mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-08-17 20:52:15 +03:00
d46e8d72c9
* feat(cli): refuse ephemeral container auto-config writes Detect containerized OmniRoute and block CLI/API config writes into throwaway homes unless a bind mount or explicit opt-in is present, and honor compose host-profile CLI_CONFIG_HOME mounts outside the container home. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * chore(changelog): name fragment for #10057 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: yansigit <yansigit@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
77 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
import test from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import path from "node:path";
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/**
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* Static scan, not behavior: a new `setup-*` command that writes a CLI-tool
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* config must not silently no-op inside the OmniRoute container. Anything that
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* writes has to route through the container guard first.
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*/
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const COMMANDS_DIR = path.join(process.cwd(), "bin/cli/commands");
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const WRITE_CALLS = /\b(writeFileSync|writeAtomic|cpSync|copyFileSync|renameSync)\s*\(/;
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const GUARD_CALL = /guardHostConfigTarget\s*\(/;
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/**
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* Commands whose writes never target a host CLI's own config (they write to a
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* user-chosen --out path, OmniRoute's own data dir, etc.). Keep this list tiny
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* and justified — an entry here is an opt-out from the guard.
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*/
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const NOT_CLI_TOOL_CONFIG = new Set<string>([]);
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function setupCommandFiles(): string[] {
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return fs
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.readdirSync(COMMANDS_DIR)
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.filter((name) => name.startsWith("setup-") && name.endsWith(".mjs"))
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.sort();
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}
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test("every setup-* command that writes files calls the container guard", () => {
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const offenders: string[] = [];
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for (const name of setupCommandFiles()) {
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if (NOT_CLI_TOOL_CONFIG.has(name)) continue;
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const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(COMMANDS_DIR, name), "utf8");
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if (!WRITE_CALLS.test(source)) continue;
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if (!GUARD_CALL.test(source)) offenders.push(name);
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}
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assert.deepEqual(
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offenders,
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[],
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`these setup-* commands write config without guardHostConfigTarget(): ${offenders.join(", ")}`
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);
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});
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test("every guarded setup-* command exposes --allow-container-write", () => {
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const offenders: string[] = [];
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for (const name of setupCommandFiles()) {
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const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(COMMANDS_DIR, name), "utf8");
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if (!GUARD_CALL.test(source)) continue;
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if (!source.includes("--allow-container-write")) offenders.push(name);
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}
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assert.deepEqual(offenders, [], `missing the --allow-container-write escape hatch: ${offenders}`);
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});
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test("the scan actually sees the commands it is meant to protect", () => {
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const files = setupCommandFiles();
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assert.ok(files.length >= 12, `expected the setup-* family, found ${files.length}`);
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for (const expected of ["setup-codex.mjs", "setup-claude.mjs", "setup-crush.mjs"]) {
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assert.ok(files.includes(expected), `${expected} should be scanned`);
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}
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});
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test("config set and configure are guarded too", () => {
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for (const name of ["config.mjs", "configure.mjs"]) {
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const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(COMMANDS_DIR, name), "utf8");
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assert.match(source, GUARD_CALL, `${name} should call the container guard`);
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assert.ok(
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source.includes("--allow-container-write"),
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`${name} should expose --allow-container-write`
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);
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}
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});
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