OmniRoute/open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts

import {
  BACKOFF_STEPS_MS,
  PROVIDER_PROFILES,
  RateLimitReason,
  HTTP_STATUS,
} from "../config/constants.ts";
import {
  BACKOFF_CONFIG,
  COOLDOWN_MS,
  calculateBackoffCooldown,
  findMatchingErrorRule,
  matchErrorRuleByText,
  matchErrorRuleByStatus,
} from "../config/errorConfig.ts";
import { getProviderErrorRuleMatch } from "../config/providerErrorRules.ts";
import { getPassthroughProviders, getProviderCategory } from "../config/providerRegistry.ts";
import {
  DEFAULT_RESILIENCE_SETTINGS,
  resolveResilienceSettings,
} from "../../src/lib/resilience/settings";
import {
  getAllCircuitBreakerStatuses,
  getCircuitBreaker,
} from "../../src/shared/utils/circuitBreaker";
import {
  classify429FromError,
  looksLikeQuotaExhausted,
  type FailureKind,
} from "../../src/shared/utils/classify429";
import { resolveProviderId } from "../../src/shared/constants/providers";
import { resolveUseUpstream429BreakerHints } from "../../src/shared/utils/providerHints";
import { getCodexModelScope } from "../config/codexQuotaScopes.ts";
import { isRpdExhausted, isRpmExhausted } from "./geminiRateLimitTracker.ts";

export type ProviderProfile = {
  baseCooldownMs: number;
  useUpstreamRetryHints: boolean;
  /** Issue #2100 follow-up. Stored override; undefined → per-provider default. */
  useUpstream429BreakerHints?: boolean;
  maxBackoffSteps: number;
  failureThreshold: number;
  resetTimeoutMs: number;
  transientCooldown: number;
  rateLimitCooldown: number;
  maxBackoffLevel: number;
  circuitBreakerThreshold: number;
  circuitBreakerReset: number;
  // Adaptive circuit breaker fields
  degradationThreshold?: number;
  // Provider-level cooldown fields
  providerFailureThreshold: number;
  providerFailureWindowMs: number;
  providerCooldownMs: number;
  maxBackoffMultiplier?: number;
  backoffEscalationCount?: number;
};
type JsonRecord = Record<string, unknown>;
type RateLimitReasonValue = (typeof RateLimitReason)[keyof typeof RateLimitReason];
type ModelLockoutEntry = {
  reason: string;
  until: number;
  lockedAt: number;
  failureCount: number;
  lastFailureAt: number;
  resetAfterMs: number;
};
type ModelFailureState = {
  failureCount: number;
  lastFailureAt: number;
  resetAfterMs: number;
  /** Cooldown applied on the last failure — extends the escalation window so a
   *  model that fails again right after its lockout expires keeps escalating. */
  lastCooldownMs?: number;
};
type AccountState = JsonRecord & {
  id?: string | null;
  rateLimitedUntil?: string | null;
  backoffLevel?: number | null;
  lastError?: unknown;
  status?: string;
};

function toJsonRecord(value: unknown): JsonRecord {
  return value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value) ? (value as JsonRecord) : {};
}

// Provider-level failure tracking for circuit breaker behavior
// Error codes that count toward provider-level failure threshold.
// 429 is included: per-error-type cooldowns (rate_limit: 60s, quota_exhausted: 1h)
// prevent cascading provider trips at scale (Issue #1846 concern addressed),
// while still allowing the circuit breaker to open on sustained 429s and
// prevent infinite combo retries (Issue #3200).
const PROVIDER_FAILURE_ERROR_CODES = new Set([408, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504]);

// Per-connection failure deduplication: prevents rapid-fire failures from the
// same connection from counting multiple times toward the provider breaker.
const CONNECTION_FAILURE_DEDUP_MS = 5000;
const MAX_CONNECTION_FAILURE_DEDUP_ENTRIES = 10_000;
const lastConnectionFailure = new Map<string, number>();

function pruneConnectionFailureDedupeEntries(): void {
  while (lastConnectionFailure.size > MAX_CONNECTION_FAILURE_DEDUP_ENTRIES) {
    const oldestKey = lastConnectionFailure.keys().next().value;
    if (typeof oldestKey !== "string") return;
    lastConnectionFailure.delete(oldestKey);
  }
}

const _connectionFailureSweep = setInterval(() => {
  const now = Date.now();
  for (const [key, ts] of lastConnectionFailure) {
    if (now - ts > CONNECTION_FAILURE_DEDUP_MS) lastConnectionFailure.delete(key);
  }
}, 60_000);
if (typeof _connectionFailureSweep === "object" && "unref" in _connectionFailureSweep) {
  (_connectionFailureSweep as { unref?: () => void }).unref?.();
}

// T06 (sub2api PR #1037): Signals that indicate permanent account deactivation.
// When a 401 body contains these strings, the account is permanently dead
// and should NOT be retried after token refresh.
export const ACCOUNT_DEACTIVATED_SIGNALS = [
  "account_deactivated",
  "account has been deactivated",
  "account has been disabled",
  "your account has been suspended",
  "this account is deactivated",
  // AG (Antigravity/Google Cloud Code) permanent ban signals
  "verify your account to continue",
  "this service has been disabled in this account for violation",
  "this service has been disabled in this account",
];

// Custom banned signals — loaded from DB settings at runtime.
// Combined with ACCOUNT_DEACTIVATED_SIGNALS in isAccountDeactivated().
let _customBannedSignals: string[] = [];

export function setCustomBannedSignals(signals: string[]): void {
  _customBannedSignals = signals;
}

export function getMergedBannedSignals(): string[] {
  if (_customBannedSignals.length === 0) return ACCOUNT_DEACTIVATED_SIGNALS;
  return [...ACCOUNT_DEACTIVATED_SIGNALS, ..._customBannedSignals];
}

// T10 (sub2api PR #1169): Signals that indicate billing credits are exhausted.
// Distinct from rate-limit 429 — the account won't recover until credits are added.
export const CREDITS_EXHAUSTED_SIGNALS = [
  "insufficient_quota",
  "billing_hard_limit_reached",
  "exceeded your current quota",
  "exceeded your current usage quota",
  "credit_balance_too_low",
  "your credit balance is too low",
  "credits exhausted",
  "out of credits",
  "payment required",
  "free tier of the model has been exhausted",
];

// T11: Signals that indicate OAuth token is invalid/expired (not permanent deactivation)
export const OAUTH_INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNALS = [
  "invalid authentication credentials",
  "oauth 2",
  "login cookie",
  "valid authentication credential",
  "invalid credentials",
];

// Context overflow patterns — the prompt exceeds the model's maximum context length.
// Different providers phrase this differently. Used to decide whether a 400 error
// should trigger combo fallback (a different model may have a larger context window).
const CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_PATTERNS = [
  /\binput is too long\b/i,
  /\binput too long\b/i,
  /\bcontext.*(too long|exceeded|overflow|limit)/i,
  /\btoo many tokens\b/i,
  /\bprompt is too long\b/i,
  /\bcontext window/i,
  /\bmaximum context/i,
  /\bmax.*token/i,
  /\btoken limit/i,
  /\brequest too large\b/i,
];

// Structured error codes that reliably indicate model access denied
// (more reliable than regex on human-readable messages).
// OpenAI:  { error: { code: "model_not_found", ... } }
// Anthropic: { error: { type: "not_found_error", ... } }
const MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_CODES = new Set([
  "model_not_found", // OpenAI, OpenAI-compatible (Kiro, Together, Fireworks, etc.)
  "deployment_not_found", // Azure OpenAI
]);

const MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_TYPES = new Set([
  "not_found_error", // Anthropic: model doesn't exist — reliably model-scoped
]);

// Anthropic's permission_error is NOT exclusively model-access related: it also
// covers API-key scope, organization restrictions and feature gating. Treating it
// as model-access-denied unconditionally would make a genuinely auth-restricted key
// silently exhaust every combo target and hide the real error from the caller.
// So it only counts when the message text confirms it refers to the model.
const MODEL_ACCESS_AMBIGUOUS_TYPES = new Set([
  "permission_error", // Anthropic: could be model access OR key/org/feature scope
]);

// Model access patterns — the account does not have access to the requested model
// but a different account (e.g. PRO vs free tier) may support it.
const MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_PATTERNS = [
  /\binvalid model\b/i,
  /\bmodel.*not.*(?:available|found|supported|accessible)\b/i,
  /\bmodel.*(?:does not exist|doesn't exist)\b/i,
  /\baccess.*denied.*model\b/i,
  /\bmodel.*access.*denied\b/i,
  /\bplease select a different model\b/i,
  // "...access to the requested model" / "model ... access" — bounded lookahead
  // (no nested quantifiers) so it stays ReDoS-safe while requiring BOTH an
  // access/permission word and "model" so a pure auth error never matches.
  /\b(?:access|permission)[\s\S]{0,60}?\bmodel\b/i,
  /\bmodel[\s\S]{0,60}?\b(?:access|permission)\b/i,
];

// Pure credential/authentication failures — the key or token itself is bad, which
// is NOT a model-availability problem. Some providers phrase these as a 400 that
// also mentions the model (e.g. "invalid api key for model X"), which would
// otherwise trip MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_PATTERNS above and trigger combo fallback
// across every target, masking the real "fix your credential" error. When the
// text clearly indicates a bad credential, the regex-based model-access detection
// is suppressed (structured codes/types like model_not_found are unaffected).
const AUTH_CREDENTIAL_ERROR_PATTERNS = [
  /\b(?:invalid|incorrect|expired|missing|revoked)\s+api[\s_-]?key\b/i,
  /\bapi[\s_-]?key\s+(?:is\s+)?(?:invalid|incorrect|expired|missing|revoked|not\s+valid)\b/i,
  /\bauthentication\s+(?:failed|error|required)\b/i,
  /\b(?:invalid|expired|missing|revoked)\s+(?:token|credentials?|bearer)\b/i,
  /\bunauthorized\b/i,
  /\bnot\s+authenticated\b/i,
];

// Malformed request patterns — the model rejected the message format but a different
// provider/model in the combo may accept it.
const MALFORMED_REQUEST_PATTERNS = [
  /\bimproperly formed request\b/i,
  /\binvalid.*message.*format/i,
  /\bmessages must alternate\b/i,
  /\bempty (message|content)\b/i,
  // Tool call function name errors
  /\bfunction'?s? name (?:can't|can not|is|has) (?:blank|empty|missing)/i,
  /function.*name.*(?:blank|empty|missing)/i,
  /tool_call.*name.*(?:blank|empty|missing)/i,
];

// Rate-limit text on a 400 — some providers (e.g. MiMoCode) signal throttling with a
// non-standard 400 status whose body carries rate-limit semantics instead of a 429
// (#4976). When detected, the request is fallback-worthy at connection-cooldown scope
// (NOT a whole-provider breaker) so combo routing can fail over to another free target.
// Bounded, non-overlapping patterns only (ReDoS-safe — no nested quantifiers).
const RATE_LIMIT_TEXT_PATTERNS = [
  /high.?frequency/i,
  /non-compliant/i,
  /too many requests/i,
  /rate.?limit/i,
  /频繁/, // "frequent" (zh) — high-frequency request throttling
  /频率/, // "frequency" (zh) — request-frequency throttling
];

// Parameter validation errors — model-specific constraints (different models = different limits)
const PARAM_VALIDATION_PATTERNS = [
  /max_tokens.*illegal/i,
  /max_tokens.*must be/i,
  /max_tokens.*range/i,
  /parameter is illegal/i,
  /is illegal.*range/i,
];

/**
 * T06: Returns true if response body indicates the account is permanently deactivated.
 */
export function isAccountDeactivated(errorText: string): boolean {
  const lower = String(errorText || "").toLowerCase();
  return getMergedBannedSignals().some((sig) => lower.includes(sig));
}

/**
 * T10: Returns true if response body indicates credits/quota are permanently exhausted.
 */
export function isCreditsExhausted(errorText: string): boolean {
  const lower = String(errorText || "").toLowerCase();
  return CREDITS_EXHAUSTED_SIGNALS.some((sig) => lower.includes(sig));
}

/**
 * T11: Returns true if response body indicates OAuth token is invalid/expired.
 * This is different from permanent account deactivation - token refresh can recover.
 */
export function isOAuthInvalidToken(errorText: string): boolean {
  const lower = String(errorText || "").toLowerCase();
  return OAUTH_INVALID_TOKEN_SIGNALS.some((sig) => lower.includes(sig));
}

// ─── Resilience Profile Helper ──────────────────────────────────────────────

function asRecord(value: unknown): JsonRecord {
  return value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value) ? (value as JsonRecord) : {};
}

function isCompatibleProvider(provider: string | null | undefined): boolean {
  return (
    typeof provider === "string" &&
    (provider.startsWith("openai-compatible-") || provider.startsWith("anthropic-compatible-"))
  );
}

function buildProviderProfile(
  category: "oauth" | "apikey",
  settings?: Record<string, unknown> | null
) {
  const resilience = settings ? resolveResilienceSettings(settings) : DEFAULT_RESILIENCE_SETTINGS;
  const connectionCooldown = resilience.connectionCooldown[category];
  const providerBreaker = resilience.providerBreaker[category];

  return {
    baseCooldownMs: connectionCooldown.baseCooldownMs,
    useUpstreamRetryHints: connectionCooldown.useUpstreamRetryHints,
    // Issue #2100 follow-up: propagate stored override (boolean | undefined)
    // so the runtime resolver picks user setting first, then per-provider default.
    useUpstream429BreakerHints: connectionCooldown.useUpstream429BreakerHints,
    maxBackoffSteps: connectionCooldown.maxBackoffSteps,
    failureThreshold: providerBreaker.failureThreshold,
    resetTimeoutMs: providerBreaker.resetTimeoutMs,
    transientCooldown: connectionCooldown.baseCooldownMs,
    rateLimitCooldown: connectionCooldown.useUpstreamRetryHints
      ? 0
      : connectionCooldown.baseCooldownMs,
    maxBackoffLevel: connectionCooldown.maxBackoffSteps,
    circuitBreakerThreshold: providerBreaker.failureThreshold,
    circuitBreakerReset: providerBreaker.resetTimeoutMs,
    degradationThreshold: providerBreaker.degradationThreshold,
    // Provider-level cooldown fields are not exposed in resilience settings yet.
    providerFailureThreshold: PROVIDER_PROFILES[category].providerFailureThreshold,
    providerFailureWindowMs: PROVIDER_PROFILES[category].providerFailureWindowMs,
    maxBackoffMultiplier: PROVIDER_PROFILES[category].maxBackoffMultiplier,
    backoffEscalationCount: PROVIDER_PROFILES[category].backoffEscalationCount,
    providerCooldownMs: PROVIDER_PROFILES[category].providerCooldownMs,
  } satisfies ProviderProfile;
}

/**
 * Get the resilience profile for a provider (oauth or apikey).
 * @param {string} provider - Provider ID or alias
 */
export function getProviderProfile(provider: string): ProviderProfile {
  const category = getProviderCategory(provider);
  return buildProviderProfile(category);
}

function shouldPreserveQuotaSignalsFor429(provider: string | null | undefined): boolean {
  if (!provider) return true;
  return getProviderCategory(provider) === "oauth";
}

export async function getRuntimeProviderProfile(provider: string | null | undefined) {
  try {
    const { getCachedSettings } = await import("@/lib/db/readCache");
    const settings = await getCachedSettings();
    const category = getProviderCategory(provider || "");
    return buildProviderProfile(category, settings);
  } catch {
    return getProviderProfile(provider || "");
  }
}

// ─── Per-Model Lockout Tracking ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// In-memory map: "provider:connectionId:model" → { reason, until, lockedAt }
const modelLockouts = new Map<string, ModelLockoutEntry>();
const modelFailureState = new Map<string, ModelFailureState>();

// Aliases (e.g. "cx" → "codex") must share lockout state with their canonical
// provider, otherwise a model locked via one spelling stays routable via the other.
const canonicalProviderCache = new Map<string, string>();
function getCanonicalLockProvider(provider: string): string {
  let canonical = canonicalProviderCache.get(provider);
  if (!canonical) {
    canonical = resolveProviderId(provider);
    canonicalProviderCache.set(provider, canonical);
  }
  return canonical;
}

function getModelLockKey(provider: string, connectionId: string, model: string) {
  const canonicalProvider = getCanonicalLockProvider(provider);
  const lockModel = canonicalProvider === "codex" ? getCodexModelScope(model) : model;
  return `${canonicalProvider}:${connectionId}:${lockModel}`;
}

function getFailureWindowMs(profile: ProviderProfile | null = null, fallbackMs = 30 * 60 * 1000) {
  const configured = profile?.resetTimeoutMs;
  return typeof configured === "number" && configured > 0 ? configured : fallbackMs;
}

function cleanupModelLockKey(key: string, now = Date.now()) {
  const entry = modelLockouts.get(key);
  if (entry && now > entry.until) {
    modelLockouts.delete(key);
  }

  const failure = modelFailureState.get(key);
  if (!failure) return;
  // The escalation window extends past the applied cooldown: a model that fails
  // again right after its lockout expires must keep escalating, not reset to 1.
  if (now - failure.lastFailureAt <= failure.resetAfterMs + (failure.lastCooldownMs ?? 0)) return;
  if (modelLockouts.has(key)) return;
  modelFailureState.delete(key);
}

function getModelLockBaseCooldown(
  status: number,
  fallbackCooldownMs: number,
  profile: ProviderProfile | null = null
) {
  if (Number.isFinite(fallbackCooldownMs) && fallbackCooldownMs > 0) {
    return fallbackCooldownMs;
  }
  if (typeof profile?.baseCooldownMs === "number" && profile.baseCooldownMs >= 0) {
    return profile.baseCooldownMs;
  }
  return status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED ? getQuotaCooldown(0) : COOLDOWN_MS.transientInitial;
}

function getScaledCooldown(
  baseCooldownMs: number,
  failureCount: number,
  maxBackoffLevel = BACKOFF_CONFIG.maxLevel
) {
  const safeBase = Number.isFinite(baseCooldownMs) && baseCooldownMs > 0 ? baseCooldownMs : 1000;
  const exponent = Math.min(Math.max(0, failureCount - 1), Math.max(0, maxBackoffLevel));
  return safeBase * Math.pow(2, exponent);
}

// Auto-cleanup expired lockouts every 15 seconds (lazy init for Cloudflare Workers compatibility)
let _cleanupTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;

function ensureCleanupTimer() {
  if (_cleanupTimer) return;
  try {
    _cleanupTimer = setInterval(() => {
      const now = Date.now();
      for (const key of modelLockouts.keys()) cleanupModelLockKey(key, now);
      for (const key of modelFailureState.keys()) cleanupModelLockKey(key, now);
    }, 15_000);
    if (typeof _cleanupTimer === "object" && "unref" in _cleanupTimer) {
      (_cleanupTimer as { unref?: () => void }).unref?.(); // Don't prevent process exit (Node.js only)
    }
  } catch {
    // Cloudflare Workers may not support setInterval outside handlers — skip cleanup timer
  }
}

/**
 * Lock a specific model on a specific account
 * @param {string} provider
 * @param {string} connectionId
 * @param {string} model
 * @param {string} reason - from RateLimitReason
 * @param {number} cooldownMs
 */
export function lockModel(
  provider: string,
  connectionId: string,
  model: string | null | undefined,
  reason: string,
  cooldownMs: number,
  metadata: Partial<ModelLockoutEntry> = {}
): void {
  if (!model) return; // No model → skip model-level locking
  ensureCleanupTimer();
  const key = getModelLockKey(provider, connectionId, model);
  cleanupModelLockKey(key);
  const newUntil = Date.now() + cooldownMs;
  // Preserve the longer cooldown if an existing lock has more time remaining.
  // Safe without a mutex: no await between get/set, so this runs atomically
  // within Node.js's single-threaded event loop.
  const existing = modelLockouts.get(key);
  if (existing && existing.until > newUntil) {
    if (metadata.failureCount && metadata.failureCount > existing.failureCount) {
      existing.failureCount = metadata.failureCount;
      existing.lastFailureAt = metadata.lastFailureAt ?? existing.lastFailureAt;
      existing.resetAfterMs = metadata.resetAfterMs ?? existing.resetAfterMs;
      modelLockouts.set(key, existing);
    }
    return;
  }
  const now = Date.now();
  modelLockouts.set(key, {
    reason,
    until: newUntil,
    lockedAt: now,
    failureCount: metadata.failureCount ?? existing?.failureCount ?? 1,
    lastFailureAt: metadata.lastFailureAt ?? now,
    resetAfterMs: metadata.resetAfterMs ?? existing?.resetAfterMs ?? 0,
  });
}

/**
 * Pick the `exactCooldownMs` to apply to a model lockout (#1308).
 *
 * When the upstream response carried an explicit reset longer than the base
 * cooldown — e.g. Antigravity "Resets in 160h", a `Retry-After` header, or a
 * parseable reset text already extracted by `checkFallbackError`/`parseRetryFromErrorText`
 * into `parsedCooldownMs` — honor it exactly so an exhausted model is not retried
 * again within minutes. Otherwise preserve the previous behavior: return `0` to let
 * `recordModelLockoutFailure` apply its exponential backoff, or the base cooldown when
 * backoff is disabled.
 */
export function selectLockoutCooldownMs(
  parsedCooldownMs: number,
  settings: { baseCooldownMs: number; useExponentialBackoff: boolean }
): number {
  if (typeof parsedCooldownMs === "number" && parsedCooldownMs > settings.baseCooldownMs) {
    return parsedCooldownMs;
  }
  return settings.useExponentialBackoff ? 0 : settings.baseCooldownMs;
}

export function recordModelLockoutFailure(
  provider: string,
  connectionId: string,
  model: string,
  reason: string,
  status: number,
  fallbackCooldownMs: number,
  profile: ProviderProfile | null = null,
  options: { exactCooldownMs?: number | null; maxCooldownMs?: number } = {}
) {
  ensureCleanupTimer();
  const key = getModelLockKey(provider, connectionId, model);
  const now = Date.now();
  cleanupModelLockKey(key, now);

  // For daily quota exhaustion (quota_exhausted), set cooldown until tomorrow 00:00
  // Use exactCooldownMs to bypass exponential backoff, ensuring precise lock until midnight
  if (reason === "quota_exhausted" && typeof options.exactCooldownMs !== "number") {
    options = { ...options, exactCooldownMs: getMsUntilTomorrow() };
  }

  const resetAfterMs = getFailureWindowMs(profile);
  const previous = modelFailureState.get(key);
  // Escalation window extends past the previously applied cooldown so a model
  // that fails again right after its lockout expires keeps escalating.
  const withinWindow =
    previous &&
    now - previous.lastFailureAt <= previous.resetAfterMs + (previous.lastCooldownMs ?? 0);
  const failureCount = withinWindow ? previous.failureCount + 1 : 1;

  const baseCooldownMs = getModelLockBaseCooldown(status, fallbackCooldownMs, profile);
  // Cap exponential backoff so repeated failures cannot produce absurdly long
  // lockouts; exact cooldowns (e.g. daily-quota until-midnight) are not capped.
  const maxCooldownMs =
    typeof options.maxCooldownMs === "number" && options.maxCooldownMs > 0
      ? options.maxCooldownMs
      : BACKOFF_CONFIG.max;
  const cooldownMs =
    typeof options.exactCooldownMs === "number" && options.exactCooldownMs > 0
      ? options.exactCooldownMs
      : Math.min(
          getScaledCooldown(
            baseCooldownMs,
            failureCount,
            profile?.maxBackoffSteps ?? BACKOFF_CONFIG.maxLevel
          ),
          maxCooldownMs
        );

  modelFailureState.set(key, {
    failureCount,
    lastFailureAt: now,
    resetAfterMs,
    lastCooldownMs: cooldownMs,
  });

  lockModel(provider, connectionId, model, reason, cooldownMs, {
    failureCount,
    lastFailureAt: now,
    resetAfterMs,
  });

  return {
    cooldownMs,
    failureCount,
    resetAfterMs,
  };
}

export function clearModelLock(
  provider: string,
  connectionId: string,
  model: string | null | undefined
): boolean {
  if (!model) return false;
  const key = getModelLockKey(provider, connectionId, model);
  const hadLock = modelLockouts.delete(key);
  const hadFailureState = modelFailureState.delete(key);
  return hadLock || hadFailureState;
}

/**
 * Whether a provider should use per-model lockouts instead of connection-wide cooldowns.
 * Compatible and passthrough providers multiplex multiple upstream models behind one
 * connection, so transient 404/429 responses should stay model-scoped instead of
 * poisoning the whole connection.
 *
 * @param provider - Provider ID
 * @param _model - Model ID (reserved for future use)
 * @param connectionPassthroughModels - Optional per-connection override from providerSpecificData.
 *        When provided, takes precedence over registry/provider-level logic.
 */
export function hasPerModelQuota(
  provider: string | null | undefined,
  _model: string | null | undefined = null,
  connectionPassthroughModels?: boolean
): boolean {
  // Connection-level override takes precedence (e.g., user-configured ModelScope)
  if (typeof connectionPassthroughModels === "boolean") {
    return connectionPassthroughModels;
  }
  if (!provider) return false;
  if (getCanonicalLockProvider(provider) === "codex") return true;
  if (provider === "gemini" || provider === "github") return true;
  if (getPassthroughProviders().has(provider)) return true;
  if (isCompatibleProvider(provider)) return true;
  return false;
}

/**
 * Lock a model (not connection) for a provider with per-model quotas.
 * No-ops for providers that don't use per-model lockouts.
 */
export function lockModelIfPerModelQuota(
  provider: string,
  connectionId: string,
  model: string | null,
  reason: string,
  cooldownMs: number,
  connectionPassthroughModels?: boolean
): boolean {
  if (!hasPerModelQuota(provider, model, connectionPassthroughModels) || !model) return false;
  // Skip model-level lock if the entire provider is in circuit-breaker cooldown.
  // The provider cooldown already prevents all requests, so a model lock is redundant.
  if (isProviderInCooldown(provider)) return false;
  lockModel(provider, connectionId, model, reason, cooldownMs);
  return true;
}

export function shouldMarkAccountExhaustedFrom429(
  provider: string | null | undefined,
  model: string | null | undefined = null,
  connectionPassthroughModels?: boolean,
  failureKind?: FailureKind
): boolean {
  // A plain 429 means transient rate limiting / high traffic for many OAuth providers.
  // Only connection-poison the quota cache when the upstream body explicitly says
  // the long-window quota is exhausted; otherwise fallback should try another account
  // without making this one look quota-depleted for 5 minutes.
  if (failureKind === "rate_limit" || failureKind === "transient") return false;
  return (
    shouldPreserveQuotaSignalsFor429(provider) &&
    !hasPerModelQuota(provider, model, connectionPassthroughModels)
  );
}

export function classifyLockoutReason(status: number): string {
  if (status === 429) return "rate_limit";
  if (status === 403) return "quota_exhausted";
  return "unknown";
}

export type DecayResult = { cleared: boolean; newFailureCount: number };

export function decayModelFailureCount(
  provider: string,
  connectionId: string,
  model: string
): DecayResult {
  const key = getModelLockKey(provider, connectionId, model);
  const failure = modelFailureState.get(key);
  if (!failure) return { cleared: false, newFailureCount: 0 };

  const newFailureCount = Math.floor(failure.failureCount / 2);
  if (newFailureCount === 0) {
    modelFailureState.delete(key);
    return { cleared: true, newFailureCount: 0 };
  } else {
    modelFailureState.set(key, {
      ...failure,
      failureCount: newFailureCount,
    });
    return { cleared: false, newFailureCount };
  }
}

/**
 * Clear all in-memory model lockouts and failure state (for tests / full reset).
 */
export function clearAllModelLockouts(): void {
  modelLockouts.clear();
  modelFailureState.clear();
}

/**
 * Check if a specific model on a specific account is locked
 * @returns {boolean}
 */
export function isModelLocked(
  provider: string,
  connectionId: string,
  model: string | null | undefined
): boolean {
  if (!model) return false;
  const key = getModelLockKey(provider, connectionId, model);
  cleanupModelLockKey(key);
  const entry = modelLockouts.get(key);
  return Boolean(entry);
}

/**
 * Get model lockout info (for debugging/dashboard)
 */
export function getModelLockoutInfo(
  provider: string,
  connectionId: string,
  model: string | null | undefined
) {
  if (!model) return null;
  const key = getModelLockKey(provider, connectionId, model);
  cleanupModelLockKey(key);
  const entry = modelLockouts.get(key);
  if (!entry) return null;
  return {
    reason: entry.reason,
    remainingMs: entry.until - Date.now(),
    lockedAt: new Date(entry.lockedAt).toISOString(),
    failureCount: entry.failureCount,
  };
}

export type ModelLockoutInfo = {
  provider: string;
  connectionId: string;
  model: string;
  reason: string;
  remainingMs: number;
  failureCount: number;
  lockedAt: string;
  until: number;
};

/**
 * Get all active model lockouts (for dashboard)
 */
export function getAllModelLockouts(): ModelLockoutInfo[] {
  const now = Date.now();
  const active: ModelLockoutInfo[] = [];
  for (const key of modelLockouts.keys()) {
    cleanupModelLockKey(key, now);
  }
  for (const [key, entry] of modelLockouts) {
    const [provider, connectionId, ...modelParts] = key.split(":");
    const model = modelParts.join(":");
    active.push({
      provider,
      connectionId,
      model,
      reason: entry.reason,
      remainingMs: entry.until - now,
      failureCount: entry.failureCount,
      lockedAt: new Date(entry.lockedAt).toISOString(),
      until: entry.until,
    });
  }
  return active;
}

// ─── Provider Breaker Compatibility Wrappers ────────────────────────────────
// Legacy helpers now delegate to the shared provider circuit breaker.

type ProviderBreakerProfile = {
  failureThreshold?: number;
  degradationThreshold?: number;
  resetTimeoutMs?: number;
  circuitBreakerThreshold?: number;
  circuitBreakerReset?: number;
};

function getProviderBreaker(provider: string | null | undefined) {
  return provider ? getCircuitBreaker(provider) : null;
}

function configureProviderBreaker(
  provider: string | null | undefined,
  profile?: ProviderBreakerProfile | null
) {
  if (!provider) return null;

  const resolvedProfile = { ...getProviderProfile(provider), ...profile };
  // Issue #2100 follow-up: resolve useUpstream429BreakerHints from the
  // provider profile (stored override) or fall back to per-provider default.
  // Stored value type is `boolean | undefined` — never `null` after PATCH.
  const userValue = resolvedProfile.useUpstream429BreakerHints;
  const useHints = resolveUseUpstream429BreakerHints(provider, userValue);
  return getCircuitBreaker(provider, {
    failureThreshold: resolvedProfile.failureThreshold ?? resolvedProfile.circuitBreakerThreshold,
    resetTimeout: resolvedProfile.resetTimeoutMs ?? resolvedProfile.circuitBreakerReset,
    ...(useHints
      ? {
          cooldownByKind: {
            rate_limit: 60_000,
            quota_exhausted: 3_600_000,
          } satisfies Partial<Record<FailureKind, number>>,
          classifyError: classify429FromError,
        }
      : {}),
    degradationThreshold: resolvedProfile.degradationThreshold,
    maxBackoffMultiplier: resolvedProfile.maxBackoffMultiplier,
    backoffEscalationCount: resolvedProfile.backoffEscalationCount,
  });
}

/**
 * Check if a provider is currently blocked by the shared circuit breaker.
 */
export function isProviderInCooldown(provider: string | null | undefined): boolean {
  const breaker = getProviderBreaker(provider);
  return breaker ? !breaker.canExecute() : false;
}

/**
 * Get remaining retry-after time for a provider breaker.
 */
export function getProviderCooldownRemainingMs(provider: string | null | undefined): number | null {
  const breaker = getProviderBreaker(provider);
  if (!breaker || breaker.canExecute()) return null;
  const remaining = breaker.getRetryAfterMs();
  return remaining > 0 ? remaining : null;
}

export function getProviderBreakerState(provider: string | null | undefined) {
  const breaker = getProviderBreaker(provider);
  return breaker?.getStatus?.() ?? null;
}

/**
 * Record a provider failure against the shared circuit breaker.
 * Delegates to the existing CircuitBreaker utility which handles
 * failure counting, threshold detection, and state transitions.
 *
 * IMPORTANT: If the breaker is already OPEN (in cooldown), we skip
 * recording the failure to prevent resetting the cooldown timer.
 * This matches the original behavior where failures during cooldown
 * were ignored to avoid indefinite lockout.
 */
export function recordProviderFailure(
  provider: string | null | undefined,
  log?: { warn?: (...args: unknown[]) => void },
  connectionId?: string | null,
  profile?: ProviderBreakerProfile | null
): void {
  if (!provider) return;

  // Deduplicate rapid-fire failures from the same connection
  if (connectionId) {
    const dedupKey = `${provider}:${connectionId}`;
    const now = Date.now();
    const lastFailure = lastConnectionFailure.get(dedupKey);
    if (lastFailure && now - lastFailure < CONNECTION_FAILURE_DEDUP_MS) {
      return;
    }
    lastConnectionFailure.delete(dedupKey);
    lastConnectionFailure.set(dedupKey, now);
    pruneConnectionFailureDedupeEntries();
  }

  const breaker = configureProviderBreaker(provider, profile);
  if (!breaker) return;

  if (!breaker.canExecute()) return;

  breaker._onFailure();

  if (!breaker.canExecute()) {
    log?.warn?.(`[ProviderFailure] ${provider}: circuit breaker opened after repeated failures`);
  }
}

/**
 * Reset the shared provider breaker.
 */
export function clearProviderFailure(provider: string | null | undefined): void {
  const breaker = getProviderBreaker(provider);
  breaker?.reset();
}

/**
 * Get all providers currently blocked by the shared breaker.
 */
export function getProvidersInCooldown(): Array<{
  provider: string;
  failureCount: number;
  cooldownRemainingMs: number | null;
  lastFailureAt: number | null;
}> {
  return getAllCircuitBreakerStatuses()
    .filter((status) => {
      const breaker = getProviderBreaker(status.name);
      return Boolean(breaker && !breaker.canExecute());
    })
    .map((status) => ({
      provider: status.name,
      failureCount: status.failureCount,
      cooldownRemainingMs: status.retryAfterMs || null,
      lastFailureAt: status.lastFailureTime,
    }));
}

/**
 * Check if a status code should be counted toward provider failure threshold
 */
export function isProviderFailureCode(status: number): boolean {
  return PROVIDER_FAILURE_ERROR_CODES.has(status);
}

/**
 * Returns true when a checkFallbackError result signals that the entire provider
 * quota is exhausted for this request, so the combo router can skip remaining
 * targets from the same provider (#1731).
 *
 * Covers:
 *  - reason === "quota_exhausted"  (subscription, daily, credits)
 *  - creditsExhausted flag
 *  - dailyQuotaExhausted flag
 */
export function isProviderExhaustedReason(result: {
  reason?: string;
  creditsExhausted?: boolean;
  dailyQuotaExhausted?: boolean;
}): boolean {
  if (result.creditsExhausted || result.dailyQuotaExhausted) return true;
  return result.reason === RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED;
}

// ─── Retry-After Parsing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Parse retry-after information from JSON error response bodies.
 * Providers embed retry info in different formats.
 *
 * @param {string|object} responseBody - Raw response body or parsed JSON
 * @returns {{ retryAfterMs: number|null, reason: string }}
 */
export function parseRetryAfterFromBody(responseBody: unknown): {
  retryAfterMs: number | null;
  reason: RateLimitReasonValue;
} {
  let body: JsonRecord;
  try {
    body = toJsonRecord(typeof responseBody === "string" ? JSON.parse(responseBody) : responseBody);
  } catch {
    return { retryAfterMs: null, reason: RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN };
  }

  if (Object.keys(body).length === 0) {
    return { retryAfterMs: null, reason: RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN };
  }

  // Gemini: { error: { details: [{ retryDelay: "33s" }] } }
  const error = toJsonRecord(body.error);
  const details = error.details || body.details || [];
  for (const detail of Array.isArray(details) ? details : []) {
    const detailRecord = toJsonRecord(detail);
    if (detailRecord.retryDelay) {
      return {
        retryAfterMs: parseDelayString(detailRecord.retryDelay),
        reason: RateLimitReason.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED,
      };
    }
  }

  // OpenAI: "Please retry after 20s" in message
  const msg = String(error.message || body.message || "");
  const retryMatch = /retry\s+after\s+(\d+)\s*s/i.exec(msg);
  if (retryMatch) {
    return {
      retryAfterMs: Number.parseInt(retryMatch[1], 10) * 1000,
      reason: RateLimitReason.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED,
    };
  }

  // Anthropic: error type classification
  const errorType = String(error.type || body.type || "");
  if (errorType === "rate_limit_error") {
    return { retryAfterMs: null, reason: RateLimitReason.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED };
  }

  // Classify by error message keywords
  const reason = classifyErrorText(msg || errorType);
  return { retryAfterMs: null, reason };
}

/**
 * Parse delay strings like "33s", "2m", "1h", "1500ms"
 */
function parseDelayString(value: unknown): number | null {
  if (!value) return null;
  const str = String(value).trim();
  const msMatch = /^(\d+)\s*ms$/i.exec(str);
  if (msMatch) return Number.parseInt(msMatch[1], 10);
  const secMatch = /^(\d+)\s*s$/i.exec(str);
  if (secMatch) return Number.parseInt(secMatch[1], 10) * 1000;
  const minMatch = /^(\d+)\s*m$/i.exec(str);
  if (minMatch) return Number.parseInt(minMatch[1], 10) * 60 * 1000;
  const hrMatch = /^(\d+)\s*h$/i.exec(str);
  if (hrMatch) return Number.parseInt(hrMatch[1], 10) * 3600 * 1000;
  // Bare number → seconds
  const num = Number.parseInt(str, 10);
  return Number.isNaN(num) ? null : num * 1000;
}

/**
 * T07: Parse retry time from error text body with combined "XhYmZs" format.
 * Examples: "Your quota will reset after 2h30m14s", "reset after 45m", "reset after 30s"
 * Returns milliseconds or null if not parseable.
 *
 * @param {string} errorText - Error message text from response body
 * @returns {number|null} Retry duration in milliseconds
 */
export function parseRetryFromErrorText(errorText: unknown): number | null {
  if (!errorText || typeof errorText !== "string") return null;
  const msg: string = String(errorText);

  // Issue #2321: Anthropic OAuth occasionally embeds an absolute ISO 8601
  // timestamp instead of a relative duration (e.g. "Try again at
  // 2026-05-17T10:00:00Z" or "Please wait until 2026-05-17T10:00:00.000Z").
  // Convert to a future-duration in milliseconds if it parses.
  const isoMatch =
    /\b(?:try again at|wait until|reset(?:s)? at|available at|retry after)\s+(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}[Tt ]\d{2}:\d{2}(?::\d{2})?(?:\.\d+)?(?:Z|[+-]\d{2}:?\d{2})?)/i.exec(
      msg
    );
  if (isoMatch) {
    const parsedTs = Date.parse(isoMatch[1]);
    if (Number.isFinite(parsedTs)) {
      const waitMs = parsedTs - Date.now();
      if (waitMs > 0) return waitMs;
    }
  }

  const match = /reset after (\d+h)?(\d+m)?(\d+s)?/i.exec(msg);
  if (match?.[1] || match?.[2] || match?.[3]) return computeDurationMs(match);

  // Variant without "reset after": "will reset after XhYmZs"
  const altMatch = /will reset after (\d+h)?(\d+m)?(\d+s)?/i.exec(msg);
  if (altMatch?.[1] || altMatch?.[2] || altMatch?.[3]) return computeDurationMs(altMatch);

  // Antigravity / Cloud Code phrasing: "Resets in 164h27m24s".
  const resetsInMatch = /resets? in (\d+h)?(\d+m)?(\d+s)?/i.exec(msg);
  if (resetsInMatch?.[1] || resetsInMatch?.[2] || resetsInMatch?.[3]) {
    return computeDurationMs(resetsInMatch);
  }

  return null;
}

/**
 * Compute total milliseconds from regex match groups (Xh)(Ym)(Zs)
 * Capped at 30 days to prevent adversarial/buggy upstream from locking indefinitely.
 */
const MAX_PROVIDER_COOLDOWN_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days

function computeDurationMs(match: RegExpMatchArray): number | null {
  let totalMs = 0;
  if (match[1]) totalMs += Number.parseInt(match[1], 10) * 3600 * 1000; // hours
  if (match[2]) totalMs += Number.parseInt(match[2], 10) * 60 * 1000; // minutes
  if (match[3]) totalMs += Number.parseInt(match[3], 10) * 1000; // seconds
  return totalMs > 0 ? Math.min(totalMs, MAX_PROVIDER_COOLDOWN_MS) : null;
}

function isSubscriptionQuotaText(lower: string): boolean {
  return (
    lower.includes("usage limit reached") ||
    lower.includes("usage limit has been") ||
    lower.includes("claude pro usage limit") ||
    lower.includes("you've reached your usage limit") ||
    lower.includes("you have reached your usage limit")
  );
}

// ─── Error Classification ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Classify error text into RateLimitReason
 */
export function classifyErrorText(errorText: unknown): RateLimitReasonValue {
  if (!errorText) return RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN;
  const lower = String(errorText).toLowerCase();

  if (
    lower.includes("quota exceeded") ||
    lower.includes("quota depleted") ||
    lower.includes("quota will reset") ||
    lower.includes("your quota will reset") ||
    lower.includes("quota has been exceeded") ||
    lower.includes("hour quota") ||
    lower.includes("billing") ||
    looksLikeQuotaExhausted(lower) ||
    // Issue #2321: Anthropic OAuth (Claude Code Pro/Team) 429 bodies surface
    // the subscription quota with phrases that contain neither "quota" nor
    // "billing". Without these patterns the error was classified as a
    // transient RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED (~5s base cooldown), which cascades all
    // Pro accounts into a tight retry loop until the 5h window resets.
    isSubscriptionQuotaText(lower)
  ) {
    return RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED;
  }
  // T10: credits_exhausted signals
  if (isCreditsExhausted(lower)) {
    return RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED;
  }
  // T06: account_deactivated signals
  if (isAccountDeactivated(lower)) {
    return RateLimitReason.AUTH_ERROR;
  }
  const configuredRule = matchErrorRuleByText(errorText);
  if (configuredRule?.reason) return configuredRule.reason;
  if (lower.includes("rate_limit")) return RateLimitReason.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
  if (lower.includes("resource exhausted") || lower.includes("high demand"))
    return RateLimitReason.MODEL_CAPACITY;
  if (
    lower.includes("unauthorized") ||
    lower.includes("invalid api key") ||
    lower.includes("authentication")
  ) {
    return RateLimitReason.AUTH_ERROR;
  }
  if (lower.includes("server error") || lower.includes("internal error")) {
    return RateLimitReason.SERVER_ERROR;
  }
  return RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN;
}

/**
 * Classify HTTP status + error text into RateLimitReason
 *
 * If context (provider, headers, body) is supplied, provider-specific rules
 * are evaluated FIRST. A provider like Opencode can signal account-wide quota
 * exhaustion via `x-ratelimit-remaining-requests: 0` even when the body says
 * "rate limit" — without context, classifyError falls through to the global
 * text rules and misclassifies as RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED. With context, the
 * provider rule takes precedence.
 */
export function classifyError(
  status: number,
  errorText: unknown,
  context?: { provider?: string | null; headers?: Record<string, string> | null; body?: unknown }
): RateLimitReasonValue {
  // Provider-specific rules take priority — they have the most accurate signal
  // (e.g. `x-ratelimit-remaining-requests: 0` is irrefutable account exhaustion).
  if (context?.provider) {
    const match = getProviderErrorRuleMatch(
      context.provider,
      status,
      context.headers ?? null,
      context.body
    );
    if (match) return match.reason;
  }

  // Text classification takes priority (more specific)
  const textReason = classifyErrorText(errorText);
  if (textReason !== RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN) return textReason;

  // Fall back to status code
  if (status === HTTP_STATUS.UNAUTHORIZED || status === HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN) {
    return RateLimitReason.AUTH_ERROR;
  }
  if (status === HTTP_STATUS.PAYMENT_REQUIRED) {
    return RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED;
  }
  if (status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED) {
    return RateLimitReason.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
  }
  if (status === HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE || status === 529) {
    return RateLimitReason.MODEL_CAPACITY;
  }
  if (status >= 500) {
    return RateLimitReason.SERVER_ERROR;
  }
  return RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN;
}

// ─── Daily Quota Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Calculate milliseconds from now until tomorrow at midnight (00:00:00).
 * Used to lock a model until the next day when daily quota is exhausted.
 * @returns {number} Milliseconds until tomorrow
 */
export function getMsUntilTomorrow(): number {
  const nowMs = Date.now();
  const tomorrow = new Date(nowMs);
  tomorrow.setDate(tomorrow.getDate() + 1);
  tomorrow.setHours(0, 0, 0, 0);
  const ms = tomorrow.getTime() - nowMs;
  // Guard against DST edge cases: if ms is negative (shouldn't happen) or
  // unreasonably large (>25h due to spring-forward), cap at 24 hours.
  return ms > 0 && ms <= 25 * 60 * 60 * 1000 ? ms : 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
}

/**
 * Check if error text indicates daily quota exhaustion (as opposed to rate limiting).
 * Daily quota errors typically mention "today's quota" or "try again tomorrow".
 * @param {string} errorText - Error message text
 * @returns {boolean} True if daily quota is exhausted
 */
export function isDailyQuotaExhausted(errorText: string): boolean {
  if (!errorText) return false;
  const lower = errorText.toLowerCase();
  return (
    lower.includes("today's quota") ||
    lower.includes("daily quota") ||
    lower.includes("try again tomorrow")
  );
}

// ─── Configurable Backoff ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Get backoff duration from configurable steps.
 * @param {number} failureCount - Number of consecutive failures
 * @returns {number} Duration in ms
 */
export function getBackoffDuration(failureCount: number): number {
  const idx = Math.min(failureCount, BACKOFF_STEPS_MS.length - 1);
  return BACKOFF_STEPS_MS[idx];
}

// ─── Original API (Backward Compatible) ────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Calculate exponential backoff cooldown for rate limits (429)
 * Level 0: 1s, Level 1: 2s, Level 2: 4s... → max 2 min
 * @param {number} backoffLevel - Current backoff level
 * @returns {number} Cooldown in milliseconds
 */
export function getQuotaCooldown(backoffLevel = 0) {
  return calculateBackoffCooldown(backoffLevel);
}

/**
 * Check if error should trigger account fallback (switch to next account)
 * @param {number} status - HTTP status code
 * @param {string} errorText - Error message text
 * @param {number} backoffLevel - Current backoff level for exponential backoff
 * @param {string} [model] - Optional model name for model-level lockout
 * @param {string} [provider] - Provider ID for profile-aware cooldowns
 * @returns {{ shouldFallback: boolean, cooldownMs: number, newBackoffLevel?: number, reason?: string }}
 */
export function checkFallbackError(
  status: number,
  errorText: string | null,
  backoffLevel: number = 0,
  _model: string | null = null,
  provider: string | null = null,
  headers: Headers | Record<string, string> | null = null,
  profileOverride: ProviderProfile | null = null,
  structuredError?: { code?: string | null; type?: string | null } | null
): {
  shouldFallback: boolean;
  cooldownMs: number;
  baseCooldownMs?: number;
  newBackoffLevel?: number;
  usedUpstreamRetryHint?: boolean;
  reason?: string;
  permanent?: boolean;
  creditsExhausted?: boolean;
  dailyQuotaExhausted?: boolean;
  /** G-02: true when the error originates from an embedded service supervisor (not the upstream AI
   * provider itself). Callers should apply connection cooldown only — do NOT record a provider
   * circuit-breaker failure when this flag is set. */
  skipProviderBreaker?: boolean;
} {
  // G-02: detect embedded service supervisor failures (X-Omni-Fallback-Hint: connection_cooldown).
  // These are NOT upstream AI provider failures — they are local supervisor state changes.
  // Apply a short 5s connection cooldown without tripping the provider circuit breaker.
  if (status === 503 && headers) {
    const hintValue =
      typeof (headers as Headers).get === "function"
        ? (headers as Headers).get("x-omni-fallback-hint")
        : (headers as Record<string, string>)["x-omni-fallback-hint"] ||
          (headers as Record<string, string>)["X-Omni-Fallback-Hint"];
    if (typeof hintValue === "string" && hintValue.toLowerCase() === "connection_cooldown") {
      return {
        shouldFallback: true,
        cooldownMs: 5_000,
        baseCooldownMs: 5_000,
        newBackoffLevel: 0,
        reason: "service_not_running",
        skipProviderBreaker: true,
      };
    }
  }

  const errorStr = (errorText || "").toString();
  const profile = profileOverride ?? (provider ? getProviderProfile(provider) : null);
  const maxBackoffSteps = profile?.maxBackoffSteps ?? BACKOFF_CONFIG.maxLevel;
  const retryableStatuses = new Set([
    HTTP_STATUS.REQUEST_TIMEOUT,
    HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED,
    HTTP_STATUS.SERVER_ERROR,
    HTTP_STATUS.BAD_GATEWAY,
    HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
    HTTP_STATUS.GATEWAY_TIMEOUT,
  ]);

  function parseResetFromHeaders(headers: Headers | Record<string, string> | null): number | null {
    if (!headers) return null;
    const recordHeaders = headers as Record<string, string>;

    // Retry-After header
    const retryAfter =
      typeof (headers as Headers).get === "function"
        ? (headers as Headers).get("retry-after")
        : recordHeaders["retry-after"] || recordHeaders["Retry-After"];

    if (retryAfter) {
      const seconds = Number.parseInt(retryAfter, 10);
      if (!Number.isNaN(seconds) && String(seconds) === String(retryAfter).trim()) {
        return Date.now() + seconds * 1000;
      }
      const date = new Date(retryAfter);
      if (!Number.isNaN(date.getTime())) return date.getTime();
    }

    // X-RateLimit-Reset
    const rlReset =
      typeof (headers as Headers).get === "function"
        ? (headers as Headers).get("x-ratelimit-reset")
        : recordHeaders["x-ratelimit-reset"] || recordHeaders["X-RateLimit-Reset"];

    if (rlReset) {
      const ts = Number.parseInt(rlReset, 10);
      if (!Number.isNaN(ts)) {
        return ts > 10000000000 ? ts : ts * 1000;
      }
    }
    return null;
  }

  function getUpstreamRetryHintMs() {
    if (!profile?.useUpstreamRetryHints) return null;
    const resetTime = parseResetFromHeaders(headers);
    if (resetTime) {
      const waitMs = Math.max(resetTime - Date.now(), 0);
      if (waitMs > 0) return waitMs;
    }

    const retryFromErrorText = parseRetryFromErrorText(errorStr);
    if (retryFromErrorText && retryFromErrorText > 0) {
      return retryFromErrorText;
    }

    return null;
  }

  function getScaledBaseCooldown(reason: RateLimitReasonValue, level = backoffLevel) {
    void reason;
    const baseCooldownMs =
      typeof profile?.baseCooldownMs === "number" && profile.baseCooldownMs >= 0
        ? profile.baseCooldownMs
        : COOLDOWN_MS.transientInitial;
    return {
      baseCooldownMs,
      cooldownMs: getScaledCooldown(baseCooldownMs, level + 1, maxBackoffSteps),
      newBackoffLevel: Math.min(level + 1, maxBackoffSteps),
    };
  }

  function buildRetryableFallback(reason: RateLimitReasonValue) {
    const upstreamRetryHintMs = getUpstreamRetryHintMs();
    if (typeof upstreamRetryHintMs === "number" && upstreamRetryHintMs > 0) {
      return {
        shouldFallback: true,
        cooldownMs: upstreamRetryHintMs,
        baseCooldownMs: upstreamRetryHintMs,
        newBackoffLevel: 0,
        usedUpstreamRetryHint: true,
        reason,
      };
    }

    const scaled = getScaledBaseCooldown(reason, backoffLevel);
    return {
      shouldFallback: true,
      cooldownMs: scaled.cooldownMs,
      baseCooldownMs: scaled.baseCooldownMs,
      newBackoffLevel: scaled.newBackoffLevel,
      usedUpstreamRetryHint: false,
      reason,
    };
  }

  const isRateLimitStatus = status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED;
  const preserveQuota429 = shouldPreserveQuotaSignalsFor429(provider);
  const shouldUseQuotaSignal = !isRateLimitStatus || preserveQuota429;

  // Check error message FIRST - specific patterns take priority over status codes
  if (errorText) {
    // T06 (sub2api #1037): Permanent account deactivation — do NOT retry, mark as permanent failure
    if (isAccountDeactivated(errorStr)) {
      return {
        shouldFallback: true,
        cooldownMs: 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 1 year = effectively permanent
        reason: RateLimitReason.AUTH_ERROR,
        permanent: true,
      };
    }

    // T10 (sub2api #1169): Credits/quota exhausted — long cooldown, distinct from rate limit
    if (shouldUseQuotaSignal && isCreditsExhausted(errorStr)) {
      return {
        shouldFallback: true,
        cooldownMs: COOLDOWN_MS.paymentRequired ?? 3600 * 1000, // 1h cooldown
        reason: RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED,
        creditsExhausted: true,
      };
    }

    // Daily quota exhausted — lock model until tomorrow
    if (shouldUseQuotaSignal && isDailyQuotaExhausted(errorStr)) {
      const msUntilTomorrow = getMsUntilTomorrow();
      // Cap at 24 hours to handle timezone edge cases
      const cooldownMs = Math.min(msUntilTomorrow, 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
      return {
        shouldFallback: true,
        cooldownMs,
        reason: RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED,
        dailyQuotaExhausted: true,
      };
    }

    // Issue #2321: Anthropic OAuth (Claude Pro/Team) returns 429 with
    // "Usage Limit Reached" for the 5-hour subscription quota. The
    // pattern-based classifier now flags these as QUOTA_EXHAUSTED, but
    // without a dedicated branch the request would still fall through to
    // the generic 429 retry path (~5s base cooldown). Honor upstream
    // Retry-After / reset hints only when the profile enables them;
    // otherwise apply a local 1h cooldown so all Pro accounts on the same
    // subscription tier stop cycling through tight retries without letting
    // upstream-provided windows bypass the operator setting. (We
    // deliberately do not use COOLDOWN_MS.paymentRequired here — that
    // constant is 2 minutes, which is shorter than the recovery time of a
    // subscription quota.)
    if (
      shouldUseQuotaSignal &&
      !isCreditsExhausted(errorStr) &&
      !isDailyQuotaExhausted(errorStr) &&
      isSubscriptionQuotaText(errorStr.toLowerCase())
    ) {
      // getUpstreamRetryHintMs() gates both headers and body reset text on
      // profile.useUpstreamRetryHints.
      const hintMs = getUpstreamRetryHintMs();
      const SUBSCRIPTION_QUOTA_COOLDOWN_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
      return {
        shouldFallback: true,
        cooldownMs: hintMs ?? SUBSCRIPTION_QUOTA_COOLDOWN_MS,
        reason: RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED,
        usedUpstreamRetryHint: Boolean(hintMs),
      };
    }

    const quotaResetHintMs = parseRetryFromErrorText(errorStr);
    if (
      shouldUseQuotaSignal &&
      quotaResetHintMs &&
      classifyErrorText(errorStr) === RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED
    ) {
      return buildRetryableFallback(RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED);
    }

    // #2929: A route-restriction 403 (e.g. Fireworks Fire Pass keys returning
    // "Fire Pass API keys are not authorized for this route." on the /models
    // endpoint) means the key is valid but lacks access to THIS route — it still
    // serves chat. It must NOT cool down the connection or be classified as an
    // auth error, otherwise a single model-listing 403 marks the key unavailable.
    if (
      status === HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN &&
      errorStr.toLowerCase().includes("not authorized for this route")
    ) {
      return { shouldFallback: false, cooldownMs: 0, reason: RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN };
    }

    if (
      status === HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN &&
      provider &&
      getProviderCategory(provider) === "apikey" &&
      !errorStr.toLowerCase().includes("has not been used in project") &&
      !errorStr.toLowerCase().includes("hour quota") &&
      !errorStr.toLowerCase().includes("quota has been exceeded")
    ) {
      return buildRetryableFallback(RateLimitReason.AUTH_ERROR);
    }
  }

  // Gemini-specific: use known published RPM/RPD limits to distinguish 429 types.
  // Gemini returns the same error body for both, so we use per-model request
  // counters to decide: if daily count >= RPD → quota_exhausted (midnight lockout);
  // if minute count >= RPM → rate_limit_exceeded (exponential backoff).
  if (provider === "gemini" && status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED && _model) {
    if (isRpdExhausted(_model)) {
      return buildRetryableFallback(RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED);
    }
    if (isRpmExhausted(_model)) {
      return buildRetryableFallback(RateLimitReason.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
    }
  }

  const configuredRule =
    isRateLimitStatus && !preserveQuota429
      ? matchErrorRuleByStatus(status)
      : findMatchingErrorRule(status, errorStr);
  if (configuredRule) {
    if (configuredRule.backoff) {
      // Provider-specific rules in `providerRuleRegistry` are MORE SPECIFIC
      // than the configured (global) rule, so we check them first. If a
      // provider rule matches, it overrides the configured rule's reason
      // (e.g. Opencode's `x-ratelimit-remaining-requests: 0` overrides
      // 429 → RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED). We do NOT call the full `classifyError`
      // here because its global status fallback would otherwise override
      // specific configured reasons (e.g. 503 → SERVER_ERROR would be
      // shadowed by 503 → MODEL_CAPACITY).
      const providerMatch = provider
        ? getProviderErrorRuleMatch(provider, status, headers, structuredError ?? null)
        : null;
      const reason = providerMatch
        ? providerMatch.reason
        : (configuredRule.reason ?? RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN);
      return buildRetryableFallback(reason);
    }
    const cooldownMs = configuredRule.cooldownMs ?? 0;
    return {
      shouldFallback: true,
      cooldownMs,
      baseCooldownMs: cooldownMs,
      reason: configuredRule.reason ?? RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN,
    };
  }

  if (status === HTTP_STATUS.NOT_ACCEPTABLE || retryableStatuses.has(status)) {
    return buildRetryableFallback(RateLimitReason.SERVER_ERROR);
  }

  // 400 — context overflow / malformed request / model access denied
  if (status === HTTP_STATUS.BAD_REQUEST) {
    // Check structured error codes first (more reliable, no false positives)
    // OpenAI:  error.code === "model_not_found"
    // Anthropic: error.type === "not_found_error" / "permission_error"
    const structuredCode =
      typeof structuredError?.code === "string" ? structuredError.code.toLowerCase() : "";
    const structuredType =
      typeof structuredError?.type === "string" ? structuredError.type.toLowerCase() : "";
    // A clear bad-credential error must never be reclassified as model-access
    // (which would silently exhaust every combo target). Structured detection
    // below still catches genuine model_not_found / not_found_error codes.
    const looksLikeAuthCredentialError = AUTH_CREDENTIAL_ERROR_PATTERNS.some((p) =>
      p.test(errorStr)
    );
    const matchesModelAccessPattern =
      !looksLikeAuthCredentialError && MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(errorStr));

    const isModelAccessDeniedStructured =
      !!structuredError &&
      (MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_CODES.has(structuredCode) ||
        MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_TYPES.has(structuredType) ||
        // Ambiguous types (e.g. Anthropic permission_error) only count as a model
        // access denial when the message text confirms it is about the model.
        (MODEL_ACCESS_AMBIGUOUS_TYPES.has(structuredType) && matchesModelAccessPattern));

    const isOverflow = CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(errorStr));
    const isMalformed = MALFORMED_REQUEST_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(errorStr));
    const isParamValidation = PARAM_VALIDATION_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(errorStr));
    const isModelAccessDenied = isModelAccessDeniedStructured || matchesModelAccessPattern;

    if (isOverflow || isMalformed || isParamValidation || isModelAccessDenied) {
      return {
        shouldFallback: true,
        cooldownMs: 0,
        reason: RateLimitReason.MODEL_CAPACITY,
      };
    }

    // Some providers (e.g. MiMoCode) signal throttling with a non-standard 400 whose
    // body carries rate-limit semantics ("Detected high-frequency non-compliant
    // requests from you.") instead of a 429. Detected here (AFTER malformed/overflow
    // detection above, so a genuinely malformed 400 still wins and keeps its #2101
    // zero-cooldown MODEL_CAPACITY classification), it is fallback-worthy at
    // connection-cooldown scope so combo can fail over to another target (#4976).
    if (RATE_LIMIT_TEXT_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(errorStr))) {
      return buildRetryableFallback(RateLimitReason.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
    }

    // Generic 400 is not account-fallback-worthy. Combo routing may still try a
    // different provider/model because combo fallback is target-level orchestration.
    return { shouldFallback: false, cooldownMs: 0, reason: RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN };
  }

  // All other errors - fallback with transient cooldown
  return {
    shouldFallback: true,
    cooldownMs: profile?.baseCooldownMs ?? COOLDOWN_MS.transient,
    baseCooldownMs: profile?.baseCooldownMs ?? COOLDOWN_MS.transient,
    reason: RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN,
  };
}

// ─── Account State Management ───────────────────────────────────────────────

/**
 * Normalize a stored cooldown timestamp to epoch milliseconds.
 *
 * `rate_limited_until` is a TEXT column, but some write paths persist a raw
 * epoch NUMBER (e.g. `setConnectionRateLimitUntil` on the Antigravity full-quota
 * path). SQLite TEXT affinity coerces it to a numeric string like
 * "1781696905131.0", which `new Date(...)` cannot parse (→ NaN). Accept numeric
 * epoch strings/numbers as well as ISO strings and Date objects (#3954).
 */
export function cooldownUntilMs(value: string | number | Date | null | undefined): number {
  if (value === null || value === undefined || value === "") return NaN;
  if (value instanceof Date) return value.getTime();
  if (typeof value === "number") return value;
  const raw = value.trim();
  if (/^\d+(\.\d+)?$/.test(raw)) return Number(raw);
  return new Date(raw).getTime();
}

/**
 * Check if account is currently unavailable (cooldown not expired)
 */
export function isAccountUnavailable(unavailableUntil: string | Date | null | undefined): boolean {
  if (!unavailableUntil) return false;
  const ms = cooldownUntilMs(unavailableUntil);
  return Number.isFinite(ms) && ms > Date.now();
}

/**
 * Calculate unavailable until timestamp
 */
export function getUnavailableUntil(cooldownMs: number): string {
  return new Date(Date.now() + cooldownMs).toISOString();
}

/**
 * Get the earliest rateLimitedUntil from a list of accounts
 */
export function getEarliestRateLimitedUntil(
  accounts: Array<{ rateLimitedUntil?: string | null }>
): string | null {
  let earliest: number | null = null;
  const now = Date.now();
  for (const acc of accounts) {
    if (!acc.rateLimitedUntil) continue;
    const until = cooldownUntilMs(acc.rateLimitedUntil);
    if (!Number.isFinite(until) || until <= now) continue;
    if (!earliest || until < earliest) earliest = until;
  }
  if (!earliest) return null;
  return new Date(earliest).toISOString();
}

/**
 * Format rateLimitedUntil to human-readable "reset after Xm Ys"
 */
export function formatRetryAfter(
  rateLimitedUntil: string | number | Date | null | undefined
): string {
  if (!rateLimitedUntil) return "";
  const diffMs = new Date(rateLimitedUntil).getTime() - Date.now();
  if (diffMs <= 0) return "reset after 0s";
  const totalSec = Math.ceil(diffMs / 1000);
  const h = Math.floor(totalSec / 3600);
  const m = Math.floor((totalSec % 3600) / 60);
  const s = totalSec % 60;
  const parts: string[] = [];
  if (h > 0) parts.push(`${h}h`);
  if (m > 0) parts.push(`${m}m`);
  if (s > 0 || parts.length === 0) parts.push(`${s}s`);
  return `reset after ${parts.join(" ")}`;
}

/**
 * Filter available accounts (not in cooldown)
 */
export function filterAvailableAccounts<T extends AccountState>(
  accounts: T[],
  excludeId: string | null = null
): T[] {
  const now = Date.now();
  return accounts.filter((acc) => {
    if (excludeId && acc.id === excludeId) return false;
    if (acc.rateLimitedUntil) {
      const until = cooldownUntilMs(acc.rateLimitedUntil);
      if (Number.isFinite(until) && until > now) return false;
    }
    return true;
  });
}

/**
 * Reset account state when request succeeds
 */
export function resetAccountState<T extends AccountState | null | undefined>(
  account: T
): T | AccountState {
  if (!account) return account;
  return {
    ...account,
    rateLimitedUntil: null,
    backoffLevel: 0,
    lastError: null,
    status: "active",
  };
}

/**
 * Apply error state to account
 */
export function applyErrorState<T extends AccountState | null | undefined>(
  account: T,
  status: number,
  errorText: string | null,
  provider: string | null = null
): T | AccountState {
  if (!account) return account;

  const backoffLevel = account.backoffLevel || 0;
  const fallbackDecision = checkFallbackError(status, errorText, backoffLevel, null, provider);
  const { cooldownMs, reason } = fallbackDecision;
  const newBackoffLevel =
    "newBackoffLevel" in fallbackDecision ? fallbackDecision.newBackoffLevel : undefined;

  return {
    ...account,
    rateLimitedUntil: cooldownMs > 0 ? getUnavailableUntil(cooldownMs) : null,
    backoffLevel: newBackoffLevel ?? backoffLevel,
    lastError: { status, message: errorText, timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), reason },
    status: "error",
  };
}

/**
 * Get account health score (0-100) for P2C selection (Phase 9)
 * @param {object} account
 * @returns {number} score 0 = unhealthy, 100 = perfectly healthy
 */
export function getAccountHealth(
  account: AccountState | null | undefined,
  model?: unknown
): number {
  if (!account) return 0;
  let score = 100;
  score -= (account.backoffLevel || 0) * 10;
  if (account.lastError) score -= 20;
  if (account.rateLimitedUntil && isAccountUnavailable(account.rateLimitedUntil)) score -= 30;
  return Math.max(0, score);
}