mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
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e48ffd38d3
Validated in a combined 10-PR batch worktree off release/v3.8.51 tip. - Focused tests: tests/unit/authz/route-guard-tunnel-processes-local-only.test.ts + tests/unit/authz/spawn-capable-prefixes-client-safe.test.ts — 6+ pass - typecheck:core, file-size, changelog-integrity, complexity, cognitive-complexity gates — all OK - Full-repo lint: 503 pre-existing problems confirmed identical on the pure release/v3.8.51 tip — unrelated to this diff ⚠️ base-red inherited: #11449 Thanks for closing the process-spawning tunnel routes to local-only (Hard Rule #15/#17 territory) while preserving authenticated remote read access to status endpoints.
79 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
79 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Compile-time deny-list: route prefixes whose handlers can spawn arbitrary local
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* subprocesses (npm install, node, MITM server, python CLIs) on behalf of the
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* caller. These MUST NEVER appear in the manage-scope bypass list — regardless of
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* DB state — because reaching them from non-loopback would re-introduce the
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* GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj surface that the LOCAL_ONLY tier exists to close.
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*
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* Enforced at two layers:
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* 1. zod schema (`settingsSchemas.ts`): rejects `PATCH /api/settings` with error
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* code `BYPASS_PREFIX_NOT_ALLOWED` if any entry in
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* `localOnlyManageScopeBypassPrefixes` falls inside this set.
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* 2. runtime (`isLocalOnlyBypassableByManageScope` in `routeGuard.ts`): even if a
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* malformed DB row claims a spawn-capable path is bypassable, the policy refuses.
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*
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* 🔒 This constant lives in `@/shared/constants` — a server-free leaf module — and
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* NOT in `@/server/authz/routeGuard`, on purpose. `settingsSchemas.ts` is reachable
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* from client components (dashboard onboarding wizard → validation barrel), and
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* importing it from `routeGuard.ts` dragged routeGuard's server runtime
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* (runtimeSettings → localDb → apiKeys → rateLimiter → ioredis) into the browser
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* bundle, breaking the Next CLI/client webpack build with
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* `Module not found: Can't resolve 'dns'/'net'`. Keeping the value here lets both the
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* client-safe schema and the server routeGuard import it with no server coupling.
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* Regression guard: `tests/unit/authz/spawn-capable-prefixes-client-safe.test.ts`.
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* Hard Rules #15 + #17.
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*/
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export const SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES: ReadonlyArray<string> = [
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"/api/cli-tools/runtime/",
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"/api/cli-tools/qwen-settings", // GET probes the Qwen Code binary; the route also mutates local ~/.qwen files
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"/api/services/", // T-10: can run npm install + spawn node processes
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"/api/tunnels/cloudflared", // POST installs/starts/stops cloudflared; safe methods remain read-only exempt
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"/api/tunnels/tailscale/disable", // stops Funnel and may stop tailscaled/Tailscale service
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"/api/tunnels/tailscale/enable", // starts tailscaled/login/funnel subprocesses
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"/api/tunnels/tailscale/install", // downloads/installs Tailscale and starts its daemon
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"/api/tunnels/tailscale/login", // spawns `tailscale up`
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"/api/tunnels/tailscale/start-daemon", // starts tailscaled/Tailscale service
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"/api/tools/agent-bridge/", // start/stop MITM server + DNS edits (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/settings/mitm", // installs a system trusted root CA + /etc/hosts DNS overrides via src/mitm/* — must never be whitelistable via manage-scope bypass (GHSA-x7vm-hp44-9p79, Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", // same privileged CA-trust + DNS surface as /api/settings/mitm (GHSA-x7vm-hp44-9p79, Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/tools/traffic-inspector/", // http-proxy listener + system proxy (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/plugins/", // plugins: load/execute via worker_threads + child_process (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/local/", // T-12: 1-click local service launchers (Redis today) — must never be whitelistable via manage-scope bypass (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/skills/collect/", // Skill Collector CLI detection: GET .../detect spawns a child process per CLI_TOOL_IDS entry — must never be whitelistable via manage-scope bypass (Hard Rules #15 + #17, PR #6294 review)
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"/api/headroom/start", // spawns headroom-ai python CLI — must never be bypassable (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/headroom/stop", // kills tracked PID — must never be bypassable (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/vnc-session", // #7892: spawns Docker containers via child_process.spawn (src/lib/vncSession/service.ts) — must never be whitelistable via manage-scope bypass (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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"/api/modality-bridge/video/", // fixed ffmpeg/ffprobe status + extraction broker (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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];
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/**
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* Regex-matched companion to `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES`, for spawn-capable
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* routes whose spawn-capable segment sits AFTER a dynamic path parameter
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* (e.g. `/api/providers/{id}/refresh-cursor`) — a flat prefix would either
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* miss them entirely or require over-broadening the shared `/api/providers/`
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* prefix (used for legitimate remote provider CRUD). Mirrors the
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* `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES`/`LOCAL_ONLY_API_PATTERNS` split already
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* established in `routeGuard.ts` for this exact shape. Checked against a
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* CONCRETE resolved request path — an exact regex match, no approximation.
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*/
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export const SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERNS: ReadonlyArray<RegExp> = [
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/^\/api\/providers\/[^/]+\/login\/?$/, // pre-existing gap: in LOCAL_ONLY_API_PATTERNS today but never in a spawn-capable deny-list
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/^\/api\/providers\/volcengine-plan\/connect(\/.*)?$/, // launches Playwright to bind a Volcano Engine console session — covers the manual headful flow AND the session-based phone/SMS auto-login sub-routes (/code, /status, /cancel, /resend)
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/^\/api\/providers\/[^/]+\/refresh-cursor\/?$/, // spawns cursor-agent via renewal.ts (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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/^\/api\/providers\/cursor\/agent-availability\/?$/, // static path (no dynamic segment), but kept in this array alongside its /api/providers/ siblings rather than the flat SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES array — spawns cursor-agent status via checkCursorAgentAvailability()/getCachedCursorAgentAvailability() (Hard Rules #15 + #17)
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/^\/api\/providers\/[^/]+\/chatgpt-web-codex-doctor\/?$/, // spawns via getTunnelRuntimeStatus() → spawnSync("...","runtimes status") (open-sse/executors/chatgpt-web-codex/tunnelClient.ts). Mirrors LOCAL_ONLY_API_PATTERNS in routeGuard.ts; keep the two in sync (GHSA-9q3h-mjm5-f4gj).
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];
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/**
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* Companion to `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERNS`, used ONLY by the zod-level candidate
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* bypass-prefix check (`settingsSchemas.ts`), which validates a candidate
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* BYPASS PREFIX STRING (not a concrete path) at `PATCH /api/settings` time —
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* general prefix-vs-regex reachability is undecidable, so this conservatively
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* treats the shared literal ancestor of the dynamic/static-segment patterns
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* as off-limits. Intentionally coarser than `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERNS`'s exact
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* per-route match, but costs nothing security-wise: the runtime check in
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* `isLocalOnlyBypassableByManageScope` (Layer 2) is the actual enforcement
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* boundary and stays exact. `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES` itself is untouched.
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*/
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export const SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERN_ANCESTORS: ReadonlyArray<string> = ["/api/providers/"];
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