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* chore(release): open v3.8.45 development cycle
* chore(release): parallel-cycle flow — sync-next-cycle script + Hard Rule #21 semantics (#6203)
Integrated into release/v3.8.45
* perf(test): tsx/esm loader + tsx 4.23 + órfãos recuperados + CI via npm scripts (plano testes+CI, Pacote 1) (#6214)
* perf(test): tsx/esm loader, tsx 4.23 bump, orphan tests recovered, CI runs npm scripts
Pacote 1 (quick wins) do plano mestre testes+CI:
- Swap --import tsx -> --import tsx/esm on the 19 test scripts: the repo is pure
ESM and the CJS hook costs ~1.3s PER test process (2,462 processes/run).
Measured: bootstrap 2.3s -> 1.1s; real-suite A/B (tests/unit/db, 12 files)
22.2s -> 14.1s wall (-36%), 82/82 pass. Non-test scripts keep the full hook.
- Bump tsx ^4.22.3 -> ^4.23.0 (fix for privatenumber/tsx#809 startup regression;
helps module resolution on big graphs — hook cost unchanged, honest note).
- Recover 22 ORPHAN test files (tests/unit/feature-triage/*.test.mjs, 53 cases,
53/53 pass) that matched no glob and ran in NO CI job; drop the dead
'executors' dir from the braces glob.
- Single source of truth for the unit-suite invocation: new test:unit:ci:shard
(shard via TEST_SHARD env) called by ci.yml test-unit/node24/node26/coverage
and quality.yml fast-unit — closing two silent drifts: CI was NOT importing
setupPolyfill.ts, and the fast path glob OMITTED tests/unit/memory + usage.
quality.yml TIA step + ci.yml test-integration get the tsx/esm swap only.
Validation: full unit suite 21,153 tests / 21,135 pass / 13 skip (5 fails =
known load-flake family, 10/10 green rerun isolated); vitest 237/237; smoke
db+feature-triage 135/135. Record run 2 = ci.yml workflow_dispatch on the
stacked pacote-2 branch (clean runners).
* fix(test): dashboard UI tests keep full tsx hook; recover 15 more .mjs orphans; extend discovery gate to .mjs
Follow-up do dispatch de validacao (run 28720431562), que pegou 2 problemas reais:
1. tests/unit/dashboard/** (11 arquivos, 102 casos) importam componentes React cujo
grafo puxa @lobehub/icons — o build es/ dele faz require() interno de arquivos com
sintaxe ESM, que so funciona com o patch CJS do tsx (sem ele: SyntaxError
'Unexpected token export' no CI; local vira crawl de ~60s/arquivo). Esses 11
arquivos rodam agora numa 2a invocacao com --import tsx COMPLETO (mesmo shard),
e o resto da suite mantem tsx/esm (-50% bootstrap). Validado: 102/102.
2. check:test-discovery falhou porque ancorava textualmente os globs nos workflows —
COLLECTORS atualizado p/ o modelo fonte-unica (ancora = nome do script
test:unit:ci:shard nos workflows) + varredura ESTENDIDA a .test.mjs, que era o
ponto cego que deixou os orfaos apodrecerem. A extensao revelou +15 orfaos .mjs
(top-level + db/) alem dos 22 de feature-triage — TODOS religados via glob
tests/unit/**/*.test.mjs (171/171 pass). Um deles (encryption-error-handling)
codificava o contrato PRE-hardening (decrypt falho retornava ciphertext cru —
vazamento); alinhado ao contrato shipped (null + log) com comentario.
Gate: [test-discovery] OK — 2892 arquivos, 22 collectors, 60 orfaos congelados
(divida rastreada, shrink-only).
* ci: dedup heavy pipeline — compat to nightly, coverage folded into unit shards, i18n single job, draft-skip (#6215)
Pacote 2+3-ci do plano mestre testes+CI (aprovado 2026-07-04). O CI pesado rodava a
suite unit 4x por sync da release-PR (95 jobs, 208 min-maquina) e o ciclo v3.8.44
disparou 123 desses runs (88 cancelados, 0 uteis) porque a release-PR viva fica
aberta o ciclo inteiro.
- D2: matrizes Node 24/26 (build + 8 jobs de teste, ~28% do custo por run) saem do
per-sync e viram .github/workflows/nightly-compat.yml (diario, fail-fast off,
resolve a release ativa como o nightly-release-green, abre issue de tracking em
falha). ci.yml/ci-summary limpos das referencias.
- D3: a matrix Coverage Shard x8 (~18% do custo) e eliminada — o job test-unit roda
os MESMOS shards sob c8/NODE_V8_COVERAGE e sobe os artifacts coverage-shard-N; o
job de merge (test-coverage) so repontou needs (padrao do CI do nodejs/node).
timeout test-unit 15->25min pelo overhead de instrumentacao.
- D4: a matrix i18n de ~40 jobs de <1min (saturava sozinha os 20 slots de
concorrencia da conta Free) vira 1 job que itera os idiomas com ::group:: por
idioma e artifact unico com resultados nomeados por idioma (antes 40 result.txt
colidiam no merge-multiple do ci-summary).
- P3: jobs pesados pulam pull_requests DRAFT (predicado em 10 jobs-raiz; o resto
pula pela cadeia de needs; ci-summary segue rodando como sinal unico) — a skill
/generate-release ja abre a release-PR viva como draft e flipa ready no 0a.0a
(commit eb04fc5 no repo .agents/skills).
- C5 (CodeQL schedule) NAO incluido: bloqueado na acao do dono Settings -> CodeQL
Default->Advanced (documentado no proprio codeql.yml).
Validacao: js-yaml parse ok; check:workflows zizmor 156 < baseline 159 (ratchet
verde); validacao de execucao = workflow_dispatch deste ci.yml neste branch ate
package-artifact + electron-package-smoke verdes (registrada no PR).
* feat(quality): no-new-warnings por PR — ESLint bulk suppressions + lint-guard fork-condicional (Pacote 4) (#6218)
* feat(quality): no-new-warnings per PR via native ESLint bulk suppressions
Pacote 4 do plano mestre testes+CI (aprovado 2026-07-04). O ratchet de
eslintWarnings so rodava no CI pesado (release-PR) -> o drift acumulava invisivel
e explodia na release (+41/+37/+88 por ciclo, rebaselinado as cegas — historico
no proprio quality-baseline.json). Modelo novo (SonarSource Clean-as-You-Code +
ESLint bulk suppressions nativo >=9.24):
- config/quality/eslint-suppressions.json congela a divida existente por
arquivo+regra: 476 arquivos / 4.273 violacoes.
- npm run lint + lint-staged (pre-commit) + novo job lint-guard no quality.yml
rodam suppressions-aware: violacao NOVA fica vermelha NO PR que a introduz
(bulk suppressions ainda eleva estouros de baseline por arquivo a error).
- 3 regras warn promovidas a error em src/** (react-hooks/exhaustive-deps,
@next/next/no-img-element, import/no-anonymous-default-export) — divida
existente congelada, ocorrencia nova = erro imediato.
- collect-metrics mede sob o baseline congelado -> a metrica eslintWarnings
vira 'divida liquida nova' (~0 em regime); baseline apertado 4279->0 no mesmo
PR (exigencia do require-tighten). Aperto do ESTOQUE congelado: npx eslint .
--prune-suppressions na reconciliacao da release.
- Principio Zero: lint-guard usa continue-on-error para PR de FORK (report-only;
a campanha /green-prs aplica o fix via co-autoria) — bloqueante so para
branches internas, a origem real do drift.
Validacao: negativo (any novo em tests/) exit 1; negativo (img em src/, regra
promovida) exit 1; positivo escopado exit 0; baseline gerado por --suppress-all
no tip (tree inteiro passa por construcao); YAML js-yaml ok.
* fix(quality): clear the 6 residual warnings so lint-guard runs clean at --max-warnings 0
The committed baseline still let 6 warnings through the lint-guard gate:
5 now-unused inline eslint-disable directives (the file-level suppressions
made them redundant — removed via eslint --fix, suppressions regenerated to
absorb the re-exposed occurrences) and 1 anonymous default export in
tests/load/k6-soak.js (outside the src/** severity-override scope — named
the k6 scenario function instead).
Verified on the clean tree: lint-guard exit=0; any-canary (new 'const x: any'
in open-sse) exit=1 — the gate bites on NEW violations while the 4,273
frozen ones stay suppressed (476 files).
* fix(ci): lint-guard continue-on-error must be boolean on non-PR events
github.event.pull_request is undefined on workflow_dispatch — the bare property
expression made the job fail at plan time (run 28722888456: 4 jobs green, run red,
lint-guard never materialized). Guard with event_name check so the expression is
always boolean: PR de fork = report-only (Principio Zero), resto = blocking.
* docs(changelog): v3.8.45 bullets for the tests+quality+CI pipeline overhaul (#6214, #6215, #6218)
i18n CHANGELOG mirrors intentionally left to the release reconciliation
(release:sync-changelog-i18n), per cycle practice.
* fix(api): stabilize relay SSRF-guard binding for minified builds (#6149) (#6224)
* fix(mcp): forward extra context through static tool loops (#6178) (#6228)
* fix(services): 9Router embed route + pre-spawn port probe (#6205) (#6227)
* fix(backend): system-first memory injection for strict providers (#6135) (#6225)
* fix(auth): clear error for stale-key decryption failures (#6148) (#6226)
* fix(backend): record reasoning source for zero-metered reasoning models (#6187) (#6229)
* fix(providers): refresh stale NVIDIA NIM model registry (#6108) (#6223)
* fix(backend): distinct max_input_tokens for GPT-family models (#6191) (#6230)
* fix(oauth): extract keychain-import-only guard to restore file-size freeze (base-red) (#6158)
`src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` grew to 959 lines, past its
frozen cap of 924 (`check:file-size` → Fast Quality Gates red on release/v3.8.44).
The growth came from #6054 (graceful 400 for keychain-import-only providers / zed):
a doc block, two Sets (KEYCHAIN_IMPORT_ONLY_PROVIDERS, OAUTH_FLOW_ACTIONS) and a
keychainImportOnlyResponse() helper, plus two duplicated guard blocks in GET/POST.
That is a cohesive, self-contained leaf, so extract it to a new
`keychainImportOnly.ts` exposing `keychainImportOnlyGuard(provider, action)`
(returns the 400 NextResponse or null). The two route callsites collapse to a
2-line guard each. route.ts: 959 -> 918 (< 924, freeze restored). No behavior
change.
Tests (Rule #8/#18):
- Existing tests/unit/oauth-keychain-import-only-6041.test.ts (route-level GET/POST
zed 400) still pass unchanged — behavior preserved.
- New tests/unit/oauth-keychain-import-only-guard.test.ts pins the extracted guard
in isolation (zed+flow -> 400, normal provider -> null, zed+non-flow -> null).
* fix(dashboard): stop model-test error freezing the page (React #31 object toast) (#6161)
Clicking 'test' on a provider model (e.g. a ClinePass flash model) could freeze
the entire dashboard. Root cause: POST /api/models/test returned an OBJECT in
`error` on the Zod-validation and invalid-JSON paths (`validation.error.format()`
/ a details object). The client does `notify.error(data.error)`, and
NotificationToast renders the message directly as a React child — an object throws
React #31 ('Objects are not valid as a React child'), crashing the tree = frozen
page instead of a toast.
Fixed in three layers (defense in depth):
1. Server (root cause): /api/models/test now returns a STRING `error` on every
path — flattens Zod issues to text, returns 'Invalid JSON body' for bad JSON.
2. Client: onTestModel funnels the response through extractApiErrorMessage() so any
object-shaped error is coerced to a string before notify.error.
3. Toast: NotificationToast coerces title/message via toToastText() — a resilient
catch-all so no future caller can freeze the page with a non-string.
Tests (Rule #18, both node:test / blocking suite):
- tests/unit/models-test-error-shape.test.ts — asserts STRING error on Zod-fail,
missing-field, and invalid-JSON (fails on the pre-fix route: 3/3 red -> green).
- tests/unit/notification-toast-coercion.test.ts — toToastText coercion matrix.
* fix(dashboard): remove the always-on Auto-Routing (combo) banner from the home page (#6164)
The blue "Auto-Routing Active — OmniRoute is automatically routing requests
using combo-based strategies" banner was rendered unconditionally on the home
page (`/home`, the default dashboard landing) — it did NOT reflect whether
auto-routing was actually active, and reappeared on every fresh browser / private
window / cleared localStorage (dismissal is stored per-browser). It added noise
to the landing page without conveying live state.
Remove it: drop the <AutoRoutingBanner /> usage + import from home/page.tsx and
delete the now-unused component and its test.
* fix(cline): force upstream streaming for Cline/ClinePass (streaming-only API) (#6165)
* fix(cline): force upstream streaming for Cline/ClinePass (streaming-only API)
Cline's API (api.cline.bot) only implements streaming (streamText). A
non-streaming request returns HTTP 500 "generateText is not implemented" (Claude
models) or HTTP 502 "empty response" (others). Live-verified on the VPS:
stream:true → works (STREAM_OK), stream:false → fails. This is why testing a Cline
model in the dashboard (the test button sends stream:false) failed.
Fix (reuses the existing isClaudeCodeCompatible mechanism, no new handler):
- Flag `cline` and `clinepass` registry entries with `forceStream: true`.
- In chatCore, OR `providerRequiresStreaming` into `upstreamStream` (line 1591)
so the upstream request always streams for these providers, while the client's
original `stream` intent still drives the response format. The existing
non-streaming branch (parseNonStreamingResponseBody) already accumulates the
upstream SSE and converts it back to JSON for stream:false clients — the same
path Claude-Code-compatible providers already use.
Tests (Rule #18): tests/unit/cline-force-stream.test.ts pins the registry flags +
resolveStreamFlag forcing behavior. Live VPS before/after recorded on the PR.
* fix(sse): cline forceStream must stream upstream only, keep client JSON
The #2081 wiring fed providerRequiresStreaming into resolveStreamFlag,
forcing the client-facing stream flag to true for forceStream providers.
That skips the if(!stream) branch that drains a forced upstream SSE and
converts it back to JSON, so a stream:false caller (model-test button,
plain JSON API) got STREAM_EARLY_EOF instead of a JSON body.
Keep providerRequiresStreaming only on upstreamStream (force upstream to
stream); leave the client-facing stream as the client sent it, so
readNonStreamingResponseBody accumulates the SSE into JSON. The promised
handleForcedSSEToJson (#2081 comment) was never implemented — this uses
the existing non-streaming SSE-buffering path (same as isClaudeCodeCompatible).
Live-verified on VPS: cline stream:true worked, stream:false failed.
* fix(providers): correct Kiro model catalog to real upstream ids (#6170)
* fix(providers): correct Kiro model catalog to real upstream ids
Kiro's API (generateAssistantResponse) returns 400 "Invalid model. Please
select a different model" for any id it does not recognize. The registry
exposed fabricated ids (copied from OmniRoute's own Anthropic catalog) that
Kiro never serves, so every call to them 400'd. Live-verified on the VPS:
Removed (400 Invalid model):
- auto-kiro (no "auto" model id — was sent verbatim upstream)
- claude-fable-5 (Kiro offers no Fable)
- claude-opus-4.8/4.7/4.6 (Kiro offers no Opus)
Corrected:
- claude-sonnet-4.6 -> claude-sonnet-4.5 (Kiro's Sonnet is 4.5; 4.5 -> 200)
Kept:
- claude-sonnet-5 (real Kiro model, plan-gated per account)
- claude-haiku-4.5, deepseek-3.2, glm-5, minimax-m2.5/m2.1,
qwen3-coder-next (all proven 200 on the VPS)
Aligns the free-model catalog and drops the orphaned auto-kiro price key.
Regression guard: tests/unit/kiro-catalog-real-models.test.ts (3/3).
Kiro cluster #6112/#6113/#6099.
* test(providers): align stale Kiro-catalog tests to the corrected upstream ids
The fabricated Kiro ids removed in the parent commit (claude-fable-5,
claude-opus-4.8/4.7/4.6, claude-sonnet-4.6) were still asserted as present by
three pre-existing tests, which encoded the bug:
- catalog-updates-v3x: now asserts Kiro does NOT expose Fable 5 / Opus (kept the
legit cc exposure) and guards the real claude-sonnet-4.5 pricing.
- model-family-fallback-notation: the dot-notation example moves from kiro/ to
anthropic/ (which genuinely serves Opus/Fable in dot notation) — coverage kept.
- provider-models-route: the Kiro local-catalog assertion now expects the real
Sonnet 5 / Sonnet 4.5 set and negatively guards the fabricated ids.
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
* fix(sse): surface ChatGPT-web image silent-drop as an accurate error (#6208)
When ChatGPT Web generates an image as an image_asset_pointer but the pointer
fails to resolve to a downloadable URL (unknown asset scheme, download 403/
expired, oversize), resolveImagePointers returned [] — indistinguishable from
'no image produced' — so the image-generation handler reported the misleading
502 'completed without returning image markdown'. The image genuinely existed
upstream; OmniRoute dropped it silently.
Fix: the executor flags x_image_resolution_failed when a pointer existed but
none resolved (and logs the unresolved asset scheme for follow-up), and the
handler surfaces a truthful 'generated but not retrievable' 502 instead of
'no image markdown'. Adds executorFactory DI for unit testing.
TDD: tests/unit/chatgpt-web-image-silentdrop.test.ts (red -> green), plus the
existing chatgpt-web / image-generation-handler suites stay green.
Reported via community triage (mesh escalated backlog).
* fix(dashboard): providers page data-timeout guard + live-ws standalone wiring (#6211)
* fix(dashboard): providers page data-timeout guard + live-ws standalone wiring
Captura de trabalho em progresso: timeout de dados na página de providers,
ajuste em ProviderLimits e instrumentation-node, com testes novos
(providers-page-data-timeout, live-ws-standalone-wiring).
* chore(quality): rebaseline ProviderLimits/index.tsx file-size (+6, #6211 data-timeout guard)
Cohesive fix growth from PR #6211's data-timeout guard on the quota page's two
first-paint fetches (1121->1127). The fast-path PR->release skips check:file-size,
so the bump lands with the PR. Justification recorded in file-size-baseline.json.
* fix(translator): strip reasoning param for nvidia z-ai/glm-5.2 (#6181)
* fix(translator): strip reasoning param for nvidia z-ai/glm-5.2
NVIDIA NIM OpenAI-compatible wrapper rejects the reasoning body field
and returns HTTP 400 "Unsupported parameter(s): `reasoning`".
Add a StripRule scoped to provider=nvidia + model /z-ai\/glm-5\.2/i.
Mirrors PR #6102 drop pattern (minimax-m2.7 thinking).
* docs(translator): tighten nvidia glm-5.2 strip-rule comment
* fix(translator): anchor glm-5.2 strip rule with word boundary
* fix: add nvidia to PROVIDER_TOOL_LIMITS (1536) to prevent tool truncation (#6177)
NVIDIA NIM API (nvidia/* models) silently truncates the tool list to 128
(the default MAX_TOOLS_LIMIT) because nvidia is not in PROVIDER_TOOL_LIMITS.
Tools beyond index 127 are dropped, causing agents to lose access to
critical tools like task, read, or high-index MCP tools.
Verified that NVIDIA NIM API supports up to 1536 tools by direct testing.
End-to-end confirmed: 198 tools sent, model successfully called tools at
indices 193, 195, and 197 (previously dropped by truncation to 128).
Follows the same pattern as #5563 (grok-cli: 200), integrated in v3.8.43.
* feat(provider): add Claude 5 Sonnet to Claude Web provider (#6200) (#6209)
* feat(provider): add Claude 5 Sonnet to Claude Web provider (#6200)
* test(providers): guard claude-web claude-sonnet-5 registry entry (#6209)
Adds the missing regression test the PR-test-policy gate requires: asserts the
claude-web registry exposes claude-sonnet-5 (Claude 5 Sonnet web) alongside the
existing 4.6 Sonnet / 4.5 Haiku entries. Fails on the release base (no entry).
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
* fix(cli): detect POSIX auto-set HOSTNAME via os.hostname() to fix bind address (#6194) (#6195)
POSIX shells (bash/zsh) always set HOSTNAME to the machine name. The
.env loader uses first-wins semantics, so HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0 in .env is
silently ignored. This causes the server to bind to the LAN hostname
instead of 0.0.0.0, breaking localhost access and all internal
self-requests (ModelSync, HealthCheck, cloud sync).
The fix compares process.env.HOSTNAME against os.hostname(): when they
match, it's the POSIX auto-set signature and HOSTNAME is ignored.
OMNIROUTE_SERVER_HOST takes precedence as the dedicated escape hatch.
Backward compatibility is preserved: users who set HOSTNAME to a value
that doesn't match the machine name (e.g. Windows CMD/PowerShell users
with HOSTNAME in .env) will still have their value honoured.
Closes #6194
* feat(sse): surface Kiro adaptive-thinking reasoning as reasoning_content (#6213)
Kiro/CodeWhisperer streams Claude's reasoning as native `reasoningContentEvent`
frames when adaptive thinking is enabled, but the Kiro executor had no handler
for them, so `reasoning_effort` requests returned no reasoning. Wire it end to
end:
- translator (openai-to-kiro): enable Kiro thinking when the request carries
`reasoning_effort`, Anthropic `output_config.effort`, or a `thinking` block
(`{type:"enabled",budget_tokens}` mapped to a level; `{type:"adaptive"}`
defaults to `high`, matching Anthropic's documented default). Prepends the
Kiro `<thinking_mode>`/`<max_thinking_length>` prompt directive and sets
top-level `additionalModelRequestFields` ({output_config.effort,
thinking:{type:"adaptive"}, max_tokens}). Gated on `supportsReasoning`; drops
non-default temperature/top_p (rejected by adaptive-only Claude models).
- executor transformRequest: forward `additionalModelRequestFields` to AWS
(previously dropped by the strict top-level allowlist).
- executor stream loop: parse `reasoningContentEvent` (and reasoningText
variants) into the OpenAI reasoning_content channel.
Verified against the live CodeWhisperer stream: reasoningContentEvent frames are
returned, and larger effort/budget measurably deepens reasoning up to the model
cap. Unit tests cover the effort sources, forwarding, temp/top_p stripping, and
native reasoning-frame parsing.
* fix(chatcore): exempt opencode client from the default 128-tool truncation (#6193)
* fix(chatcore): exempt opencode client from the default 128-tool truncation
The default MAX_TOOLS_LIMIT (128) cap made truncateToolList blind-slice
tools.slice(0, 128), dropping opencode's built-in task tool and part of
its MCP tools when the inbound list exceeded 128 — so models routed
through OmniRoute could not launch subagents or reach all their tools.
Detect the opencode client (any x-opencode-* header, or 'opencode' in
the user-agent) and bypass ONLY the speculative 128 default. A known
provider ceiling (proactive PROVIDER_TOOL_LIMITS or a detected limit)
always wins and still truncates, even for opencode, so upstreams with
real hard limits (e.g. grok-cli 200) keep their 400-avoidance guard.
Non-opencode clients are unchanged.
- requestFormat.ts: add isOpencodeClient(headers, userAgent) + expose it
on resolveChatCoreRequestFormat.
- toolLimitDetector.ts: add getKnownToolLimit(); getEffectiveToolLimit
becomes getKnownToolLimit(provider) ?? DEFAULT_LIMIT (byte-identical
for existing callers).
- upstreamBody.ts: truncateToolList takes bypassDefaultToolLimit and
encodes the precedence; fix cosmetic debug-log count.
- chatCore.ts: thread the flag into prepareUpstreamBody.
- tests: extend tool-limit-detector unit tests.
* refactor(tools): accept nullable provider in tool-limit resolvers
Address PR review: widen getKnownToolLimit / getEffectiveToolLimit to
(provider: string | null | undefined) to match the call sites in
truncateToolList, and add unit assertions covering null/undefined
providers (getKnownToolLimit -> null, getEffectiveToolLimit -> 128).
---------
Co-authored-by: DKotsyuba <16292493+DKotsyuba@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
* fix(providers): refresh GitHub Copilot catalog (#6154)
* fix(providers): refresh github copilot catalog
Limit GitHub Copilot discovery to the curated supported model set and keep the provider cooldown panel client-safe by moving countdown formatting out of localDb.
* chore(quality): rebaseline providerPageHelpers.ts file-size (+13, #6154 copilot catalog)
The GitHub Copilot catalog refresh grows the provider-page model-section helper
(1021->1034). Fast-path PR->release skips check:file-size, so the bump lands with
the PR. Justification recorded in file-size-baseline.json.
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
* chore(quality): rebaseline kiro-translator file-size debt from #6213
The #6213 kiro adaptive-thinking feature grew openai-to-kiro.ts (853->890) and its
test (1093->1234); the fast-path PR->release does not gate check:file-size on merge,
so the growth accumulated on the release tip. Rebaselined to keep the tip green.
Justification recorded in file-size-baseline.json.
* fix(doctor): resolve two false-positive WARNs (#6162) (#6163)
* fix(doctor): resolve two false-positive WARNs (#6162)
The `omniroute doctor` command reported two warnings on healthy installs
even though the underlying checks actually passed. Both came from the
doctor probing state that already worked; they looked like bugs but users
couldn't tell without manual digging.
Issue 1 — Server liveness HTTP 401
/api/health and /api/health/degradation both require the management
token. Doctor called them without auth → 401 → WARN, even when the
Next.js server was clearly alive and listening.
Fix: probe the configured health endpoint first; on 401/403, fall
back to a publicly served static asset (/favicon.ico) to confirm the
server is alive. WARN now only fires when both probes fail.
Issue 2 — CLI Tools '@/shared' import
tool-detector.ts (and 3 other cli-helper files) import @/shared/...
aliases that resolve via tsconfig.json paths. The CLI ships raw TS
source (no compile step) and runs through tsx, but tsx does not honor
tsconfig paths at runtime, and tsconfig-paths only hooks CJS
Module._resolveFilename while doctor uses ESM `import()`.
Fix: replace @/shared/... with relative imports in the 4 cli-helper
files. This is the same pattern these files already use for ./config-
generator/* imports. No new dependency, no architectural change, and
the fix doesn't regress Next.js itself which keeps using @/shared.
Verified on v3.8.43 (Node v24.17, Windows 11):
Before: 7 ok, 2 warning(s), 0 failure(s)
After: 8 ok, N warning(s), 0 failure(s)
where N accurately reflects which CLI tools are installed and
configured for OmniRoute (e.g. Hermes Agent installed but not
pointed at 20128 → 2 real warnings, not 1 false-positive).
Refs #6162
* fix(doctor): derive fallback URL from primary URL via new URL()
Per Gemini code-assist review feedback: the previous fallback constructed
the /favicon.ico URL from defaults (127.0.0.1:PORT) which ignored custom
host/port/protocol configurations supplied via:
- OMNIROUTE_DOCTOR_LIVENESS_URL
- OMNIROUTE_DOCTOR_HOST
- --liveness-url / --host CLI flags
Parse the primary URL with new URL() to preserve protocol, host, port, and
subpaths. The previous default-based fallback remains as a catch-all for
invalid primary URLs.
* test(doctor): add regression tests for #6162 fixes
Two new test files lock the fix and satisfy the PR Test Policy gate
("production code change without tests"):
- tests/unit/cli-helper-tool-detector-paths-6162.test.ts
Locks the @/shared → relative imports fix across all 4 cli-helper
files. Asserts (a) no @/shared alias remains in the cli-helper
sources, and (b) each file is importable at runtime via tsx/ESM,
which would have thrown "Cannot find package '@/shared'" before
the fix.
- tests/unit/cli-doctor-liveness-fallback-6162.test.ts
Locks the /favicon.ico fallback in doctor.mjs. Asserts the
fallback probe exists, derives its URL from the primary URL via
new URL() (per Gemini review feedback), and that the buggy
'Server responded with HTTP 401' WARN path is gone.
Both tests use only node:test + node:assert/strict so they slot into
the existing 'test' and 'test:unit' scripts with no extra config.
* test(doctor): fix primary.ok regex in fallback test
The earlier regex /primary\.ok\s*\?/ required a '?' immediately after,
but the actual doctor.mjs code uses a multi-line if-block:
if (primary.ok) {
return ok(...);
}
Use /\bprimary\.ok\b/ instead so the assertion matches the existing
branching.
---------
Co-authored-by: Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
* fix(doubao-web): switch provider to Dola global (#6235)
* fix(doubao-web): switch provider to Dola global
* fix(doubao-web): use .dola.com cookie domain for s_v_web_id + rebaseline test
The Dola switch left s_v_web_id with a host-only "www.dola.com" domain, which fails
the token-source contract (domain must start with "." or "http") — the sibling
sessionid/ttwid cookies and the canonical cookieDomain already use ".dola.com", which
also matches www.dola.com. Also rebaselines web-cookie-providers-new.test.ts (850->890)
for the provider-switch regression cases.
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
* fix(providers): register zed in OAuth PROVIDERS to fix Unknown provider error (#6041) (#6078)
Registers a minimal import_token entry for the existing Zed IDE keychain-import
provider so getProvider("zed") no longer throws "Unknown provider: zed" when the
UI probes the OAuth capability endpoint; generateAuthData returns { supported: false }.
Test runner fix: the regression test imported from "vitest" but lives in tests/unit/
(node:test territory, outside the vitest include globs) — it ran in no runner. Converted
to node:test + node:assert so it actually executes (8/8 green).
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
* fix(oauth): align zed in OAUTH_PROVIDER_IDS + config enum after #6078 merge
#6078 registered zed in the OAuth PROVIDERS registry but did not add it to the
constants PROVIDERS id map nor the oauth-providers-config enumeration test, leaving
that test red on the release tip (getProvider enumeration vs EXPECTED mismatch).
Adds ZED to the id constants + zed to EXPECTED_PROVIDER_KEYS/EXPECTED_CONFIG_BY_PROVIDER.
* fix(mitm): strip colons from macOS cert fingerprint before keychain match (#6134) (#6204)
fix(mitm): strip colons from macOS cert fingerprint before keychain match (#6134). Extracted testable macCertOutputHasFingerprint helper + regression guard. Thanks @rianonehub. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* docs(architecture): sync stale DB-layer counts (45+/55 → 95+/110+) in REPOSITORY_MAP, db-schema diagram and llm.txt (+42 i18n mirrors) (#6167)
docs(architecture): sync stale DB-layer counts (45+/55 → 95+/110+) across REPOSITORY_MAP, db-schema diagram, llm.txt + 42 i18n mirrors (#6167). Docs-only; check:docs-all passes locally on the reconstruction. Reds are pre-existing base-red drift on release/v3.8.45 (dast-smoke #6228; executor-kiro.test.ts eslint anys; changelog/package.json version drift) — none introduced by this PR. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* fix(api): count tool_use/tool_result/thinking blocks in count_tokens estimate (port from 9router#2337) (#6221)
fix(api): count tool_use/tool_result/thinking blocks in count_tokens estimate (#6221, port from 9router#2337). TDD-covered (6/6); typed the test casts to clear no-new-eslint. Reds are pre-existing base-red drift on release/v3.8.45 (dast-smoke #6228; executor-kiro.test.ts eslint anys; changelog/package.json version drift) — none introduced by this PR. Thanks @luweiCN. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* fix(antigravity): strip trailing assistant prefill turn for Vertex Claude models (#6114)
fix(antigravity): strip trailing assistant prefill for Vertex Claude models (#6114). TDD-covered (6/6), merged on TDD strength per owner. Reds are pre-existing base-red drift on release/v3.8.45. Thanks @anki1kr. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* fix(security): require management auth for mutable cloud routes (#6233) (#6233)
fix(security): require management auth for mutable cloud routes (#6233). Verified: 3 PR tests + full authz/route-guard suite 241/241 green. Thanks @vittoroliveira-dev. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* fix(dashboard): use connection.id (UUID) not connection.provider (category) in onboarding wizard href (issue #6144) (#6166)
refactor(dashboard): extract tested buildProviderDetailsHref helper for onboarding wizard (#6166). Behavioral #6144 fix already on tip via #6145; this lands the tested-helper hardening. Thanks @KooshaPari. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* feat(rankings): add 'Configured Only' filter to Free Provider Rankings page (#6245)
feat(rankings): add 'Configured Only' filter to Free Provider Rankings (#6245, closes #6150). 9/9 test green. Thanks @Iammilansoni. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* fix(i18n): add 118 missing Italian translations (#6212)
i18n(it): add 118 Italian translations (#6212). Audited net-additive (0 keys dropped, valid JSON). Thanks @serverless83. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* test(dashboard): realign #6145 onboarding-href guard to the #6166 helper refactor (#6270)
Realign the #6145 onboarding-href guard to the #6166 helper refactor (buildProviderDetailsHref). Test-only; unblocks the fast-path unit job across the open PR queue. Base-reds only (dast-smoke #6228, docs version-drift, executor-kiro anys). Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* feat(providers): add Yuanbao (web) cookie-session provider (#6196) (#6256)
feat(providers): add Yuanbao (web) cookie-session provider (#6196). TDD-covered; base-reds only (dast-smoke #6228, docs version-drift, executor-kiro anys — #6145 guard fixed on tip via #6270). Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* feat(providers): route built-in agentrouter through dynamic CC wire image (#6056) (#6255)
feat(providers): route built-in agentrouter through dynamic CC wire image (#6056). TDD-covered (agentrouter-cc-wire-image.test.ts). Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* feat(providers): bulk-add API keys for Cloudflare Workers AI (#6174) (#6254)
feat(providers): bulk-add API keys for Cloudflare Workers AI (#6174). Per-entry providerSpecificData (fixes shared-object reuse); TDD guard bulk-api-key-parser-cloudflare.test.ts. Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45. (thanks @muflifadla38)
* feat(dashboard): routing/settings UX clarity — share %, Cloud Sync rename, base-URL override (#6147) (#6253)
feat(dashboard): routing/settings UX clarity (#6147) — effective share %, Cloud Sync→Remote Settings Sync rename, opt-in advanced base-URL override. TDD guard routing-settings-ux-6147.test.ts (6/6). Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* feat(combo): add option to disable session stickiness (#6168) (#6252)
feat(combo): add option to disable session stickiness (#6168) — per-combo/global, precedence config→settings→false (preserves #3825). TDD guard combo-disable-session-stickiness.test.ts (8/8). Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45. (thanks @RCrushMe)
* feat(docker): OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO env flag for root-less MITM cert trust (#6122) (#6249)
feat(docker): OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO env flag for root-less MITM cert trust (#6122). resolveSudoSpawn strips sudo when set; argv-array spawn preserved (Hard Rule #13). TDD guard mitm-systemCommands-no-sudo.test.ts (5/5). Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45. (thanks @powellnorma)
* feat(providers): add Requesty as an OpenAI-compatible gateway provider (#6120) (#6250)
feat(providers): add Requesty as an OpenAI-compatible gateway provider (#6120). Fixed the APIKEY_PROVIDERS count guard (167→168) the feature had missed. TDD guard requesty-provider.test.ts (4/4) + providers-constants-split (4/4). Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45. (thanks @chirag127)
* fix(providers): remove deprecated MiMo v2 entries (#6248)
chore(providers): remove deprecated MiMo V2 catalog entries (superseded by V2.5); realign provider-catalog tests. Merged — thank you, @backryun! Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* fix(github-skills): add missing import, add unit tests, fix settings JSON parse (#6186)
feat(skills): GitHub skill-discovery subsystem — search/score/scan/import agent skills from GitHub, MCP tools (scope-gated) + /api/github-skills route (host-pinned api.github.com, sanitized errors). Merged — thank you, @Moseyuh333! Pre-merge fixes: passed toolDef.scopes so tools gate correctly under scope enforcement, routed the GET error path through sanitizeErrorMessage+500 (Hard Rule #12), and realigned the agent-skills count guards (catalog/routes/generator/mcp) for the new catalog entry. Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* Fix/5976 continued (#6216)
fix(combo): 5 streaming-path fixes (#5976) — locked-stream 500, error-frame-only-if-no-content, Gemini MALFORMED_RESPONSE→content_filter failover, correlationId substring, per-model-500 lockout skip + request-logger UI. Merged — thank you, @hartmark! Maintainer follow-up: releaseQualityClone cancels the abandoned quality-check tee branch (per-request memory) + regression test. All 41 combo/streaming quality tests green. Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* feat(dashboard): filter Free Provider Rankings by configured/available (#6150) (#6251)
feat(dashboard): configured-only / available-only filters on Free Provider Rankings (#6150) — server-side query params + tested lib helper; supersedes the client-side #6245 toggle with an available-only dimension. Lib logic 11/11 green; UI validated live on VPS. Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* ci: unblock test jobs from the Build gate (start at minute 0) (#6275)
test-unit x8, test-vitest, test-integration x2 and test-security all had
needs: build but never download the next-build artifact — the dependency
only serialized ~20min of Build wall-clock in front of every test run.
Switch them to needs: changes with the same skip condition Build uses
(docs-only PRs and drafts still skip), so the test chain
(test-unit -> test-coverage -> quality-gate -> sonarqube) now runs in
parallel with Build instead of after it.
Jobs that genuinely consume the artifact keep needs: build unchanged:
test-e2e x9, package-artifact, electron-package-smoke.
Expected effect on a full ci.yml run: critical path drops from
build + tests (~30min+) to max(build, tests) — roughly 15-20min saved
per run, no extra runner minutes beyond starting the same jobs earlier.
* ci(build): switch Next.js production build to Turbopack (1.9x faster) (#6273)
Next 16 ships Turbopack as the stable production bundler. Benchmarked on a
32-core box against the same tree: webpack 1035s -> Turbopack 539s (1.92x).
The build script already supports the switch via OMNIROUTE_USE_TURBOPACK=1
(scripts/build/build-next-isolated.mjs) and next.config.mjs already mirrors
the resolveAlias stubs in the turbopack block, so this only flips the CI env.
The webpack .build/next/cache actions/cache step is removed in the same
commit: Turbopack does not use the webpack cache dir (its persistent FS
cache is experimental and NOT enabled), so restoring ~0.5 GB per run would
be pure wasted download. Revert restores webpack + its cache together.
Validation: standalone output smoke-tested (server.js boots, health 200,
dashboard 307); the 428 build warnings are the known benign 'overly broad
file pattern' static-analysis notices for dynamic fs usage (covered at
runtime by outputFileTracingIncludes). Downstream e2e x9, package-artifact
and electron-package-smoke consume this artifact, so a green CI run here
validates the Turbopack artifact end-to-end. nightly-compat and npm-publish
stay on webpack until this PR proves out.
* feat(build): make Turbopack the default bundler for dev and build (#6283)
Turbopack (stable in Next 16) becomes the code default in the three entry
points that previously required an explicit OMNIROUTE_USE_TURBOPACK=1:
- scripts/build/build-next-isolated.mjs (production build)
- scripts/dev/run-next.mjs (dev server)
- scripts/dev/run-next-playwright.mjs (playwright dev runner)
OMNIROUTE_USE_TURBOPACK=0 remains the webpack escape hatch (Windows /
native-binding / bundler-compat issues), and only the documented '0'
opts out — junk values keep the default.
Benchmarked on this codebase (same tree, Next 16.2.9): webpack 1035s vs
Turbopack 539s on a 32-core box; ~20min vs 6min59s on ubuntu-latest.
Artifact validated end-to-end (standalone smoke + e2e/package-artifact/
electron-package-smoke CI jobs, Docker amd64+arm64 builds clean with the
v3.8.27 ImportTracer panic gone on 16.2.9).
TDD: tests/unit/build-bundler-default-turbopack.test.ts (new) +
run-next-playwright.test.ts extended with the unset-env default case;
both red before the flip, green after. ENVIRONMENT.md updated.
* feat(docker): build the image with Turbopack (v3.8.27 panic gone on Next 16.2.9) (#6285)
Flips the builder stage to OMNIROUTE_USE_TURBOPACK=1 and rewrites the stale
panic comment: the v3.8.27-era TurbopackInternalError ('entered unreachable
code: there must be a path to a root' in ImportTracer::get_traces) no longer
reproduces on Next 16.2.9.
Validation (2026-07-05, this exact Dockerfile, default
OMNIROUTE_BUILD_MEMORY_MB=4096, no overrides):
- amd64: docker build 659s, exit 0, zero panic/OOM strings in the full log,
container smoke-tested (/api/monitoring/health 200)
- arm64 (qemu): exit 0, zero panic strings
Webpack stays available as the escape hatch:
--build-arg / -e OMNIROUTE_USE_TURBOPACK=0. The V8 heap ceiling is kept:
Turbopack's compile is native Rust, but prerender/export still runs on V8.
* ci: opt-in self-hosted VPS runners for the release window (anti-queue) (#6284)
Adds the on-demand self-hosted runner plumbing for /generate-release:
- scripts/vps/release-runner-up.sh: starts the runner VM on Proxmox, waits
for >=1 'omni-release' runner to report online via the GitHub API, then
flips the USE_VPS_RUNNER repo variable to true. Any failure/timeout sets
it back to false and exits 1 so the caller falls back to hosted runners.
- scripts/vps/release-runner-down.sh: flips USE_VPS_RUNNER=false FIRST
(so no job gets scheduled onto a dying runner), then gracefully shuts
the VM down. Idempotent.
- ci.yml: build, test-unit x8 and test-vitest pick their runner
dynamically. Self-hosted is used ONLY when USE_VPS_RUNNER == 'true'
AND the event is own-origin (push/dispatch, or a PR whose head repo is
this repository). Fork PRs and the var's default/absent state always
fall back to ubuntu-latest.
Why: the Free plan caps hosted concurrency at 20 jobs; a release run
saturates it and queues. The benchmarked VPS (32-core, 4 runners) matches
hosted per-job times (unit ~8.5min/shard, build 9min turbo) but eliminates
the queue, which is the real release bottleneck (~30-50min on a busy day).
Scope is conservative: only the three job families benchmarked on the VPS;
e2e/electron/integration stay hosted (playwright/xvfb provisioning not
validated on the runner workspace yet).
* docs(changelog): restore v3.8.45/v3.8.44 sections eaten by the #6193 merge auto-resolve + CI-perf campaign bullets (#6273 #6275 #6283 #6284 #6285)
* fix(dashboard): null-guard connection in EditConnectionModal base-URL override (#6147) (#6287)
fix(dashboard): null-guard connection in EditConnectionModal (#6147) — fixes 'Cannot read properties of null (reading authType)' crash on every provider-detail page entry. TDD: connModals.test.tsx null-mount 9/9. Base-reds only. Integrated into release/v3.8.45.
* chore(release-green): clear test-masking + docs-all HARD reds for the v3.8.45 pre-flight
- test-masking: allowlist the 4 verified-legitimate assert reductions of the
cycle (#6248 MiMo V2 removal, #6170 Kiro catalog correction, #6154 Copilot
catalog refresh) and register the #6164 AutoRoutingBanner test deletion with
a real replacement guard (tests/unit/home-no-autorouting-banner.test.ts —
asserts the banner stays out of home/page.tsx and the component stays deleted)
- docs-sync: executors count 68 -> 73 in ARCHITECTURE.md + CODEBASE_DOCUMENTATION.md
- env-doc-sync: document OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO (#6249/#6122) in .env.example +
docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
* fix(quality): clear the cycle's 11 net-new ESLint errors + make validate-release-green suppressions-aware
- executor-kiro/save-call-log/call-logs-correlation tests: replace 15 'as any'
casts with typed shapes (net-new no-explicit-any errors from #6213/#6216);
prune the now-empty suppression entries so the frozen baseline stays exact
- github-skills + usage/call-logs routes: raw toLowerCase().includes() search
replaced by matchesSearch() (no-restricted-syntax — Turkish-safe search,
behavior covered by tests/unit/call-logs-correlation-substring.test.ts and
tests/unit/github-collector.test.ts)
- validate-release-green.mjs: run ESLint with --suppressions-location (match
the npm run lint contract — frozen debt is not a release red) and raise the
lint timeout 15->30min (a full pass takes ~14min alone; the 15min ceiling
expired under concurrent suite load and surfaced as 'could not parse eslint
json')
* fix(skills): generate the missing omni-github-skills registry entry + align catalog count tests
PR #6186 added omni-github-skills to the agent-skills catalog (API 22 -> 23)
but did not run the generator, so skills/omni-github-skills/SKILL.md never
existed and 6 integration assertions split between the old (42/43) and new
counts. Generated via scripts/skills/generate-agent-skills.mjs --apply and
aligned agent-skills-discovery to the real totals (43 = 23 API + 20 CLI;
handlers return 44 with config-codex-cli). 30/30 discovery+content tests green.
* fix(combo): restrict the #6216 empty-stream failover to truly empty bodies (restores #3399/#3685 contracts)
The 'streaming no recognized content' branch added by #6216 marked ANY
stream that ended without content deltas as invalid — sweeping in two
regression-guarded pass-through contracts: an empty stream terminated by an
explicit 'data: [DONE]' (#3399 context-cache protection) and an incomplete
Claude lifecycle (ping only, no message_start; #3685 — stream-readiness
timeout territory, not failover). Both unit guards were red on the branch
and green on main (86/86 vs 84/86).
The branch now fires only for a truly EMPTY body (zero bytes — the Gemini
HTTP-200-empty case that motivated #6216), tracked via sawAnyBytes. New
guard: '#5976 truly EMPTY streaming body (zero bytes) -> invalid for combo
failover'. 87/87 across both files.
Also in this pre-flight batch:
- agentSkillTools-mcp: api.have upper bound 22 -> 23 (the #6186 catalog
addition updated the totals but missed this bound)
- delete tests/unit/free-provider-rankings-configured-filter.test.ts:
#6251 (server-side configuredOnly/availableOnly) superseded the #6245
client-side toggle it pinned; replacement declared in the test-masking
allowlist (tests/unit/freeProviderRankings-filters.test.ts, 11/11)
* chore(quality): prune stale ESLint suppressions (4,273 -> 4,233)
Entries whose violations no longer exist (cleaned by cycle merges and the
pre-flight fixes) made 'npm run lint' exit 2 with 'suppressions left that do
not occur anymore'. Regenerated via --prune-suppressions; net-new policy
unchanged.
* fix(proxy): #6246 stop the v3.8.44 proxy IP-leak + over-deactivation regression (#6296)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. Reds pré-existentes classificados: dast-smoke (infra), check:file-size (drift de baseline de god-files congelados), e 3 testes de contagem agentSkills stale (43→44 já corrigidos no tip pelo #6186 — somem no squash sobre o tip). Núcleo do fix #6246 (proxy IP-leak + over-deactivation).
* fix(proxy): make "Test All" read-only + add bulk enable/disable (#6246) (#6299)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. Delta do par #6246 (Test-All read-only + bulk enable/disable), reconciliado com o núcleo #6296 já mergeado. CHANGELOG restaurado (ambos bullets do #6246 coexistem). Reds pré-existentes: dast-smoke (infra) + file-size drift.
* fix(resilience): evict sticky affinity on pinned-account failover (#6219) (#6231)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. Sticky affinity failover (#6219). Sincronizado com tip; CHANGELOG restaurado (base bullets preservados, net +1). Reds pré-existentes: dast-smoke + file-size drift.
* fix(sse): drop commentary-phase text in Responses passthrough (#6199) (#6232)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. Responses commentary-phase filter (#6199). Sincronizado; CHANGELOG restaurado net +1. Reds: dast-smoke + file-size drift.
* fix: bug-fix sweep — log path, AgentBridge DNS, opencode-go headers, GitLab Duo tools, M365 EDU (#6197 #6127 #6198 #5997 #6220 #6210) (#6234)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. Bug-fix sweep (#6197 log path, #6127/#6198 AgentBridge DNS, #6210 M365 EDU, #6220 GitLab Duo tools, #5997 opencode-go headers). 27 testes verdes. CHANGELOG restaurado net +5. Reds: dast-smoke + file-size drift.
* fix(docker): add id= to BuildKit cache mounts for strict builders (#6291)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. Dockerfile-only: explicit id= on BuildKit cache mounts (fixes strict-frontend parse error). Reds pré-existentes (dast-smoke/file-size drift) não relacionados a mudança de Dockerfile. Thanks @karimalsalah.
* fix(sse): strip zero-width markers from streamed tool-call arguments (follow-up to #5857) (#6292)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. Strip zero-width markers from streamed tool-call arguments (#5857 follow-up). Test 50/50. CHANGELOG reconciled net +1. Reds pré-existentes (dast-smoke/file-size drift). Thanks @DKotsyuba.
* ci(quality): merge-integrity fast-gates + pre-flight hermetic mode (#6300)
Merged into release/v3.8.45. CI merge-integrity fast-gates (changelog-integrity + agent-skills-sync) + pre-flight hermetic mode. O gate novo detectou 11 SKILL.md gerados fora de sync (drift pré-existente no tip: omni-api-keys endpoints, omni-github-skills do #6186) — regenerados neste PR, Merge-integrity GREEN no CI. Reds restantes base-red (dast-smoke/file-size drift/live-data flaky). Testes novos 17/17.
* fix(a2a): finish the #6186 catalog-count update — 3 hardcoded 22s left in production
#6186 added omni-github-skills (API 22 -> 23) and updated computeCoverage's
total, but left the old count hardcoded in the A2A layer: listCapabilities
metadata reported coverage.api.total 22 (type literal + value) and
SkillCoverageSchema pinned z.literal(22) — so the schema would REJECT the
correct runtime value. Aligned all three to 23 + the unit fixtures
(listCapabilities-a2a, agentSkills-schemas, 46/46 with agentSkillTools-mcp).
* fix(quality): type the 7 net-new 'as any' casts from #6292 (Lint red on the release tip)
#6292 rewrote/added zero-width-marker tests with 7 new 'as any' result casts,
pushing the file past its frozen suppression (84) — and when violations
exceed the suppressed count ESLint reports ALL of them, so the ci.yml Lint
job went red with 90 errors. The 7 new sites get typed shapes (delta /
arguments / choices / output accessors — same pattern as fecf888fd); the
pre-existing debt stays frozen at the exact new count (83). 50/50 tests
green, file lint-clean under the suppressions baseline.
* fix(api): Zod-validate POST /api/github-skills + document new gate envs + pin merge-integrity actions
Three latent heavy-CI reds surfaced by the VPS validation dispatch (the fast
path never runs these gates):
- t06 route-validation: POST /api/github-skills destructured request.json()
blind — a non-array 'targets' would .map-crash. Now validateBody(zod)
with defaults preserved (Hard Rule #7). Guard:
tests/unit/github-skills-route-validation.test.ts (4/4).
- env-doc-sync: document OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST (#6310) and the
changelog-integrity gate envs CHANGELOG_BASE_REF/ALLOW_CHANGELOG_REMOVALS
(#6300) in .env.example + ENVIRONMENT.md.
- zizmor ratchet: the new merge-integrity job's checkout/setup-node uses were
unpinned (+1 finding, 160 > baseline 159); pinned by SHA -> 158 (< baseline).
* fix(quality): clear the 2 remaining heavy-gate reds on the release tip
- check:error-helper: githubSkillTools.ts (#6186 wave) built MCP install
error results with raw err.message — routed through sanitizeErrorMessage()
(Hard Rule #12; 19/19 agentSkillTools tests green)
- check:mutation-test-coverage: tests/unit/combo-provider-cooldown-sibling.test.ts
(#6216) was missing from stryker.conf tap.testFiles — added so its mutant
kills count on nightly-mutation
* fix(security): 405 method-first for /api/keys/{id}/devices (dast-smoke QUERY check)
Schemathesis's newer unsupported-methods check (unpinned tool drift) sends
QUERY /api/keys/{id}/devices and demands 405 Method Not Allowed; the path had
no HIGH_RISK_METHOD_RULES entry, so the auth layer answered 401 first. Add
the devices rule (GET-only) so undocumented methods get a clean method-first
405 — same pattern as the v3.8.44 TRACE fix. TDD:
tests/unit/dast-method-not-allowed.test.ts gains the devices QUERY case (4/4).
* fix(mitm): test suite and CI must never mutate the OS trust store (OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST) (#6310)
Incident 2026-07-05 on the self-hosted release runner (VM 113): the
integration test 'POST /cert: installs trust when cert exists' exercised the
REAL install path, wrote a 105-byte fake PEM (FakeMITMCertForTestingOnly)
into /usr/local/share/ca-certificates and update-ca-certificates baked the
invalid entry into ca-certificates.crt — breaking ALL system TLS on the VM
(curl error 77, apt cert failures, and the intermittent gzip-corrupted
next-build artifacts that failed 6/9 e2e shards in run 28754447912). Hosted
runners are ephemeral, so the same mutation went unnoticed for months.
- installCert/uninstallCert: skip the OS dispatch under
OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST=1 — AFTER the input checks, so the #4546
environment-skip contract (missing file throws -> structured skip) and the
already-installed/not-installed early returns are preserved.
- installTproxyCa/uninstallTproxyCa: same guard, only when no run dep is
injected (DI'd tests keep exercising the full command sequence with mocks).
- tests/_setup/isolateDataDir.ts sets the env for every node:test process;
ci.yml/quality.yml/nightly-release-green.yml set it workflow-wide (e2e runs
the real app outside the test setup).
TDD: tests/unit/system-trust-test-guard.test.ts (guard exported to every test
process; guarded install resolves on a real file without touching the OS;
missing-file contract preserved). 82/82 across the affected cert/tproxy/
agent-bridge suites.
* ci(vps): hermetic nightly pre-flight on the release runner (descoped: e2e/integration/electron stay hosted) (#6305)
* ci(vps): extend the dynamic omni-release runner to e2e/integration/electron + nightly pre-flight
Completes the #6284 rollout to the jobs where the VPS pays the most:
- test-e2e (9 shards, 15-20min/shard hosted — dominated by setup, not tests),
test-integration (2 shards) and electron-package-smoke now pick the
self-hosted omni-release runner under the same gate: vars.USE_VPS_RUNNER
== 'true' AND own-origin (fork PRs never reach self-hosted).
- nightly-release-green (the release pre-flight) becomes runner-dynamic too:
on the VPS it runs in a clean env — no operator OMNIROUTE_API_KEY, no
local noauth CLIs — eliminating the machine-specific false positives that
dominated the 2026-07-05 pre-flight; passes --hermetic (no-op until the
#6300 validator lands, then belt-and-suspenders).
Validation plan (per operator request): release-runner-up.sh -> full ci.yml
workflow_dispatch on this branch exercising e2e/integration/electron on the
VPS (proves playwright --with-deps + xvfb on the runner) -> down.sh -> VM
off verified.
* fix(mitm): test suite and CI must never mutate the OS trust store (OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST)
Incident 2026-07-05 on the self-hosted release runner (VM 113): the
integration test 'POST /cert: installs trust when cert exists' exercised the
REAL install path, wrote a 105-byte fake PEM (FakeMITMCertForTestingOnly)
into /usr/local/share/ca-certificates and update-ca-certificates baked the
invalid entry into ca-certificates.crt — breaking ALL system TLS on the VM
(curl error 77, apt cert failures, and the intermittent gzip-corrupted
next-build artifacts that failed 6/9 e2e shards in run 28754447912). Hosted
runners are ephemeral, so the same mutation went unnoticed for months.
- installCert/uninstallCert: skip the OS dispatch under
OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST=1 — AFTER the input checks, so the #4546
environment-skip contract (missing file throws -> structured skip) and the
already-installed/not-installed early returns are preserved.
- installTproxyCa/uninstallTproxyCa: same guard, only when no run dep is
injected (DI'd tests keep exercising the full command sequence with mocks).
- tests/_setup/isolateDataDir.ts sets the env for every node:test process;
ci.yml/quality.yml/nightly-release-green.yml set it workflow-wide (e2e runs
the real app outside the test setup).
TDD: tests/unit/system-trust-test-guard.test.ts (guard exported to every test
process; guarded install resolves on a real file without touching the OS;
missing-file contract preserved). 82/82 across the affected cert/tproxy/
agent-bridge suites.
* ci(vps): descope — e2e/integration/electron stay on hosted runners; keep the hermetic nightly pre-flight dynamic
Validation verdict (runs 28754447912 + 28757670732, VM 113):
- e2e cannot run >1 per VM: both jobs bind port 20128 ('already used') — needs
a per-job port in the playwright runner before any VM rollout.
- concurrent ~1GB artifact downloads truncate on the VM uplink (gzip 'invalid
compressed data' — with 2 runners the e2e shard passed; corruption returned
at 4) — actions/download-artifact has no integrity retry here.
- integration shard 2 exceeded its 15-min timeout twice on the VM.
The VPS remains a win for whole-machine jobs: build/unit/vitest (already
dynamic via #6284) and nightly-release-green (single job, clean env, hermetic
pre-flight) — which this PR keeps.
* chore(quality): v3.8.45 cycle-close file-size rebaseline (Phase 0 drift absorption)
13 files grown by the cycle's merged PRs (#6216 streaming+request-logger UI;
#6251/#6253 dashboard UX) — legitimate merged-feature growth absorbed by the
release captain per the Phase 0 drift policy; all entries stay frozen (cannot
grow further). Justification key: _rebaseline_2026_07_06_v3845_release_close.
* chore(quality): v3.8.45 cycle-close cognitive/cyclomatic rebaseline (Phase 0 drift absorption)
cognitive 867->877 (+10), cyclomatic 2028->2035 (+7) — inherited cycle drift
measured by check:release-green (hermetic) on the release tip; the captain's
pre-flight fixes are gate/test/workflow changes (complexity-neutral).
Justification keys: _rebaseline_2026_07_06_v3845_release_close.
* docs(changelog): v3.8.45 reconciliation — fold Unreleased into the version section, 30 missing bullets, contributors hall
Phase 0a reconciliation (/generate-release): every commit since v3.8.44 now
has a bullet or a Maintenance rollup (82 commits; the only ref-less residues
are the bump/recording commits); #6193 bullet gains its PR ref; #6298
diagnosis credited (@subhansh-dev, landed via #6234); [3.8.44] header dated;
'### 🙌 Contributors' table injected (27 external + maintainer) + 42 i18n
mirrors resynced.
* chore(release): v3.8.45 — 2026-07-06
* fix(resilience): 502/503/504 keep the connection-unavailability path — only the exact 500 skips lockout (#5976 contract)
The #6216 branch used 'status >= 500', so a 503 on a per-model-quota /
openai-compatible provider returned cooldownMs 0 — no model lockout AND no
connection cooldown — hot-looping the failing upstream and breaking the
resilience-http-e2e 'priority combo falls back on 503' guard on the release
PR (the request after a 503 hit the same primary again). #6216's OWN unit
contract pins the narrow behavior ('Gemini 503 should NOT skip cooldown',
combo-provider-cooldown-sibling.test.ts) but computes the condition inline
instead of exercising auth.ts. Code aligned to the tested contract:
status === 500 skips (intermittent, not model-specific); 502/503/504 keep
the pre-#6216 model-lockout path. Validated: the failing integration test
flips red -> green locally (19s, deterministic before).
* fix(security): crypto-backed randomNumericId in doubao-web (CodeQL js/insecure-randomness)
The synthetic Dola device/web id was built from Math.random; CodeQL flags it
as insecure randomness in a security context. Not a secret, but
crypto.getRandomValues costs the same and closes alert #692 at the source.
Doubao executor tests 14/14 green. Alerts #693-695 (incomplete-url-substring
in unit-test asserts) dismissed as false positives per the v3.8.35 precedent
(Hard Rule #14).
* chore(quality): shave the #5976 fix comment back under the auth.ts file-size freeze (2447)
---------
Co-authored-by: Danny S <36470572+kanztu@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Luis Alejandro Vega <LuisAlejandroVega@redesprivadasvirtuales.com>
Co-authored-by: Milan Soni <123074437+Iammilansoni@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: R. Beltran <rbeltran8000@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: VXNCXNX <93332837+VXNCXNX@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Denis Kotsyuba <kocubads96@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: DKotsyuba <16292493+DKotsyuba@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: backryun <bakryun0718@proton.me>
Co-authored-by: Aris <arissunandar399@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ankit <177378174+anki1kr@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rian Priskanova <rian@evercore.technology>
Co-authored-by: Vittor Guilherme Borges de Oliveira <vittoroliveira.dev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <42529354+KooshaPari@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: serverless83 <35410475+serverless83@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Moseyuh333 <148680980+Moseyuh333@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: HenryHaniHannoush <karimmalsalah@gmail.com>
1150 lines
60 KiB
TypeScript
1150 lines
60 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* tests/integration/liveGeminiShared.ts
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*
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* Shared utilities for live Gemini workload tests (streaming + non-streaming).
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* Import from here to reuse payload generators without duplicating code.
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*/
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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export const API_KEY = process.env.OMNIROUTE_API_KEY;
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export const BASE_URL = process.env.OMNIROUTE_URL || "http://localhost:3000";
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export const MODEL = "default";
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const GEMINI_API_KEY = process.env.GEMINI_API_KEY;
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export const DELAY_BETWEEN_REQUESTS_MS = Number(process.env.TEST_DELAY_MS) || 5000;
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export const skip = !API_KEY ? "OMNIROUTE_API_KEY not set — skipping live test" : undefined;
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test Environment Setup — ensures gemini provider + "default" combo exist
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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const DEFAULT_COMBO_CONFIG = {
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name: "default",
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strategy: "auto",
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models: [
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{ model: "gemini/gemma-4-31b-it", providerId: "gemini" },
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{ model: "gemini/gemma-4-26b-a4b-it", providerId: "gemini" },
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],
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config: {
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maxRetries: 3,
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retryDelayMs: 500,
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maxComboDepth: 3,
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trackMetrics: true,
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failoverBeforeRetry: true,
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maxSetRetries: 3,
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candidatePool: ["gemini"],
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targetTimeoutMs: 300_000,
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streamPreBuffer: { enabled: false, mode: "tokens", threshold: 100 },
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},
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};
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async function apiFetch(path: string, options: RequestInit = {}): Promise<Response> {
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return fetch(`${BASE_URL}${path}`, {
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...options,
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headers: {
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Authorization: `Bearer ${API_KEY}`,
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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...(options.headers || {}),
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},
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});
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}
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async function ensureGeminiProvider(): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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const res = await apiFetch("/api/providers");
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if (!res.ok) return false;
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const data = await res.json();
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const connections = data.connections || data;
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const geminiActive = Array.isArray(connections)
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? connections.find(
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(c: any) => c.provider === "gemini" && c.isActive && c.testStatus !== "expired"
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)
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: null;
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if (geminiActive) {
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console.log(` [setup] gemini provider active (id=${geminiActive.id.slice(0, 8)}…)`);
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return true;
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}
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// Check if gemini exists but is expired — try to reactivate via DB
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const geminiExpired = Array.isArray(connections)
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? connections.find((c: any) => c.provider === "gemini" && c.isActive)
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: null;
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if (geminiExpired) {
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console.log(
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` [setup] gemini provider expired (id=${geminiExpired.id.slice(0, 8)}…), reactivating via DB...`
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);
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// The health check marks API-key connections as expired because it expects
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// OAuth refresh tokens. Force test_status=active via direct DB update.
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try {
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const { getDbInstance } = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
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const db = getDbInstance();
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db.prepare(
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"UPDATE provider_connections SET test_status = 'active', error_code = NULL, last_error = NULL WHERE id = ?"
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).run(geminiExpired.id);
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console.log(` [setup] Reactivated gemini connection ${geminiExpired.id.slice(0, 8)}…`);
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return true;
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} catch (dbErr) {
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console.warn(` [setup] DB reactivation failed: ${dbErr}`);
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}
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}
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// No gemini connection at all — create one with GEMINI_API_KEY
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if (!GEMINI_API_KEY) {
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console.warn(" [setup] No active gemini connection and GEMINI_API_KEY not set — skipping");
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return false;
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}
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console.log(` [setup] Creating gemini provider with GEMINI_API_KEY...`);
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const createRes = await apiFetch("/api/providers", {
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method: "POST",
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body: JSON.stringify({
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provider: "gemini",
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apiKey: GEMINI_API_KEY,
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name: "gemini-test",
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testStatus: "active",
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healthCheckInterval: 999999999,
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}),
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});
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if (!createRes.ok) {
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const err = await createRes.text();
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console.warn(` [setup] Failed to create gemini provider: ${createRes.status} ${err}`);
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return false;
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}
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const created = await createRes.json();
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const connId = created?.connection?.id;
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if (connId) {
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// Force test_status=active via direct DB — the health check will otherwise
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// mark it expired immediately because there's no OAuth refresh token.
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try {
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const { getDbInstance } = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
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const db = getDbInstance();
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db.prepare(
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"UPDATE provider_connections SET test_status = 'active', error_code = NULL, last_error = NULL WHERE id = ?"
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).run(connId);
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console.log(` [setup] gemini provider created and activated (id=${connId.slice(0, 8)}…)`);
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} catch (dbErr) {
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console.warn(` [setup] DB activation failed: ${dbErr}`);
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console.log(` [setup] gemini provider created (id=${connId?.slice(0, 8)}…)`);
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}
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}
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return true;
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn(` [setup] Could not check/create gemini provider: ${err}`);
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return false;
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}
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}
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async function ensureDefaultCombo(): Promise<void> {
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try {
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const res = await apiFetch("/api/combos");
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if (!res.ok) return;
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const data = await res.json();
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const combos = data.combos || data;
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const existing = Array.isArray(combos) ? combos.find((c: any) => c.name === "default") : null;
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if (existing) {
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console.log(
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` [setup] "default" combo exists (strategy=${existing.strategy}, models=${existing.models?.length})`
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);
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return;
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}
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console.log(` [setup] Creating "default" combo with gemma-4 models...`);
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const createRes = await apiFetch("/api/combos", {
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method: "POST",
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body: JSON.stringify(DEFAULT_COMBO_CONFIG),
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});
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if (createRes.ok) {
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console.log(` [setup] "default" combo created successfully`);
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} else {
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const err = await createRes.text();
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console.warn(` [setup] Failed to create "default" combo: ${createRes.status} ${err}`);
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}
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn(` [setup] Could not check/create combo: ${err}`);
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}
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}
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export async function ensureTestEnvironment(): Promise<void> {
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if (!API_KEY) return;
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console.log(`\n [setup] Ensuring test environment...`);
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await ensureGeminiProvider();
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await ensureDefaultCombo();
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}
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test Data Generator
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export type Message = { role: string; content: string };
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export function pick<T>(arr: T[]): T {
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return arr[Math.floor(Math.random() * arr.length)];
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}
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export function randomInt(min: number, max: number): number {
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return Math.floor(Math.random() * (max - min + 1)) + min;
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}
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export const SYSTEM_PROMPTS = [
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"You are a helpful coding assistant. Respond concisely and accurately.",
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"You are a senior software engineer reviewing code. Be thorough and critical.",
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"You are a data scientist analyzing complex datasets. Explain your reasoning step by step.",
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"You are a technical writer creating documentation. Be clear and well-structured.",
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"You are a DevOps engineer debugging infrastructure issues. Think about root causes.",
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"You are a security auditor reviewing code for vulnerabilities. Be meticulous.",
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"You are an AI researcher explaining concepts. Use analogies and examples.",
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"You are a product manager evaluating technical proposals. Consider trade-offs.",
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];
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export const USER_PROMPTS = [
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"Write a function that implements a trie data structure with insert, search, and startsWith methods.",
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"Explain the difference between REST and GraphQL, with pros and cons of each.",
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"Debug this code and explain what's wrong: function sum(a,b){return a+b} console.log(sum(1,2,3))",
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"Write a SQL query to find the top 5 most common words in a articles table across all articles.",
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"Compare and contrast Docker vs Podman for container orchestration.",
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"Explain how HTTP/2 multiplexing works and why it improves performance.",
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"Write a Python decorator that caches function results with a TTL.",
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"What are the trade-offs between microservices and monoliths? When would you choose each?",
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"Design a rate limiter algorithm. Compare token bucket vs sliding window.",
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"Explain the CAP theorem and how it applies to distributed databases.",
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"Write a React custom hook for WebSocket connections with auto-reconnect.",
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"How does garbage collection work in V8 JavaScript engine?",
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"Compare SQLite vs PostgreSQL for a production web application.",
|
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"Write a bash script that monitors CPU and memory usage and alerts when thresholds are exceeded.",
|
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"Explain zero-trust networking principles and how to implement them.",
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"Write a TypeScript type-safe event emitter class.",
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"How does TLS 1.3 handshake work? Compare with TLS 1.2.",
|
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"Design a URL shortening service. Cover the database schema, API design, and scaling considerations.",
|
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"Explain the event loop in Node.js with specific examples of microtasks vs macrotasks.",
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"Write a regex to validate email addresses and explain the trade-offs.",
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"Compare Kafka vs RabbitMQ for event-driven architectures.",
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"How would you implement feature flags in a distributed system?",
|
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"Write an implementation of Promise.all() with timeout support.",
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"Explain the actor model and how it compares to traditional threading.",
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"Design a caching strategy for a read-heavy API serving 10k requests/second.",
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];
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export const CODE_BLOCKS = [
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`\`\`\`python
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def quicksort(arr):
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if len(arr) <= 1:
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return arr
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pivot = arr[len(arr) // 2]
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left = [x for x in arr if x < pivot]
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middle = [x for x in arr if x == pivot]
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right = [x for x in arr if x > pivot]
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return quicksort(left) + middle + quicksort(right)
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\`\`\``,
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`\`\`\`javascript
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const pipeline = (initial, ...fns) =>
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fns.reduce((acc, fn) => fn(acc), initial);
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const result = pipeline(
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5,
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x => x * 2,
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x => x + 1,
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x => x ** 2
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);
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\`\`\``,
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`\`\`\`typescript
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interface Task<T> {
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id: string;
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priority: number;
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execute: () => Promise<T>;
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timeout: number;
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}
|
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class TaskQueue<T> {
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private queue: Task<T>[] = [];
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private running = false;
|
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async enqueue(task: Task<T>): Promise<T> {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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this.queue.push({
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...task,
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execute: () => task.execute().then(resolve).catch(reject),
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});
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if (!this.running) this.processNext();
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});
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}
|
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private async processNext(): Promise<void> {
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this.running = true;
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const sorted = this.queue.sort((a, b) => b.priority - a.priority);
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const task = sorted.shift();
|
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if (task) {
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const result = await task.execute();
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this.processNext();
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|
} else {
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this.running = false;
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|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
\`\`\``,
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|
`\`\`\`sql
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WITH word_freq AS (
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SELECT
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UNNEST(STRING_TO_ARRAY(LOWER(content), ' ')) AS word,
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COUNT(*) AS cnt
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FROM articles
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WHERE content IS NOT NULL
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GROUP BY word
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)
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SELECT word, cnt
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FROM word_freq
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WHERE LENGTH(word) > 3
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ORDER BY cnt DESC
|
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LIMIT 20;
|
|
\`\`\``,
|
|
`\`\`\`yaml
|
|
apiVersion: v1
|
|
kind: ConfigMap
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: app-config
|
|
namespace: production
|
|
data:
|
|
database.url: "postgresql://db.internal:5432/app"
|
|
redis.host: "redis-cluster.internal"
|
|
redis.port: "6379"
|
|
log.level: "info"
|
|
feature.flags: '{"darkMode":true,"betaApi":false,"newDashboard":true}'
|
|
\`\`\``,
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
export const LONG_DOCUMENTS = [
|
|
`In distributed systems theory, the CAP theorem states that it is impossible for a distributed data store to simultaneously provide more than two out of the following three guarantees: Consistency (every read receives the most recent write or an error), Availability (every request receives a non-error response, without the guarantee that it contains the most recent write), and Partition Tolerance (the system continues to operate despite an arbitrary number of messages being dropped or delayed by the network between nodes). This fundamental trade-off was first articulated by Eric Brewer in 2000 and later formally proven as a theorem by Seth Gilbert and Nancy Lynch in 2002.
|
|
|
|
The practical implication of CAP is that when a network partition occurs, system designers must choose between consistency and availability. Traditional ACID-compliant databases like PostgreSQL typically choose consistency (CP), while many NoSQL systems like Cassandra choose availability (AP). However, modern systems increasingly recognize that CAP is not binary — techniques like conflict-free replicated data types (CRDTs), consensus algorithms like Raft, and hybrid approaches allow systems to achieve different trade-offs at different levels.
|
|
|
|
In practice, most production systems aim for "PA/EL" (Partition-Aware / Eventually-Literate) or use compensatory transactions to handle inconsistencies. The PACELC extension further refines CAP by noting that even when the network is functioning normally (no partition), there's still a trade-off between latency and consistency. Systems like Amazon DynamoDB and Google Spanner represent different points on this continuum, with Spanner using TrueTime to achieve external consistency at higher latency, while DynamoDB prioritizes availability and partition tolerance with weaker consistency models.`,
|
|
|
|
`Concurrency models represent fundamentally different approaches to managing multiple computations that overlap in time. The traditional threading model, used extensively in languages like Java and C++, relies on shared memory with explicit locking mechanisms (mutexes, semaphores, read-write locks) to coordinate access to shared state. This model is well-understood but notoriously difficult to get right — deadlocks, race conditions, and priority inversion are common bugs that can be extremely subtle.
|
|
|
|
The actor model, popularized by Erlang and later adopted by Akka, Dapr, and Orleans, takes a different approach: each actor is an independent computation unit with its own private state, communicating exclusively through asynchronous message passing. Actors can create other actors, send messages, and change their behavior for the next message they receive. This model eliminates shared-state concurrency issues entirely, since actors never share memory — they only share messages. The trade-off is that certain patterns (like distributed transactions) become more complex to implement.
|
|
|
|
Software Transactional Memory (STM) offers another paradigm, borrowing from database transactions to manage memory accesses. Clojure's STM, for instance, uses multiversion concurrency control (MVCC) to provide optimistic concurrency — transactions proceed in isolation and are committed atomically, with automatic retry on conflicts. STM can be more ergonomic than explicit locking, but performance overhead and the challenge of handling side effects within transactions remain concerns.
|
|
|
|
The structured concurrency model, recently gaining traction through Kotlin coroutines, Java virtual threads, and Swift's async/await, organizes concurrent operations into a hierarchy where each operation's lifetime is scoped to its enclosing block. This ensures proper cleanup, simplifies error propagation, and prevents resource leaks. Go's goroutines follow a similar philosophy with channels providing CSP-style communication (Communicating Sequential Processes), where processes communicate by sending values through typed channels rather than through shared memory.
|
|
|
|
For I/O-bound workloads, event-driven models (Node.js, Python asyncio, C# async/await) use an event loop to multiplex concurrent operations onto a single thread, avoiding context-switching overhead. This works well when the workload is primarily waiting on I/O, but CPU-bound work can block the event loop and degrade responsiveness. The modern trend is toward hybrid approaches that combine the scalability of event-driven models with the flexibility of thread pools for CPU-intensive work.`,
|
|
|
|
`Event sourcing is an architectural pattern where state changes are stored as an immutable sequence of events, rather than as the current state. Instead of updating a row in a database when a user changes their email address, you append an "EmailChanged" event to an event store. The current state is derived by replaying all events for that entity. This fundamental shift in thinking has profound implications for system design, traceability, and temporal queries.
|
|
|
|
The primary advantages of event sourcing include: complete audit trail (every state change is recorded with full context), temporal querying (you can reconstruct state at any point in time), event-driven architecture fit (events can be published to downstream consumers naturally), and the ability to create multiple different views (projections) from the same event stream. Command Query Responsibility Segregation (CQRS) is a natural companion pattern, where write operations use the event store and read operations use pre-computed projections optimized for specific query patterns.
|
|
|
|
However, event sourcing introduces significant complexity: event schema evolution must be carefully managed (events are permanent), the event store becomes a critical piece of infrastructure requiring careful backup and disaster recovery, and read models can be eventually consistent with the write model, potentially serving stale data. Common implementation patterns using PostgreSQL as an event store include the "outbox pattern" with transactional outbox tables, and using JSONB columns for flexible event payloads while maintaining indexed metadata columns for efficient querying.
|
|
|
|
Tools like Kafka (for event streaming), Debezium (for change data capture), and Axon Framework (for Java-based CQRS/ES) provide infrastructure to implement these patterns. The decision to adopt event sourcing should be driven by concrete requirements for audit trails, temporal queries, or complex event-driven workflows — it adds significant complexity that may not be justified for simpler CRUD applications.`,
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
export const AGENTIC_TASKS = [
|
|
"I need to build a microservice that processes webhook events. Let's start with the requirements. First, what should I consider when designing the webhook ingestion endpoint?",
|
|
"Let me show you what I have so far for the task queue system. Actually, first let me reconsider the requirements — we need to handle priorities and timeouts.",
|
|
"I'm working on refactoring the authentication module. Looking at the current code, I see we're using JWT with refresh tokens. But we also need API key auth for service-to-service communication.",
|
|
"Before we write any code, let me think about the data model. We have users, organizations, projects, and teams. Users can belong to multiple organizations and each project belongs to one organization.",
|
|
"Let me walk through the deployment pipeline. We build with Docker, push to GHCR, deploy to Kubernetes. But we're seeing issues with rolling updates — sometimes the old pods serve requests after the new ones are ready.",
|
|
"I just realized there's a security concern. We're exposing internal service names in error messages returned to the client. Let me check all the error handling paths.",
|
|
"OK I've been thinking about the caching strategy more. We need multi-layer caching: Redis for API responses, CDN for static assets, and browser caching for images. But invalidation is tricky — what happens when a user updates their avatar?",
|
|
"Let me trace through the payment flow end to end. User submits payment → we create a pending transaction → call Stripe → handle webhook → update order status → send confirmation email. Each step has failure modes.",
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Generator helpers
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
export function genSystemMessage(): Message {
|
|
return { role: "system", content: pick(SYSTEM_PROMPTS) };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function genUserMessage(): Message {
|
|
return { role: "user", content: pick(USER_PROMPTS) };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function genCodeReviewMessage(): Message {
|
|
return {
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `Review this code and suggest improvements:\n${pick(CODE_BLOCKS)}\n\nFocus on: performance, readability, edge cases.`,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function genLongDocMessage(): Message {
|
|
return {
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `Please summarize the following text and extract 5 key insights:\n\n${pick(LONG_DOCUMENTS)}`,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function genAgenticTaskMessage(): Message {
|
|
return { role: "user", content: pick(AGENTIC_TASKS) };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function genMultiTurnConversation(turns: number): Message[] {
|
|
const messages: Message[] = [];
|
|
|
|
if (Math.random() > 0.3) {
|
|
messages.push({ role: "system", content: pick(SYSTEM_PROMPTS) });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const topics = [
|
|
"building a real-time chat application with WebSockets",
|
|
"designing a distributed task queue",
|
|
"implementing OAuth 2.0 from scratch",
|
|
"optimizing database query performance at scale",
|
|
"creating a monitoring and alerting system",
|
|
"building a feature flag system with gradual rollout",
|
|
"designing an API gateway with rate limiting",
|
|
"implementing event-driven microservices",
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
const topic = pick(topics);
|
|
|
|
const assistantReplies = [
|
|
`Great question about ${topic}. Let me break this down systematically and consider the key design decisions involved. First, we need to understand the core requirements and constraints. The main challenges here are around scalability, reliability, and maintainability.\n\nLet me start with the architecture: I'd recommend a layered approach. At the foundation, we need a solid data model. Then we build the business logic layer, followed by the API layer. For ${topic}, we should consider using established patterns like the repository pattern for data access and the strategy pattern for algorithm selection.\n\nHere's a concrete example of how I'd structure this:\n\n1. First, define clear interfaces and contracts\n2. Implement the core logic with dependency injection\n3. Add observability (metrics, logging, tracing)\n4. Write comprehensive tests\n5. Add performance optimizations iteratively`,
|
|
`Building on what we discussed about ${topic}, I want to dive deeper into the implementation details. There are several important design patterns that apply here.\n\nThe key insight is that we need to separate concerns properly. Let me illustrate with a specific scenario:\n\nConsider how data flows through the system. We receive input, process it through a pipeline, and produce output. Each stage of the pipeline should be independently testable and replaceable.\n\nSome common pitfalls to avoid:\n- Tight coupling between components\n- Neglecting error handling and edge cases\n- Premature optimization without profiling\n- Ignoring security implications\n\nInstead, focus on:\n- Clean interfaces between modules\n- Comprehensive error handling with meaningful messages\n- Performance baselines before optimization\n- Security review as part of the design process`,
|
|
`Let me reconsider my approach to ${topic}. After thinking about it more carefully, I realize there are some important nuances I should address.\n\nThe initial approach I suggested works for small to medium scale, but for production systems we need to consider:\n\n1. **Resilience**: What happens when dependencies fail? Circuit breakers, retries with exponential backoff, graceful degradation.\n2. **Observability**: How do we know the system is working correctly? Distributed tracing, structured logging, metrics with dashboards.\n3. **Operational complexity**: How do we deploy, monitor, and debug this in production?\n\nLet me revise the architecture to address these concerns...`,
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
const followUps = [
|
|
`That's helpful. Now let me think about the specific implementation. How would you handle error cases where ${topic} encounters a failure mid-operation? Should we use compensating transactions or rollback?`,
|
|
`I see. Building on that, what about monitoring and observability for ${topic}? What metrics should we track and what alerting thresholds make sense?`,
|
|
`Interesting points. Going deeper — how would we test ${topic}? Integration tests? E2E tests? Property-based testing? What's the testing strategy?`,
|
|
`That makes sense. Now considering the deployment aspect — how would we roll out ${topic} incrementally? Feature flags? Blue-green deployment? Canary releases?`,
|
|
`One more thing — for ${topic}, how do we handle data consistency across services? Eventual consistency? Saga pattern? Two-phase commit?`,
|
|
`Let me think about the security implications of ${topic}. What are the threat models we should consider? Authentication, authorization, data encryption, audit logging?`,
|
|
`Good. Now about performance — what's the bottleneck in ${topic}? Database queries? Network calls? CPU-bound computation? How do we profile and optimize?`,
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
messages.push({
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `I need help with ${topic}. Can you walk me through the design and implementation?`,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const numTurns = Math.min(turns, 6);
|
|
|
|
for (let i = 0; i < numTurns; i++) {
|
|
messages.push({ role: "assistant", content: pick(assistantReplies) });
|
|
messages.push({ role: "user", content: pick(followUps) });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return messages;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function genCodeConversation(): Message[] {
|
|
return [
|
|
{
|
|
role: "system",
|
|
content: "You are a senior developer reviewing production code. Be thorough.",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `I have this code that's causing performance issues in production. Can you help me optimize it?\n\n${pick(CODE_BLOCKS)}\n\nThe function is called about 10,000 times per second and we're seeing GC pressure.`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Let me analyze the code for performance issues. I can see several opportunities for optimization:\n\n1. **Allocation pressure**: The code creates intermediate objects on every call. We should reuse buffers or use object pooling.\n2. **Algorithmic complexity**: The current approach is O(n²) but we can make it O(n log n) with a better data structure.\n3. **GC overhead**: Frequent allocations trigger GC pauses.\n\nLet me provide an optimized version that addresses these issues.",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Thanks, that helped a lot. Now, I also need to add error handling. What patterns do you recommend for this kind of batch processing? Should I use the Result pattern, exceptions, or something else?",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content:
|
|
"For batch processing, I recommend a combination approach:\n\nUse a Result/Either type for expected failures (validation errors, not-found cases) and exceptions for unexpected failures (network errors, bugs). This gives you typed error handling for business logic while keeping unexpected errors visible.\n\nHere's a pattern I use:\n\n```typescript\ntype Result<T, E = Error> = { ok: true; value: T } | { ok: false; error: E };\n\nasync function processBatch(items: Item[]): Promise<Result<Processed[], BatchError>> {\n const results: Processed[] = [];\n for (const item of items) {\n try {\n const processed = await processItem(item);\n results.push(processed);\n } catch (err) {\n return { ok: false, error: new BatchError(item.id, err) };\n }\n }\n return { ok: true, value: results };\n}\n```\n\nThis way callers can pattern-match on the result without try/catch everywhere.",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"That pattern looks clean. One more question — how should I test the batch processor? I want good coverage but the tests are slow because of the async operations.",
|
|
},
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// SSE Stream Reader
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
interface StreamResult {
|
|
fullContent: string;
|
|
finishReason: string;
|
|
totalTokens: number;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function readSSEStream(response: Response): Promise<StreamResult> {
|
|
const reader = response.body!.getReader();
|
|
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
|
|
let buffer = "";
|
|
let fullContent = "";
|
|
let finishReason = "unknown";
|
|
let totalTokens = 0;
|
|
let rawChunkCount = 0;
|
|
let dataLineCount = 0;
|
|
const debugLines: string[] = [];
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
|
|
if (done) break;
|
|
rawChunkCount++;
|
|
|
|
buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
|
|
const lines = buffer.split("\n");
|
|
buffer = lines.pop() || "";
|
|
|
|
for (const line of lines) {
|
|
if (!line.startsWith("data: ")) continue;
|
|
dataLineCount++;
|
|
const data = line.slice(6).trim();
|
|
if (data === "[DONE]") continue;
|
|
|
|
if (debugLines.length < 3) {
|
|
debugLines.push(data.slice(0, 200));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(data) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
const choice = ((parsed?.choices ?? []) as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)[0];
|
|
if (choice) {
|
|
const delta = choice.delta as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
|
|
if (delta?.content) fullContent += delta.content as string;
|
|
else if (delta?.reasoning_content) fullContent += delta.reasoning_content as string;
|
|
if (choice.finish_reason) finishReason = choice.finish_reason as string;
|
|
}
|
|
const usage = parsed.usage as Record<string, number> | undefined;
|
|
if (usage) {
|
|
totalTokens =
|
|
usage.total_tokens ?? (usage.prompt_tokens ?? 0) + (usage.completion_tokens ?? 0);
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// skip malformed chunks
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fullContent.length === 0 && rawChunkCount > 0) {
|
|
console.log(
|
|
` [DEBUG] empty content: ${rawChunkCount} raw chunks, ${dataLineCount} data lines`
|
|
);
|
|
for (const d of debugLines) console.log(` [DEBUG] data: ${d}`);
|
|
} else if (fullContent.length > 0 && fullContent.length < 1000 && finishReason === "unknown") {
|
|
console.log(
|
|
` [DEBUG] suspicious content (${fullContent.length} chars, finish=${finishReason}): ${fullContent.slice(0, 300)}`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { fullContent, finishReason, totalTokens };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Shared helper
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
function ts(): string {
|
|
return new Date().toISOString().slice(11, 23); // HH:MM:SS.mmm
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function sendAndValidate(
|
|
tcName: string,
|
|
buildMessages: () => Message[],
|
|
stream = true
|
|
): Promise<{
|
|
status: number;
|
|
duration: number;
|
|
tokens: number;
|
|
contentLength: number;
|
|
correlationId: string;
|
|
}> {
|
|
const MAX_RETRIES = 3;
|
|
const RETRY_DELAY_MS = 10_000;
|
|
|
|
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= MAX_RETRIES; attempt++) {
|
|
const messages = buildMessages();
|
|
|
|
const controller = new AbortController();
|
|
const requestTimeoutMs = Number(process.env.TEST_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS) || 600_000;
|
|
const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), requestTimeoutMs);
|
|
const start = performance.now();
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const response = await fetch(`${BASE_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: {
|
|
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
|
Authorization: `Bearer ${API_KEY}`,
|
|
},
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({
|
|
model: MODEL,
|
|
messages,
|
|
stream,
|
|
max_tokens: 4096,
|
|
temperature: 0.3,
|
|
}),
|
|
signal: controller.signal,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const duration = performance.now() - start;
|
|
clearTimeout(timeout);
|
|
|
|
const correlationId = response.headers.get("x-correlation-id") || "?";
|
|
let content = "";
|
|
let finishReason = "unknown";
|
|
let totalTokens = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (stream) {
|
|
const streamResult = await readSSEStream(response);
|
|
content = streamResult.fullContent;
|
|
finishReason = streamResult.finishReason;
|
|
totalTokens = streamResult.totalTokens;
|
|
} else {
|
|
const json = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
|
|
const choice = json?.choices?.[0];
|
|
content = choice?.message?.content || "";
|
|
finishReason = choice?.finish_reason || "unknown";
|
|
totalTokens = json?.usage?.total_tokens || 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const msPerToken = totalTokens > 0 ? (duration / totalTokens).toFixed(1) : "?";
|
|
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`${ts()} ${tcName.padEnd(45)} ` +
|
|
`HTTP ${response.status} | ` +
|
|
`${Math.round(duration).toString().padStart(5)}ms | ` +
|
|
`${String(messages.length).padStart(2)} msgs | ` +
|
|
`${String(totalTokens).padStart(5)} tok | ` +
|
|
`${msPerToken.padStart(4)} ms/tok | ` +
|
|
`finish: ${finishReason} | ` +
|
|
`response: ${content.length} chars | ` +
|
|
`cid: ${correlationId}`
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if (response.status === 200) {
|
|
const isGoodFinish = finishReason === "stop" || finishReason === "length";
|
|
const isRetryable =
|
|
content.length === 0 ||
|
|
finishReason === "malformed_response" ||
|
|
finishReason === "content_filter" ||
|
|
(finishReason === "unknown" && totalTokens === 0);
|
|
|
|
if (isGoodFinish) {
|
|
// success — continue to return
|
|
} else if (isRetryable && attempt < MAX_RETRIES) {
|
|
const backoff = Math.min(RETRY_DELAY_MS * 2 ** (attempt - 1), 30_000);
|
|
const reason = content.length === 0 ? "empty content" : `finish: ${finishReason}`;
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`${ts()} ${tcName.padEnd(45)} RETRY ${attempt}/${MAX_RETRIES} after ${reason} (waiting ${Math.round(backoff / 1000)}s) | cid: ${correlationId}`
|
|
);
|
|
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, backoff));
|
|
continue;
|
|
} else if (isRetryable) {
|
|
assert.fail(
|
|
`${ts()} ${tcName.padEnd(45)} ${finishReason === "malformed_response" ? "malformed_response" : "empty content"} after ${MAX_RETRIES} attempts | cid: ${correlationId}`
|
|
);
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert.fail(`expected stop/length finish, got ${finishReason} | cid: ${correlationId}`);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if ((response.status === 503 || response.status === 429) && attempt < MAX_RETRIES) {
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`${ts()} ${tcName.padEnd(45)} RETRY ${attempt}/${MAX_RETRIES} after ${response.status} (waiting ${RETRY_DELAY_MS / 1000}s)`
|
|
);
|
|
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, RETRY_DELAY_MS));
|
|
continue;
|
|
} else {
|
|
const errorBody = await response.text().catch(() => "unknown");
|
|
assert.fail(`HTTP ${response.status}: ${errorBody}`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
status: response.status,
|
|
duration,
|
|
tokens: totalTokens,
|
|
contentLength: content.length,
|
|
correlationId,
|
|
};
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
clearTimeout(timeout);
|
|
const errorMessage = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
if ((errorMessage.includes("503") || errorMessage.includes("429")) && attempt < MAX_RETRIES) {
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`${ts()} ${tcName.padEnd(45)} RETRY ${attempt}/${MAX_RETRIES} after error (waiting ${RETRY_DELAY_MS / 1000}s)`
|
|
);
|
|
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, RETRY_DELAY_MS));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
console.log(`${ts()} ${tcName.padEnd(45)} FAILED: ${errorMessage}`);
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
throw new Error("Max retries exceeded");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// CASE_BUILDERS: 25 named payload generators (shared by streaming + non-streaming)
|
|
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
export const CASE_BUILDERS = [
|
|
{ name: "basic coding question", build: (): Message[] => [genSystemMessage(), genUserMessage()] },
|
|
{
|
|
name: "code review request",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [genSystemMessage(), genCodeReviewMessage()],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "long document analysis",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [genSystemMessage(), genLongDocMessage()],
|
|
},
|
|
{ name: "direct question no system", build: (): Message[] => [genUserMessage()] },
|
|
{
|
|
name: "agentic planning task",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [genSystemMessage(), genAgenticTaskMessage()],
|
|
},
|
|
{ name: "agentic 3-turn conversation", build: (): Message[] => genMultiTurnConversation(3) },
|
|
{ name: "agentic 5-turn conversation", build: (): Message[] => genMultiTurnConversation(5) },
|
|
{ name: "agentic 2-turn conversation", build: (): Message[] => genMultiTurnConversation(2) },
|
|
{ name: "agentic 4-turn conversation", build: (): Message[] => genMultiTurnConversation(4) },
|
|
{ name: "agentic 6-turn conversation", build: (): Message[] => genMultiTurnConversation(6) },
|
|
{ name: "code conversation with review", build: (): Message[] => genCodeConversation() },
|
|
{
|
|
name: "code review with long doc",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
genLongDocMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `Now let's apply this to actual code. Optimize this:\n${pick(CODE_BLOCKS)}`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "multi-part coding task",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `First, let me understand the problem. I need to build a webhook processor.\n\n${pick(CODE_BLOCKS)}\n\nActually, let me also consider the monitoring aspects after the initial implementation.`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Let me outline the architecture for a robust webhook processor. The key components are:\n\n1. **Ingestion endpoint**: Validates signatures, deduplicates, queues\n2. **Processing pipeline**: Routes to handlers based on event type\n3. **Retry logic**: Exponential backoff with dead letter queue\n4. **Monitoring**: Metrics for throughput, latency, error rates\n\nHere's a detailed design...",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Great breakdown. Now let's focus on the retry logic specifically. I need it to handle different error types differently: 4xx should not retry, 5xx should retry up to 3 times, and network errors should retry up to 5 times with shorter intervals.",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "debugging session simulation",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `I'm seeing this error in production and I can't figure out the root cause:\n\n\`\`\`\nError: EMFILE: too many open files\n at FSReqCallback.open (node:fs:249)\n at Object.openSync (node:fs:466)\n at Object.readFileSync (node:fs:355)\n\`\`\`\n\nThis happens intermittently under load. The service processes file uploads.`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content:
|
|
"The EMFILE error occurs when a process exceeds the file descriptor limit. Let me help you debug this systematically:\n\n1. **Check the current limit**: `ulimit -n` shows the soft limit\n2. **Find descriptor leaks**: Use `lsof -p <PID>` to list open files\n3. **Common causes**:\n - Streams not properly closed after processing\n - Database connections not returned to pool\n - File handles held by garbage collector\n\nMost likely you're opening file streams in your upload handler without properly closing them in all code paths (especially error paths).",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"You're right, I found it! We were using `fs.readFileSync` in a middleware but not catching errors — on validation failures the file handle was leaking. What's the best pattern to prevent this?",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Great find! Here's the recommended pattern:\n\n```typescript\nimport { open, readFile, unlink } from 'fs/promises';\n\nasync function processUpload(path: string) {\n let file;\n try {\n file = await open(path, 'r');\n const data = await readFile(file);\n // validate and process\n } finally {\n await file?.close().catch(() => {});\n await unlink(path).catch(() => {}); // cleanup temp file\n }\n}\n```\n\nKey principles:\n- Always use `finally` for cleanup\n- Prefer async file operations\n- Use the file handle API (open → use → close) rather than one-shot methods for long-lived operations\n- Add file descriptor monitoring in production",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Perfect, that's very clear. Now let me also think about monitoring — what metrics should we expose around file descriptors to catch this early next time?",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "architecture discussion with trade-offs",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
genLongDocMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Based on the document, I can extract the following key insights about distributed systems design...\n\n1. **CAP theorem trade-offs** need careful evaluation based on your specific use case\n2. **Consensus algorithms** like Raft provide strong consistency but at latency cost\n3. **Event-driven architectures** offer scalability but require careful handling of eventual consistency\n4. **CQRS + Event Sourcing** gives flexibility but adds operational complexity\n5. **Monitoring and observability** are critical in distributed systems",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Given these insights, how would you architect a payment processing system that needs both strong consistency (for balances) and high availability (for the API)? This seems like the classic CAP dilemma applied to fintech.",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "JSON-heavy structured data prompt",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `Here's a JSON payload from our API. Transform it into a different structure and explain your changes:\n\n${JSON.stringify(
|
|
{
|
|
event: "order.created",
|
|
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
data: {
|
|
orderId: `ord_${randomInt(100000, 999999)}`,
|
|
customer: {
|
|
id: `cus_${randomInt(10000, 99999)}`,
|
|
tier: ["basic", "premium", "enterprise"][randomInt(0, 2)],
|
|
},
|
|
items: Array.from({ length: randomInt(3, 8) }, (_, i) => ({
|
|
sku: `SKU-${String(i + 1).padStart(4, "0")}`,
|
|
name: pick([
|
|
"Widget Pro",
|
|
"Deluxe Gadget",
|
|
"Basic Tool",
|
|
"Premium Service",
|
|
"Add-on Pack",
|
|
]),
|
|
quantity: randomInt(1, 5),
|
|
price: parseFloat((Math.random() * 200 + 5).toFixed(2)),
|
|
})),
|
|
total: 0,
|
|
shipping: {
|
|
method: pick(["standard", "express", "overnight"]),
|
|
address: {
|
|
street: "123 Main St",
|
|
city: "San Francisco",
|
|
state: "CA",
|
|
zip: "94105",
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
payment: { method: pick(["card", "wallet", "invoice"]), status: "pending" },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
null,
|
|
2
|
|
)}`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "markdown formatting prompt",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `# Architecture Review Request
|
|
|
|
## Project Overview
|
|
We are building a **real-time collaboration platform** similar to Google Docs but for code editing.
|
|
|
|
## Requirements
|
|
1. Real-time sync using **CRDTs** (not OT)
|
|
2. **Multi-cursor** support with presence awareness
|
|
3. **Offline-first** with conflict resolution
|
|
4. **Plugin system** for extensions
|
|
|
|
## Questions
|
|
1. What's the best CRDT implementation for this use case?
|
|
2. How do we handle **large documents** (100k+ lines)?
|
|
3. What's the **performance budget** for sync operations?
|
|
|
|
## Current Stack
|
|
| Component | Technology | Status |
|
|
|-----------|------------|--------|
|
|
| Frontend | React + Monaco Editor | POC done |
|
|
| Sync Layer | Yjs | POC done |
|
|
| Backend | Node.js + WebSockets | In progress |
|
|
| Storage | PostgreSQL | Planned |
|
|
| Auth | OAuth 2.0 + JWT | Done |
|
|
|
|
Please provide a detailed analysis with code examples.`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "multi-part instructions with constraints",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `I need you to solve this problem with specific constraints:
|
|
|
|
PROBLEM: Design a rate-limited API proxy that:
|
|
1. Routes requests to different backends based on path prefix
|
|
2. Enforces per-tenant rate limits (100 req/s per tenant)
|
|
3. Caches responses with configurable TTL
|
|
4. Logs all requests with timing data
|
|
|
|
CONSTRAINTS:
|
|
- Must handle 50k req/s peak
|
|
- P99 latency must stay under 50ms
|
|
- No single point of failure
|
|
- Must support gradual rollout
|
|
|
|
Please provide:
|
|
1. Architecture diagram (ASCII art)
|
|
2. Data structures
|
|
3. Key algorithms
|
|
4. Trade-offs`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "debugging with stack trace",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `I'm getting this error in production. Help me debug it:\n\n\`\`\`\nTypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'map')\n at transformResponse (/app/src/services/transformer.ts:142:23)\n at processResponse (/app/src/middleware/response.ts:89:14)\n at processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:95:5)\n at async handleRequest (/app/src/router/index.ts:234:18)\n at async Server.handle (/app/src/server.ts:56:22)\n\`\`\`\n\nThe relevant code at line 142:\n\`\`\`typescript\nconst transformed = response.data.items.map(item => ({\n id: item.id,\n name: item.attributes.name,\n price: item.attributes.price,\n}));\n\`\`\`\n\nI think the issue is that \`response.data.items\` is sometimes undefined. What's the best way to handle this? Should I validate the response shape, use optional chaining, or something else?`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "comparative analysis request",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `Compare these three approaches to handling async operations in JavaScript/TypeScript. For each, provide:\n1. A concrete code example\n2. Error handling strategy\n3. Performance characteristics\n4. When to use it\n\n**Approach 1: Callbacks**\n**Approach 2: Promises with async/await**\n**Approach 3: Observables (RxJS)**\n\nI'm specifically interested in:\n- How cancellation works in each\n- Memory implications for long-lived operations\n- Composability (combining multiple async operations)`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "very long single user message",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `I need a comprehensive analysis of the following topics. Please address each one in detail:\n\n${LONG_DOCUMENTS.join("\n\n---\n\n")}\n\nFor each section above, please:\n1. Summarize the key points\n2. Identify any logical gaps or missing information\n3. Suggest practical applications\n4. List follow-up questions that would deepen understanding`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "system prompt + multi-part code task",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
{
|
|
role: "system",
|
|
content:
|
|
"You are a strict code reviewer. Always point out potential bugs, security issues, and performance problems. Use specific line references.",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `Review this React component for production readiness:\n\n${pick(CODE_BLOCKS)}\n\n${pick(CODE_BLOCKS)}`,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "conversation with long assistant responses",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Explain how modern CPU architectures handle branch prediction and speculative execution, including the security implications.",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content: `Modern CPU branch prediction is a fascinating and complex topic with significant security implications.
|
|
|
|
**How Branch Prediction Works**
|
|
|
|
Modern processors use deep pipelines (14-20 stages in modern x86 CPUs). To keep these pipelines full, they need to predict which way branches will go before the condition is actually evaluated. Processors maintain several structures:
|
|
|
|
1. **Branch Target Buffer (BTB)**: Caches the target address of recently executed branches. When a branch instruction is decoded, the BTB predicts the target.
|
|
|
|
2. **Branch History Table (BHT) / Pattern History Table (PHT)**: Tracks the recent outcomes of branches (taken/not taken) using 2-bit saturating counters. A branch that was taken twice in a row is likely to be taken again.
|
|
|
|
3. **Return Stack Buffer (RSB)**: A hardware stack that predicts return addresses for CALL/RET instructions. Since returns are indirect (the address depends on the call site), the RSB provides much better accuracy than the BTB for returns.
|
|
|
|
4. **Tournament Predictors**: Modern CPUs combine multiple prediction strategies (e.g., local predictor per branch, global predictor that considers branch history) and select the best performer. The Intel Pentium M's "Hybrid Predictor" and later "Perceptron Predictors" in some designs are examples.
|
|
|
|
**Speculative Execution**
|
|
|
|
Once a prediction is made, the CPU speculatively executes instructions along the predicted path before the branch condition is resolved. This includes:
|
|
- Computing addresses and loading data into cache
|
|
- Executing arithmetic operations
|
|
- Even writing to architectural state (though these are retired only if the prediction was correct)
|
|
|
|
If the prediction was wrong, the CPU must:
|
|
1. Flush the pipeline (discard all speculatively executed instructions)
|
|
2. Restore the architectural state to the checkpoint before the branch
|
|
3. Fetch from the correct path
|
|
|
|
The performance penalty for a misprediction is roughly 10-20 cycles on modern CPUs — hence the massive investment in accurate prediction.
|
|
|
|
**Security Implications: Spectre and Meltdown**
|
|
|
|
The problem is that speculative execution leaves side-effect traces in microarchitectural state, particularly the cache. Here's how Spectre Variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass) works:
|
|
|
|
\`\`\`c
|
|
if (x < array1->length) {
|
|
// Speculatively executed even when x is out of bounds
|
|
value = array2[array1[x] * 4096]; // Cache-timing side channel
|
|
}
|
|
\`\`\`
|
|
|
|
By training the branch predictor to predict the bounds check will pass, an attacker can cause speculative access to arbitrary memory. The value read affects which cache line of array2 is loaded, which can be detected through timing measurements.
|
|
|
|
Mitigations include:
|
|
- **LFENCE serialization**: Insert serializing instructions after bounds checks (heavy overhead)
|
|
- **Retpolines**: Replace indirect branches with returns to confuse the BTB
|
|
- **Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)**: Hardware-level mitigation in newer CPUs
|
|
- **Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP)**: Prevents cross-hyperthread predictor interference
|
|
|
|
Meltdown (CVE-2018-3615) is a related but distinct attack where the CPU speculatively executes instructions after a fault (not a branch misprediction), allowing access to kernel memory from user space. This affects primarily Intel and some ARM cores.
|
|
|
|
**Modern Defenses**
|
|
|
|
Starting with Intel's "Security First" architecture (Ice Lake and later), hardware mitigations include:
|
|
- **Predictor tagging by privilege level**: Branch predictors are tagged with the CPL, preventing user-mode training from affecting kernel predictions
|
|
- **Hardware-enforced bounds checking**: Some instructions can be marked to prevent speculation past them
|
|
- **Mitigation-less performance**: Newer generations have reduced the performance impact of software mitigations from 30%+ to 2-5%`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `That's a great overview. Now, zooming in on one specific aspect: how do Return Stack Buffer (RSB) and CALL/RET prediction work at the microarchitectural level? Specifically, how does the CPU handle:
|
|
|
|
1. Deeply nested function calls (e.g., recursive functions with 100+ levels)
|
|
2. Indirect function calls through function pointers
|
|
3. Return-oriented programming (ROP) exploits and how CET/Shadow Stack mitigates them
|
|
|
|
Also, can you explain the "RSB underflow" issue when switching between privilege levels?`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content: `Excellent questions. Let me dive deep into each area.
|
|
|
|
**RSB Microarchitecture**
|
|
|
|
The Return Stack Buffer is a specialized predictor implemented as a circular buffer (typically 16-48 entries in modern CPUs). Each CALL instruction pushes the return address onto this hardware stack. Each RET instruction pops the top entry and uses it as the predicted target.
|
|
|
|
The key insight is that the RSB is a true stack — it naturally handles nested calls correctly, unlike the BTB which would confuse RET instructions that can have many different targets depending on context.
|
|
|
|
1. **Deeply Nested Calls (100+ levels)**:
|
|
|
|
When the nesting depth exceeds the RSB size:
|
|
- The bottom entries are simply overwritten (circular buffer behavior)
|
|
- On return beyond the RSB depth, the CPU experiences an **RSB underflow** — there's no valid prediction available
|
|
- The fallback mechanism varies by microarchitecture:
|
|
- Intel Sandy Bridge and earlier: falls back to BTB prediction for RETs (poor accuracy)
|
|
- Intel Haswell and later: uses a "return predictor" that's actually a secondary BTB trained on RET behavior
|
|
- AMD Zen: uses a hybrid approach with a deeper RSB-like structure
|
|
|
|
2. **Indirect Calls Through Function Pointers**:
|
|
|
|
Modern CPUs handle indirect calls and returns quite differently:
|
|
- **Indirect calls** (CALL [rax]): predicted using the BTB, which stores mapping from the indirect call instruction address to the recently used target(s).
|
|
- **Indirect jumps** (JMP [rax]): same BTB mechanism
|
|
- **RET instructions**: predicted via RSB exclusively
|
|
|
|
3. **Return-Oriented Programming and CET**:
|
|
|
|
ROP works precisely because of how RSB prediction functions:
|
|
- The attacker finds small instruction sequences ("gadgets") ending in RET in existing code
|
|
- By overflowing the stack or corrupting the return address, the attacker chains these gadgets
|
|
|
|
**Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)**:
|
|
|
|
Intel CET provides two complementary protections:
|
|
|
|
a) **Shadow Stack (SHSTK)**: A separate, hardware-protected stack that shadows the return addresses pushed by CALL instructions. On RET, the CPU compares the return address from the regular stack with the shadow stack — any mismatch triggers a hardware exception.
|
|
|
|
b) **Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT)**: For indirect CALL and JMP instructions, the target must begin with an ENDBRANCH instruction. This prevents JOP/COP attacks.
|
|
|
|
**RSB Underflow Between Privilege Levels**:
|
|
|
|
When switching from a higher privilege level (kernel) to a lower one (user):
|
|
1. The CPU executes a SYSRET or IRET instruction
|
|
2. The RSB had entries from kernel-mode CALL instructions
|
|
3. These entries predict return addresses *within the kernel*
|
|
4. In user mode, the RSB may predict kernel addresses — speculatively executing kernel code from user space!
|
|
|
|
The mitigation (kernel RSB stuffing) involves executing 32 fake CALL instructions after transitioning to user mode, pushing and popping to overwrite the RSB entries with harmless addresses.`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Fascinating. One last question on this topic — how do AMD and ARM implementations compare to Intel's here? I'm particularly interested in ARM's PAC (Pointer Authentication) and how it differs from CET's shadow stack approach.",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "mixed content types in conversation",
|
|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `I need to process this data and then answer questions about it. First, here's the data:\n\n## System Configuration\n${JSON.stringify(
|
|
{
|
|
environment: "production",
|
|
region: pick(["us-east-1", "eu-west-1", "ap-southeast-1"]),
|
|
services: [
|
|
{ name: "api-gateway", replicas: 3, memory: "512Mi", cpu: "250m" },
|
|
{ name: "user-service", replicas: 5, memory: "1Gi", cpu: "500m" },
|
|
{ name: "payment-service", replicas: 2, memory: "2Gi", cpu: "1" },
|
|
{ name: "notification-service", replicas: 2, memory: "256Mi", cpu: "100m" },
|
|
],
|
|
databases: [
|
|
{ name: "postgres-primary", type: "PostgreSQL", version: "16", storage: "500Gi" },
|
|
{ name: "redis-cache", type: "Redis", version: "7", storage: "50Gi" },
|
|
{ name: "clickhouse-analytics", type: "ClickHouse", version: "24", storage: "2Ti" },
|
|
],
|
|
monitoring: {
|
|
prometheus: { retention: "30d", storage: "200Gi" },
|
|
grafana: { plugins: ["prometheus", "elasticsearch", "cloudwatch"] },
|
|
alertmanager: { slack: true, pagerduty: true, email: true },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
null,
|
|
2
|
|
)}\n\nHere's a SQL query that aggregates the deployment data:\n\n${pick(CODE_BLOCKS)}`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
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content:
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"I've analyzed your deployment configuration. Here are my observations:\n\n**Resource Allocation Analysis:**\n- Your API gateway has reasonable resource allocation for typical traffic patterns\n- The payment service has significant CPU allocation which suggests CPU-bound processing\n- Notification service appears under-provisioned if you handle high throughput\n\n**Potential Issues:**\n1. Single PostgreSQL primary is a single point of failure — consider read replicas\n2. No connection pooling configuration visible — pgbouncer recommended\n3. ClickHouse storage seems high — verify your data retention policies\n\n**Recommendations:**\n1. Add pod disruption budgets for production services\n2. Configure horizontal pod autoscaling with appropriate metrics\n3. Consider separating batch workloads onto spot instances",
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},
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{
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role: "user",
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content: `Great analysis. Now, let me give you some additional context and ask specific questions:\n\n1. We're seeing increased latency in the payment service during peak hours. The CPU usage goes to 80%+ and response times spike from 200ms to 2s. What should we investigate first?\n\n2. For the notification service, we're planning to scale from 2 to 10 replicas ahead of a Black Friday event. Besides increasing replicas, what else should we prepare?\n\n3. Looking at the SQL query in the config — that's actually a migration script that's running slowly. It takes 45 minutes on the primary. How would you optimize it without significant refactoring?`,
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},
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{
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role: "assistant",
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content:
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|
"Let me address each question:\n\n**1. Payment Service Latency**\n\nThe 2s spike at 80% CPU suggests CPU contention. Common causes:\n- Cryptography operations — consider caching\n- JSON serialization — use streaming\n- Synchronous database calls — verify connection pool settings\n\n**2. Black Friday Scaling for Notifications**\n\n- Pre-warm connection pools\n- Queue-based architecture with SQS/RabbitMQ\n- Rate limiting downstream API calls\n- Degrade gracefully with priority levels\n- Load test at 2x expected load\n\n**3. Slow Migration Query**\n\nBatch processing:\n```sql\nDO $$\nDECLARE\n batch_size CONSTANT INTEGER := 10000;\nBEGIN\n FOR i IN 0..(SELECT CEIL(COUNT(*)/batch_size) FROM target_table) LOOP\n UPDATE target_table\n SET processed = true\n WHERE ctid IN (\n SELECT ctid FROM target_table\n WHERE processed IS false\n LIMIT batch_size\n );\n COMMIT;\n PERFORM pg_sleep(0.1);\n END LOOP;\nEND $$;\n```",
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},
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{
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role: "user",
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content:
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"The batching approach for the migration seems most practical. One concern though — the migration also needs to backfill a new column based on data from a JOIN with another table that has 5M rows.",
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},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
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|
name: "long context with repeated patterns",
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|
build: (): Message[] => [
|
|
genSystemMessage(),
|
|
...Array.from({ length: 5 }, () => [
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|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content: `Consider this scenario in a microservices architecture: ${pick(AGENTIC_TASKS)}`,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
role: "assistant",
|
|
content: `Here's my analysis of this scenario. The key considerations are scalability, fault tolerance, and operational complexity. Let me break this down...\n\n1. **Architecture**: We need to consider the overall system design and how components interact\n2. **Data flow**: Understanding how data moves through the system is critical\n3. **Failure modes**: Each component can fail in different ways\n4. **Monitoring**: We need observability at every layer\n\nThe recommended approach depends on your specific constraints around latency, throughput, and consistency requirements.`,
|
|
},
|
|
]).flat(),
|
|
{
|
|
role: "user",
|
|
content:
|
|
"Now, given all the scenarios above, what common patterns do you see? Are there any cross-cutting concerns that appear in multiple scenarios?",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
];
|