Files
OmniRoute/scripts/dev/run-standalone.mjs
diegosouzapw 729252008b fix(authz): close 2nd Host-spoof path (cliTokenAuth) + IPv6 loopback + Docker stamp
Adversarial review of the peer-IP fix surfaced: (1) CRITICAL — cliTokenAuth.ts
still derived loopback from new URL(request.url).hostname (the same spoofable
Host class), letting a remote caller with a stolen CLI token reach management
APIs via Host: 127.0.0.1; now it trusts the middleware-stamped locality verdict
(AUTHZ_HEADER_PEER_LOCALITY, a client-stripped trusted header). (2) HIGH —
isLoopbackHost mangled bare IPv6 (::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) via split(":")[0],
a fail-closed DoS on IPv6 deploys. (3) HIGH — the Docker entrypoint ran bare
server.js (no peer stamp); run-standalone.mjs now prefers server-ws.mjs.
2026-05-31 01:15:27 -03:00

25 lines
873 B
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
import {
resolveRuntimePorts,
withRuntimePortEnv,
spawnWithForwardedSignals,
} from "../build/runtime-env.mjs";
import { bootstrapEnv } from "../build/bootstrap-env.mjs";
const env = bootstrapEnv();
const runtimePorts = resolveRuntimePorts(env);
// Prefer the WS-aware wrapper (server-ws.mjs) over the bare Next standalone
// server.js: it installs the trusted peer-IP stamp (scripts/dev/peer-stamp.mjs)
// that the authz middleware needs to allow loopback/LAN access to LOCAL_ONLY
// routes. Falling back to server.js fails CLOSED (every LOCAL_ONLY request 403s)
// rather than trusting the spoofable Host header.
const entry = existsSync("server-ws.mjs") ? "server-ws.mjs" : "server.js";
spawnWithForwardedSignals("node", [entry], {
stdio: "inherit",
env: withRuntimePortEnv(env, runtimePorts),
});