMs: 0 });
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable preserves terminal statuses without overwriting them", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "terminal-status",
|
|
testStatus: "expired",
|
|
rateLimitedUntil: null,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(connection.id, 503, "upstream error", "openai");
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 0);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "expired");
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable reuses an existing connection-wide cooldown", async () => {
|
|
const retryAfter = futureIso(90_000);
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "existing-cooldown",
|
|
rateLimitedUntil: retryAfter,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(connection.id, 503, "upstream error", "openai");
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, retryAfter);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable reuses an existing Codex scope cooldown", async () => {
|
|
const retryAfter = futureIso(90_000);
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
|
|
authType: "oauth",
|
|
name: "codex-existing-scope",
|
|
email: "codex-existing-scope@example.com",
|
|
apiKey: null,
|
|
accessToken: "scope-access",
|
|
refreshToken: "scope-refresh",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
codexScopeRateLimitedUntil: {
|
|
spark: retryAfter,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
429,
|
|
"quota reached",
|
|
"codex",
|
|
"codex-spark-mini"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.providerSpecificData.codexScopeRateLimitedUntil.spark, retryAfter);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable uses a connection-wide cooldown for non-local 404 errors", async () => {
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "remote-404",
|
|
providerSpecificData: {
|
|
baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
404,
|
|
"model not found",
|
|
"openai",
|
|
"gpt-missing"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "unavailable");
|
|
assert.ok(updated.rateLimitedUntil);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable auto-disables permanently banned accounts when the setting is enabled", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ autoDisableBannedAccounts: true });
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "permanent-ban",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
401,
|
|
"Verify your account to continue",
|
|
"openai",
|
|
"gpt-4o"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.isActive, false);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable leaves permanently banned accounts active when auto-disable is disabled", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ autoDisableBannedAccounts: false });
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "permanent-ban-disabled",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
401,
|
|
"Verify your account to continue",
|
|
"openai",
|
|
"gpt-4o"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.isActive, true);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("markAccountUnavailable swallows auto-disable persistence errors", async () => {
|
|
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ autoDisableBannedAccounts: true });
|
|
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
|
|
name: "permanent-ban-update-fails",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const db = core.getDbInstance();
|
|
const originalPrepare = db.prepare.bind(db);
|
|
db.prepare = (sql) => {
|
|
const statement = originalPrepare(sql);
|
|
if (!String(sql).includes("UPDATE provider_connections SET")) {
|
|
return statement;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new Proxy(statement, {
|
|
get(target, prop, receiver) {
|
|
if (prop === "run") {
|
|
return (params) => {
|
|
if (params && typeof params === "object" && params.isActive === 0) {
|
|
throw new Error("persist disable failed");
|
|
}
|
|
return target.run(params);
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
401,
|
|
"Verify your account to continue",
|
|
"openai",
|
|
"gpt-4o"
|
|
);
|
|
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.isActive, true);
|
|
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
|
|
} finally {
|
|
db.prepare = originalPrepare;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|