mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-08-15 19:52:50 +03:00
The `instanceof Response` guard from #10256 broke two ways: 1. `instanceof` is nominal against `globalThis.Response`, but proxyFetch dispatches through the npm undici package's fetch, whose Response is a different class — so valid upstream responses were rejected as contract violations. Replaced with `isResponseLike()` (instanceof fast path + structural brand/member probe); genuinely malformed shapes still throw. 2. The thrown error had no `.status`, so it fell through to chatCore's BAD_GATEWAY default — an internal defect was treated as a flaky provider, cooling the connection down and retrying forever. It now carries status 500 + `executor_contract_violation`, registered as request-scoped and terminal (no cooldown, no breaker, no retry). batch_api.test.ts went from exit 124 (infinite hang, pinning Unit shard 4/4 in every open PR) to exit 0, 22/22 passing. Closes #10360
364 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
364 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
import { getUpstreamTimeoutConfig } from "@/shared/utils/runtimeTimeouts";
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import { resolvePublicCred } from "../utils/publicCreds.ts";
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import type { LegacyProvider } from "./providerRegistry.ts";
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import { loadProviderCredentials } from "./credentialLoader.ts";
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import { generateLegacyProviders } from "./providerRegistry.ts";
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const upstreamTimeouts = getUpstreamTimeoutConfig(process.env, (message) => {
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console.warn(`[open-sse] ${message}`);
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});
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// Timeout for receiving the initial upstream response (ms).
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// After headers arrive, active SSE streams are governed by STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
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// and Undici's bodyTimeout instead of this one-shot startup timer.
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export const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = upstreamTimeouts.fetchTimeoutMs;
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// Idle timeout for SSE streams (ms). Before a stream is accepted, the same
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// budget is used to wait for the first useful event so HTTP 200 zombie streams
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// can fail fast and trigger fallback. After startup, it closes streams that go
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// idle for this duration. Override with STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS env var.
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export const STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = upstreamTimeouts.streamIdleTimeoutMs;
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// Grace period (ms) a client-disconnect finalization waits for the stream's own
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// completion bookkeeping to land before persisting a 499. See #9653 — a client
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// that closes right after reading a fully-completed SSE stream can otherwise
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// race OmniRoute's own completion callback, resulting in a false 499 with zero
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// token usage for a request that actually delivered its full response. Set
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// STREAM_DISCONNECT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS=0 to disable and restore the old
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// immediate-fail behavior.
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export const STREAM_DISCONNECT_GRACE_PERIOD_MS = upstreamTimeouts.streamDisconnectGracePeriodMs;
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// Timeout for the first non-ping SSE event. Inherits REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS when
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// set, unless STREAM_READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS is specified directly. This must stay
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// conservative for large prompts and slow first-byte reasoning providers.
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export const STREAM_READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS = upstreamTimeouts.streamReadinessTimeoutMs;
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// Upper bound for adaptive stream readiness extensions (large histories,
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// tool-heavy requests, high-reasoning Codex targets). Override with
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// STREAM_READINESS_MAX_TIMEOUT_MS when an operator needs longer first-event
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// windows for slow-thinking agent workloads.
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export const STREAM_READINESS_MAX_TIMEOUT_MS = upstreamTimeouts.streamReadinessMaxTimeoutMs;
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// Error code used when an upstream Antigravity request stalls before response
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// headers are returned. Keep it shared so executor, core normalization and
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// account fallback detection cannot drift.
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export const ANTIGRAVITY_PRE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_CODE = "ANTIGRAVITY_PRE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT";
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// Heartbeat interval for synthetic SSE keepalive emission toward the downstream
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// client (Capy, Claude Code, OpenAI SDK, etc). Keeps strict proxies from
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// dropping the connection during long upstream thinking phases. Set to 0 to
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// disable. Override with SSE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS env var.
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export const SSE_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = upstreamTimeouts.sseHeartbeatIntervalMs;
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// Timeout for reading the full response body after headers arrive (ms).
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// Prevents indefinite hangs when the upstream sends headers but stalls on the body.
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// Defaults to FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS. Override with FETCH_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS env var.
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export const FETCH_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = upstreamTimeouts.fetchBodyTimeoutMs;
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// Provider configurations
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// OAuth credentials read from env vars with hardcoded fallbacks for backward compatibility.
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// Use provider-credentials.json or env vars to override in production.
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// Lazy PROVIDERS: deferred until first property access to speed up startup.
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// The Proxy defers `generateLegacyProviders()` + `loadProviderCredentials()`
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// from module-evaluation time to the first read of any provider property.
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let _providers: Record<string, LegacyProvider> | null = null;
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function initProviders(): Record<string, LegacyProvider> {
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if (!_providers) {
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const p = generateLegacyProviders();
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loadProviderCredentials(p);
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_providers = p;
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}
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return _providers;
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}
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export const PROVIDERS: Record<string, LegacyProvider> = new Proxy(
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{} as Record<string, LegacyProvider>,
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{
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get(_, prop) {
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if (typeof prop === "symbol") return undefined;
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return Reflect.get(initProviders(), prop, _providers);
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},
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has(_, prop) {
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if (typeof prop === "symbol") return false;
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return Reflect.has(initProviders(), prop);
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},
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ownKeys() {
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return Reflect.ownKeys(initProviders());
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},
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getOwnPropertyDescriptor(_, prop) {
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if (typeof prop === "symbol") return undefined;
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return Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(initProviders(), prop);
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},
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set(_, prop, value) {
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if (typeof prop === "symbol") return false;
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(initProviders() as Record<string, LegacyProvider>)[prop] = value;
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return true;
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},
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deleteProperty(_, prop) {
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if (typeof prop === "symbol") return false;
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return Reflect.deleteProperty(initProviders(), prop);
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},
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}
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);
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// Claude system prompt
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export const CLAUDE_SYSTEM_PROMPT = "You are Claude Code, Anthropic's official CLI for Claude.";
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// Antigravity default system prompt (required for API to work)
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export const ANTIGRAVITY_DEFAULT_SYSTEM =
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"You are Antigravity, a powerful agentic AI coding assistant designed by the Google Deepmind team working on Advanced Agentic Coding.\n" +
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"You are pair programming with a USER to solve their coding task. The task may require creating a new codebase, modifying or debugging an existing codebase, or simply answering a question.\n" +
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"**Absolute paths only**\n" +
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"**Proactiveness**";
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// OAuth endpoints
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export const OAUTH_ENDPOINTS = {
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google: {
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token: "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
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auth: "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth",
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},
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openai: {
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token: "https://auth.openai.com/oauth/token",
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auth: "https://auth.openai.com/oauth/authorize",
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},
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anthropic: {
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token: "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/oauth/token",
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auth: "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/oauth/authorize",
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},
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qoder: {
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token: process.env.QODER_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL || "",
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auth: process.env.QODER_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL || "",
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},
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github: {
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token: "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",
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auth: "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize",
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deviceCode: "https://github.com/login/device/code",
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},
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openference: {
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token: "https://openference.com/oauth/token",
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auth: "https://openference.com/app/oauth/authorize",
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clientId: resolvePublicCred("openference_id"),
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},
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};
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// Cache TTLs (seconds)
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export const CACHE_TTL = {
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userInfo: 300, // 5 minutes
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modelAlias: 3600, // 1 hour
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};
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// Default max tokens
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export const DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS = 64000;
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// Minimum max tokens for tool calling (to prevent truncated arguments)
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export const DEFAULT_MIN_TOKENS = 32000;
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export const PROVIDER_MAX_TOKENS: Record<string, number> = {
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groq: 16384, // Groq strict per-model enforcement
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openai: 16384, // GPT-4/4o standard
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anthropic: 65536, // Claude models
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gemini: 65536, // Gemini Studio
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sensenova: 65536, // SenseNova Token Plan rejects MaxTokens outside [1, 65536]
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};
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export const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_MAX_TOKENS = 32000;
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// HTTP status codes
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export const HTTP_STATUS = {
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BAD_REQUEST: 400,
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UNAUTHORIZED: 401,
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PAYMENT_REQUIRED: 402,
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FORBIDDEN: 403,
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NOT_FOUND: 404,
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NOT_ACCEPTABLE: 406,
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REQUEST_TIMEOUT: 408,
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GONE: 410,
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RATE_LIMITED: 429,
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SERVER_ERROR: 500,
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BAD_GATEWAY: 502,
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SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE: 503,
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GATEWAY_TIMEOUT: 504,
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};
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/**
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* #10360 — stable error code for an INTERNAL violation of the executor
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* `execute()` result contract (`normalizeExecutorResult` received something
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* that is neither a Response nor `{ response: Response }`).
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*
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* This is our own bug, never a provider/account health signal, so every
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* resilience layer must treat it as request-scoped and terminal: no connection
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* cooldown, no provider circuit-breaker trip, no retry. It rides on the error's
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* `.code` (read by `getUpstreamErrorIdentifier`) and therefore reaches
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* `checkFallbackError` as `structuredError.code` and the chat/combo predicates
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* as `result.errorCode`.
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*
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* Lives here (leaf config module) so both `open-sse/handlers/` and
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* `open-sse/services/` can import it without creating a cycle.
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*/
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export const EXECUTOR_CONTRACT_VIOLATION_CODE = "executor_contract_violation";
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export {
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BACKOFF_CONFIG,
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COOLDOWN_MS,
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DEFAULT_ERROR_MESSAGES,
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ERROR_RULES,
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ERROR_TYPES,
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TRANSIENT_COOLDOWN_MS,
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calculateBackoffCooldown,
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findMatchingErrorRule,
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getDefaultErrorMessage,
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getErrorInfo,
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matchErrorRuleByStatus,
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matchErrorRuleByText,
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} from "./errorConfig.ts";
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// Configurable backoff steps for rate limits (Phase 1 — enhanced rate limiting)
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// Used for per-model lockouts with increasing severity
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export const BACKOFF_STEPS_MS = [60_000, 120_000, 300_000, 600_000, 1_200_000];
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// 1min → 2min → 5min → 10min → 20min
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// Structured error classification for rate limiting decisions
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export const RateLimitReason = {
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QUOTA_EXHAUSTED: "quota_exhausted", // Daily/monthly quota depleted
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RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: "rate_limit_exceeded", // RPM/RPD limits hit
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MODEL_CAPACITY: "model_capacity", // Model overloaded (529, 503)
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SERVER_ERROR: "server_error", // 5xx errors
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AUTH_ERROR: "auth_error", // 401, 403
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UNKNOWN: "unknown",
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};
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// ─── Provider Resilience Profiles ───────────────────────────────────────────
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// Separate behavior for OAuth (low-limit, session-based) vs API Key (high-limit, metered)
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// Circuit-breaker thresholds and reset windows are overridable via
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// OMNIROUTE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_* env vars so operators can dampen or harden
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// behavior without recompiling.
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function envInt(name: string, fallback: number): number {
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const raw = process.env[name];
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if (raw === undefined || raw === null || raw === "") return fallback;
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const parsed = Number(raw);
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return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed >= 0 ? parsed : fallback;
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}
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export const PROVIDER_PROFILES = {
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oauth: {
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transientCooldown: 5000, // 5s (session tokens — short recovery)
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rateLimitCooldown: 60000, // 60s default when no retry-after header
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maxBackoffLevel: 8, // Higher ceiling (sessions may stay bad longer)
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circuitBreakerThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_OAUTH_THRESHOLD", 8),
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circuitBreakerReset: envInt("OMNIROUTE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_OAUTH_RESET_MS", 60000),
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// Provider-level circuit breaker (entire provider cooldown after repeated failures)
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providerFailureThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_OAUTH_FAILURE_THRESHOLD", 10), // Scaled for 500+ connections (was 3)
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providerFailureWindowMs: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_OAUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS", 900000), // 15min window (was 10min)
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providerCooldownMs: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_OAUTH_COOLDOWN_MS", 300000), // 5min cooldown when threshold reached
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// Adaptive circuit breaker v2 settings
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degradationThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_OAUTH_DEGRADATION_THRESHOLD", 5), // Enter DEGRADED at this many failures
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maxBackoffMultiplier: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_OAUTH_MAX_BACKOFF_MULTIPLIER", 8), // Max 8x resetTimeout escalation
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backoffEscalationCount: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_OAUTH_BACKOFF_ESCALATION_COUNT", 2), // Escalate after 2 open cycles
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},
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apikey: {
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transientCooldown: 3000, // 3s (API providers recover faster)
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rateLimitCooldown: 0, // 0 = respect retry-after header from provider
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maxBackoffLevel: 5, // Lower ceiling (API quotas reset at known intervals)
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circuitBreakerThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_API_KEY_THRESHOLD", 12),
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circuitBreakerReset: envInt("OMNIROUTE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_API_KEY_RESET_MS", 30000),
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// Provider-level circuit breaker (entire provider cooldown after repeated failures)
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providerFailureThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_API_KEY_FAILURE_THRESHOLD", 15), // Scaled for 500+ connections (was 5)
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providerFailureWindowMs: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_API_KEY_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS", 1800000), // 30min window (was 20min)
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providerCooldownMs: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_API_KEY_COOLDOWN_MS", 600000), // 10min cooldown when threshold reached
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degradationThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_API_KEY_DEGRADATION_THRESHOLD", 7),
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maxBackoffMultiplier: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_API_KEY_MAX_BACKOFF_MULTIPLIER", 4),
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backoffEscalationCount: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_API_KEY_BACKOFF_ESCALATION_COUNT", 3),
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},
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// Local providers (localhost inference backends like Ollama, LM Studio, oMLX).
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// Not yet wired into getProviderProfile() — will be used when local provider_nodes
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// are integrated into the resilience layer. Kept here to avoid a second constants change.
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local: {
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transientCooldown: 2000, // 2s (local — very fast recovery)
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rateLimitCooldown: 5000, // 5s (local — no real rate limits)
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maxBackoffLevel: 3, // Low ceiling (local either works or doesn't)
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circuitBreakerThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_LOCAL_THRESHOLD", 2),
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circuitBreakerReset: envInt("OMNIROUTE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_LOCAL_RESET_MS", 15000),
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// Provider-level circuit breaker (entire provider cooldown after repeated failures)
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providerFailureThreshold: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_LOCAL_FAILURE_THRESHOLD", 2), // 2 failures trigger provider cooldown
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providerFailureWindowMs: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_LOCAL_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS", 300000), // 5min window for counting failures
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providerCooldownMs: envInt("OMNIROUTE_PROVIDER_BREAKER_LOCAL_COOLDOWN_MS", 60000), // 1min cooldown when threshold reached
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},
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};
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// Default rate limit values for API Key providers (auto-enabled safety net)
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// These are intentionally HIGH — they won't restrict normal usage.
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// Real limits are learned from provider response headers.
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export const DEFAULT_API_LIMITS = {
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requestsPerMinute: 60, // 60 RPM (reduced from 100 — saves Bottleneck queue memory)
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minTimeBetweenRequests: 350, // 350ms minimum gap (increased from 200)
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concurrentRequests: 6, // Max 6 parallel per provider (reduced from 10)
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};
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// Skip patterns - requests containing these texts will bypass provider
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export const SKIP_PATTERNS = ["Please write a 5-10 word title for the following conversation:"];
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// Default maximum number of tools allowed in a request (OpenAI default)
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export const MAX_TOOLS_LIMIT = 128;
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// ── Credential Health Check ────────────────────────────────────────
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/**
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* Interval (ms) for the background credential health check scheduler.
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* Default: 300000 (5 minutes). Minimum: 10000 (10 seconds).
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*/
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export const CREDENTIAL_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL = (() => {
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const raw = process.env.CREDENTIAL_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL;
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if (raw) {
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const parsed = Number(raw);
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if (Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed >= 10_000) return parsed;
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}
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return 300_000;
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})();
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/**
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* TTL (ms) for cached credential health status.
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* After this time, the cache entry expires and the next request will
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* re-check. Default: 300000 (5 minutes).
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*/
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export const CREDENTIAL_HEALTH_CACHE_TTL = (() => {
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const raw = process.env.CREDENTIAL_HEALTH_CACHE_TTL;
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if (raw) {
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const parsed = Number(raw);
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if (Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed >= 10_000) return parsed;
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}
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return 300_000;
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})();
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/**
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* Stream-recovery tuning (opt-in, see ResilienceSettings.streamRecovery).
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*
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* Ported from free-claude-code's always-on recovery (`core/anthropic/stream_recovery.py`).
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* In OmniRoute the holdback is disabled by default because buffering the opening
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* window adds up to HOLDBACK_MS of time-to-first-token latency on every stream;
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* operators opt in via STREAM_RECOVERY_ENABLED / the resilience settings.
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*
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* - HOLDBACK_MS: how long the opening SSE window is held so an early truncation
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* can be retried transparently before any byte reaches the client.
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* - BUFFER_MAX_BYTES: hard cap on the held window — commit (flush + passthrough)
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* as soon as this many bytes accumulate, regardless of the timer.
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* - EARLY_RETRY_MAX: max transparent re-opens of the upstream stream while the
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* holdback is still uncommitted (free-claude-code uses 5 total attempts = 4 retries).
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*/
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export const STREAM_RECOVERY = {
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HOLDBACK_MS: 750,
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BUFFER_MAX_BYTES: 65536,
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EARLY_RETRY_MAX: 4,
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} as const;
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/**
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* Active-stream quality watchdog defaults (#9709). This is separate from the
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* idle timeout (no chunks) and the absolute upstream-attempt deadline: it only
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* evaluates useful assistant output after warm-up plus one complete window.
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*/
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export const STREAM_THROUGHPUT_WATCHDOG = {
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WARMUP_MS: 30_000,
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WINDOW_MS: 30_000,
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MIN_USEFUL_BYTES_PER_SECOND: 4,
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MIN_USEFUL_BYTES: 1,
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} as const;
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