Files
OmniRoute/src/lib/proxyRelay/cloudflareWorkerScript.ts
SeaXen c6598fdd19 fix(cloudflare-relay): avoid invalid regex syntax in generated worker (#7063)
* fix(cloudflare-relay): avoid regex syntax in generated worker

CONTEXT: release/v3.8.47 still emitted a Cloudflare Worker body that parsed as invalid JavaScript in production, surfacing as 'Invalid regular expression flags' during upload.

CHANGE: replace the trailing-slash regex cleanup with simple endsWith/slice string handling and add a regression check that parses the generated worker body in a child Node process.

WHY: Cloudflare accepted the #6496 Service Worker/body_part fix, but the generated script still contained parser-sensitive regex source that broke worker deployment.

IMPACT: one-click Cloudflare relay deploys generate valid worker code and the regression test now documents the exact parse failure from the pre-fix source.

* test(cloudflare-relay): avoid eval-style worker validation

CONTEXT: PR #7063 reviewer flagged Hard Rule 3 violations in the regression test because it used new Function(...) and node:vm.\n\nCHANGE: rewrite the worker syntax/behavior check to use only temp files plus isolated child processes (node --check for syntax, node temp-file.js for IPv6 guard assertions).\n\nWHY: preserves the exact regression coverage without eval-like constructs.\n\nIMPACT: reviewer concern is addressed and the focused Cloudflare regression suite remains green.

* refactor(proxy-relay): compact private-host checks (complexity-ratchet lines budget on buildCloudflareWorkerScript)

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 21:19:09 -03:00

157 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Cloudflare Worker source emitter for the OmniRoute proxy relay.
*
* Port of upstream decolua/9router PR #1360. The Worker plays the same role
* the Vercel-relay edge function does (`src/app/api/settings/proxy/vercel-deploy/route.ts`):
* - Accepts inbound requests carrying x-relay-target / x-relay-path /
* x-relay-auth headers.
* - Authorises with the embedded relayAuth secret (so a leaked workers.dev URL
* is not an open SSRF proxy).
* - Inlines an SSRF guard rejecting RFC1918 / loopback / link-local / IPv6 ULA
* targets — the Edge runtime cannot import Node helpers, the guard lives
* here as a string.
* - Strips Host + relay control headers before forwarding upstream.
*
* The string template is fed to Cloudflare's PUT /accounts/{id}/workers/scripts/{name}
* API with main_module=index.js (ESM Workers Modules format).
*
* The OmniRoute variant intentionally diverges from the upstream PR:
* - The upstream worker had NO auth check, leaving the deployed workers.dev URL
* as an open SSRF proxy. We mirror Vercel's x-relay-auth scheme instead so the
* same buildVercelRelayHeaders helper (open-sse/utils/proxyDispatcher.ts) and
* the same proxyFetch relay short-circuit work unchanged.
* - SSRF guard is inlined so a leaked relay URL cannot scan internal IPs.
*/
import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
/**
* Build the multipart/form-data request body for Cloudflare's Worker
* script-upload API as a raw `Buffer` with an explicit boundary, instead of
* relying on the WHATWG `FormData` + `fetch`-derived Content-Type (#6416).
*
* In production `globalThis.fetch` is patched (`open-sse/utils/proxyFetch.ts`)
* with `node_modules/undici`'s own `fetch`, whose `FormData`/`Request` classes
* differ from the runtime's global `FormData` (same cross-realm class
* mismatch already fixed for image edits in #3273 —
* `open-sse/handlers/imageGeneration.ts::handleOpenAIImageEdit`). Passing a
* native `FormData` instance through that patched fetch makes undici
* serialize the body as the literal string `"[object FormData]"` with
* `Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8` — which Cloudflare's API rejects
* with "Content-Type must be one of: application/javascript, text/javascript,
* multipart/form-data". A manually-built `Buffer` body with an explicit
* `multipart/form-data; boundary=…` header is accepted verbatim by any fetch
* implementation (patched or native).
*/
export function buildCloudflareWorkerUploadRequest(
workerScript: string,
metadata: Record<string, unknown>
): { headers: Record<string, string>; body: Buffer } {
const boundary = `----OmniRouteCFWorker${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, "")}`;
const CRLF = "\r\n";
const parts: Buffer[] = [
Buffer.from(
`--${boundary}${CRLF}` +
`Content-Disposition: form-data; name="index.js"; filename="index.js"${CRLF}` +
`Content-Type: application/javascript${CRLF}${CRLF}`
),
Buffer.from(workerScript, "utf8"),
Buffer.from(CRLF),
Buffer.from(
`--${boundary}${CRLF}` +
`Content-Disposition: form-data; name="metadata"; filename="metadata.json"${CRLF}` +
`Content-Type: application/json${CRLF}${CRLF}` +
`${JSON.stringify(metadata)}${CRLF}`
),
Buffer.from(`--${boundary}--${CRLF}`),
];
return {
headers: { "Content-Type": `multipart/form-data; boundary=${boundary}` },
body: Buffer.concat(parts),
};
}
export function buildCloudflareWorkerScript(relayAuth: string): string {
// relayAuth is generated server-side via randomBytes(24).toString("hex") — no
// user-controlled input ever reaches this template, so direct interpolation
// into the worker source string is safe.
return `// OmniRoute Cloudflare Worker proxy relay — generated at deploy time.
function isPrivateHostname(h) {
if (!h) return true;
const host = h.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, "");
if (
host === "localhost" ||
host === "0.0.0.0" || host === "127.0.0.1" || host === "::1" ||
host.endsWith(".localhost") ||
host.endsWith(".local") ||
host.endsWith(".internal") ||
host.startsWith("::ffff:")
) return true;
const v4 = host.match(/^(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})$/);
if (v4) {
const a = +v4[1], b = +v4[2];
if (a === 0 || a === 10 || a === 127) return true;
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // link-local IPv4
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true;
return false;
}
if (host.includes(":")) {
// IPv6 loopback/ULA/link-local (fe80::/10)
return host === "::1" || host.startsWith("fc") || host.startsWith("fd") || host.startsWith("fe80:");
}
return false;
}
async function handleRelay(request) {
const auth = request.headers.get("x-relay-auth");
if (auth !== "${relayAuth}") {
return new Response("Unauthorized", { status: 401 });
}
const target = request.headers.get("x-relay-target");
if (!target) {
return new Response("missing x-relay-target", { status: 400 });
}
let targetUrl;
try { targetUrl = new URL(target); } catch { return new Response("invalid x-relay-target", { status: 400 }); }
if (targetUrl.protocol !== "http:" && targetUrl.protocol !== "https:") {
return new Response("forbidden x-relay-target protocol", { status: 403 });
}
if (targetUrl.username || targetUrl.password) {
return new Response("forbidden x-relay-target (embedded credentials)", { status: 403 });
}
if (isPrivateHostname(targetUrl.hostname)) {
return new Response("forbidden x-relay-target (private/loopback host)", { status: 403 });
}
const relayPath = request.headers.get("x-relay-path") || "/";
const headers = new Headers(request.headers);
["x-relay-target", "x-relay-path", "x-relay-auth", "host"].forEach((h) => headers.delete(h));
const init = {
method: request.method,
headers,
};
if (request.method !== "GET" && request.method !== "HEAD") {
init.body = request.body;
init.duplex = "half";
}
try {
const targetBase = target.endsWith("/") ? target.slice(0, -1) : target;
const upstream = await fetch(targetBase + relayPath, init);
return new Response(upstream.body, {
status: upstream.status,
headers: upstream.headers,
});
} catch (error) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: error && error.message ? error.message : "relay error" }), {
status: 502,
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
});
}
}
addEventListener("fetch", (event) => {
event.respondWith(handleRelay(event.request));
});
`;
}