Files
OmniRoute/open-sse/services/rateLimitManager.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza 8180b49ce1 fix(quality): 2 production bugs + 24 unit base-reds + measured gate ceilings (#9529)
* fix(quality): resolve net-new lint errors and allowlist #9343 assert rewrite

Two `no-explicit-any` errors landed with #9407 and #9320 after the
suppressions inventory was generated. Project policy is to fix new
violations rather than freeze them, so both are typed instead:
  - #9407: `executor as unknown as Record<string, unknown>`
  - #9320: `(k: { name?: string })`

Also allowlists the net-assert reduction in web-tools-translation-2820
(39->35). #9343 inverted the contract — bare JSON must no longer be
promoted to tool_calls without an explicit <tool> envelope — so the
tests were rewritten to assert non-promotion, which costs fewer asserts
than validating a promoted object. More restrictive, not weaker.

* fix(quality): raise integration ceiling to 40min and unpin codex-cli version in test

The integration gate's 20min ceiling killed a healthy run: measured 22m08s
hermetic on an idle 16-core box (935 tests across 112 files, strictly serial
at --test-concurrency=1 because ~16 of them bind a port or share a DB). The
"~3-10min" estimate in the code was stale by ~3x. 40min keeps the ceiling's
real purpose — turning a genuine hang into a visible failure — without
failing a long-but-healthy suite.

Also fixes a base-red in chat-pipeline: 564c204efe bumped
DEFAULT_CODEX_CLIENT_VERSION to 0.146.0 but the User-Agent assertion still
pinned 0.144.1. The line two above already read the constant via
getCodexClientVersion(); this one duplicated the literal. Deriving it from
the same source stops the next bump from breaking the test again.

* fix(ratelimit): re-arm Bottleneck reservoir heartbeat after updateSettings

Bottleneck 2.19.5 (frozen upstream dependency, no release since 2019) has a
bug in LocalDatastore#_startHeartbeat() (node_modules/bottleneck/lib/
LocalDatastore.js:29,56): the guard `if (this.heartbeat == null && ...)`
only (re)creates the periodic reservoir-refresh interval the first time it
runs. Every later call -- including the one updateSettings() itself
triggers internally -- falls into the else branch and does
clearInterval(this.heartbeat) WITHOUT resetting the reference back to
null. Because the stale reference sticks around, every future
_startHeartbeat() call keeps taking the same dead else branch: the
periodic reservoir refresh is gone forever after the first manual
updateSettings() call on a limiter.

Every limiter created by this file starts with a live heartbeat
(buildLimiterDefaults() always sets reservoirRefreshInterval/
reservoirRefreshAmount), so the very first updateFromHeaders() /
updateFromResponseBody() / applyRequestQueueSettings() call against a
limiter permanently kills its refresh. In production this wedges the
request queue once the reservoir hits 0: an auto-enrolled apikey
connection accumulates its default 60 requests, the reservoir zeroes, the
queue freezes for ~120s, the watchdog fires a synthetic 502
(RATE_LIMIT_QUEUE_WEDGED), the connection cools down and gets excluded
from weighted combo pools -- turning a configured 70/30 split into
~50/50.

Add applyLimiterSettings(), a module-local wrapper around
limiter.updateSettings() that nulls the stale heartbeat reference and
re-invokes _startHeartbeat() afterward so it takes the "start a fresh
interval" branch again. Route all 5 updateSettings() call sites through
it (updateAllLimiterSettings, both updateFromHeaders() branches,
loadPersistedLimits(), and updateFromResponseBody()). updateAllLimiterSettings
is now async and awaited by its two callers (initializeRateLimits,
applyRequestQueueSettings); the sync call sites use the existing
trackAsyncOperation() fire-and-forget tracking pattern.

tests/integration/combo-matrix/weighted.test.ts is the E2E proof: the
"weighted: 70/30" case now passes with zero WEDGED/RATE_LIMIT_QUEUE/502
log lines across 200 sequential requests (previously the wedge/recovery
cycle inflated its runtime and skewed the distribution toward ~50/50).

Refs #8213

* fix(tests): remove stray TDD probes committed by accident in f4e93f339d

Three TDD repro/probe test files landed on the release tip via
f4e93f339d (docs: add management authentication terminology guide,
files from a worktree. Each file is a pre-fix TDD probe that belongs
to a *different*, still-in-flight fix branch/PR and duplicates a file
path that PR already owns and will properly update on merge:

- tests/unit/authz/probe-9033-repro.test.ts: probe for #9033 (IP
  blacklist direct-connection bypass). 3/4 asserts fail against this
  tree (D1, D2, Bonus — all assert the not-yet-implemented target
  behavior); D3 passes (pre-existing behavior). Owned by PR #9385
  (open, unmerged), which modifies this exact path.
- tests/unit/repro-8522.test.ts: probe for #8522 (absolute file-size
  baseline reds innocent PRs on inherited drift). First test fails
  against this tree's evaluateFileSizes (still absolute-only); second
  (sanity: real growth still flags) passes. #8522 is actually CLOSED
  upstream — PR #9355 merged the real fix into release/v3.8.50 today
  (2026-08-05T15:53Z) modifying this exact path — but this branch's
  merge-base with release/v3.8.50 (6b0e11e378) predates that merge,
  so the fix has not synced into this tree yet.
- tests/unit/repro-8956.test.ts: probe for #8956 (resolveProjectRoot
  stops at synthetic Next.js standalone package.json). First test
  fails against this tree; second (sanity: named package.json still
  resolves) passes. Owned by PR #9354 (open, unmerged), which
  modifies this exact path.

Each deleted file's real implementation + passing version already
exists in its owning PR and will land normally through that PR's own
merge — deleting the premature copy here does not lose any coverage.

No config/quality/test-masking-allowlist.json entry was added: the
_deletedWithReplacement schema only supports `replacement` (a test
file that must already exist in this tree's HEAD — none does, the
real versions live in the unmerged sibling PRs above) or `sourceRemoved`
(production files that must be absent from HEAD — they are not, none
of the three issues are implemented in this tree). Neither shape fits
an "owned by an in-flight sibling PR" deletion, so the CI test-masking
gate will flag these 3 deletions for mandatory human review on this
branch's next PR diff against release/v3.8.50 — flagged for the owner
rather than inventing a new allowlist shape.

Refs #9033, #8522, #8956, #7786

* fix(tests): align 8189-classifier-compat with #9276 always-mode semantics

tests/unit/8189-classifier-compat-auto-narrow.test.ts was a test-sibling
forgotten when #9276 (commit 6b531fbacd) removed the unconditional
`if (mode === "always") return true` branch from
shouldDefaultAllowClassifier(). tests/unit/claude-classifier-compat.test.ts
was updated in that same commit; this file was not.

Old contract: 'always' mode short-circuited every Claude-format request
unconditionally (operator opt-in was treated as sufficient on its own).
New contract: 'always' now requires the same SECURITY_MONITOR_MARKER
system-prompt text as 'auto' — the marker-optional behavior let a normal
chat request through /v1/messages be silently swallowed by an operator's
'always' opt-in.

The single 'always' test (1 assert, no-marker body expecting true) is
replaced by two tests mirroring the depth already used for 'auto' mode
in the same file: no-marker/false and marker-present/true. Net effect is
+1 assert, not a reduction — the new pair verifies both directions of
the narrowed contract instead of only the now-incorrect unconditional
case.

Before: 3/4 pass (the 'always' test failed: expected true, got false).
After: 5/5 pass.

Refs #9276

* fix(tests): align deepseek-web-tools-execute with #9343 tool envelope contract

tests/unit/deepseek-web-tools-execute-2820.test.ts (executor level) was a
test-sibling forgotten when #9343 (commit d969555417) hardened tool-call
parsing: bare JSON with no explicit <tool>/<tool_call> envelope is never
promoted to tool_calls anymore (previously it was, whenever a tools[] set
was requested — a security gap allowing prose/code-fenced JSON echoed
back by the model, or a copy-attack, to trigger real tool execution).

Three siblings were updated in the same commit: web-tools-translation.test.ts
and web-tools-translation-2820.test.ts (parseToolCallsFromText, the shared
translator), and deepseek-web-tools-variants.test.ts (parseDeepSeekToolCalls,
deepseek-specific parser) — all inverted their bare-JSON assertions to
`toolCalls === null` + `content === text` (preserved verbatim, not stripped).
This file calls the executor's execute() (full HTTP round trip through
buildToolAwareResult), so it was not touched by that diff and kept
asserting the old contract (finish_reason: "tool_calls", content: null).

Verified against source (open-sse/executors/deepseek-web.ts
buildToolAwareResult): when parseDeepSeekToolCalls returns toolCalls=null,
hasCalls is false, so finish_reason is "stop", message.tool_calls is never
set, and message.content is the parser's returned content — which for text
with no <tool>/<tool_call> tag at all is the original string, unchanged
(parseToolCallsFromText's early-return branch). The test now asserts
exactly that shape, at the same executor level as the rest of the file's
tool_calls that make sense at that level as the rest of the file's tool_calls
Refs #9343

* fix(tests): align visionBridge tests with #8430 contract (partial — see note)

Two test-siblings were forgotten when #8430 (commit 7e55abbc41) hardened
Vision Bridge's vision-model selection: getBestVisionModel() now validates
that a candidate has a usable active connection (hasUsableCredentialsForModel,
DB-backed) before returning it, instead of unconditionally returning the
fixedModel or a hardcoded "openai/gpt-4o-mini" default. Three siblings were
updated in the same commit (visionBridgeRouter.test.ts, the new
repro-8430.test.ts, vision-bridge-preserve-on-failure-4012.test.ts); these two
were not.

tests/unit/guardrails/visionBridgeHelpers.callVisionModel.test.ts (8 failures,
all "No vision-capable provider connected"): callVisionModel()'s `routerConfig`
param only merges into getBestVisionModel's CONFIG argument, never its `deps`
argument, so there is no way to inject a credentials stub through this
function's public signature (unlike the guardrail class and getBestVisionModel
itself, which do accept an injectable `hasUsableCredentials`). These tests
exercise callVisionModel's own request/response handling, not credential
routing (already covered elsewhere), so the fix seeds one real usable
`provider_connections` row per provider the file exercises (openai, anthropic)
via createProviderConnection in a test.before() hook, with resetDbInstance()
in test.after() per the DB-handle-cleanup convention. All 8 now pass.

tests/unit/guardrails/visionBridge.test.ts (7 failures): 1 of the 7 (VB-S03)
is a genuine forgotten-contract case, fixed here — same semantic flip already
applied to vision-bridge-preserve-on-failure-4012.test.ts: in the combo
describe path, when EVERY describe call fails, the raw image is now replaced
with an "(unavailable)" stub instead of preserved, because that path is only
reached for confirmed non-vision targets. Assertions inverted to match
(imagePart undefined, unavailable-stub present), same assert count, no
weakening.

*** THE OTHER 6 (VB-S12, VB-S12b, VB-S01, VB-S13, VB-S07, VB-S10) ARE
DELIBERATELY LEFT FAILING. *** These are NOT a #8430 contract change — root-
caused to what looks like a separate, unintentional regression: the ONE call
to getBestVisionModel() in visionBridge.ts's whole-request-reroute path
(line 244, `getBestVisionModel({ fixedModel: configuredModel })`) does not
pass a `deps` second argument, so it always uses the real DB-backed
hasUsableCredentialsForModel instead of this.deps.hasUsableCredentials — even
though the two adjacent checks in the very same function (`checkCreds(model)`
at line 226, `checkCreds(bestModel)` at line 246) DO honor the injectable
override. In this suite's empty-but-readable isolated test DB, that real
check deterministically returns `false` (not the indeterminate `null` the
file's own createGuardrail() comment says these tests rely on: "Fail-open
(null) so classic VB-S01/S07/S10 reroute tests keep working without a live
credential DB"), so getBestVisionModel silently returns null, the reroute
branch's `if (bestModel && ...)` guard never fires, and every test that
expects a reroute observes a silent no-op instead.

Evidence this is a source gap, not a test that needs updating:
- The file's own pre-existing comment names VB-S01/S07/S10 as tests the
  `null` fail-open default is SUPPOSED to keep green.
- VB-CRED-01/02 (the file's only two tests that actually inject a non-default
  hasUsableCredentials mock) both pass today, but neither one's assertions
  distinguish "mock honored" from "mock ignored, real check also says no" —
  they don't prove the threading works, they just don't happen to notice it's
  missing.
- visionBridgeRouter.test.ts, repro-8430.test.ts, and
  vision-bridge-preserve-on-failure-4012.test.ts (22 tests, all green) all
  either call getBestVisionModel directly with explicit deps, or mock
  callVisionModel wholesale (bypassing getBestVisionModel entirely) — none of
  them exercises this exact call site through the guardrail's own deps.

Per instructions, this was intentionally NOT "fixed" by weakening these 6
tests' assertions (that would mask the gap) or by seeding fake DB credentials
to route around it (that would hide a real production DI inconsistency behind
a test-only workaround) or by touching src/lib/guardrails/visionBridge.ts
(a production behavior change outside a test-alignment task's scope, and
Hard Rule #18 requires its own TDD/validation cycle). Flagging for the owner:
the likely one-line fix is threading `{ hasUsableCredentials:
this.deps.hasUsableCredentials }` as getBestVisionModel's second argument at
visionBridge.ts:244, mirroring the two adjacent call sites in the same
function.

Before: 15 failures (7 + 8). After: 9 pass added (1 + 8), 6 still fail
(unchanged, by design).

Refs #8430

* feat(quality): add strayFromCommit deletion allowlist form to test-masking gate

The deletion allowlist supported two shapes: replacement (test rewritten
elsewhere) and sourceRemoved (feature deleted). Neither fits a third
legitimate case surfaced today: test files that entered the repo BY
ACCIDENT — commit f4e93f339d (#7786 docs) swept another session's
worktree artifacts into the release, including TDD probes owned by open
fix PRs (probe-9033-repro -> PR #9385, repro-8956 -> PR #9354,
repro-8522 -> PR #9355). Those probes fail by design until their owning
PR merges, so every unit run on the release tip broke on them.

The new strayFromCommit form is verified, not trusted: the gate asks git
which commit actually ADDED the file (git log --diff-filter=A) and only
exempts the deletion when it matches the declared hash; a non-empty
reason naming the owning PR/issue is mandatory. Also allowlists the
deepseek-web-tools-execute assert reduction (23->21) from ed661f2126 —
same #9343 contract-inversion class as the existing
web-tools-translation entry.

Gate unit tests: 55/55 pass. Full gate vs main: OK.

* fix(guardrails): pass credential deps to getBestVisionModel at reroute call site

The individual-model reroute path in VisionBridgeGuardrail.preCall() calls
getBestVisionModel({ fixedModel: configuredModel }) without its second
`deps` argument, so the router always falls back to the real DB-backed
hasUsableCredentialsForModel instead of an injected
`deps.hasUsableCredentials` override. The two adjacent credential checks in
the same function (the original-model check and the best-model check,
both via the local `checkCreds` binding) already thread deps correctly —
only this middle call, added in #8430, was left out.

Pass the same resolved `checkCreds` used by those two adjacent checks as
`getBestVisionModel`'s deps argument so all three credential checks in this
reroute path stay consistent.

Fixes 6 tests in tests/unit/guardrails/visionBridge.test.ts that depended
on the injected hasUsableCredentials mock being honored on this path:
VB-S12, VB-S12b, VB-S01, VB-S13, VB-S07, VB-S10.

Refs #8430

* fix(quality): raise unit ceiling to 100min and align 2 more forgotten sibling tests

Unit ceiling 45->100min: a hermetic-env measurement on the loaded devbox
(load 7-26) was still inside invocation 1 of 3 at 76min when killed;
contention factor 2-3x measured, no idle measurement exists. The
pre-flight's real condition is exactly that contended one (unit runs in
Promise.all with integration+vitest), and there 45min provably killed a
healthy suite and fabricated a false base-red. The 45min value came from
v3.8.43 as an estimate never validated by measurement. TODO in-code:
re-tighten after an idle run on the .113 box.

Also aligns the 6th and 7th occurrences of the same systemic pattern
(behavior change merged updating only part of the sibling tests):
- issue-7859-gemini-web-redirect-valid: #9407 refined ServiceLogin
  redirects to mean expired session; the #7859 regression coverage is
  preserved via a non-ServiceLogin public redirect variant.
- provider-validation-specialty claude-web 429: #9406 inverted the
  contract (rate-limited session is unhealthy); the dedicated repro file
  owns the full contract, this sibling now matches it.

Also carries the file-size rebaseline for #9323's base.ts growth
(1578->1623, WAF retry + burst guard) and the eslintWarnings baseline
tightened 5000->0 (real measured value with the TS7 suppressions in
place — 5000 left the ratchet inert).

Refs #9407, #9406, #9323

* fix(tests): restore the 3 TDD probes now owned by merged fixes and drop their stray allowlist entries

The base advanced while this PR was open: the real fixes for the three
issues behind the stray probes all merged into release/v3.8.50 —
#9385 (issue 9033), #9355 (issue 8522) and #9354 (issue 8956).

- probe-9033-repro / repro-8522: the base rewrote both probes into the
  regression tests of their merged fixes, so the delete side of the
  rebase conflict was dropped and the base versions kept.
- repro-8956: #9354 only realigned one fixture line in
  auto-update.test.ts (package.json marker now needs a name field) and
  added no test for the new skip-synthetic behavior — the probe is the
  ONLY regression coverage of that merged fix (2/2 green on the base),
  so deleting it would remove real coverage. Restored.

With no test-file deletions left in the PR diff, the three
strayFromCommit allowlist entries are stale and removed. The
strayFromCommit form support in check-test-masking.mjs stays (covered
by its own fixtures).

* fix(quality): rebaseline file-size for PR #9529 own growth

The base sits exactly at the old frozen values, so the base-relative
mode (#8522) does not cover this growth — it is this PR's own:

- open-sse/services/rateLimitManager.ts 1060->1105: the
  applyLimiterSettings() helper that re-arms the reservoir heartbeat
  after updateSettings (Bottleneck 2.19.5 fix, TDD in
  ratelimit-reservoir-refresh.test.ts).
- tests/integration/chat-pipeline.test.ts 1592->1598: codex User-Agent
  derived from getCodexClientVersion() instead of a pinned literal.
- tests/unit/provider-validation-specialty.test.ts 2980->2985: new
  claude-web 429 -> valid:false coverage (#9406).

* fix(docs): sync provider count to 291 in README and CLAUDE

The live catalog counts 291 providers but README.md/CLAUDE.md still
said 290, so the STRICT 'Docs Gates (fast-path)' check reds EVERY open
PR against release/v3.8.50 (verified on #9537/#9539 as well — inherited
base-red, not introduced by this PR). Updated all provider-count
mentions including the section anchor.

* fix(tests): align launch-codex 6312 guard with the async #9454 spawn contract

#9454 made resolveCodexSpawn async (PATH-probes a native codex.exe before
the .cmd shim) and updated its own tests, but left this older sibling
calling the function synchronously — destructuring the Promise yields
undefined and reds Unit fast-path (1/4) for EVERY open PR against the
release (verified on #9537/#9539; inherited base-red). Realigned to the
async contract with an injected probe; keeps the original #6312 fallback
guard plus the only non-Windows codex coverage (now also asserting the
probe never runs off Windows).

* fix(translator): move state-mutating reasoning summary helper out of the pure leaf

#9500 added buildResponsesReasoningSummaryDelta(state, ...) to
pureHelpers.ts, but the function reads AND mutates stream state
(reasoningSummaryIndex map) — violating the leaf contract declared in
the file header ('no host imports, no stream state') and guarded by
response-openai-responses-purehelpers-split.test.ts, which reds Unit
fast-path (4/4) for every open PR (inherited base-red, verified on
#9537/#9539). Moved verbatim to the host next to the other stream-state
helpers (markResponsesReasoningDeltaEmitted); the host was its only
consumer. Behavior unchanged: repro-9500-reasoning-separator 3/3 green,
leaf/host architecture tests green.

* fix(quality): rebaseline openai-responses.ts for the leaf-state relocation

The #9500 helper moved from pureHelpers.ts into the host (previous
commit) grows the host file 1174->1204 while the leaf shrinks by the
same amount — net-zero LOC across the pair, but the per-file frozen
ratchet only sees the growing side.

* fix(tests): let the 9442 cert-mode test see past the harness trust-store guard

tests/_setup/isolateDataDir.ts sets OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST=1
globally, which makes installCert() return before issuing any command —
so the #9442 install-gap test captured nothing and could NEVER pass
under npm run test:unit (it only passed invoked directly, harness-less;
inherited base-red on Unit fast-path 3/4, verified on #9537/#9539).
Clear the flag for this file only (restored in test.after): safe because
every spawned command is a logging stub on PATH and OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO=1
strips sudo, so nothing touches the real trust store. 6/6 under the CI
harness including system-trust-test-guard.

---------

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-05 22:52:50 -03:00

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/**
* Rate Limit Manager — Adaptive rate limiting using Bottleneck
*
* Creates per-provider+connection limiters that auto-learn rate limits
* from API response headers (x-ratelimit-*, retry-after, anthropic-ratelimit-*).
*
* Default: ENABLED for API key providers (safety net), DISABLED for OAuth.
* Can be toggled per provider connection via dashboard.
*/
import Bottleneck from "bottleneck";
import { parseRetryAfterFromBody } from "./accountFallback.ts";
import { getAntigravityQuotaFamily } from "./antigravityQuotaFamily.ts";
import { getProviderCategory } from "../config/providerRegistry.ts";
import { getCodexRateLimitKey } from "../executors/codex.ts";
import { awaitProviderDefaultSlot, setProviderQuotaOverrides } from "./providerDefaultRateLimit.ts";
import {
DEFAULT_RESILIENCE_SETTINGS,
resolveResilienceSettings,
type RequestQueueSettings,
} from "../../src/lib/resilience/settings";
import {
STANDARD_HEADERS,
ANTHROPIC_HEADERS,
parseResetTime,
toPlainHeaders,
} from "./rateLimitManager/headers";
import { checkQueueAdmission } from "./rateLimitManager/admission";
interface LearnedLimitEntry {
provider: string;
connectionId: string;
lastUpdated: number;
limit?: number;
remaining?: number;
minTime?: number;
}
interface LimiterUpdateSettings {
maxConcurrent?: number | null;
minTime: number;
reservoir?: number | null;
reservoirRefreshAmount?: number | null;
reservoirRefreshInterval?: number | null;
}
type JsonRecord = Record<string, unknown>;
function toRecord(value: unknown): JsonRecord {
return value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value) ? (value as JsonRecord) : {};
}
function toNumber(value: unknown, fallback = 0): number {
const parsed =
typeof value === "number"
? value
: typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0
? Number(value)
: Number.NaN;
return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : fallback;
}
function isNodeTestRunnerChild(): boolean {
return typeof process.env.NODE_TEST_CONTEXT === "string";
}
function logRateLimit(...args: unknown[]): void {
if (!isNodeTestRunnerChild()) console.log(...args);
}
function warnRateLimit(...args: unknown[]): void {
if (!isNodeTestRunnerChild()) console.warn(...args);
}
function errorRateLimit(...args: unknown[]): void {
if (!isNodeTestRunnerChild()) console.error(...args);
}
// Store limiters keyed by "provider:connectionId" (and optionally ":model")
const limiters = new Map<string, Bottleneck>();
// Store connections that have rate limit protection enabled
const enabledConnections = new Set<string>();
// Store per-connection rate limit overrides (RPM, TPM, TPD, minTime, maxConcurrent)
// Populated from provider_connections.rateLimitOverrides on startup and refresh.
const connectionRateLimitOverrides = new Map<string, Record<string, number>>();
// Store learned limits for persistence (debounced)
const learnedLimits: Record<string, LearnedLimitEntry> = {};
const MAX_LEARNED_LIMITS = 200;
const INACTIVE_LIMITER_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
const limiterLastUsed = new Map<string, number>();
let persistTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
const pendingAsyncOperations = new Set<Promise<unknown>>();
const PERSIST_DEBOUNCE_MS = 60_000; // Debounce persistence to every 60s max
// Track initialization
let initialized = false;
let currentRequestQueueSettings: RequestQueueSettings = DEFAULT_RESILIENCE_SETTINGS.requestQueue;
// Watchdog: detect Bottleneck limiters that are wedged (queue has work, but no
// jobs are dispatched). When the reservoir/refresh state desyncs from reality,
// this catches it and force-resets so traffic isn't stuck forever.
const lastDispatchAt = new Map<string, number>();
let watchdogInterval: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
const WATCHDOG_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;
// Threshold has to exceed any *legitimate* gap between dispatches:
// - default reservoirRefreshInterval is 60s
// - adaptive minTime can climb to ~60s for 1-RPM providers (see updateFromHeaders)
// 120s gives a 2× margin against both, while still catching the actual wedge
// case we observed (queue stalled for 3+ minutes with no progress).
const WEDGE_THRESHOLD_MS = 120_000;
/**
* Env-var override for the auto-enable safety net. Highest priority — wins
* over the persisted dashboard setting. Use to disable in an incident without
* needing dashboard access.
* RATE_LIMIT_AUTO_ENABLE=false → never auto-enable
* RATE_LIMIT_AUTO_ENABLE=true → force on regardless of dashboard
* (unset) → use dashboard setting
*/
function isAutoEnableActive(settings: RequestQueueSettings): boolean {
const env = process.env.RATE_LIMIT_AUTO_ENABLE?.trim().toLowerCase();
if (env === "false" || env === "0" || env === "off") return false;
if (env === "true" || env === "1" || env === "on") return true;
return settings.autoEnableApiKeyProviders;
}
// Sentinels for "no rate limit" / effectively infinite capacity. The reservoir
// value uses Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER so the bucket can never realistically be
// exhausted; maxConcurrent uses a smaller-but-still-vast ceiling since
// Bottleneck tracks concurrent jobs in memory and an unbounded number would
// risk internal counter overflow under sustained pressure.
const EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE = Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER;
const EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE_CONCURRENCY = 1000;
// Resolve an RPM override. 0 or missing means "infinite" (no rate cap).
function resolveRpm(override: number | undefined | null): number {
return typeof override === "number" && override > 0 ? override : EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE;
}
// Resolve a minTime override. 0 or missing means "no minimum gap".
function resolveMinTime(override: number | undefined | null): number {
return typeof override === "number" && override > 0 ? override : 0;
}
// Resolve a maxConcurrent override. 0 or missing means "effectively infinite".
function resolveMaxConcurrent(override: number | undefined | null): number {
return typeof override === "number" && override > 0 ? override : EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE_CONCURRENCY;
}
function buildLimiterDefaults() {
// 0 or missing values mean "infinite" / no rate limit applies. This treats
// the global request-queue settings the same way per-connection overrides
// are interpreted (see resolveRpm / resolveMinTime / resolveMaxConcurrent).
return {
maxConcurrent: resolveMaxConcurrent(currentRequestQueueSettings.concurrentRequests),
minTime: resolveMinTime(currentRequestQueueSettings.minTimeBetweenRequestsMs),
reservoir: resolveRpm(currentRequestQueueSettings.requestsPerMinute),
reservoirRefreshAmount: resolveRpm(currentRequestQueueSettings.requestsPerMinute),
reservoirRefreshInterval: 60 * 1000,
};
}
/**
* Apply new settings to a Bottleneck limiter and re-arm its reservoir-refresh
* heartbeat.
*
* Bottleneck 2.19.5 (frozen upstream dependency, no release since 2019) has a
* bug in `LocalDatastore#_startHeartbeat()`
* (node_modules/bottleneck/lib/LocalDatastore.js:29,56): the guard
* `if (this.heartbeat == null && ...)` only (re)creates the periodic
* reservoir-refresh interval the FIRST time it runs. Every later call —
* including the one `updateSettings()` itself triggers internally — falls
* into the `else` branch and does `clearInterval(this.heartbeat)` WITHOUT
* resetting `this.heartbeat` back to `null`. Because the stale reference is
* left in place, every future `_startHeartbeat()` call keeps taking the same
* dead `else` branch: the periodic reservoir refresh is gone forever after
* the FIRST manual `updateSettings()` call on a limiter — every limiter here
* starts with a live heartbeat (buildLimiterDefaults() always sets
* reservoirRefreshInterval/reservoirRefreshAmount), so that "first call" is
* whichever of the 5 updateSettings() call sites in this file runs first.
*
* Work around it here instead of patching node_modules: null out the stale
* reference ourselves and re-invoke `_startHeartbeat()` so it takes the
* "start a fresh interval" branch again. Every `limiter.updateSettings(...)`
* call in this file MUST go through this helper, never Bottleneck's method
* directly.
*/
async function applyLimiterSettings(
limiter: Bottleneck,
updates: Bottleneck.ConstructorOptions
): Promise<void> {
await limiter.updateSettings(updates);
const store = (
limiter as unknown as {
_store?: {
heartbeat?: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null;
_startHeartbeat?: () => void;
};
}
)._store;
if (store && typeof store._startHeartbeat === "function") {
if (store.heartbeat != null) clearInterval(store.heartbeat);
store.heartbeat = null;
store._startHeartbeat();
}
}
async function updateAllLimiterSettings() {
const defaults = buildLimiterDefaults();
await Promise.all(
Array.from(limiters.values(), (limiter) => applyLimiterSettings(limiter, defaults))
);
}
function reconcileEnabledConnections(
connectionsRaw: unknown[],
requestQueueSettings: RequestQueueSettings
) {
const nextEnabledConnections = new Set<string>();
let explicitCount = 0;
let autoCount = 0;
for (const connRaw of connectionsRaw) {
const conn = toRecord(connRaw);
const connectionId = typeof conn.id === "string" ? conn.id : "";
const provider = typeof conn.provider === "string" ? conn.provider : "";
const isActive = conn.isActive === true;
const rateLimitProtection = conn.rateLimitProtection === true;
if (!connectionId || !provider) continue;
if (rateLimitProtection) {
nextEnabledConnections.add(connectionId);
explicitCount++;
continue;
}
if (
isAutoEnableActive(requestQueueSettings) &&
getProviderCategory(provider) === "apikey" &&
isActive
) {
nextEnabledConnections.add(connectionId);
autoCount++;
// Route through getLimiter so the `queued`/`executing` listeners and
// lastDispatchAt heartbeat are wired up — otherwise the watchdog sees
// `stalledMs = now - 0` and falsely flags healthy idle limiters as wedged.
getLimiter(provider, connectionId);
}
}
for (const connectionId of Array.from(enabledConnections)) {
if (!nextEnabledConnections.has(connectionId)) {
disableRateLimitProtection(connectionId);
}
}
for (const connectionId of nextEnabledConnections) {
enabledConnections.add(connectionId);
}
return {
explicitCount,
autoCount,
};
}
function watchdogTick() {
const now = Date.now();
// Clean up idle limiters that haven't been used recently
for (const [key, limiter] of Array.from(limiters)) {
const lastUsed = limiterLastUsed.get(key) ?? 0;
if (now - lastUsed > INACTIVE_LIMITER_MS) {
const counts = limiter.counts();
if (counts.QUEUED === 0 && counts.RUNNING === 0 && counts.EXECUTING === 0) {
limiters.delete(key);
lastDispatchAt.delete(key);
limiterLastUsed.delete(key);
logRateLimit(
`🧹 [RATE-LIMIT] Evicting idle limiter: ${key} (inactive for ${Math.round((now - lastUsed) / 1000)}s)`
);
trackAsyncOperation(limiter.disconnect());
}
}
}
for (const [key, limiter] of Array.from(limiters)) {
const counts = limiter.counts();
if (counts.QUEUED === 0) continue;
if (counts.RUNNING > 0 || counts.EXECUTING > 0) continue;
const lastDispatch = lastDispatchAt.get(key);
// No heartbeat yet → seed it and skip this tick. Prevents false wedge
// detection on a brand-new limiter or one created outside getLimiter.
if (lastDispatch === undefined) {
lastDispatchAt.set(key, now);
continue;
}
const stalledMs = now - lastDispatch;
if (stalledMs < WEDGE_THRESHOLD_MS) continue;
warnRateLimit(
`🚨 [RATE-LIMIT] WEDGED: ${key} queued=${counts.QUEUED} running=0 executing=0 stalled=${stalledMs}ms — force-resetting`
);
// Live incident (log id 1784465227489-a2cbc0): disconnect() releases the
// heartbeat timer but does NOT reject the QUEUED jobs already sitting on
// this instance — withRateLimit's `limiter.schedule()` for those callers
// then just hangs forever (nothing will ever dequeue them; getLimiter()
// only hands out a FRESH instance to future callers), leaving the
// dispatch orphaned until the outer ~300s per-target timeout eventually
// aborts it. Real clients routinely give up (and retry) well before that
// — this specific incident's client aborted at ~60s having never reached
// the provider at all (queued=2 running=0 executing=0 the entire time).
//
// stop({ dropWaitingJobs: true }) rejects exactly the RECEIVED/QUEUED/
// RUNNING jobs on THIS instance immediately (Bottleneck's own contract —
// see node_modules/bottleneck/bottleneck.d.ts StopOptions) so those
// withRateLimit() callers reject right away instead of hanging, letting
// combo's fallback/cooldown-wait engage within seconds instead of minutes.
// This is safe against the previously-documented "spurious 502 bursts"
// concern: the wedge condition checked above already requires
// RUNNING === 0 && EXECUTING === 0, so no job that's actually progressing
// can be caught by this — only ones already confirmed stuck. The instance
// is deleted from `limiters` synchronously (above) before this call, so
// no future getLimiter() call can ever hand out this now-stopped instance
// — the "permanently rejects future .schedule()" behavior stop() has is
// therefore moot; nothing will call .schedule() on it again.
evictWedgeLimiter(key, limiter);
}
}
let shutdownHandlersRegistered = false;
export function startRateLimitWatchdog(): void {
if (watchdogInterval) return;
watchdogInterval = setInterval(watchdogTick, WATCHDOG_INTERVAL_MS);
watchdogInterval.unref?.();
// Register SIGTERM/SIGINT shutdown handlers once, lazily, on first watchdog start.
// Registering here (rather than at module load) avoids interfering with test runner
// subprocess IPC teardown — the test suite does not call startRateLimitWatchdog().
if (!shutdownHandlersRegistered) {
shutdownHandlersRegistered = true;
process.once("SIGTERM", shutdownLimiters);
process.once("SIGINT", shutdownLimiters);
}
}
export function stopRateLimitWatchdog(): void {
if (!watchdogInterval) return;
clearInterval(watchdogInterval);
watchdogInterval = null;
}
function evictWedgeLimiter(key: string, limiter: Bottleneck): void {
if (limiters.get(key) !== limiter) return;
limiters.delete(key);
lastDispatchAt.delete(key);
limiterLastUsed.delete(key);
trackAsyncOperation(limiter.disconnect());
trackAsyncOperation(
limiter.stop({ dropWaitingJobs: true, dropErrorMessage: "rate-limit-watchdog-wedge-reset" })
);
}
/**
* Gracefully stop all limiters for process shutdown.
* ONLY call this from SIGTERM/SIGINT handlers — not during runtime resets.
* Calling .stop() during runtime (e.g. on 429 or connection disable) permanently
* rejects future .schedule() calls, causing 502 bursts. This function is the
* sole legitimate use of limiter.stop() in this module.
*/
function shutdownLimiters(): void {
for (const limiter of limiters.values()) {
limiter.stop({ dropWaitingJobs: false });
}
limiters.clear();
lastDispatchAt.clear();
limiterLastUsed.clear();
}
// Only register shutdown handlers when there are active limiters to shut down.
// Guard with once() so repeated registrations (e.g. test resets) don't stack.
// Note: these are registered lazily in startRateLimitWatchdog() to avoid
// interfering with test runner subprocess IPC teardown.
function trackAsyncOperation<T>(promise: Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
pendingAsyncOperations.add(promise);
// Do not use a fire-and-forget `.finally()` here: it creates a derived
// Promise that mirrors rejections from `promise`. When the caller intentionally
// tracks a background cleanup without awaiting it, that derived Promise can be
// reported as an unhandled rejection during Node's test-runner IPC teardown.
void promise.then(
() => {
pendingAsyncOperations.delete(promise);
},
() => {
pendingAsyncOperations.delete(promise);
}
);
return promise;
}
/**
* Initialize rate limit protection from persisted connection settings.
* Called once on app startup.
*/
export async function initializeRateLimits() {
if (initialized) return;
initialized = true;
try {
const { getCachedProviderConnections, getSettings } = await import("@/lib/localDb");
const [connections, settings] = await Promise.all([
getCachedProviderConnections(),
getSettings(),
]);
const resilience = resolveResilienceSettings(settings);
currentRequestQueueSettings = { ...resilience.requestQueue };
// #6846 Phase 1: operator overrides for header-less providers' static RPM
// budget + concurrency cap (nvidia today). No-op for every provider without
// an entry in either providerQuotaOverrides or PROVIDER_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS.
setProviderQuotaOverrides(resilience.providerQuotaOverrides);
const { explicitCount, autoCount } = reconcileEnabledConnections(
connections as unknown[],
currentRequestQueueSettings
);
await updateAllLimiterSettings();
// Load per-connection rate limit overrides
connectionRateLimitOverrides.clear();
for (const conn of connections as Array<Record<string, unknown>>) {
const overrides = conn.rateLimitOverrides;
if (overrides && typeof overrides === "object" && !Array.isArray(overrides)) {
connectionRateLimitOverrides.set(String(conn.id), overrides as Record<string, number>);
}
}
if (explicitCount > 0 || autoCount > 0) {
logRateLimit(
`🛡️ [RATE-LIMIT] Loaded ${explicitCount} explicit + ${autoCount} auto-enabled protection(s)`
);
}
// Load persisted learned limits
await loadPersistedLimits();
// Watchdog runs unconditionally — cheap, only fires when something is
// actually wedged.
startRateLimitWatchdog();
} catch (err) {
errorRateLimit("[RATE-LIMIT] Failed to load settings:", err.message);
}
}
export async function applyRequestQueueSettings(nextSettings: RequestQueueSettings) {
currentRequestQueueSettings = { ...nextSettings };
const { getCachedProviderConnections } = await import("@/lib/localDb");
const connections = await getCachedProviderConnections();
reconcileEnabledConnections(connections as unknown[], currentRequestQueueSettings);
await updateAllLimiterSettings();
}
/**
* Get or create a limiter for a given provider+connection combination
*/
export function enableRateLimitProtection(connectionId) {
enabledConnections.add(connectionId);
}
/**
* Disable rate limit protection for a connection
*/
export function disableRateLimitProtection(connectionId) {
enabledConnections.delete(connectionId);
// Evict limiters for this connection from the cache. Do NOT call limiter.stop() —
// it permanently rejects future .schedule() calls with "This limiter has been stopped",
// and in-flight requests holding a reference to the old instance would fail with 502.
// Call disconnect() (not stop()) to release Bottleneck's internal heartbeat timer
// without permanently poisoning the instance for any remaining in-flight jobs.
// Eviction-only would leak the heartbeat timer until GC; disconnect() releases it
// synchronously so the runtime memory footprint stays flat under heavy connection churn.
// .stop() is reserved exclusively for SIGTERM/SIGINT shutdown (see shutdownLimiters).
for (const [key, limiter] of Array.from(limiters)) {
if (key.includes(connectionId)) {
limiters.delete(key);
lastDispatchAt.delete(key);
limiterLastUsed.delete(key);
trackAsyncOperation(limiter.disconnect());
}
}
}
/**
* Check if rate limit protection is enabled for a connection
*/
export function isRateLimitEnabled(connectionId) {
return enabledConnections.has(connectionId);
}
/**
* Refresh per-connection rate limit overrides.
*
* Called after a PATCH update to `rateLimitOverrides` on a provider connection.
* Updates the in-memory map and evicts existing Bottleneck limiters for the
* connection so the next request gets a fresh limiter with the new settings.
*
* @param {string} connectionId
* @param {Record<string, number> | null} overrides - New overrides (null/undefined clears)
*/
export function refreshConnectionRateLimits(connectionId, overrides) {
if (overrides === null || overrides === undefined) {
connectionRateLimitOverrides.delete(connectionId);
} else {
connectionRateLimitOverrides.set(connectionId, overrides);
}
// Evict limiters referencing this connection so they get recreated on next use
for (const [key, limiter] of Array.from(limiters)) {
if (key.includes(connectionId)) {
limiters.delete(key);
lastDispatchAt.delete(key);
limiterLastUsed.delete(key);
trackAsyncOperation(limiter.disconnect());
}
}
}
/**
* Get or create a limiter for a given provider+connection combination
*/
function getLimiterKey(provider, connectionId, model = null) {
if (provider === "codex" && model) {
return `${provider}:${getCodexRateLimitKey(connectionId, model)}`;
}
if ((provider === "antigravity" || provider === "agy") && model) {
const family = getAntigravityQuotaFamily(model);
const scope = family === "other" ? model : family;
return `${provider}:${connectionId}:${scope}`;
}
// Gemini AI Studio and GitHub Copilot have per-model quotas — use model-scoped
// limiter keys so a 429 on one model doesn't pause requests for other models.
if ((provider === "gemini" || provider === "github") && model) {
return `${provider}:${connectionId}:${model}`;
}
return `${provider}:${connectionId}`;
}
function getLimiter(provider, connectionId, model = null) {
const key = getLimiterKey(provider, connectionId, model);
if (!limiters.has(key)) {
const defaults = buildLimiterDefaults();
const overrides = connectionRateLimitOverrides.get(connectionId);
if (overrides) {
// 0 (or missing) means "no override — fall through to buildLimiterDefaults()".
// Without this guard, an rpm of 0 sets reservoir=0, which Bottleneck treats
// as "depleted" and blocks ALL requests indefinitely. Treating 0 as "use
// default" lets users effectively disable per-connection limits without
// globally raising the system default.
if (typeof overrides.maxConcurrent === "number" && overrides.maxConcurrent > 0) {
defaults.maxConcurrent = overrides.maxConcurrent;
}
if (typeof overrides.minTime === "number" && overrides.minTime > 0) {
defaults.minTime = overrides.minTime;
}
if (typeof overrides.rpm === "number" && overrides.rpm > 0) {
defaults.reservoir = overrides.rpm;
defaults.reservoirRefreshAmount = overrides.rpm;
defaults.reservoirRefreshInterval = 60 * 1000;
}
// TODO: TPM/TPD integration — requires a token-bucket vs request-bucket
// separation (Bottleneck's reservoir is request-count, not token-count).
// When added, treat 0/missing the same way: fall through to system default.
}
const limiter = new Bottleneck({
...defaults,
id: key,
});
// Heartbeat: timestamp every dispatch so the watchdog can tell a healthy
// queue (just dispatched a job) from a wedged one (queue has work but
// nothing has been dispatched in a while).
limiter.on("executing", () => {
lastDispatchAt.set(key, Date.now());
});
limiters.set(key, limiter);
lastDispatchAt.set(key, Date.now());
limiterLastUsed.set(key, Date.now());
}
limiterLastUsed.set(key, Date.now());
return limiters.get(key);
}
/**
* Acquire a rate limit slot before making a request.
* If rate limiting is disabled for this connection, returns immediately.
*
* @param {string} provider - Provider ID
* @param {string} connectionId - Connection ID
* @param {string} model - Model name (optional, for per-model limits)
* @param {Function} fn - The async function to execute (e.g., executor.execute)
* @param {AbortSignal} signal - Optional abort signal to cancel waiting
* @returns {Promise<unknown>} Result of fn()
*/
async function getQueueHealthSnapshot(key: string, limiter: Bottleneck) {
const counts = limiter.counts();
let reservoirRemaining: number | null = null;
try {
reservoirRemaining = await limiter.currentReservoir();
} catch {
// Snapshot logging must never affect request handling.
}
const lastDispatch = lastDispatchAt.get(key);
return {
queued: counts.QUEUED,
running: counts.RUNNING,
executing: counts.EXECUTING,
reservoirRemaining,
lastDispatchAgeMs: lastDispatch ? Date.now() - lastDispatch : null,
};
}
export async function withRateLimit(
provider,
connectionId,
model,
fn,
signal = null,
retryAfterWedge = true
) {
if (!enabledConnections.has(connectionId)) {
return fn();
}
if (signal?.aborted) {
const reason = signal.reason;
if (reason instanceof Error) throw reason;
const err = new Error(typeof reason === "string" ? reason : "The operation was aborted");
err.name = "AbortError";
throw err;
}
// Proactive sliding-window fallback for header-less providers with a declared cap
// (Fase 8.2). No-op unless PROVIDER_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS has an entry for `provider`.
await awaitProviderDefaultSlot(
provider,
connectionId,
signal,
currentRequestQueueSettings.maxWaitMs
);
const limiter = getLimiter(provider, connectionId, model);
const maxWaitMs = currentRequestQueueSettings.maxWaitMs;
const scheduleOpts = maxWaitMs && maxWaitMs > 0 ? { expiration: maxWaitMs } : {};
// Issue #6593: opt-in admission cap — fast-reject before Bottleneck's
// schedule() (and before any downstream compression/prompt work runs) when
// the queue is already at/over maxQueueDepth. Default 0 = disabled.
const admissionErr = checkQueueAdmission(
limiter.counts().QUEUED,
currentRequestQueueSettings.maxQueueDepth,
model ? `${provider}/${model}` : provider
);
if (admissionErr) {
logRateLimit(
`🚧 [RATE-LIMIT] ${getLimiterKey(provider, connectionId, model)} — queue full, rejecting fast (maxQueueDepth=${currentRequestQueueSettings.maxQueueDepth})`
);
throw admissionErr;
}
try {
if (signal) {
let abortListener: (() => void) | undefined;
const abortPromise = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
const onAbort = () => {
const reason = signal.reason;
// Preserve native Error reasons (including AbortController's
// read-only DOMException) instead of mutating or wrapping them.
if (reason instanceof Error) {
reject(reason);
return;
}
const err = new Error(typeof reason === "string" ? reason : "The operation was aborted");
err.name = "AbortError";
if (reason !== undefined) {
(err as Error & { cause?: unknown }).cause = reason;
}
reject(err);
};
if (signal.aborted) {
onAbort();
return;
}
abortListener = onAbort;
signal.addEventListener("abort", abortListener, { once: true });
});
try {
return await Promise.race([limiter.schedule(scheduleOpts, fn), abortPromise]);
} finally {
if (abortListener) {
signal.removeEventListener("abort", abortListener);
}
}
} else {
return await limiter.schedule(scheduleOpts, fn);
}
} catch (err) {
// Bottleneck's raw `This job timed out after <maxWaitMs> ms.` is
// indistinguishable from an upstream gateway timeout, so it leaks into 502
// bodies / call-log `last_error` and gets misdiagnosed as a provider outage
// (#4165). Rewrite it into a clear, OmniRoute-owned error (knob named,
// upstream disclaimed, original kept as `cause`, `code` for classification).
// If the limiter is idle with capacity after the expiry, the scheduler is wedged.
// Reset it and retry this never-dispatched function once on a fresh limiter.
if (err?.message?.includes("This job timed out")) {
const key = getLimiterKey(provider, connectionId, model);
const queueState = await getQueueHealthSnapshot(key, limiter);
logRateLimit(
`⏰ [RATE-LIMIT] ${key} — job expired after ${Math.ceil((maxWaitMs || 0) / 1000)}s in queue, dropping`
);
const limiterIsWedged =
retryAfterWedge &&
queueState.running === 0 &&
queueState.executing === 0 &&
typeof queueState.reservoirRemaining === "number" &&
queueState.reservoirRemaining > 0 &&
typeof queueState.lastDispatchAgeMs === "number" &&
queueState.lastDispatchAgeMs >= Math.max(1, maxWaitMs || 0);
if (limiterIsWedged) {
logRateLimit(`🔄 [RATE-LIMIT] ${key} — recovering idle limiter after queue expiry`);
evictWedgeLimiter(key, limiter);
return withRateLimit(provider, connectionId, model, fn, signal, false);
}
const queueErr = new Error(
`Request dropped after exceeding the local rate-limit queue budget maxWaitMs (${maxWaitMs}ms) for ` +
`${model ? `${provider}/${model}` : provider} — this is OmniRoute's request queue ` +
`(resilienceSettings.requestQueue.maxWaitMs), not an upstream timeout. Raise it in ` +
`Settings → Resilience if this is queue saturation rather than a slow provider.`,
{ cause: err }
) as Error & { code?: string };
queueErr.code = "RATE_LIMIT_QUEUE_TIMEOUT";
throw queueErr;
}
// The watchdog's stop({ dropWaitingJobs: true }) wedge-recovery (above) rejects
// queued jobs with this exact message. Rewrite it the same way as the timeout
// case — a clear, OmniRoute-owned, classifiable error — so combo's transient-error
// handling (which already treats a 502 as retryable) falls back to the next target
// immediately instead of surfacing Bottleneck's internal wording.
if (err?.message === "rate-limit-watchdog-wedge-reset") {
const wedgeErr = new Error(
`Request dropped: the local rate-limit queue for ${model ? `${provider}/${model}` : provider} ` +
`was detected as wedged (stalled with nothing executing) and force-reset. This is OmniRoute's ` +
`own queue recovering, not an upstream error.`,
{ cause: err }
) as Error & { code?: string };
wedgeErr.code = "RATE_LIMIT_QUEUE_WEDGED";
throw wedgeErr;
}
throw err;
}
}
/**
* Update rate limiter based on API response headers.
* Called after every successful or failed response from a provider.
*
* @param {string} provider - Provider ID
* @param {string} connectionId - Connection ID
* @param {Headers} headers - Response headers
* @param {number} status - HTTP status code
* @param {string} model - Model name
*/
export function updateFromHeaders(provider, connectionId, headers, status, model = null) {
if (!enabledConnections.has(connectionId)) return;
if (!headers) return;
const plainHeaders = toPlainHeaders(headers);
const limiter = getLimiter(provider, connectionId, model);
const headerMap =
provider === "claude" || provider === "anthropic" ? ANTHROPIC_HEADERS : STANDARD_HEADERS;
// Get header values (handle both Headers object and plain object)
const getHeader = (name: string) => {
return plainHeaders[name.toLowerCase()] || null;
};
const limit = parseInt(getHeader(headerMap.limit));
const remaining = parseInt(getHeader(headerMap.remaining));
const resetStr = getHeader(headerMap.reset);
const retryAfterStr = getHeader(headerMap.retryAfter);
const overLimit = getHeader(STANDARD_HEADERS.overLimit);
// Handle 429 — rate limited
if (status === 429) {
const retryAfterMs = parseResetTime(retryAfterStr) || 60000; // Default 60s
const counts = limiter.counts();
const limiterKey = getLimiterKey(provider, connectionId, model);
logRateLimit(
`🚫 [RATE-LIMIT] ${provider}:${connectionId.slice(0, 8)} — 429 received, pausing for ${Math.ceil(retryAfterMs / 1000)}s, dropping ${counts.QUEUED} queued request(s)`
);
// Evict from the cache so follow-up learning from the same error body
// can materialize a fresh limiter immediately. Do NOT call limiter.stop() —
// it permanently rejects future .schedule() calls with "This limiter has been stopped".
// In-flight requests holding a reference to the evicted instance will fail (they
// were already going to fail — the 429 means the API rejected them), but future
// requests will get a fresh Bottleneck instance via getLimiter().
// Call disconnect() (not stop()) to release Bottleneck's internal heartbeat timer
// without permanently poisoning the instance for any remaining in-flight jobs.
// Without disconnect() here, every 429 leaks a heartbeat timer until GC reclaims
// the abandoned Bottleneck; under sustained quota pressure that is a real leak.
limiters.delete(limiterKey);
lastDispatchAt.delete(limiterKey);
limiterLastUsed.delete(limiterKey);
trackAsyncOperation(limiter.disconnect());
return;
}
// Handle "over limit" soft warning (Fireworks)
if (overLimit === "yes") {
logRateLimit(
`⚠️ [RATE-LIMIT] ${provider}:${connectionId.slice(0, 8)} — near capacity, slowing down`
);
trackAsyncOperation(applyLimiterSettings(limiter, { minTime: 200 }));
return;
}
// Normal response — update limiter from headers
if (!isNaN(limit) && limit > 0) {
const resetMs = parseResetTime(resetStr) || 60000;
// Calculate optimal minTime from RPM limit
const minTime = Math.max(0, Math.floor(60000 / limit) - 10); // Small buffer
const updates: LimiterUpdateSettings = { minTime };
// If remaining is low (< 10% of limit), set reservoir to throttle immediately
if (!isNaN(remaining)) {
if (remaining < limit * 0.1) {
updates.reservoir = remaining;
updates.reservoirRefreshAmount = limit;
updates.reservoirRefreshInterval = resetMs;
logRateLimit(
`⚠️ [RATE-LIMIT] ${provider}:${connectionId.slice(0, 8)}${remaining}/${limit} remaining, throttling`
);
} else if (remaining > limit * 0.5) {
// Plenty of headroom — relax the limiter
updates.minTime = 0;
updates.reservoir = null;
updates.reservoirRefreshAmount = null;
updates.reservoirRefreshInterval = null;
}
}
trackAsyncOperation(applyLimiterSettings(limiter, updates));
// Persist learned limits (debounced)
recordLearnedLimit(
provider,
connectionId,
{ limit, remaining, minTime: updates.minTime },
model
);
}
}
/**
* Get current rate limit status for a provider+connection (for dashboard display)
*/
export function getRateLimitStatus(provider, connectionId) {
const key = `${provider}:${connectionId}`;
const limiter = limiters.get(key);
if (!limiter) {
return {
enabled: enabledConnections.has(connectionId),
active: false,
queued: 0,
running: 0,
};
}
const counts = limiter.counts();
return {
enabled: enabledConnections.has(connectionId),
active: true,
queued: counts.QUEUED || 0,
running: counts.RUNNING || 0,
executing: counts.EXECUTING || 0,
done: counts.DONE || 0,
};
}
/**
* Get all active limiters status (for dashboard overview)
*/
export function getAllRateLimitStatus() {
const result: Record<string, { queued: number; running: number; executing: number }> = {};
for (const [key, limiter] of limiters) {
const counts = limiter.counts();
result[key] = {
queued: counts.QUEUED || 0,
running: counts.RUNNING || 0,
executing: counts.EXECUTING || 0,
};
}
return result;
}
/**
* Get all learned limits (for dashboard display).
*/
export function getLearnedLimits() {
return { ...learnedLimits };
}
// ─── Persistence ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function persistLearnedLimitsNow() {
try {
const { updateSettings } = await import("@/lib/db/settings");
await updateSettings({ learnedRateLimits: JSON.stringify(learnedLimits) });
logRateLimit(
`💾 [RATE-LIMIT] Persisted learned limits for ${Object.keys(learnedLimits).length} provider(s)`
);
} catch (err) {
errorRateLimit("[RATE-LIMIT] Failed to persist learned limits:", err.message);
}
}
/**
* Record a learned limit for debounced persistence.
*/
function recordLearnedLimit(
provider: string,
connectionId: string,
limits: Partial<Omit<LearnedLimitEntry, "provider" | "connectionId" | "lastUpdated">>,
model: string | null = null
) {
const key = getLimiterKey(provider, connectionId, model);
learnedLimits[key] = {
...limits,
provider,
connectionId,
lastUpdated: Date.now(),
};
// Debounce: save at most once per PERSIST_DEBOUNCE_MS
if (!persistTimer) {
persistTimer = setTimeout(async () => {
persistTimer = null;
await trackAsyncOperation(persistLearnedLimitsNow());
}, PERSIST_DEBOUNCE_MS);
}
}
export async function __flushLearnedLimitsForTests() {
if (persistTimer) {
clearTimeout(persistTimer);
persistTimer = null;
}
await trackAsyncOperation(persistLearnedLimitsNow());
if (pendingAsyncOperations.size > 0) {
await Promise.allSettled(Array.from(pendingAsyncOperations));
}
}
export async function __resetRateLimitManagerForTests() {
if (persistTimer) {
clearTimeout(persistTimer);
persistTimer = null;
}
// Collect and await all disconnect() Promises so Bottleneck's internal
// yieldLoop(0) calls settle before the next test starts. Not awaiting
// these can cause the Node.js test runner IPC channel to receive a
// corrupted message when the pending Promise fires during IPC serialization.
const disconnectPromises: Promise<unknown>[] = [];
for (const limiter of limiters.values()) {
disconnectPromises.push(limiter.disconnect());
}
limiters.clear();
enabledConnections.clear();
initialized = false;
lastDispatchAt.clear();
limiterLastUsed.clear();
shutdownHandlersRegistered = false;
for (const key of Object.keys(learnedLimits)) {
delete learnedLimits[key];
}
if (pendingAsyncOperations.size > 0) {
await Promise.allSettled(Array.from(pendingAsyncOperations));
}
if (disconnectPromises.length > 0) {
await Promise.allSettled(disconnectPromises);
}
}
export async function __getLimiterStateForTests(provider, connectionId, model = null) {
const key = getLimiterKey(provider, connectionId, model);
const limiter = limiters.get(key);
if (!limiter) return null;
const counts = limiter.counts();
const reservoir = await limiter.currentReservoir();
return {
key,
reservoir,
queued: counts.QUEUED || 0,
running: counts.RUNNING || 0,
executing: counts.EXECUTING || 0,
done: counts.DONE || 0,
};
}
/**
* Load persisted learned limits on startup.
*/
async function loadPersistedLimits() {
try {
const { getSettings } = await import("@/lib/db/settings");
const settings = await getSettings();
const raw = settings?.learnedRateLimits;
if (typeof raw !== "string" || raw.trim().length === 0) return;
const parsed = toRecord(JSON.parse(raw) as unknown);
let count = 0;
for (const [key, dataRaw] of Object.entries(parsed)) {
const data = toRecord(dataRaw);
const lastUpdated = toNumber(data.lastUpdated, 0);
// Skip stale entries (older than 24h)
if (lastUpdated > 0 && Date.now() - lastUpdated > 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000) continue;
const connectionId = typeof data.connectionId === "string" ? data.connectionId : "";
const provider = typeof data.provider === "string" ? data.provider : "";
const limit = toNumber(data.limit, 0);
const remaining = toNumber(data.remaining, 0);
const minTime = toNumber(data.minTime, 0);
learnedLimits[key] = {
provider,
connectionId,
lastUpdated,
...(limit > 0 ? { limit } : {}),
...(remaining >= 0 ? { remaining } : {}),
...(minTime >= 0 ? { minTime } : {}),
};
// Apply to limiter if it exists and has rate limit enabled
if (connectionId && enabledConnections.has(connectionId)) {
const limiter = limiters.get(key);
if (limiter && limit > 0) {
const inferredMinTime = minTime || Math.max(0, Math.floor(60000 / limit) - 10);
await applyLimiterSettings(limiter, { minTime: inferredMinTime });
count++;
}
}
}
if (count > 0) {
logRateLimit(`📥 [RATE-LIMIT] Restored ${count} learned rate limit(s) from persistence`);
}
} catch (err) {
errorRateLimit("[RATE-LIMIT] Failed to load persisted limits:", err.message);
}
}
/**
* Update rate limiter based on API response body (JSON error responses).
* Providers embed retry info in JSON payloads in different formats.
* Should be called alongside updateFromHeaders for 4xx/5xx responses.
*
* @param {string} provider - Provider ID
* @param {string} connectionId - Connection ID
* @param {string|object} responseBody - Response body (string or parsed JSON)
* @param {number} status - HTTP status code
* @param {string} model - Model name (for per-model lockouts)
*/
export function updateFromResponseBody(provider, connectionId, responseBody, status, model = null) {
if (!enabledConnections.has(connectionId)) return;
const { retryAfterMs, reason } = parseRetryAfterFromBody(responseBody);
if (retryAfterMs && retryAfterMs > 0) {
const limiter = getLimiter(provider, connectionId, model);
logRateLimit(
`🚫 [RATE-LIMIT] ${provider}:${connectionId.slice(0, 8)} — body-parsed retry: ${Math.ceil(retryAfterMs / 1000)}s (${reason})`
);
trackAsyncOperation(
applyLimiterSettings(limiter, {
reservoir: 0,
reservoirRefreshAmount: 60,
reservoirRefreshInterval: retryAfterMs,
})
);
}
}