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* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity * fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls * fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls * fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls * fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls * fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls * fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls * chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions) * fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes * docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança, CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos. Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket, suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas. Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última atividade. * fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted * fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field * docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely. That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and `/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits. Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT, Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>` attribution. Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note, and 41 i18n translations. * fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'. Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models, validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message. Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth is OK. Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers. * test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429), network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers. * feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading 'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning. Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers (same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the provider registry without any warning, since all registered models are functional via POST /chat/completions. * refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test - Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory - Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md * fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup * feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback Hybrid approach: - gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models - gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern * i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json * feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision (lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22). * fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth) Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow: - Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path - Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation Spec only - no code changes yet. * docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan 10 tasks covering: - TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses - Provider switch to import_token - Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback - OAuthModal UI override - i18n sync - Verification + PR steps * fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404 post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token. - windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token - generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli - tests: assert flowType + disabled stub * fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged. Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex regression check. * refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl, codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl, showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately. * fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6: - src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test. - Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md to satisfy the env/docs sync contract. * fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow. The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy. * fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes `providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with `mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as `accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it crashed with: SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second `if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the second block was unreachable but identical to the first. Adds two regression tests asserting that `provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate instead of the SQLite bind error in production. * feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows * test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894) Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6: - Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes through resolvePublicCred per rule #11. - Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not apply (false positive). * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895) * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877): - docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6) and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section. Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading. - any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any` (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly. - pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files" (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning. * feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868) * feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT) * fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections --------- Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute> * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool New providers: - huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription) - phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent - poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie) - venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie) - v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie) - kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie) - doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie) Additional: - Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md - Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073 - Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers - Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup) - All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials Closes #2885 * fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules * feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899) Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity. It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id + daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking, claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect: - token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON) - auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token) - browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow) - bulk / ZIP import New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}. Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml, ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration, the token parser, and route auth-hardening. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896) Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11). * Pr 2871 (#2897) * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure. * docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly. --------- Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local> Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local> Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se> Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me> Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru> Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br> Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com> Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
473 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
473 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* API Key Policy Enforcement — Shared middleware for all /v1/* endpoints.
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*
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* Enforces API key policies: model restrictions and budget limits.
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* Should be called after API key authentication in every endpoint that
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* accepts a model parameter.
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*
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* @module shared/utils/apiKeyPolicy
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*/
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import { extractApiKey } from "@/sse/services/auth";
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import { getApiKeyMetadata, getComboByName, isModelAllowedForKey } from "@/lib/localDb";
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import { resolveComboForModel } from "@/lib/db/modelComboMappings";
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import { checkBudget } from "@/domain/costRules";
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import { checkTokenLimits } from "@omniroute/open-sse/services/tokenLimitCounter.ts";
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import { errorResponse } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error.ts";
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import { HTTP_STATUS } from "@omniroute/open-sse/config/constants.ts";
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import * as log from "@/sse/utils/logger";
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import { checkRateLimit, RateLimitRule } from "./rateLimiter";
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import { resolveEndpointCategory } from "@/shared/constants/endpointCategories";
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// Default to no per-key request cap. API keys can still opt into explicit
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// limits via Settings/API Manager, while provider/account quota controls remain
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// responsible for upstream 429 handling and fallback.
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// Exported so tests can lock in the "no implicit caps" contract from #2289.
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export const DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS: RateLimitRule[] = [];
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const LEGACY_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY = 1000;
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export function buildDefaultRateLimits(rawValue?: string): RateLimitRule[] {
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const normalized = rawValue?.trim();
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if (normalized === undefined || normalized === "") return [];
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const limitPerDay = /^\d+$/.test(normalized)
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? Number(normalized)
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: LEGACY_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY;
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if (limitPerDay === 0) return [];
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return [
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{ limit: limitPerDay, window: 86400 },
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{ limit: limitPerDay * 5, window: 604800 },
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{ limit: limitPerDay * 20, window: 2592000 },
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];
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||
}
|
||
|
||
const ENV_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS: RateLimitRule[] = buildDefaultRateLimits(
|
||
process.env.DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
interface AccessSchedule {
|
||
enabled: boolean;
|
||
from: string;
|
||
until: string;
|
||
days: number[];
|
||
tz: string;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Metadata stored for an API key in the local database. */
|
||
export interface ApiKeyMetadata {
|
||
id: string;
|
||
name?: string;
|
||
allowedModels?: string[];
|
||
allowedCombos?: string[];
|
||
allowedConnections?: string[];
|
||
noLog?: boolean;
|
||
autoResolve?: boolean;
|
||
budget?: number;
|
||
usedBudget?: number;
|
||
isActive?: boolean;
|
||
isBanned?: boolean;
|
||
expiresAt?: string | null;
|
||
accessSchedule?: AccessSchedule | null;
|
||
maxRequestsPerDay?: number | null;
|
||
maxRequestsPerMinute?: number | null;
|
||
throttleDelayMs?: number | null;
|
||
maxSessions?: number | null;
|
||
rateLimits?: RateLimitRule[] | null;
|
||
allowedEndpoints?: string[];
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Returns true if the current time (in the schedule's timezone) is within
|
||
* the configured window.
|
||
* Supports overnight ranges (e.g. 22:00 until 06:00).
|
||
*/
|
||
function isWithinSchedule(schedule: AccessSchedule): boolean {
|
||
if (!schedule.enabled) return true;
|
||
|
||
const now = new Date();
|
||
|
||
// Convert current UTC time to the configured timezone
|
||
let localTimeStr: string;
|
||
try {
|
||
localTimeStr = new Intl.DateTimeFormat("en-US", {
|
||
timeZone: schedule.tz,
|
||
hour: "2-digit",
|
||
minute: "2-digit",
|
||
hour12: false,
|
||
}).format(now);
|
||
} catch {
|
||
// Invalid timezone — fail open (don't block)
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Intl may return "24:xx" instead of "00:xx" — normalize
|
||
const normalizedTime = localTimeStr.replace(/^24:/, "00:");
|
||
const [localHour, localMin] = normalizedTime.split(":").map(Number);
|
||
const localMinutes = localHour * 60 + localMin;
|
||
|
||
// Determine current weekday in the configured timezone
|
||
let localDayStr: string;
|
||
try {
|
||
localDayStr = new Intl.DateTimeFormat("en-US", {
|
||
timeZone: schedule.tz,
|
||
weekday: "short",
|
||
}).format(now);
|
||
} catch {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const dayMap: Record<string, number> = {
|
||
Sun: 0,
|
||
Mon: 1,
|
||
Tue: 2,
|
||
Wed: 3,
|
||
Thu: 4,
|
||
Fri: 5,
|
||
Sat: 6,
|
||
};
|
||
const localDay = dayMap[localDayStr] ?? now.getDay();
|
||
|
||
if (!schedule.days.includes(localDay)) return false;
|
||
|
||
const [fromHour, fromMin] = schedule.from.split(":").map(Number);
|
||
const [untilHour, untilMin] = schedule.until.split(":").map(Number);
|
||
const fromMinutes = fromHour * 60 + fromMin;
|
||
const untilMinutes = untilHour * 60 + untilMin;
|
||
|
||
// Overnight window (e.g. 22:00 → 06:00)
|
||
if (untilMinutes < fromMinutes) {
|
||
return localMinutes >= fromMinutes || localMinutes < untilMinutes;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return localMinutes >= fromMinutes && localMinutes < untilMinutes;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Legacy in-memory request counter has been replaced by Redis-backed multi-window rate limiter
|
||
|
||
function delay(ms: number): Promise<void> {
|
||
return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
function normalizeComboAccessName(value: unknown): string | null {
|
||
if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
|
||
const trimmed = value.trim();
|
||
if (!trimmed) return null;
|
||
return trimmed.startsWith("combo/") ? trimmed.slice(6).trim() || trimmed : trimmed;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
function matchesComboAccessRule(comboName: string, requestedModel: string, rule: string): boolean {
|
||
const normalizedRule = normalizeComboAccessName(rule);
|
||
if (!normalizedRule) return false;
|
||
return (
|
||
normalizedRule === comboName ||
|
||
rule === requestedModel ||
|
||
`combo/${normalizedRule}` === requestedModel
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
async function resolveRequestedComboName(modelStr: string): Promise<string | null> {
|
||
const exact = await getComboByName(modelStr);
|
||
if (exact && typeof exact.name === "string") return exact.name;
|
||
|
||
if (modelStr.startsWith("combo/")) {
|
||
const withoutPrefix = modelStr.slice(6);
|
||
const prefixed = await getComboByName(withoutPrefix);
|
||
if (prefixed && typeof prefixed.name === "string") return prefixed.name;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const mapped = await resolveComboForModel(modelStr);
|
||
const mappedName = normalizeComboAccessName(mapped?.name);
|
||
return mappedName;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
async function isComboAllowedForKey(
|
||
allowedCombos: string[],
|
||
modelStr: string
|
||
): Promise<{ allowed: boolean; comboName: string | null }> {
|
||
const comboName = await resolveRequestedComboName(modelStr);
|
||
if (!comboName) return { allowed: true, comboName: null };
|
||
|
||
const allowed = allowedCombos.some((rule) => matchesComboAccessRule(comboName, modelStr, rule));
|
||
return { allowed, comboName };
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
export interface ApiKeyPolicyResult {
|
||
/** API key string (null if no key provided) */
|
||
apiKey: string | null;
|
||
/** Metadata from DB (null if no key or key not found) */
|
||
apiKeyInfo: ApiKeyMetadata | null;
|
||
/** If set, the request should be rejected with this Response */
|
||
rejection: Response | null;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Enforce API key policies for a request.
|
||
*
|
||
* Checks:
|
||
* 1. Model restriction — if the key has `allowedModels`, verify the requested model is permitted
|
||
* 2. Budget limit — if the key has a budget configured, verify it hasn't been exceeded
|
||
*
|
||
* @param request - The incoming HTTP request
|
||
* @param modelStr - The model ID from the request body
|
||
* @returns ApiKeyPolicyResult with apiKey, metadata, and optional rejection response
|
||
*
|
||
* @example
|
||
* ```ts
|
||
* const policy = await enforceApiKeyPolicy(request, body.model);
|
||
* if (policy.rejection) return policy.rejection;
|
||
* // proceed with request, optionally use policy.apiKeyInfo
|
||
* ```
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function enforceApiKeyPolicy(
|
||
request: Request,
|
||
modelStr: string | null
|
||
): Promise<ApiKeyPolicyResult> {
|
||
const apiKey = extractApiKey(request);
|
||
|
||
// No API key = local mode, skip policy checks
|
||
if (!apiKey) {
|
||
return { apiKey: null, apiKeyInfo: null, rejection: null };
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Fetch key metadata (includes allowedModels)
|
||
let apiKeyInfo: ApiKeyMetadata | null = null;
|
||
try {
|
||
apiKeyInfo = await getApiKeyMetadata(apiKey);
|
||
} catch (error) {
|
||
// Fail-closed: if policy backend fails, reject the request
|
||
log.error("API_POLICY", "Failed to fetch API key metadata. Request blocked.", { error });
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo: null,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "API key policy unavailable"),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Key not found in DB — skip policy (auth layer handles validation)
|
||
if (!apiKeyInfo) {
|
||
return { apiKey, apiKeyInfo: null, rejection: null };
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 1: is_active / is_banned ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.isActive === false) {
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN, "This API key is disabled"),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.isBanned === true) {
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
|
||
"This API key is banned due to policy violations"
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 1.5: expires_at ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.expiresAt) {
|
||
const expiry = new Date(apiKeyInfo.expiresAt).getTime();
|
||
if (Date.now() > expiry) {
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN, "This API key has expired"),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 2: access_schedule — time-based access window ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule && apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule.enabled) {
|
||
if (!isWithinSchedule(apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule)) {
|
||
const { from, until, tz } = apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule;
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
|
||
`Access denied outside allowed hours (${from}–${until} ${tz})`
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 2.5: Endpoint restriction ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.allowedEndpoints && apiKeyInfo.allowedEndpoints.length > 0) {
|
||
try {
|
||
const url = new URL(request.url);
|
||
const category = resolveEndpointCategory(url.pathname);
|
||
if (category && !apiKeyInfo.allowedEndpoints.includes(category)) {
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
|
||
`Endpoint category "${category}" is not allowed for this API key`
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
} catch {
|
||
// URL parse failure — fail open, let other checks decide
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 3: Model restriction ──
|
||
let requestedComboName: string | null = null;
|
||
if (modelStr && apiKeyInfo.allowedCombos && apiKeyInfo.allowedCombos.length > 0) {
|
||
try {
|
||
const comboAccess = await isComboAllowedForKey(apiKeyInfo.allowedCombos, modelStr);
|
||
requestedComboName = comboAccess.comboName;
|
||
if (!comboAccess.allowed) {
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
|
||
`Combo "${comboAccess.comboName || modelStr}" is not allowed for this API key`
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
} catch (error) {
|
||
log.error("API_POLICY", "Combo access check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
|
||
"API key combo policy unavailable"
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const hasModelRestrictions = apiKeyInfo.allowedModels && apiKeyInfo.allowedModels.length > 0;
|
||
|
||
if (!requestedComboName && modelStr && hasModelRestrictions) {
|
||
try {
|
||
requestedComboName = await resolveRequestedComboName(modelStr);
|
||
} catch {
|
||
requestedComboName = null;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (modelStr && !requestedComboName && hasModelRestrictions) {
|
||
const allowed = await isModelAllowedForKey(apiKey, modelStr);
|
||
if (!allowed) {
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
|
||
`Model "${modelStr}" is not allowed for this API key`
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 4: Budget limit ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.id) {
|
||
try {
|
||
const budgetOk = checkBudget(apiKeyInfo.id);
|
||
if (!budgetOk.allowed) {
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED,
|
||
budgetOk.reason || "Budget limit exceeded"
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
} catch (error) {
|
||
// Fail-closed: budget backend error should block request
|
||
log.error("API_POLICY", "Budget check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "Budget policy unavailable"),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 4.5: Per-model / per-provider token limits (Tier 1) ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.id) {
|
||
try {
|
||
const breach = checkTokenLimits(apiKeyInfo.id, undefined, modelStr ?? undefined);
|
||
if (breach) {
|
||
const scopeLabel =
|
||
breach.scopeType === "global"
|
||
? "account"
|
||
: `${breach.scopeType} "${breach.scopeValue}"`;
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED,
|
||
`Token limit exceeded for ${scopeLabel}: ${breach.tokensUsed}/${breach.limitValue} tokens used in the current window. Please try again later.`
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
} catch (error) {
|
||
// Fail-closed: token-limit backend error should block the request,
|
||
// consistent with the budget check above.
|
||
log.error("API_POLICY", "Token limit check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
|
||
"Token limit policy unavailable"
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 5: Generic Multi-Window Rate Limits ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.id) {
|
||
const hasCustomRateLimits = Boolean(apiKeyInfo.rateLimits && apiKeyInfo.rateLimits.length > 0);
|
||
const rulesToApply = hasCustomRateLimits
|
||
? [...(apiKeyInfo.rateLimits as RateLimitRule[])]
|
||
: [...DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS, ...ENV_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS];
|
||
|
||
// Combine with legacy limits if they exist and custom rate limits aren't set
|
||
if (!hasCustomRateLimits) {
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerDay) {
|
||
rulesToApply.push({ limit: apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerDay, window: 86400 });
|
||
}
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerMinute) {
|
||
rulesToApply.push({ limit: apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerMinute, window: 60 });
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (rulesToApply.length > 0) {
|
||
const rateLimitResult = await checkRateLimit(apiKeyInfo.id, rulesToApply);
|
||
if (!rateLimitResult.allowed) {
|
||
const failedWindowStr = rateLimitResult.failedWindow
|
||
? ` (${rateLimitResult.failedWindow}s window)`
|
||
: "";
|
||
return {
|
||
apiKey,
|
||
apiKeyInfo,
|
||
rejection: errorResponse(
|
||
HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED,
|
||
`Request limit exceeded${failedWindowStr}. Please try again later.`
|
||
),
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── Check 6: Soft throttle / slowdown ──
|
||
if (apiKeyInfo.throttleDelayMs && apiKeyInfo.throttleDelayMs > 0) {
|
||
await delay(Math.min(apiKeyInfo.throttleDelayMs, 300_000));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return { apiKey, apiKeyInfo, rejection: null };
|
||
}
|