OmniRoute/docs/frameworks/AGENTBRIDGE.md

title, version, lastUpdated

title	version	lastUpdated
AgentBridge	3.8.31	2026-06-20

AgentBridge

AgentBridge is OmniRoute's MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) proxy that intercepts HTTPS traffic from IDE AI agents and reroutes it through OmniRoute's unified routing engine. It supports 9 IDE agents — Antigravity, Kiro, GitHub Copilot, OpenAI Codex, Cursor, Zed, Claude Code, Open Code, and Trae (investigating) — making OmniRoute the broadest-coverage MITM proxy for AI coding assistants on the market.

Dashboard location: /dashboard/tools/agent-bridge Sidebar group: Tools (after Cloud Agents) See also: TRAFFIC_INSPECTOR.md — monitor all intercepted traffic in real-time; docs/security/MITM-TPROXY-DECRYPT.md — the Linux TPROXY transparent-decrypt capture mode driven by the /api/tools/agent-bridge/tproxy route.

---

§1 Overview

What is AgentBridge?

When an IDE agent (e.g., GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Claude Code) makes an API call, it connects directly to the upstream AI provider (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.). AgentBridge intercepts that connection transparently at the TLS level — without requiring any agent configuration change — and rewrites the request through OmniRoute.

This means you can:

• Reroute any agent to any provider: Copilot talking to OpenAI? Redirect it to Anthropic Claude, Gemini, or any of OmniRoute's 226+ providers.
• Apply model mappings: gemini-3-flash → claude-sonnet-4.7 transparently at the handler level.
• Observe all agent traffic: every intercepted request is published to the Traffic Inspector.
• Apply OmniRoute resilience: combo routing, circuit breakers, fallbacks, and cost tracking work for IDE agent traffic too.

Positioning vs. the market

Feature	9router	anti-api	llm-interceptor	OmniRoute AgentBridge
Antigravity	✓	✓	—	✓
GitHub Copilot	✓	✓	—	✓
Kiro (AWS)	✓	✓	—	✓
OpenAI Codex	—	✓	—	✓
Cursor IDE	✓	✓	—	✓
Zed Industries	—	✓	—	✓
Claude Code	—	—	✓	✓
Open Code	—	—	✓	✓
Trae	—	—	—	🔍 Investigating
Dashboard UI	✓	✗	✗	✓
Traffic Inspector	✗	✗	✓	✓
OmniRoute routing	✗	✗	✗	✓
Model mapping UI	✗	✗	✗	✓
Bypass list	✗	✗	✓	✓
Upstream CA cert	✗	✗	✓	✓

---

§2 Architecture

2.1 Components overview

IDE Agent (VS Code / Cursor / etc.)
    │  HTTPS (port 443)
    ▼
/etc/hosts — 127.0.0.1 api.githubcopilot.com   ← DNS redirect
    │
    ▼
src/mitm/server.cjs  (port 443, CJS child process)
    │  resolves target by Host header SNI
    │  generates per-SNI TLS cert signed by AgentBridge CA
    ├── Bypass list match? → TCP passthrough (no decrypt)
    ├── Target match? → fetch → OmniRoute router (port 20128)
    │       └── handler.intercept() — TypeScript
    │               ├── maskSecrets() on request body/headers
    │               ├── TrafficBuffer.push() — publishes to Traffic Inspector
    │               └── fetchRouter() → /v1/chat/completions
    └── No match? → TCP passthrough (no decrypt)

2.2 MITM server (src/mitm/server.cjs)

The core MITM server runs as a Node.js CJS child process (to avoid rewriting the existing CJS codebase). It:

• Listens on port 443 (requires privilege or authbind/setcap)
• Receives CONNECT tunnels from the OS (via /etc/hosts DNS redirect)
• Generates per-SNI TLS certificates signed by the AgentBridge CA (DATA_DIR/mitm/ca.crt)
• Resolves the target agent by Host header via targets/index.ts registry
• Dispatches to the TypeScript handler layer via HTTP to http://127.0.0.1:20128

TARGET_HOSTS is loaded from DATA_DIR/mitm/targets.json (written by targets/index.ts at boot), allowing dynamic updates without restarting the CJS server.

2.3 Handler base (src/mitm/handlers/base.ts)

All agent handlers extend MitmHandlerBase:

export abstract class MitmHandlerBase {
  abstract readonly agentId: AgentId;

  abstract intercept(
    req: IncomingMessage,
    res: ServerResponse,
    body: Buffer,
    mappedModel: string,
  ): Promise<void>;

  // Protected helpers: fetchRouter, pipeSSE, hookBufferStart, hookBufferUpdate
}

Each handler calls hookBufferStart() before proxying and hookBufferUpdate() when complete. These push InterceptedRequest entries into globalTrafficBuffer (see Traffic Inspector §4).

2.4 Targets registry (src/mitm/targets/)

Each agent has a declarative target file:

// src/mitm/targets/copilot.ts
export const COPILOT_TARGET: MitmTarget = {
  id: "copilot",
  name: "GitHub Copilot",
  hosts: ["api.githubcopilot.com", "copilot-proxy.githubusercontent.com"],
  port: 443,
  endpointPatterns: ["/chat/completions", "/v1/chat/completions"],
  defaultModels: [
    { id: "gpt-4o", name: "GPT-4o", alias: "gpt-4o" },
  ],
  handler: () => import("../handlers/copilot"),
  riskNoticeKey: "providers.riskNotice.oauth",
};

The registry (targets/index.ts) exports ALL_TARGETS and emits DATA_DIR/mitm/targets.json on boot.

2.5 Passthrough and bypass list (src/mitm/passthrough.ts)

Bypass list (checked first, with precedence over target match):

• Default patterns: banking hosts, .gov., OAuth/SSO providers (Okta, Auth0), etc.
• User patterns: stored in DB table agent_bridge_bypass
• Bypassed hosts receive a transparent TCP tunnel — TLS is never decrypted

Passthrough default (no target match and not in bypass):

• Also receives a TCP tunnel — connections are never broken
• Prevents the AgentBridge from disrupting general system HTTPS traffic

Routing precedence:

bypass list → target match → passthrough

2.6 Upstream CA cert (src/mitm/upstreamTrust.ts)

For corporate network environments with a custom CA:

AGENTBRIDGE_UPSTREAM_CA_CERT=/path/to/corporate-ca.pem

When set, configures undici's global dispatcher with the extra CA cert, allowing AgentBridge to reach upstream providers through corporate TLS termination proxies.

2.7 Secret masking (src/mitm/maskSecrets.ts)

Applied to all request bodies and headers before they enter the Traffic Inspector buffer or any log:

• sk- / ak- / pk- prefixed tokens (OpenAI/Anthropic-style)
• Authorization: Bearer <token> headers
• Generic long tokens (≥40 chars)

---

§3 Setup

3.1 Start/stop the MITM server

Use the AgentBridge Server Card at /dashboard/tools/agent-bridge:

Action	Description
Start Server	Spawns src/mitm/server.cjs on port 443
Stop Server	Gracefully shuts down the child process
Restart Server	Stop + start (picks up target changes)
Trust Cert	Installs DATA_DIR/mitm/ca.crt into OS trust store
Download Cert	Downloads ca.crt for manual installation
Regenerate Cert	Creates a new CA keypair (all existing per-agent certs are invalidated)

3.2 Trust the certificate

The AgentBridge CA certificate must be trusted by the OS before IDEs will accept the MITM connection.

Linux (NSS — Chrome/Firefox):

certutil -A -d sql:$HOME/.pki/nssdb -n "OmniRoute AgentBridge" -t CT,, -i ~/.omniroute/mitm/ca.crt

macOS (Keychain):

sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot \
  -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain ~/.omniroute/mitm/ca.crt

Windows (certmgr):

certutil -addstore -f Root $env:USERPROFILE\.omniroute\mitm\ca.crt

Or use the "Trust Cert" button in the dashboard (runs the appropriate command for your OS, with sudo prompt if needed).

Electron-based IDEs ignore the OS trust store (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS)

Some IDEs — notably Antigravity IDE, and other Electron / VS Code-derived apps — bundle their own Node.js runtime that does not consult the OS trust store for outbound fetch/HTTPS. Trusting the CA at the OS/NSS level is enough for the IDE's native backend (e.g. a Go language server, which uses the OS CA bundle), but the Electron frontend will still fail TLS — it surfaces as the app being logged out or showing a "connection error" even though the MITM log shows the backend's bootstrap calls returning 200. Two steps are required, and both matter:

1. Point the runtime at the CA explicitly:

   export NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/path/to/omniroute-agentbridge-ca.crt
   

2. Launch the IDE from that shell. Starting it from the desktop icon / Dock / Start menu does not inherit shell exports, and ~/.config/environment.d/*.conf only applies after a fresh graphical login. Fully quit the IDE first — Electron's singleton lock means a second launch just focuses the existing process and the new environment is ignored.

The OS-trust + NSS step above remains necessary (the Chromium network stack used by some auth flows reads the per-user NSS store, and has its own static pins for *.googleapis.com that a locally-trusted CA overrides). NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS covers the Node fetch path on top of it.

3.3 DNS routing

For each agent you want to intercept, its API host(s) must resolve to 127.0.0.1. AgentBridge manages /etc/hosts entries automatically when you toggle DNS for an agent in the Setup Wizard.

Example /etc/hosts entries for GitHub Copilot:

127.0.0.1 api.githubcopilot.com
127.0.0.1 copilot-proxy.githubusercontent.com

3.4 Model mapping

Use the Model Mapping Table in each agent card to define source → target mappings:

Source model (agent native)	Target model (OmniRoute)
gpt-4o	claude-sonnet-4.7
* (wildcard)	claude-haiku-4.7

Wildcard * maps any unrecognized model to the specified target. Persisted in agent_bridge_mappings table.

Tip — discover the agent's real model IDs. An IDE may send model names that differ from its UI labels and that change between major versions. For example Antigravity 2 sends gemini-3.1-pro-low, gemini-pro-agent, and gemini-3.1-flash-lite over the wire — not the gemini-2.5-pro shown in older docs. Send one chat with no matching mapping in place: the MITM logs the exact incoming model: and passes the request through. Map that literal value, then the next request is intercepted and routed to your target.

3.5 Risk notice

AgentBridge intercepts credentials (OAuth tokens, API keys) that the IDE uses to authenticate with upstream providers. These are masked before logging (see §2.7) but are visible to OmniRoute's MITM layer. First activation of each agent shows a dismissible risk notice modal.

3.6 Maintenance & Diagnostics

The dashboard exposes a Maintenance & Diagnostics card (AgentBridgeMaintenanceCard, in src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/tools/agent-bridge/components/) that surfaces operational MITM routes which previously had no UI. Its subtitle: "Self-test the capture pipeline, undo leftover system state, and move your setup between machines." The card client helpers live in src/lib/inspector/agentBridgeMaintenanceApi.ts.

Button	Route	What it does
Diagnose	GET /api/tools/agent-bridge/diagnose	Runs the capture-pipeline self-test and shows a per-check report (✓/✗ + remediation hint).
Repair	POST /api/tools/agent-bridge/repair	Undoes orphaned MITM system state (DNS spoof entries, root CA, system proxy) left behind by a crash or SIGKILL. Idempotent — reports "Nothing to repair" when state is clean.
Remove CA	DELETE /api/tools/agent-bridge/cert	Untrusts and removes the MITM root CA from the OS trust store (explicit, idempotent). Shown only when the CA is currently trusted; requires an inline "Remove CA?" confirmation.
Export config	GET /api/tools/agent-bridge/config	Downloads the portable config JSON (see §3.7).
Import config	POST /api/tools/agent-bridge/config	Uploads a previously-exported config JSON (see §3.7).

Diagnostics checks (summarizeDiagnostics() in src/mitm/inspector/diagnostics.ts). The route runs the effectful probe for each and feeds the booleans into the pure summarizer; a single healthy verdict plus a per-failure hint is returned:

Check name	What it verifies	Hint on failure
server-running	The MITM server process is active	"The MITM server is not running. Start it from the AgentBridge tab."
server-reachable	The MITM server accepts connections on its port (TCP probe)	"The MITM server is not accepting connections on its port. Check that the port is free and that you have privileges to bind it."
cert-exists	The MITM certificate has been generated on disk	"No MITM certificate has been generated yet. Generate one from the AgentBridge tab."
cert-trusted	The MITM root CA is in the OS trust store	"The MITM root CA is not trusted by the OS store, so TLS interception will fail. Trust the certificate from the AgentBridge tab."
dns-configured	Target hostnames are spoofed in /etc/hosts	"Target hostnames are not spoofed in /etc/hosts, so traffic never reaches the proxy. Enable DNS for the agent(s) you want to capture."

Orphaned-state banner: when the page detects state left behind by a crash (DNS spoof / CA / system proxy), the card shows an amber banner — "A previous session left system state behind (DNS spoof, CA, or system proxy). Run Repair to clean it up." — and highlights the Repair button. Repair is the application-layer analogue of ProxyBridge's --cleanup flag (it delegates to repairMitm() in src/mitm/manager.ts).

The MITM root CA is kept installed across stop/start to avoid repeated sudo prompts (the same behavior as mitmproxy/Charles), so removing it is an explicit Remove CA action rather than something that happens automatically on stop.

3.7 Portable config import/export

AgentBridge can serialize the operator-tunable state into a versioned JSON blob so a setup can be replicated across machines. The serializer is src/lib/inspector/configPortability.ts (exportConfig() / importConfig()), validated by AgentBridgeConfigSchema.

The export includes exactly three pieces (built-in defaults are intentionally NOT exported, so importing never duplicates or fights them):

Field	Source	Notes
bypassPatterns	user-defined bypass patterns (agent_bridge_bypass)	default bank/gov/okta patterns are excluded
customHosts	Traffic Inspector custom hosts (inspector_custom_hosts)	each: { host, kind: "llm"|"app"|"custom", label? }
agentMappings	per-agent model mappings (agent_bridge_mappings)	{ [agentId]: [{ source, target }] } for every agent that has mappings

// GET /api/tools/agent-bridge/config
{
  "version": 1,
  "bypassPatterns": ["*.internal.example.com"],
  "customHosts": [{ "host": "api.example.com", "kind": "llm", "label": null }],
  "agentMappings": { "copilot": [{ "source": "gpt-4o", "target": "claude-sonnet-4.7" }] }
}

Import behavior (POST /api/tools/agent-bridge/config): bypass patterns and per-agent mappings replace wholesale; custom hosts are added idempotently (INSERT OR IGNORE). The response reports how many of each were applied:

{ "ok": true, "bypassPatterns": 1, "customHosts": 1, "agents": 1 }

What is NOT in the config: server running state, cert paths, per-agent DNS state, upstream CA path, and TPROXY settings — those are host/runtime state, not portable preferences.

---

§4 Per-agent reference

#	Agent	Status	Hosts intercepted	Auth type
1	Antigravity	✅ Supported	daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com, cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com	Firebase OAuth
2	Kiro (AWS)	✅ Supported	prod.kiro.aws, dev.kiro.aws	AWS SigV4
3	GitHub Copilot	✅ Supported	api.githubcopilot.com, copilot-proxy.githubusercontent.com	GitHub OAuth
4	OpenAI Codex	✅ Supported	api.openai.com (Codex paths), chatgpt.com	OpenAI key
5	Cursor IDE	✅ Supported	api2.cursor.sh, api.cursor.sh	Cursor OAuth
6	Zed Industries	✅ Supported	api.zed.dev, llm.zed.dev	Zed OAuth
7	Claude Code	✅ Supported	api.anthropic.com (opt-in)	Anthropic key
8	Open Code	✅ Supported	openrouter.ai, api.openai.com (zen paths)	API key
9	Trae	🔍 Investigating	TBD — see §8	TBD

Setup wizard steps (per agent)

Each agent card has a 3-step setup wizard:

1. Verify prerequisites — Server running? Cert trusted? IDE installed (auto-detected)?
2. Enable DNS — Adds /etc/hosts entries (requires sudo). Shows exactly which lines will be added.
3. Map models — Optional model mapping table. Wildcards accepted.

Agent detection

For agents 1–8, AgentBridge attempts to auto-detect IDE installation:

export async function detectAgent(agentId: AgentId): Promise<DetectionResult>
// Returns: { installed: boolean, version?: string, path?: string }

Detection uses OS-specific paths and binary checks (e.g., code --list-extensions | grep github.copilot for Copilot, ~/.config/antigravity/ for Antigravity).

---

§5 Security

Hard Rules applied

Rule	Application
#12 sanitizeErrorMessage	All handler errors are sanitized before response or buffer entry
#13 Shell env-passing	/etc/hosts edits use env option — no string interpolation of paths
#15 + #17 isLocalOnlyPath()	/api/tools/agent-bridge/ is LOCAL_ONLY + SPAWN_CAPABLE — loopback enforced before auth

Bypass list for sensitive hosts

The bypass list ensures that financial institutions, OAuth/SSO providers, and other sensitive hosts are never decrypted. Their TLS traffic passes through as a transparent TCP tunnel — OmniRoute never sees the plaintext.

Default bypass patterns include:

• *.bank.*, *.gov.* (financial/government)
• *.okta.com, *.auth0.com, *.microsoft.com (SSO/identity)
• *.apple.com, *.icloud.com (Apple system services)

User-added bypass patterns are stored in agent_bridge_bypass table and take precedence over everything.

Secret masking

maskSecrets() from src/mitm/maskSecrets.ts is applied:

• On every request body before TrafficBuffer.push()
• On every header before logging or broadcasting

Patterns: sk-/ak-/pk- prefix tokens, Bearer tokens, and generic tokens ≥40 characters.

Upstream CA cert

When AGENTBRIDGE_UPSTREAM_CA_CERT is set, the file is read at startup. If the path exists but the file is unreadable, AgentBridge logs a clear error and refuses to start (prevents silent TLS failures in corporate environments).

Known limitations

• Port 443 requires privilege: On Linux, AgentBridge needs setcap 'cap_net_bind_service=+ep' on the Node binary, or run via authbind. The Setup Wizard displays OS-specific instructions.
• IDE restart required: After DNS redirect, the IDE must be restarted for the new host resolution to take effect.
• Hardcoded OAuth tokens: Some agents (Kiro, Antigravity) store OAuth refresh tokens locally. These are transparent to AgentBridge — it sees the Bearer token in each request, which is masked before logging.
• Electron frontends need NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: IDEs whose frontend runs on a bundled Node/Electron runtime ignore the OS/NSS trust store and must be launched from a shell with NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS set (see §3.2). Symptom when missing: the IDE backend authenticates (MITM shows 200s) but the UI stays logged out.
• Multiple installs of the same IDE are independent: a system install (e.g. /usr/share/antigravity/antigravity) and a user-local "Full" install (e.g. ~/AntigravityIDE_Full/antigravity-ide) are separate processes with their own runtimes — each must be relaunched with the CA injected. Identify which one is running by its binary path before relaunching.
• Identity is set by the agent's system prompt, not the routed model: when you remap an agent's model to a different provider, the reply still claims the agent's native identity (e.g. Antigravity answers "I am powered by Gemini") because the IDE injects that into the system prompt. Confirm the real backend in call_logs / proxy_logs (provider, model, target_format), not by asking the model who it is.

---

§6 Troubleshooting

Port 443 conflict

If another process is already listening on port 443 (web server, VPN, etc.):

lsof -i :443          # find the process
sudo fuser -k 443/tcp  # force-kill (use with care)

Alternatively, configure a non-privileged port in AgentBridge settings and set up iptables / pf redirect rules.

Certificate not trusted

If the IDE shows TLS errors after starting AgentBridge:

1. Verify the cert was installed: security find-certificate -c "OmniRoute AgentBridge" (macOS) or certutil -L -d sql:$HOME/.pki/nssdb (Linux/NSS)
2. Some apps maintain their own trust store (Firefox, Chrome on Linux). Run "Trust Cert" again and check the NSS/Firefox-specific cert store.
3. Restart the IDE after trusting — in-flight TLS sessions use the old trust state.

IDE logged out / "connection error" despite a trusted CA

Symptom: after redirecting DNS and trusting the CA, an Electron-based IDE (e.g. Antigravity) opens logged out or shows an authentication/connection error, yet the MITM log shows the bootstrap calls (loadCodeAssist, fetchAvailableModels, …) returning 200.

Cause: the IDE's bundled Node/Electron runtime ignores the OS trust store. The native backend (a Go language server) trusts the OS CA and authenticates, but the Electron frontend does not — so the UI believes it is offline.

Fix (both steps): export NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=<ca.crt> and relaunch the IDE from that shell, not from the desktop icon. Fully quit the IDE first — Electron's singleton lock means a second launch just focuses the existing process and the new environment is ignored. See §3.2. This mirrors an open upstream report where a standalone agent works through a MITM but the IDE variant fails under the same setup.

DNS not propagated

Check that /etc/hosts was updated:

grep "omniroute\|127.0.0.1.*github\|127.0.0.1.*cursor" /etc/hosts

Flush DNS cache:

# macOS
sudo dscacheutil -flushcache && sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder
# Linux (systemd-resolved)
sudo systemctl restart systemd-resolved
# Windows
ipconfig /flushdns

IDE not detected

Auto-detection uses common installation paths. If detection fails but the IDE is installed:

• Check if the IDE binary is in a non-standard location
• The Setup Wizard still works — detection failure just means the badge won't show the install path

Handler errors (upstream fetch fails)

If AgentBridge intercepts but all requests fail:

1. Verify at least one provider is connected at /dashboard/providers
2. Check OmniRoute server logs: APP_LOG_LEVEL=debug in .env
3. Verify OMNIROUTE_BASE_URL points to the correct router endpoint (default: http://127.0.0.1:20128)

---

§7 API reference

All routes are LOCAL_ONLY (loopback-only, enforced before auth) and SPAWN_CAPABLE. See src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts.

Base path: /api/tools/agent-bridge/

Method	Path	Description
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/state	Global server state + per-agent detection/status
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/agents	List registered agents (id, name, hosts, viability, state)
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/agents/{id}	State of one agent (target config + detection + stored state)
PATCH	/api/tools/agent-bridge/agents/{id}	Update setup_completed for agent
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/agents/{id}/detect	Run detection probe for agent (installed, version?, path?)
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/agents/{id}/dns	Enable/disable DNS for agent ({enabled: boolean})
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/agents/{id}/mappings	Model mappings for agent
PUT	/api/tools/agent-bridge/agents/{id}/mappings	Replace model mappings
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/server	Start/stop/restart server (action: "start"|"stop"|"restart"|"trust-cert"|"regenerate-cert")
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/cert	Cert status (exists, trusted, path)
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/cert	Trust (install) the MITM root CA
DELETE	/api/tools/agent-bridge/cert	Untrust (remove) the MITM root CA — idempotent (see §3.6)
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/cert/regenerate	Regenerate the self-signed MITM cert
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/cert/download	Stream the PEM cert for download
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/bypass	List bypass patterns (default + user)
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/bypass	Replace user-defined bypass patterns wholesale
DELETE	/api/tools/agent-bridge/bypass?pattern=...	Remove a single user-defined bypass pattern
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/diagnose	Capture-pipeline self-test (see §3.6)
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/repair	Undo orphaned MITM system state (see §3.6)
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/config	Export portable config JSON (see §3.7)
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/config	Import portable config JSON (see §3.7)
GET	/api/tools/agent-bridge/upstream-ca	Get configured upstream CA path
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/upstream-ca	Validate + persist upstream CA path
POST	/api/tools/agent-bridge/upstream-ca/test	Validate-only (dry-run) an upstream CA path — does not persist
GET / POST / DELETE	/api/tools/agent-bridge/tproxy	TPROXY transparent-decrypt capture mode — see docs/security/MITM-TPROXY-DECRYPT.md

Full OpenAPI schemas: docs/openapi.yaml → tag AgentBridge.

---

§8 Roadmap

Trae investigation

Trae is a relatively new AI coding assistant. Before implementing a handler:

1. Identify the binary/extension in VS Code / JetBrains marketplaces or as a standalone app
2. Capture traffic with mitmproxy to discover API hosts and endpoint shapes
3. Determine authentication mechanism
4. Assess go/no-go based on TOS and API discoverability

Until investigation completes, the Trae card in the dashboard shows a "Investigating" badge with a "Report viability" link. The handler stub at src/mitm/handlers/trae.ts throws a structured Not yet implemented error.

Backlog agents (MITM required — no custom base URL support)

The following tools do not support custom base URLs in their current versions, making MITM the only interception path. Viability assessment is pending:

• Windsurf (Codeium/Cognition)
• Amp (Sourcegraph)
• Amazon Q / Kiro CLI (AWS Bedrock — separate from Kiro IDE)
• Cowork (Anthropic desktop)

Note: GitHub Copilot CLI ≥v1.0.19 supports COPILOT_PROVIDER_BASE_URL — use direct config instead of MITM for that tool.