Files
OmniRoute/open-sse/services/tokenRefresh.ts
MumuTW 533f8051a4 chore(token-refresh): decompose services/tokenRefresh.ts into tokenRefresh/* leaves (999 → 724) (#8547)
* chore(token-refresh): extract rotation/cas/circuit-breaker refresh logic into tokenRefresh/* leaves

* test(oauth): follow isUnrecoverableRefreshError to tokenRefresh/shared.ts

cad2c7285 moved isUnrecoverableRefreshError out of tokenRefresh.ts into
tokenRefresh/shared.ts. This suite asserts on source *text* (it regex-matches
the function body to prove the unrecoverable sentinel is returned), so the
move made it fail to find the definition — the only red test across the 23
tokenRefresh-related suites.

Repoint the read() at the file that now defines the body. The public surface
is unchanged: tokenRefresh.ts still re-exports the symbol, verified by import.

* docs(changelog): add fragment for this PR

* docs(auth): correct the #7338 attribution wording in the tokenRefresh header

The header claimed credit for KooshaPari's #7338 was "preserved via co-authorship on the
extraction commits", but none of the commits carries a Co-authored-by trailer -- and adding
one would be inaccurate, since this is an independent implementation against the current
tip rather than a reuse of that diff. The by-name credit for proposing the split stays;
only the false claim about the mechanism is removed.
2026-07-26 03:52:27 -03:00

725 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript
Executable File

// @ts-nocheck
//
// Per-provider refresh implementations live in ./tokenRefresh/providers/ (one
// file per provider) with shared helpers in ./tokenRefresh/shared.ts. This
// file keeps the orchestrator (refreshAccessToken, getAccessToken), the
// in-flight/rotation dedup maps, the CAS guard, and refreshWithRetry — the
// cross-provider plumbing. The provider-module split was originally proposed
// by KooshaPari in PR #7338, whose base was too old to merge as-is; this is an
// independent implementation of the same idea against the current tip, not a
// reuse of that diff. All previously-public exports are re-exported below so existing
// importers (open-sse/index.ts, executors, src/sse/services/tokenRefresh.ts,
// tests) are unaffected.
import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks";
import { PROVIDERS } from "../config/constants.ts";
import { runWithProxyContext } from "../utils/proxyFetch.ts";
import { serializeRefresh } from "./refreshSerializer.ts";
import {
extractOAuthErrorCode,
isUnrecoverableRefreshError,
type RefreshLogger,
} from "./tokenRefresh/shared.ts";
import {
getRefreshCacheKey,
lookupRotation,
recordRotation,
_getTokenRotationMapStats,
_clearTokenRotationMap,
} from "./tokenRefresh/rotationMap.ts";
import {
runWithCasGuard,
getActiveCasGuard,
getCasGuardStats,
_resetCasGuardStats,
casGuardShouldSkipPersist,
} from "./tokenRefresh/casGuard.ts";
import {
isProviderBlocked,
getCircuitBreakerStatus,
refreshWithRetry,
} from "./tokenRefresh/circuitBreaker.ts";
import { refreshWindsurfToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/windsurf.ts";
import { refreshCodebuddyCnToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/codebuddyCn.ts";
import { refreshClineToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/cline.ts";
import { refreshKimiCodingToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/kimiCoding.ts";
import { refreshGitLabDuoToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/gitlabDuo.ts";
import { refreshClaudeOAuthToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/claudeOAuth.ts";
import { refreshGoogleToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/google.ts";
import { refreshCodexToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/codex.ts";
import { refreshKiroToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/kiro.ts";
import { refreshQoderToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/qoder.ts";
import { refreshGitHubToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/github.ts";
import { refreshCopilotToken } from "./tokenRefresh/providers/copilot.ts";
export {
refreshWindsurfToken,
refreshCodebuddyCnToken,
refreshClineToken,
refreshKimiCodingToken,
refreshGitLabDuoToken,
refreshClaudeOAuthToken,
refreshGoogleToken,
refreshCodexToken,
refreshKiroToken,
refreshQoderToken,
refreshGitHubToken,
refreshCopilotToken,
extractOAuthErrorCode,
isUnrecoverableRefreshError,
isProviderBlocked,
getCircuitBreakerStatus,
refreshWithRetry,
runWithCasGuard,
getActiveCasGuard,
getCasGuardStats,
_resetCasGuardStats,
_getTokenRotationMapStats,
_clearTokenRotationMap,
};
// Default token expiry buffer (refresh if expires within 5 minutes).
// Used as fallback for providers without an explicit lead time in
// REFRESH_LEAD_MS below.
export const TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
// Per-provider proactive-refresh lead time.
//
// For multi-account OAuth on providers that enforce "single active session per
// client_id" (notably OpenAI Codex / Auth0), refreshing one account's token
// can invalidate the refresh_token family of OTHER accounts under the same
// client. We MINIMIZE refresh frequency for these providers: stay on the
// original access_token until it is genuinely about to expire, so each account
// gets the full access_token lifetime without triggering Auth0's family-
// invalidation logic on its siblings.
//
// Trade-off: when refresh finally happens (last 5 min before expiry), Auth0
// MAY invalidate other accounts' refresh_tokens. The user must re-auth those.
// This is the upstream limitation documented in openai/codex#9648.
//
// Providers with non-rotating tokens (Google, Anthropic) or where multi-
// account is naturally isolated keep longer lead times.
export const REFRESH_LEAD_MS: Record<string, number> = {
// Rotating refresh tokens — minimize refresh frequency to avoid the
// "refresh-invalidates-siblings" cascade documented for OpenAI Auth0.
codex: 5 * 60 * 1000, // 5 minutes
openai: 5 * 60 * 1000, // same Auth0 backend as codex
claude: 5 * 60 * 1000, // Anthropic OAuth rotates refresh_tokens (user-reported)
"gitlab-duo": 5 * 60 * 1000, // GitLab token family revocation on misuse
kiro: 5 * 60 * 1000, // AWS SSO OIDC issues one-time-use refresh tokens
"kimi-coding": 5 * 60 * 1000, // Moonshot rotates per-refresh
// Non-rotating providers — longer lead is safe.
iflow: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours
// Google OAuth refresh_tokens are permanent (non-rotating) — longer lead
// is safe and reduces unnecessary upstream chatter.
antigravity: 15 * 60 * 1000,
agy: 15 * 60 * 1000, // same Google backend as antigravity (non-rotating refresh tokens)
"gemini-cli": 15 * 60 * 1000, // legacy stored connections; provider is no longer public
};
/**
* Get the proactive refresh lead time (ms) for a given provider.
*
* Precedence:
* 1. A per-connection override in `providerSpecificData.refreshLeadMs`
* (must be a positive finite number), so an operator can tune the lead
* time for a single connection without touching the provider defaults.
* 2. The provider default from REFRESH_LEAD_MS.
* 3. TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_MS (5 min) when nothing else applies.
*/
export function getRefreshLeadMs(
provider: string,
providerSpecificData?: { refreshLeadMs?: unknown } | null
): number {
const override = providerSpecificData?.refreshLeadMs;
if (typeof override === "number" && Number.isFinite(override) && override > 0) {
return override;
}
return REFRESH_LEAD_MS[provider] ?? TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_MS;
}
// In-flight refresh promise cache to prevent race conditions
// Key: "provider:sha256(refreshToken)" → Value: Promise<result>
const refreshPromiseCache = new Map();
// Per-connection mutex: prevents parallel OAuth refresh for rotating tokens.
// Key: connectionId → Value: { promise, waiters }
// Primary dedup when credentials.connectionId is present; refreshPromiseCache is fallback.
const connectionRefreshMutex = new Map();
// Token Rotation Map (codex-multi-auth pattern) lives in
// ./tokenRefresh/rotationMap.ts — see that leaf for the in-memory rotation
// cache + getRefreshCacheKey. Imported above and re-exported for tests.
// AsyncLocalStorage for plumbing `onPersist` through executor.refreshCredentials
// without modifying every executor's signature. The chatCore.ts / base.ts call
// sites wrap executor.refreshCredentials in `runWithOnPersist(persistFn, () => ...)`
// and `getAccessToken` reads the active store as a fallback when no explicit
// onPersist parameter is provided. This keeps Fix A's atomic [refresh + persist]
// guarantee while avoiding per-executor signature changes.
type RefreshPersistResult = Record<string, unknown>;
type RefreshPersistFn = (result: RefreshPersistResult) => Promise<void>;
const onPersistStore = new AsyncLocalStorage<RefreshPersistFn>();
export function runWithOnPersist<T>(
onPersist: RefreshPersistFn | undefined | null,
fn: () => Promise<T>
): Promise<T> {
if (!onPersist) return fn();
return onPersistStore.run(onPersist, fn);
}
export function getActiveOnPersist(): RefreshPersistFn | undefined {
return onPersistStore.getStore();
}
// #4038 compare-and-swap (CAS) guard on the refresh persist lives in
// ./tokenRefresh/casGuard.ts — imported above and re-exported for tests.
// casGuardShouldSkipPersist is imported and used by getAccessToken below.
// extractOAuthErrorCode + isUnrecoverableRefreshError live in
// ./tokenRefresh/shared.ts (imported above, re-exported below) — used both by
// the generic orchestrator below and by every per-provider refresh module.
/**
* Refresh OAuth access token using refresh token
*/
export async function refreshAccessToken(
provider,
refreshToken,
credentials,
log,
proxyConfig: unknown = null
) {
const config = PROVIDERS[provider];
const refreshEndpoint = config?.refreshUrl || config?.tokenUrl;
if (!config || !refreshEndpoint) {
log?.warn?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `No refresh endpoint configured for provider: ${provider}`);
return null;
}
if (!refreshToken) {
log?.warn?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `No refresh token available for provider: ${provider}`);
return null;
}
try {
const params = new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "refresh_token",
refresh_token: refreshToken,
});
if (config.clientId) params.set("client_id", config.clientId);
if (config.clientSecret) params.set("client_secret", config.clientSecret);
const response = await runWithProxyContext(proxyConfig, () =>
fetch(refreshEndpoint, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
Accept: "application/json",
},
body: params,
})
);
if (!response.ok) {
const errorText = await response.text();
log?.error?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `Failed to refresh token for ${provider}`, {
status: response.status,
error: errorText,
});
const code = extractOAuthErrorCode(errorText);
if (code === "invalid_grant" || code === "invalid_request") {
return { error: "unrecoverable_refresh_error", code };
}
return null;
}
const tokens = await response.json();
log?.info?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `Successfully refreshed token for ${provider}`, {
hasNewAccessToken: !!tokens.access_token,
hasNewRefreshToken: !!tokens.refresh_token,
expiresIn: tokens.expires_in,
});
return {
accessToken: tokens.access_token,
refreshToken: tokens.refresh_token || refreshToken,
expiresIn: tokens.expires_in,
};
} catch (error) {
log?.error?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `Error refreshing token for ${provider}`, {
error: error.message,
});
return null;
}
}
/**
* Get access token for a specific provider (internal, does the actual work)
*/
async function _getAccessTokenInternal(provider, credentials, log, proxyConfig: unknown = null) {
switch (provider) {
case "gemini-cli":
// Legacy DB rows can retain this discontinued provider id. Refresh them
// with the same public OAuth client used by Gemini CLI without restoring
// gemini-cli to the routable provider or OAuth UI registries.
return await refreshGoogleToken(
credentials.refreshToken,
PROVIDERS.gemini.clientId,
PROVIDERS.gemini.clientSecret,
log,
proxyConfig
);
case "gemini":
case "antigravity":
case "agy":
return await refreshGoogleToken(
credentials.refreshToken,
PROVIDERS[provider].clientId,
PROVIDERS[provider].clientSecret,
log,
proxyConfig
);
case "claude":
return await refreshClaudeOAuthToken(credentials.refreshToken, log, proxyConfig);
case "codex":
return await refreshCodexToken(credentials.refreshToken, log, proxyConfig);
case "qoder":
return await refreshQoderToken(credentials.refreshToken, log, proxyConfig);
case "github":
return await refreshGitHubToken(credentials.refreshToken, log, proxyConfig);
case "kiro":
case "amazon-q":
return await refreshKiroToken(
credentials.refreshToken,
credentials.providerSpecificData,
log,
proxyConfig
);
case "cline":
case "clinepass": // reuses the Cline WorkOS refresh flow (clinepass: cline)
return await refreshClineToken(credentials.refreshToken, log, proxyConfig);
case "kimi-coding":
return await refreshKimiCodingToken(
credentials.refreshToken,
credentials.providerSpecificData,
log,
proxyConfig
);
case "gitlab-duo":
return await refreshGitLabDuoToken(
credentials.refreshToken,
credentials.providerSpecificData,
log,
proxyConfig
);
case "windsurf":
case "devin-cli":
return await refreshWindsurfToken(
credentials.refreshToken,
credentials.providerSpecificData,
log,
proxyConfig
);
case "codebuddy-cn":
return await refreshCodebuddyCnToken(credentials.refreshToken, log, proxyConfig);
default:
// Fallback to generic OAuth refresh for unknown providers
return refreshAccessToken(provider, credentials.refreshToken, credentials, log, proxyConfig);
}
}
/**
* Whether a provider has a supported refresh path in this service.
*/
export function supportsTokenRefresh(provider) {
const explicitlySupported = new Set([
"gemini",
"gemini-cli", // legacy refresh compatibility only; not a routable provider
"antigravity",
"agy",
"claude",
"codex",
"qoder",
"github",
"kiro",
"amazon-q",
"cline",
"kimi-coding",
"windsurf",
// #8407: do NOT list "devin-cli" here. It is import-token / local-CLI owned
// (`devin auth login`); connections never carry a refresh token. Leaving it
// in this set made tokenHealthCheck treat it as refresh-capable and force
// testStatus="expired" / errorCode="no_refresh_token". Keep it out of the
// explicit set (same idea as not listing non-refresh local-CLI providers).
"gitlab-duo",
"codebuddy-cn",
]);
if (explicitlySupported.has(provider)) return true;
const config = PROVIDERS[provider];
return !!(config?.refreshUrl || config?.tokenUrl);
}
// isUnrecoverableRefreshError lives in ./tokenRefresh/shared.ts (imported above
// and re-exported) — used by refreshWithRetry (./tokenRefresh/circuitBreaker.ts)
// and by callers that need to classify a refresh result.
/**
* Get access token for a specific provider (with deduplication).
*
* Deduplication strategy (two layers):
* 1. Per-connection mutex (primary): if credentials.connectionId is present, all concurrent
* callers for that connection share one in-flight promise regardless of which token they
* loaded. This prevents refresh_token_reused errors with rotating (one-time-use) tokens,
* e.g. Codex/OpenAI, where callers that loaded credentials at different times may hold
* different token strings but refer to the same connection.
* 2. Token-hash fallback: if no connectionId, dedup by provider+sha256(refreshToken) as before.
*
* Additionally, when connectionId is present, the stale-token check reads the DB to detect
* whether another process already refreshed the token. If the DB token is still valid it is
* returned immediately without a new upstream call.
*
* @param onPersist - Optional callback invoked INSIDE the per-connection mutex closure after a
* successful refresh, before the mutex releases. Use this to atomically persist the new tokens
* to the DB within the same lock window. If `onPersist` throws, the error is logged and
* re-thrown so the caller is aware of the persistence failure.
*/
export async function getAccessToken(
provider,
credentials,
log,
proxyConfig: unknown = null,
onPersist?: RefreshPersistFn
) {
if (!credentials || !credentials.refreshToken || typeof credentials.refreshToken !== "string") {
log?.warn?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `No valid refresh token available for provider: ${provider}`);
return null;
}
// If the caller did not pass onPersist explicitly, fall back to the active
// AsyncLocalStorage store. This lets `runWithOnPersist(persistFn, () =>
// executor.refreshCredentials(creds, log))` plumb the persist callback through
// executors (e.g. CodexExecutor) without modifying their signature.
const effectiveOnPersist = onPersist ?? getActiveOnPersist();
const connectionId = credentials.connectionId;
// ── Layer 1: per-connection mutex ──────────────────────────────────────────
if (connectionId && typeof connectionId === "string") {
const existing = connectionRefreshMutex.get(connectionId);
if (existing) {
existing.waiters++;
log?.info?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", "Concurrent refresh detected — sharing in-flight refresh", {
provider,
connectionId,
waiters: existing.waiters,
});
return existing.promise;
}
const entry = { promise: null, waiters: 0 };
entry.promise = (async () => {
const result = await _getAccessTokenWithStalenessCheck(
provider,
credentials,
log,
proxyConfig
);
// Invoke onPersist INSIDE the mutex so [network call + DB write] are one atomic step.
// This prevents a concurrent waiter from reading stale credentials before the DB is updated.
if (result?.accessToken && effectiveOnPersist) {
// #4038: skip the persist if a concurrent writer already rotated this row past the
// refresh_token we presented (compare-and-swap) — overwriting would revert it.
if (await casGuardShouldSkipPersist(log)) {
return result;
}
try {
await effectiveOnPersist(result);
} catch (persistErr) {
const { sanitizeErrorMessage } = await import("../utils/error.ts");
log?.error?.(
"TOKEN_REFRESH",
`onPersist callback failed for ${provider}/${connectionId}: ${sanitizeErrorMessage(persistErr instanceof Error ? persistErr : new Error(String(persistErr)))}`
);
throw persistErr;
}
}
return result;
})().finally(() => {
connectionRefreshMutex.delete(connectionId);
});
connectionRefreshMutex.set(connectionId, entry);
return entry.promise;
}
// ── Layer 2: token-hash fallback (no connectionId) ─────────────────────────
const cacheKey = getRefreshCacheKey(provider, credentials.refreshToken);
if (refreshPromiseCache.has(cacheKey)) {
log?.info?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `Reusing in-flight refresh for ${provider}`);
return refreshPromiseCache.get(cacheKey);
}
// Layer 2 has no per-connection mutex, so callers that pass an onPersist
// callback expect it to fire after a successful refresh. Without this hook
// the legacy `connectionId`-less path would silently swallow the callback,
// leaving DB rows out of sync with rotated tokens (Codex/OpenAI). We still
// resolve the promise to all waiters with the refreshed credentials.
const refreshPromise = serializeRefresh(provider, () =>
_getAccessTokenInternal(provider, credentials, log, proxyConfig)
)
.then(async (result) => {
if (result?.accessToken && effectiveOnPersist) {
// #4038: same compare-and-swap guard as Layer 1 — skip the persist if a concurrent
// writer already rotated this row past the refresh_token we presented.
if (await casGuardShouldSkipPersist(log)) {
return result;
}
try {
await effectiveOnPersist(result);
} catch (persistErr) {
const { sanitizeErrorMessage } = await import("../utils/error.ts");
log?.error?.(
"TOKEN_REFRESH",
`Layer 2 onPersist callback failed for ${provider}: ${sanitizeErrorMessage(persistErr instanceof Error ? persistErr : new Error(String(persistErr)))}`
);
throw persistErr;
}
} else if (result?.accessToken && !effectiveOnPersist) {
log?.warn?.(
"TOKEN_REFRESH",
`Layer 2 refresh succeeded for ${provider} without onPersist — DB row will not be updated with rotated token. Callers should pass connectionId for Layer 1 atomicity.`
);
}
return result;
})
.finally(() => {
refreshPromiseCache.delete(cacheKey);
});
refreshPromiseCache.set(cacheKey, refreshPromise);
return refreshPromise;
}
/**
* Internal helper: performs the DB staleness check then calls the actual refresh.
* Only called from the per-connection mutex path (Layer 1 above).
*/
async function _getAccessTokenWithStalenessCheck(provider, credentials, log, proxyConfig) {
// ROTATION MAP CHECK (codex-multi-auth pattern): if this refresh_token was
// rotated very recently (within ROTATION_MAP_TTL_MS), reuse the cached new
// tokens INSTEAD of hitting upstream. Auth0 treats re-use of a rotated token
// as a security event and revokes the entire token family — fatal for
// multi-account Codex setups. The in-memory rotation map catches this even
// when the caller bypasses the DB staleness path (no connectionId, stale
// in-memory credentials in retries, etc.).
const rotated = lookupRotation(provider, credentials.refreshToken);
if (rotated) {
log?.info?.(
"TOKEN_REFRESH",
`Rotation map hit for ${provider}. Returning cached rotated tokens (avoids family-revoke).`
);
return rotated.result;
}
// RACE CONDITION PREVENTION:
// If the credentials object in memory is stale (e.g. it waited in a semaphore while another
// request refreshed the token), using its OLD refreshToken will cause the provider (e.g. OpenAI)
// to reject it with 'refresh_token_reused' and revoke the new token family.
// We MUST check if the DB has a newer token before proceeding with a network refresh.
if (credentials.connectionId) {
try {
const { getProviderConnectionById } = await import("@/lib/db/providers");
const dbConnection = await getProviderConnectionById(credentials.connectionId);
if (dbConnection && dbConnection.refreshToken) {
const now = Date.now();
const dbExpiresAt = dbConnection.expiresAt ? new Date(dbConnection.expiresAt).getTime() : 0;
if (dbConnection.refreshToken !== credentials.refreshToken) {
log?.info?.(
"TOKEN_REFRESH",
`Stale token detected in memory for ${provider}. Using refreshed token from DB.`
);
// If the DB token is not expired, we can just return it!
if (dbExpiresAt > now + 60000) {
// 60 seconds buffer
log?.info?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `DB token is still valid. Skipping OAuth refresh.`);
return {
accessToken: dbConnection.accessToken,
refreshToken: dbConnection.refreshToken,
// Return absolute expiresAt so downstream callers do NOT recompute lifetime
// from a relative expiresIn value (which would incorrectly extend the TTL).
// expiresIn intentionally omitted here.
expiresAt: dbConnection.expiresAt,
};
} else {
// DB token is also expired, but it's the NEWEST one. We must use it to refresh.
credentials.refreshToken = dbConnection.refreshToken;
credentials.accessToken = dbConnection.accessToken;
}
}
// NOTE: Fix F (skip when DB == memory and DB > now+60s) was intentionally
// removed. The caller (checkAndRefreshToken) already decided to refresh
// because the token is within TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_MS of expiry. Re-checking
// with a tighter 60-second window here would skip legitimate refreshes and
// let near-expired tokens hit the upstream. Layer-1 mutex (per-connection)
// and Layer-2 dedup (token-hash) already prevent concurrent refreshes for
// the import-burst scenario.
}
} catch (e) {
log?.warn?.(
"TOKEN_REFRESH",
`Failed to check DB for stale token: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`
);
}
}
const oldRefreshToken = credentials.refreshToken;
// Front 1: serialize the network refresh across all connections of the same
// rotation group (e.g. Codex+openai share one Auth0 client) so two sibling
// accounts never refresh concurrently and trip Auth0 family revocation.
const result = await serializeRefresh(provider, () =>
_getAccessTokenInternal(provider, credentials, log, proxyConfig)
);
// Record the rotation so subsequent stale callers can be redirected to the
// new tokens without re-hitting upstream (which would trigger Auth0 family
// revocation). Only records when the refresh actually rotated the token.
if (
result &&
typeof result === "object" &&
!("error" in result) &&
(result as { accessToken?: string }).accessToken &&
(result as { refreshToken?: string }).refreshToken
) {
recordRotation(
provider,
oldRefreshToken,
result as {
accessToken: string;
refreshToken: string;
expiresIn?: number;
expiresAt?: string;
}
);
}
return result;
}
/**
* Refresh token by provider type (alias for getAccessToken)
* @deprecated Since v0.2.70 — use getAccessToken() directly.
* Still exported because open-sse/index.js and src/sse wrapper use it.
* Will be removed in a future major version.
*/
export const refreshTokenByProvider = getAccessToken;
/**
* Format credentials for provider
*/
export function formatProviderCredentials(provider, credentials, log) {
const config = PROVIDERS[provider];
if (!config) {
log?.warn?.("TOKEN_REFRESH", `No configuration found for provider: ${provider}`);
return null;
}
switch (provider) {
case "gemini":
return {
apiKey: credentials.apiKey,
accessToken: credentials.accessToken,
projectId: credentials.projectId,
};
case "claude":
return {
apiKey: credentials.apiKey,
accessToken: credentials.accessToken,
};
case "codex":
case "qoder":
case "openai":
case "openrouter":
return {
apiKey: credentials.apiKey,
accessToken: credentials.accessToken,
};
case "antigravity":
case "agy":
return {
accessToken: credentials.accessToken,
refreshToken: credentials.refreshToken,
};
default:
return {
apiKey: credentials.apiKey,
accessToken: credentials.accessToken,
refreshToken: credentials.refreshToken,
};
}
}
/**
* Get all access tokens for a user
*/
export async function getAllAccessTokens(userInfo, log) {
const results = {};
if (userInfo.connections && Array.isArray(userInfo.connections)) {
for (const connection of userInfo.connections) {
if (connection.isActive && connection.provider) {
const token = await getAccessToken(
connection.provider,
{
refreshToken: connection.refreshToken,
},
log
);
if (token) {
results[connection.provider] = token;
}
}
}
}
return results;
}
// Per-provider circuit breaker + refreshWithRetry + withTimeout live in
// ./tokenRefresh/circuitBreaker.ts — imported above and re-exported for tests.
// isProviderBlocked / getCircuitBreakerStatus / refreshWithRetry are
// re-exported from that leaf.
/**
* Get active per-connection mutex entries (for diagnostics/metrics).
* Returns a snapshot of connections that have an in-flight refresh and their waiter count.
*/
export function getConnectionRefreshMutexStatus(): Record<string, { waiters: number }> {
const result: Record<string, { waiters: number }> = {};
for (const [connectionId, entry] of connectionRefreshMutex.entries()) {
result[connectionId] = { waiters: entry.waiters };
}
return result;
}