Files
OmniRoute/tests/unit/sse-auth.test.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza f59f8daa94 Release v3.8.6 (#2804)
* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity

* fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls

* fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls

* fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls

* chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions)

* fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes

* docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem

Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança,
CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em
VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos.

Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket,
suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo
tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas.

Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem
cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última
atividade.

* fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted

* fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field

* docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers

Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely.
That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and
`/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors
and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits.

Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT,
Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com
emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>`
attribution.

Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note,
and 41 i18n translations.

* fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe

GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models
endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe
and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'.

Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the
same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models,
validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message.
Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth
is OK.

Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers.

* test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators

Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429),
network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers.

* feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning

GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per
provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic
fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading
'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning.

Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers
(same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the
provider registry without any warning, since all registered models
are functional via POST /chat/completions.

* refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test

- Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory
- Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md

* fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup

* feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback

Hybrid approach:
- gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models
- gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully
Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern

* i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json

* feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md

Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision
(lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in
package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22).

* fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth)

Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow:
- Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote
  import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path
- Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from
  fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation

Spec only - no code changes yet.

* docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan

10 tasks covering:
- TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses
- Provider switch to import_token
- Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback
- OAuthModal UI override
- i18n sync
- Verification + PR steps

* fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow

The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404
post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the
only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token.

- windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token
- generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli
- tests: assert flowType + disabled stub

* fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions

start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now
return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit
runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being
permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged.

Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex
regression check.

* refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG

No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl,
codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and
exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl,
showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately.

* fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env

Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6:
- src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared
  requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the
  cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test.
- Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
  to satisfy the env/docs sync contract.

* fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli

Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key
mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so
no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow.

The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token
via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy.

* fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch

The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes
`providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the
cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with
`mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as
`accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it
crashed with:

  SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null

Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller
and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second
`if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the
second block was unreachable but identical to the first.

Adds two regression tests asserting that
`provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for
both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate
instead of the SQLite bind error in production.

* feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows

* test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894)

Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6:

- Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec
  embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web
  API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is
  gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips
  secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes
  through resolvePublicCred per rule #11.

- Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses
  SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for
  password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not
  apply (false positive).

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895)

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact)

Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877):

- docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above
  "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6)
  and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section.
  Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading.
- any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any`
  (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which
  matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly.
- pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files"
  (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack
  policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the
windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning.

* feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868)

* feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT)

* fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections

---------

Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool

New providers:
- huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription)
- phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent
- poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie)
- venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie)
- v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie)
- kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie)
- doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie)

Additional:
- Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
- Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073
- Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers
- Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup)
- All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials

Closes #2885

* fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules

* feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899)

Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity.
It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id +
daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own
model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking,
claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect:

- token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON)
- auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token)
- browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow)
- bulk / ZIP import

New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}.
Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml,
ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration,
the token parser, and route auth-hardening.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896)

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal
trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6
(PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11).

* Pr 2871 (#2897)

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index

Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep
documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure.

* docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest

Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local>
Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local>
Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me>
Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru>
Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
2026-05-29 12:44:29 -03:00

1372 lines
45 KiB
TypeScript

import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import fs from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-sse-auth-"));
process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR;
process.env.API_KEY_SECRET = process.env.API_KEY_SECRET || "sse-auth-test-secret";
const core = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
const providersDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/providers.ts");
const settingsDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/settings.ts");
const apiKeysDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/apiKeys.ts");
const auth = await import("../../src/sse/services/auth.ts");
const quotaCache = await import("../../src/domain/quotaCache.ts");
async function resetStorage() {
core.resetDbInstance();
apiKeysDb.resetApiKeyState();
fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.mkdirSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true });
}
function futureIso(ms = 60_000) {
return new Date(Date.now() + ms).toISOString();
}
async function seedConnection(provider: string, overrides: any = {}) {
return providersDb.createProviderConnection({
provider,
authType: overrides.authType || "apikey",
name: overrides.name || `${provider}-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 8)}`,
email: overrides.email,
apiKey: overrides.apiKey || "sk-test",
accessToken: overrides.accessToken,
refreshToken: overrides.refreshToken,
isActive: overrides.isActive ?? true,
testStatus: overrides.testStatus || "active",
priority: overrides.priority,
rateLimitedUntil: overrides.rateLimitedUntil,
lastError: overrides.lastError,
lastErrorType: overrides.lastErrorType,
lastErrorSource: overrides.lastErrorSource,
errorCode: overrides.errorCode,
backoffLevel: overrides.backoffLevel,
providerSpecificData: overrides.providerSpecificData || {},
lastUsedAt: overrides.lastUsedAt,
consecutiveUseCount: overrides.consecutiveUseCount,
});
}
function msUntil(timestamp) {
return new Date(timestamp).getTime() - Date.now();
}
async function flushWrites() {
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
}
test.beforeEach(async () => {
await resetStorage();
});
test.after(async () => {
core.resetDbInstance();
apiKeysDb.resetApiKeyState();
fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
test("extractApiKey parses bearer headers and isValidApiKey validates persisted keys", async () => {
const created = await apiKeysDb.createApiKey("auth-check", "machine-auth-check");
const request = new Request("http://localhost/v1/chat/completions", {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${created.key}` },
});
assert.equal(auth.extractApiKey(request), created.key);
assert.equal(
auth.extractApiKey(
new Request("http://localhost/v1/chat/completions", {
headers: { Authorization: "Basic abc123" },
})
),
null
);
assert.equal(await auth.isValidApiKey(created.key), true);
assert.equal(await auth.isValidApiKey("sk-missing"), false);
assert.equal(await auth.isValidApiKey(""), false);
});
test("getProviderCredentials reports rate limiting when only inactive suppressed records remain", async () => {
const retryAfter = futureIso();
await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "inactive-rate-limited",
isActive: false,
rateLimitedUntil: retryAfter,
});
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(result.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(result.retryAfter, retryAfter);
assert.match(String(result.retryAfterHuman), /reset after/i);
});
test("codex session account affinity is opt-in and honors TTL", async () => {
const affinityDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/sessionAccountAffinity.ts");
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "least-used" });
await seedConnection("codex", { name: "codex-affinity-a", priority: 1 });
await seedConnection("codex", { name: "codex-affinity-b", priority: 2 });
const withoutAffinityA = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
sessionKey: "session-without-affinity",
});
const withoutAffinityB = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
sessionKey: "session-without-affinity",
});
assert.equal(typeof withoutAffinityA.connectionId, "string");
assert.equal(typeof withoutAffinityB.connectionId, "string");
assert.equal(
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("session-without-affinity", "codex", 60_000),
null
);
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000 });
const withAffinityA = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
sessionKey: "session-with-affinity",
});
const withAffinityB = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5", {
sessionKey: "session-with-affinity",
});
assert.equal(withAffinityB.connectionId, withAffinityA.connectionId);
assert.equal(
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("session-with-affinity", "codex", 60_000)?.connectionId,
withAffinityA.connectionId
);
});
test("session account affinity expires when TTL has passed", async () => {
const affinityDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/sessionAccountAffinity.ts");
const now = Date.now();
affinityDb.upsertSessionAccountAffinity("expiring-session", "codex", "conn-a", now, 1000);
assert.equal(
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("expiring-session", "codex", 1000, now + 500)
?.connectionId,
"conn-a"
);
assert.equal(
affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("expiring-session", "codex", 1000, now + 1001),
null
);
});
test("getProviderCredentials returns last error metadata when active accounts are all rate limited", async () => {
const retryAfter = futureIso();
await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "active-rate-limited",
rateLimitedUntil: retryAfter,
lastError: "provider rate limit",
errorCode: 429,
});
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(result.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(result.retryAfter, retryAfter);
assert.equal(Number(result.lastErrorCode), 429);
assert.equal(result.lastError, "provider rate limit");
});
test("getProviderCredentials enforces generic quota policy unless explicitly bypassed", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-policy",
providerSpecificData: {
limitPolicy: {
enabled: true,
thresholdPercent: 75,
windows: ["daily"],
},
},
});
const resetAt = futureIso();
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(connection.id, "openai", {
daily: { remainingPercentage: 10, resetAt },
});
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
bypassQuotaPolicy: true,
});
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(blocked.lastErrorCode, 429);
assert.match(blocked.lastError, /configured quota threshold/i);
assert.equal(blocked.retryAfter, resetAt);
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight skips exhausted preflight accounts and selects the next healthy one", async () => {
const blocked = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-preflight-blocked",
apiKey: "sk-preflight-blocked",
providerSpecificData: {
quotaPreflightEnabled: true,
},
});
const healthy = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-preflight-healthy",
apiKey: "sk-preflight-healthy",
providerSpecificData: {
quotaPreflightEnabled: true,
},
});
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async (connectionId) => ({
used: connectionId === blocked.id ? 100 : 40,
total: 100,
percentUsed: connectionId === blocked.id ? 1.0 : 0.4,
}));
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
assert.equal((selected as any).connectionId, healthy.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight returns allRateLimited when a forced connection is blocked by preflight", async () => {
const blocked = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-preflight-forced",
apiKey: "sk-preflight-forced",
providerSpecificData: {
quotaPreflightEnabled: true,
},
});
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async (connectionId) => ({
used: connectionId === blocked.id ? 100 : 20,
total: 100,
percentUsed: connectionId === blocked.id ? 1.0 : 0.2,
resetAt: futureIso(120_000),
}));
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai", null, null, null, {
forcedConnectionId: (blocked as any).id,
});
assert.equal(selected.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(selected.lastErrorCode, 429);
assert.match(selected.lastError, /quota preflight/i);
});
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight skips the upstream fetcher when no limits are configured", async () => {
// Latency gate regression test. When a connection has no per-window
// overrides AND its provider has no per-(provider, window) defaults seeded
// AND the legacy quotaPreflightEnabled flag isn't set, the dispatch loop
// must NOT call the registered quota fetcher. We assert by registering a
// fetcher that throws if invoked — any invocation surfaces as a test
// failure either via the thrown error or via the connection getting
// skipped (we expect it to pass through cleanly).
const conn = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-preflight-no-limits",
apiKey: "sk-no-limits",
// Crucially: no quotaPreflightEnabled flag, no overrides.
});
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
let fetcherCalls = 0;
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
fetcherCalls++;
throw new Error(
"quota fetcher must not run when no per-window overrides or provider defaults are set"
);
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
assert.equal((selected as any).connectionId, conn.id);
assert.equal(fetcherCalls, 0, "fetcher should not have been invoked");
});
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight invokes the fetcher when the global default is restrictive", async () => {
// No per-connection override and no provider-window defaults — but the
// operator has raised the global default cutoff above the factory no-op
// level (2% remaining). Preflight must run so the tighter floor applies.
const conn = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-preflight-restrictive-global",
apiKey: "sk-restrictive-global",
});
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
resilienceSettings: {
quotaPreflight: {
defaultThresholdPercent: 20, // stop at 20% remaining = 80% used
warnThresholdPercent: 30,
providerWindowDefaults: {},
},
},
});
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
let fetcherCalls = 0;
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
fetcherCalls++;
return null;
});
await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
assert.equal(
fetcherCalls,
1,
"fetcher should run when global default is stricter than the factory no-op level"
);
// Reset settings so subsequent tests see factory defaults.
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ resilienceSettings: {} });
// Verify the gate immediately returns to skip mode.
fetcherCalls = 0;
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
fetcherCalls++;
throw new Error("must not run with factory global default");
});
await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
assert.equal(fetcherCalls, 0, "fetcher should not run after settings reset to factory default");
});
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight invokes the fetcher when an override IS set", async () => {
// Counterpart to the no-limits test: if the connection has a
// quotaWindowThresholds override, preflight must run.
const conn = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-preflight-with-override",
apiKey: "sk-with-override",
});
const updated = await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(conn.id, {
quotaWindowThresholds: { primary: 50 },
});
// Sanity: the override must be readable on the connection row (this is
// what the dispatch loop reads through getProviderCredentials).
assert.deepEqual(
(updated as any)?.quotaWindowThresholds,
{ primary: 50 },
"override must be persisted on the connection row"
);
const refetched = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(conn.id);
assert.deepEqual(
(refetched as any)?.quotaWindowThresholds,
{ primary: 50 },
"override must round-trip through getProviderConnectionById"
);
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
let fetcherCalls = 0;
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("openai", async () => {
fetcherCalls++;
return null; // null → preflight proceeds, no skip
});
await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("openai");
assert.equal(fetcherCalls, 1, "fetcher should have been invoked exactly once");
});
test("getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight: explicit quotaPreflightEnabled:false bypasses preflight even when provider has global window defaults (#2831)", async () => {
// Regression: when a provider has providerWindowDefaults set AND a connection
// carries quotaWindowThresholds, the AND-of-negations gate in auth.ts would
// proceed to preflight even if the connection explicitly opted out with
// providerSpecificData.quotaPreflightEnabled === false.
const conn = await seedConnection("github", {
name: "github-explicit-opt-out",
apiKey: "ghp-opt-out-test",
providerSpecificData: { quotaPreflightEnabled: false },
});
// Give the connection per-window overrides (simulates a user-configured
// threshold) — this is the field that previously caused the gate to keep going.
await (await import("../../src/lib/db/providers.ts")).updateProviderConnection(conn.id, {
quotaWindowThresholds: { primary: 50 },
});
// Seed provider-level window defaults so providerHasDefaults === true.
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
resilienceSettings: {
quotaPreflight: {
defaultThresholdPercent: 2,
warnThresholdPercent: 20,
providerWindowDefaults: { github: { primary: 10 } },
},
},
});
const quotaPreflight = await import("../../open-sse/services/quotaPreflight.ts");
let fetcherCalls = 0;
quotaPreflight.registerQuotaFetcher("github", async () => {
fetcherCalls++;
// Return a quota that would block if preflight actually ran.
return { used: 98, total: 100, percentUsed: 0.98 };
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight("github");
assert.equal(
fetcherCalls,
0,
"fetcher must NOT run when connection explicitly opts out with quotaPreflightEnabled: false"
);
assert.equal(
(selected as any).connectionId,
conn.id,
"opted-out connection must be returned directly without being blocked by preflight"
);
// Cleanup: reset settings so subsequent tests see factory defaults.
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ resilienceSettings: {} });
});
test("getProviderCredentials keeps separate codex affinity per session", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 10,
codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000,
});
const first = await seedConnection("codex", {
name: "codex-affinity-a",
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 20_000).toISOString(),
});
const second = await seedConnection("codex", {
name: "codex-affinity-b",
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 10_000).toISOString(),
});
const sessionA1 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
sessionKey: "session-a",
});
const sessionB1 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
sessionKey: "session-b",
});
const sessionA2 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
sessionKey: "session-a",
});
const sessionB2 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
sessionKey: "session-b",
});
assert.equal(sessionA1.connectionId, first.id);
assert.equal(sessionB1.connectionId, second.id);
assert.equal(sessionA2.connectionId, first.id);
assert.equal(sessionB2.connectionId, second.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials rebinds codex session when affinity connection is excluded", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 10,
codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000,
});
const first = await seedConnection("codex", {
name: "codex-affinity-excluded-a",
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 20_000).toISOString(),
});
const second = await seedConnection("codex", {
name: "codex-affinity-excluded-b",
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 10_000).toISOString(),
});
const initial = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
sessionKey: "session-excluded",
});
const rebound = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", first.id, null, "gpt-5.5", {
sessionKey: "session-excluded",
});
const sticky = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "gpt-5.5", {
sessionKey: "session-excluded",
});
assert.equal(initial.connectionId, first.id);
assert.equal(rebound.connectionId, second.id);
assert.equal(sticky.connectionId, second.id);
});
test("resolveQuotaLimitPolicy normalizes Codex windows, thresholds, and defaults", () => {
const normalized = auth.resolveQuotaLimitPolicy("codex", {
limitPolicy: {
windows: [" Session (5h) ", "weekly (7d)", "custom-window", "", 42],
thresholdPercent: "250",
},
codexLimitPolicy: {
use5h: false,
useWeekly: true,
},
});
const defaults = auth.resolveQuotaLimitPolicy("codex", {});
const generic = auth.resolveQuotaLimitPolicy("openai", {
limitPolicy: {
enabled: "maybe",
thresholdPercent: "0",
windows: [" Daily ", "", null],
},
});
assert.deepEqual(normalized, {
enabled: true,
thresholdPercent: 100,
windows: ["weekly", "custom-window"],
});
assert.deepEqual(defaults, {
enabled: true,
thresholdPercent: 99,
windows: ["session", "weekly"],
});
assert.deepEqual(generic, {
enabled: false,
thresholdPercent: 1,
windows: ["daily"],
});
});
test("evaluateQuotaLimitPolicy aggregates reasons and keeps the earliest valid future reset", () => {
const connection = {
id: "quota-eval-connection",
providerSpecificData: {
limitPolicy: {
enabled: true,
thresholdPercent: 75,
windows: ["weekly", "session", "daily"],
},
},
};
const earliestReset = futureIso(90_000);
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(connection.id, "openai", {
weekly: { remainingPercentage: 20, resetAt: "not-a-date" },
session: { remainingPercentage: 5, resetAt: earliestReset },
daily: { remainingPercentage: 90, resetAt: futureIso(180_000) },
});
const evaluation = auth.evaluateQuotaLimitPolicy("openai", connection as any);
assert.equal(evaluation.blocked, true);
assert.deepEqual(evaluation.reasons, ["weekly usage 80%", "session usage 95%"]);
assert.equal(evaluation.resetAt, earliestReset);
});
test("getProviderCredentials round-robin stays on the current account while below the sticky limit", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 3,
});
const current = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "round-robin-current",
priority: 1,
});
const other = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "round-robin-other",
priority: 2,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(current.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
consecutiveUseCount: 1,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(other.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString(),
consecutiveUseCount: 0,
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(current.id);
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, current.id);
assert.equal(updated.consecutiveUseCount, 2);
});
test("getProviderCredentials returns null when only inactive non-rate-limited records remain", async () => {
await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "inactive-no-limit",
isActive: false,
testStatus: "active",
});
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(result, null);
});
test("getProviderCredentials honors allowedConnections filters", async () => {
const skipped = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "allowed-skip",
apiKey: "sk-skip",
});
const selectedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "allowed-select",
apiKey: "sk-selected",
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, [(selectedConn as any).id]);
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, selectedConn.id);
assert.equal(selected.apiKey, "sk-selected");
assert.notEqual(selected.connectionId, skipped.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials honors forcedConnectionId even when another account is preferred", async () => {
await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "forced-default",
priority: 1,
apiKey: "sk-default",
});
const forcedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "forced-target",
priority: 99,
apiKey: "sk-forced",
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
forcedConnectionId: (forcedConn as any).id,
});
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, forcedConn.id);
assert.equal(selected.apiKey, "sk-forced");
});
test("getProviderCredentials intersects forcedConnectionId with allowedConnections", async () => {
const allowedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "forced-allowed",
apiKey: "sk-allowed",
});
const blockedConn = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "forced-blocked",
apiKey: "sk-blocked",
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials(
"openai",
null,
[(allowedConn as any).id],
null,
{
forcedConnectionId: (blockedConn as any).id,
}
);
assert.equal(selected, null);
});
test("getProviderCredentials retains rate-limited accounts when allowSuppressedConnections is enabled", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "suppressed-rate-limit",
rateLimitedUntil: futureIso(),
});
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
allowSuppressedConnections: true,
});
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials retains rate-limited accounts when allowRateLimitedConnections is enabled", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "allow-rate-limit-option",
rateLimitedUntil: futureIso(),
});
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
allowRateLimitedConnections: true,
});
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials retains terminal accounts for combo live tests", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "suppressed-terminal",
testStatus: "banned",
backoffLevel: 4,
});
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", null, null, null, {
allowSuppressedConnections: true,
});
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(blocked, null);
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
});
test("getProviderCredentials skips codex scope-limited accounts unless suppression is allowed", async () => {
const retryAfter = futureIso();
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
authType: "oauth",
name: "codex-scope-limited",
email: "scope-limited@example.com",
apiKey: null,
accessToken: "scope-access",
refreshToken: "scope-refresh",
providerSpecificData: {
codexScopeRateLimitedUntil: {
spark: retryAfter,
},
},
});
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "codex-spark-mini");
const bypassed = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "codex-spark-mini", {
allowSuppressedConnections: true,
});
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(blocked.retryAfter, retryAfter);
assert.equal(bypassed.connectionId, connection.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials reports allRateLimited when every account is model-locked", async () => {
const first = await seedConnection("gemini", {
name: "gemini-model-lock-first",
});
const second = await seedConnection("gemini", {
name: "gemini-model-lock-second",
});
await auth.markAccountUnavailable(first.id, 429, "too many requests", "gemini", "gemini-2.5-pro");
await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
second.id,
429,
"too many requests",
"gemini",
"gemini-2.5-pro"
);
const blocked = await auth.getProviderCredentials("gemini", null, null, "gemini-2.5-pro");
assert.equal(blocked.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(Number(blocked.lastErrorCode), 429);
assert.ok(typeof blocked.retryAfter === "string" && blocked.retryAfter.length > 0);
assert.match(String(blocked.retryAfterHuman), /reset after/i);
});
test("getProviderCredentials auto-decays stale backoff metadata for recovered accounts", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "stale-backoff",
testStatus: "unavailable",
rateLimitedUntil: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString(),
lastError: "old error",
errorCode: 429,
backoffLevel: 3,
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
await flushWrites();
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
assert.equal(updated.backoffLevel, 0);
});
test("getProviderCredentials falls back to a five-minute retry window when quota policy has no reset", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-no-reset",
providerSpecificData: {
limitPolicy: {
enabled: true,
thresholdPercent: 50,
windows: ["daily"],
},
},
});
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(connection.id, "openai", {
daily: { remainingPercentage: 0, resetAt: null },
});
const result = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(result.allRateLimited, true);
assert.equal(result.lastErrorCode, 429);
assert.match(result.lastError, /configured quota threshold/i);
assert.ok(msUntil(result.retryAfter) > 240_000);
assert.ok(msUntil(result.retryAfter) <= 305_000);
});
test("getProviderCredentials prioritizes accounts that still have quota available", async () => {
const exhausted = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-exhausted",
priority: 1,
apiKey: "sk-exhausted",
});
const available = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "quota-available",
priority: 9,
apiKey: "sk-available",
});
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(exhausted.id, "openai", {
daily: { remainingPercentage: 0, resetAt: futureIso() },
});
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(available.id, "openai", {
daily: { remainingPercentage: 65, resetAt: futureIso() },
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, available.id);
assert.equal(selected.apiKey, "sk-available");
});
test("getProviderCredentials round-robin switches to the least recently used account after the sticky limit", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 2,
});
const current = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "round-robin-limit-current",
priority: 1,
});
const fallback = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "round-robin-limit-fallback",
priority: 2,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(current.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
consecutiveUseCount: 2,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(fallback.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 120_000).toISOString(),
consecutiveUseCount: 0,
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(fallback.id);
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, fallback.id);
assert.equal(updated.consecutiveUseCount, 1);
});
test("getProviderCredentials round-robin fallback mode excludes the failed account and picks the LRU peer", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
fallbackStrategy: "round-robin",
stickyRoundRobinLimit: 2,
});
const failed = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "round-robin-failed",
priority: 1,
});
const fallback = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "round-robin-fallback",
priority: 2,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(failed.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
consecutiveUseCount: 3,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(fallback.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 120_000).toISOString(),
consecutiveUseCount: 0,
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai", failed.id);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(fallback.id);
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, fallback.id);
assert.equal(updated.consecutiveUseCount, 1);
});
for (const strategy of ["random", "p2c", "least-used", "cost-optimized", "strict-random"]) {
test(`getProviderCredentials supports the ${strategy} selection strategy`, async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: strategy });
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: `strategy-${strategy}`,
priority: 7,
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
});
}
test("getProviderCredentials least-used prefers accounts that were never used", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "least-used" });
const recentlyUsed = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "least-used-recent",
priority: 1,
});
const neverUsed = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "least-used-never",
priority: 9,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(recentlyUsed.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(neverUsed.id, {
lastUsedAt: null,
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, neverUsed.id);
assert.notEqual(selected.connectionId, recentlyUsed.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials least-used prefers the oldest timestamp when all accounts were used", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "least-used" });
const oldest = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "least-used-oldest",
priority: 9,
});
const newest = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "least-used-newest",
priority: 1,
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(oldest.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 120_000).toISOString(),
});
await providersDb.updateProviderConnection(newest.id, {
lastUsedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, oldest.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials cost-optimized selects the lowest priority account", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "cost-optimized" });
const cheapest = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "cost-low",
priority: 1,
});
await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "cost-high",
priority: 8,
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, cheapest.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials p2c prefers the account with more quota headroom over raw priority", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "p2c" });
const nearLimit = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "p2c-near-limit",
priority: 1,
apiKey: "sk-p2c-near-limit",
providerSpecificData: {
limitPolicy: {
enabled: true,
thresholdPercent: 80,
windows: ["daily"],
},
},
});
const healthy = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "p2c-healthy-headroom",
priority: 9,
apiKey: "sk-p2c-healthy",
providerSpecificData: {
limitPolicy: {
enabled: true,
thresholdPercent: 80,
windows: ["daily"],
},
},
});
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(nearLimit.id, "openai", {
daily: { remainingPercentage: 12, resetAt: futureIso(180_000) },
});
quotaCache.setQuotaCache(healthy.id, "openai", {
daily: { remainingPercentage: 78, resetAt: futureIso(180_000) },
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, healthy.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials p2c deprioritizes accounts with recent rate-limit/backoff signals", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ fallbackStrategy: "p2c" });
await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "p2c-rate-limited-history",
priority: 1,
apiKey: "sk-p2c-rate-limited",
lastError: "rate limit",
lastErrorType: "rate_limited",
errorCode: 429,
backoffLevel: 3,
});
const healthy = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "p2c-clean-account",
priority: 8,
apiKey: "sk-p2c-clean",
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("openai");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, healthy.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials resolves the nvidia special alias pool", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("nvidia_nim", {
name: "nvidia-special-alias",
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("nvidia");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
});
test("getProviderCredentials exposes copilotToken when present in providerSpecificData", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
authType: "oauth",
name: "codex-copilot-token",
email: "copilot@example.com",
apiKey: null,
accessToken: "codex-access",
refreshToken: "codex-refresh",
providerSpecificData: {
copilotToken: "copilot-token-value",
},
});
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex");
assert.equal(selected.connectionId, connection.id);
assert.equal(selected.copilotToken, "copilot-token-value");
});
test("markAccountUnavailable uses configured cooldowns for local 404 model lockouts", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
providerProfiles: {
apikey: {
transientCooldown: 250,
rateLimitCooldown: 125,
maxBackoffLevel: 3,
circuitBreakerThreshold: 60,
circuitBreakerReset: 5000,
},
},
});
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "local-openai",
providerSpecificData: {
baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1",
},
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
404,
"model not found",
"openai",
"local-model"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 250);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
assert.equal(updated.lastErrorType, "not_found");
assert.equal(Number(updated.errorCode), 404);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable applies a model-only lockout for Gemini 429 responses", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("gemini", {
name: "gemini-model-limit",
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
429,
"too many requests",
"gemini",
"gemini-2.5-pro"
);
await flushWrites();
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
assert.equal(updated.lastErrorType, "rate_limited");
assert.equal(Number(updated.errorCode), 429);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable applies a model-only lockout for compatible provider 429 responses", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai-compatible-custom-node", {
name: "compatible-model-limit",
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
429,
"The upstream compatible service exhausted its capacity",
"openai-compatible-custom-node",
"custom-model-a"
);
await flushWrites();
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
assert.equal(updated.lastErrorType, "rate_limited");
assert.equal(Number(updated.errorCode), 429);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable honors configured api-key rate-limit cooldowns", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({
providerProfiles: {
apikey: {
transientCooldown: 125,
rateLimitCooldown: 125,
maxBackoffLevel: 3,
circuitBreakerThreshold: 60,
circuitBreakerReset: 5000,
},
},
});
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "configured-rate-limit-cooldown",
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
429,
"too many requests",
"openai",
"gpt-4o-mini"
);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 125);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable stores Codex scope-specific cooldowns without a global rate limit", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
authType: "oauth",
name: "codex-scope",
email: "codex@example.com",
apiKey: null,
accessToken: "codex-access",
refreshToken: "codex-refresh",
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
429,
"quota reached",
"codex",
"codex-spark-mini"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
const selected = await auth.getProviderCredentials("codex", null, null, "codex-spark-mini");
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "unavailable");
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
assert.ok(updated.providerSpecificData.codexScopeRateLimitedUntil.spark);
assert.equal(selected.allRateLimited, true);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable returns without fallback on bad requests", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "bad-request-no-fallback",
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
400,
"schema mismatch",
"openai",
"gpt-4o"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.deepEqual(result, { shouldFallback: false, cooldownMs: 0 });
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "active");
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable preserves terminal statuses without overwriting them", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "terminal-status",
testStatus: "expired",
rateLimitedUntil: null,
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(connection.id, 503, "upstream error", "openai");
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 0);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "expired");
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable reuses an existing connection-wide cooldown", async () => {
const retryAfter = futureIso(90_000);
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "existing-cooldown",
rateLimitedUntil: retryAfter,
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(connection.id, 503, "upstream error", "openai");
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, retryAfter);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable reuses an existing Codex scope cooldown", async () => {
const retryAfter = futureIso(90_000);
const connection = await seedConnection("codex", {
authType: "oauth",
name: "codex-existing-scope",
email: "codex-existing-scope@example.com",
apiKey: null,
accessToken: "scope-access",
refreshToken: "scope-refresh",
providerSpecificData: {
codexScopeRateLimitedUntil: {
spark: retryAfter,
},
},
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
429,
"quota reached",
"codex",
"codex-spark-mini"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
assert.equal(updated.rateLimitedUntil, undefined);
assert.equal(updated.providerSpecificData.codexScopeRateLimitedUntil.spark, retryAfter);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable uses a connection-wide cooldown for non-local 404 errors", async () => {
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "remote-404",
providerSpecificData: {
baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
},
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
404,
"model not found",
"openai",
"gpt-missing"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "unavailable");
assert.ok(updated.rateLimitedUntil);
});
test("markAccountUnavailable auto-disables permanently banned accounts when the setting is enabled", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ autoDisableBannedAccounts: true });
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "permanent-ban",
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
401,
"Verify your account to continue",
"openai",
"gpt-4o"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.equal(updated.isActive, false);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
});
test("markAccountUnavailable leaves permanently banned accounts active when auto-disable is disabled", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ autoDisableBannedAccounts: false });
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "permanent-ban-disabled",
});
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
401,
"Verify your account to continue",
"openai",
"gpt-4o"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.equal(updated.isActive, true);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
});
test("markAccountUnavailable swallows auto-disable persistence errors", async () => {
await settingsDb.updateSettings({ autoDisableBannedAccounts: true });
const connection = await seedConnection("openai", {
name: "permanent-ban-update-fails",
});
const db = core.getDbInstance();
const originalPrepare = db.prepare.bind(db);
db.prepare = (sql) => {
const statement = originalPrepare(sql);
if (!String(sql).includes("UPDATE provider_connections SET")) {
return statement;
}
return new Proxy(statement, {
get(target, prop, receiver) {
if (prop === "run") {
return (params) => {
if (params && typeof params === "object" && params.isActive === 0) {
throw new Error("persist disable failed");
}
return target.run(params);
};
}
return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
},
});
};
try {
const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
connection.id,
401,
"Verify your account to continue",
"openai",
"gpt-4o"
);
const updated = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connection.id);
assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
assert.equal(updated.isActive, true);
assert.equal(updated.testStatus, "banned");
} finally {
db.prepare = originalPrepare;
}
});