mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-08-24 08:02:14 +03:00
8d6f91b558
Validated on a 17-PR combined board: upstream-headers-proxy-auth within the board's 287/287, typecheck:core clean, gates within baseline. proxy-authorization and proxy-authenticate join the FORBIDDEN denylist — forwarding proxy-authorization to a model provider would hand that provider the operator's own proxy credential. Thank you @ntdat812!
67 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
67 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
// `FORBIDDEN` in src/shared/constants/upstreamHeaders.ts is documented as the
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// hop-by-hop / Host / framing denylist, and it was missing two of the RFC 7230
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// §6.1 names. Measured before the fix:
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//
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// proxy-authorization upstream=allow custom=allow
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// proxy-authenticate upstream=allow custom=allow
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// proxy-connection upstream=BLOCK custom=BLOCK
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//
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// `proxy-authorization` is the one that costs something: it authenticates the
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// hop to the operator's own proxy, so forwarding it hands that credential to
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// the model provider. Five other modules in this repo already strip it
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// (reverseProxy HOP_BY_HOP, mitm/sanitizeHeaders, inspector/httpProxyServer,
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// tproxy/tlsCapture, openapi/try) — the canonical list did not.
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import { test } from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import {
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isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName,
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isForbiddenCustomHeaderName,
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} from "../../src/shared/constants/upstreamHeaders.ts";
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import { HOP_BY_HOP } from "../../src/lib/services/reverseProxy.ts";
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import { sanitizeUpstreamHeadersMap } from "../../src/lib/db/models.ts";
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test("proxy-authorization and proxy-authenticate are refused", () => {
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for (const name of ["proxy-authorization", "proxy-authenticate"]) {
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assert.equal(isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName(name), true, name);
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assert.equal(isForbiddenCustomHeaderName(name), true, name);
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}
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});
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test("the refusal is case-insensitive, like every other name in the list", () => {
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for (const name of ["Proxy-Authorization", "PROXY-AUTHENTICATE", " Proxy-Authorization "]) {
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assert.equal(isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName(name), true, name);
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}
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});
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test("sanitizeUpstreamHeadersMap drops them and keeps the rest", () => {
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const out = sanitizeUpstreamHeadersMap({
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"Proxy-Authorization": "Basic c2VjcmV0",
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"Proxy-Authenticate": "Basic realm=x",
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"X-Custom": "ok",
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});
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assert.deepEqual(out, { "X-Custom": "ok" });
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});
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test("the canonical list now covers every hop-by-hop name reverseProxy strips", () => {
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// `reverseProxy.HOP_BY_HOP` is the repo's own RFC 7230 §6.1 list. The two
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// lists drifting apart is what this fix repairs, so compare them directly —
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// `trailers` is the TE token, spelled `trailer` as a header name.
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const missing = [...HOP_BY_HOP]
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.map((name) => (name === "trailers" ? "trailer" : name))
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.filter((name) => !isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName(name));
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assert.deepEqual(missing, []);
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});
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test("ordinary headers are still allowed", () => {
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for (const name of ["x-custom", "x-forwarded-for", "user-agent", "accept"]) {
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assert.equal(isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName(name), false, name);
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}
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// Auth headers stay allowed as *upstream* headers (the credential layer owns
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// them) while remaining forbidden as operator-supplied custom headers.
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assert.equal(isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName("authorization"), false);
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assert.equal(isForbiddenCustomHeaderName("authorization"), true);
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});
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