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b45e0c69e6
* feat(security): warn at boot when the inference server is exposed anonymously `GET /v1/models` follows the dashboard login posture (`isAuthRequired()` / `requireAuthForModels`) while the inference routes follow `REQUIRE_API_KEY`. On an instance with an admin password set and `REQUIRE_API_KEY=false`, `/v1/models` answers 401 while `/v1/responses` is open to anyone who can reach the port — so the most natural probe an operator runs reports the opposite of the truth. #12568 added a boot warning for exactly this combination, but wired it only into the API bridge and the live dashboard WebSocket. The Next server that actually answers `/v1/chat/completions` and `/v1/responses` never reached it, and it is the one that binds every interface by default (`process.env.HOST || "0.0.0.0"`). Wire the existing guard into the Next boot hook, and document the split. Resolving the bound host needed care: two entrypoints bind that server and they read different variables. `run-next.mjs` honours `HOST`; the Docker entrypoint delegates to Next's generated `server.js`, which reads `HOSTNAME`. `run-next.mjs` now publishes what it actually binds as `OMNIROUTE_BOUND_HOST`, and the guard reads that, then `HOSTNAME`, then the shared `0.0.0.0` default. `HOST` is deliberately absent from the chain: the standalone server ignores it, so consulting it there would warn about an interface the server is not on — and one false warning teaches an operator to ignore the next one. Closes #13695 * docs(changelog): add changelog.d entry for #13820