Files
OmniRoute/src/middleware/promptInjectionGuard.ts
Ravi Tharuma 4fd1f0f15c fix(guardrails): align INPUT_SANITIZER request masking gate (#8093) (#8124)
Scoped to guardrails/security: dropped the unrelated js-yaml/tar/shell-quote/
brace-expansion override bumps, and isolated sanitizer-residual-policy.test.ts
to a tmp DATA_DIR so it no longer touches the real storage.sqlite.

Co-authored-by: RaviTharuma <RaviTharuma@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: rafaumeu <rafael.zendron22@gmail.com>
2026-07-23 04:50:43 -03:00

116 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Prompt Injection Guard — Express/Next.js middleware
*
* Legacy middleware facade that now delegates to the guardrail system.
*
* @module middleware/promptInjectionGuard
*/
import {
evaluatePromptInjection,
type PromptInjectionGuardrailOptions,
} from "@/lib/guardrails/promptInjection";
import { resolveDisabledGuardrails } from "@/lib/guardrails/registry";
import { CORS_HEADERS } from "@/shared/utils/cors";
/**
* Create a prompt injection guard middleware.
*
* @param {PromptInjectionGuardrailOptions} [options={}]
* @returns {(req: Request) => { blocked: boolean, result: Object }|null}
*/
export function createInjectionGuard(options: PromptInjectionGuardrailOptions = {}) {
/**
* Check a request body for prompt injection.
*
* @param {Object} body - The parsed request body
* @returns {{ blocked: boolean, result: Object }}
*/
return function guardRequest(body: any) {
if (!body || typeof body !== "object") {
return { blocked: false, result: { flagged: false, detections: [], piiDetections: [] } };
}
const decision = evaluatePromptInjection(body, options, {
disabledGuardrails: resolveDisabledGuardrails({ body }),
log: options.logger || console,
});
return {
blocked: decision.blocked,
result: decision.result,
};
};
}
/**
* Next.js API route handler wrapper for injection guarding.
*
* @param {Function} handler - Original route handler
* @param {GuardOptions} [options={}]
* @returns {Function} Wrapped handler
*/
export function withInjectionGuard(handler: any, options: any = {}) {
const guard = createInjectionGuard(options);
return async function guardedHandler(request: any, context: any) {
// Only apply to POST/PUT/PATCH
if (!["POST", "PUT", "PATCH"].includes(request.method)) {
return handler(request, context);
}
// Hoist parsed body so it can be threaded to the downstream handler (#4041).
let parsedBody: any = null;
try {
// Clone request so body can still be read by handler
const cloned = request.clone();
parsedBody = await cloned.json().catch(() => null);
if (parsedBody) {
const { blocked, result }: any = guard(parsedBody);
if (blocked) {
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message: "Request blocked: potential prompt injection detected",
type: "injection_detected",
code: "SECURITY_001",
detections: result.detections.length,
},
}),
{ status: 400, headers: { ...CORS_HEADERS, "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
);
}
// Attach sanitization result as header for downstream handlers.
// Web Request headers may be immutable — never let this throw into the
// outer security-check path (issue #8095).
if (result.flagged) {
try {
request.headers.set("X-Injection-Flagged", "true");
request.headers.set(
"X-Injection-Detections",
String(result.detections.length)
);
} catch {
// immutable headers: detection still applied; metadata is best-effort
}
}
}
} catch (error) {
console.error("[SECURITY] Injection guard error:", error);
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "Security check failed" }), {
status: 500,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
});
}
// Thread the already-parsed body to the handler as a third argument so downstream
// handlers (e.g. /v1/responses) can reuse it without re-cloning+re-parsing the
// request on the hot path (#4041). Handlers that don't accept a preParsedBody
// simply ignore the extra argument — no signature change required for other routes.
return handler(request, context, parsedBody);
};
}