OmniRoute/CLAUDE.md

CLAUDE.md

This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.

Quick Start

npm install                    # Install deps (auto-generates .env from .env.example)
npm run dev                    # Dev server at http://localhost:20128
npm run build                  # Production build (Next.js 16 standalone)
npm run lint                   # ESLint (0 errors expected; warnings are pre-existing)
npm run typecheck:core         # TypeScript check (should be clean)
npm run typecheck:noimplicit:core  # Strict check (no implicit any)
npm run test:coverage          # Unit tests + coverage gate (40/40/40/40 — statements/lines/functions/branches)
npm run check                  # lint + test combined
npm run check:cycles           # Detect circular dependencies

Running Tests

# Single test file (Node.js native test runner — most tests)
node --import tsx/esm --test tests/unit/your-file.test.ts

# Vitest (MCP server, autoCombo, cache)
npm run test:vitest

# All suites
npm run test:all

For full test matrix, see CONTRIBUTING.md → "Running Tests". For deep architecture, see AGENTS.md.

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Project at a Glance

OmniRoute — unified AI proxy/router. One endpoint, 160+ LLM providers, auto-fallback.

Layer	Location	Purpose
API Routes	src/app/api/v1/	Next.js App Router — entry points
Handlers	open-sse/handlers/	Request processing (chat, embeddings, etc)
Executors	open-sse/executors/	Provider-specific HTTP dispatch
Translators	open-sse/translator/	Format conversion (OpenAI↔Claude↔Gemini)
Transformer	open-sse/transformer/	Responses API ↔ Chat Completions
Services	open-sse/services/	Combo routing, rate limits, caching, etc
Database	src/lib/db/	SQLite domain modules (45+ files, 55 migrations)
Domain/Policy	src/domain/	Policy engine, cost rules, fallback logic
MCP Server	open-sse/mcp-server/	43 tools (30 base + 3 memory + 4 skills + 6 notion), 3 transports, ~13 scopes
A2A Server	src/lib/a2a/	JSON-RPC 2.0 agent protocol
Skills	src/lib/skills/	Extensible skill framework
Memory	src/lib/memory/	Persistent conversational memory

Monorepo: src/ (Next.js 16 app), open-sse/ (streaming engine workspace), electron/ (desktop app), tests/, bin/ (CLI entry point).

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Request Pipeline

Client → /v1/chat/completions (Next.js route)
  → CORS → Zod validation → auth? → policy check → prompt injection guard
  → handleChatCore() [open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts]
    → cache check → rate limit → combo routing?
      → resolveComboTargets() → handleSingleModel() per target
    → translateRequest() → getExecutor() → executor.execute()
      → fetch() upstream → retry w/ backoff
    → response translation → SSE stream or JSON
    → If Responses API: responsesTransformer.ts TransformStream

API routes follow a consistent pattern: Route → CORS preflight → Zod body validation → Optional auth (extractApiKey/isValidApiKey) → API key policy enforcement → Handler delegation (open-sse). No global Next.js middleware — interception is route-specific.

Combo routing (open-sse/services/combo.ts): 14 strategies (priority, weighted, fill-first, round-robin, P2C, random, least-used, cost-optimized, reset-aware, strict-random, auto, lkgp, context-optimized, context-relay). Each target calls handleSingleModel() which wraps handleChatCore() with per-target error handling and circuit breaker checks. See docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md for the 9-factor Auto-Combo scoring and docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md for the 3 resilience layers.

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Resilience Runtime State

OmniRoute has three related but distinct temporary-failure mechanisms. Keep their scope separate when debugging routing behavior. See the 3-layer resilience diagram (source: docs/diagrams/resilience-3layers.mmd) for an at-a-glance map.

Provider Circuit Breaker

Scope: whole provider, e.g. glm, openai, anthropic.

Purpose: stop sending traffic to a provider that is repeatedly failing at the upstream/service level, so one unhealthy provider does not slow down every request.

Implementation:

• Core class: src/shared/utils/circuitBreaker.ts
• Chat gate/execution wiring: src/sse/handlers/chatHelpers.ts, src/sse/handlers/chat.ts
• Runtime status API: src/app/api/monitoring/health/route.ts
• Shared wrappers: open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts
• Persisted state table: domain_circuit_breakers

States:

• CLOSED: normal traffic is allowed.
• OPEN: provider is temporarily blocked; callers get a provider-circuit-open response or combo routing skips to another target.
• HALF_OPEN: reset timeout has elapsed; allow a probe request. Success closes the breaker, failure opens it again.

Defaults (open-sse/config/constants.ts):

• OAuth providers: threshold 3, reset timeout 60s.
• API-key providers: threshold 5, reset timeout 30s.
• Local providers: threshold 2, reset timeout 15s.

Only provider-level failure statuses should trip the provider breaker:

(408, 500, 502, 503, 504);

Do not trip the whole-provider breaker for normal account/key/model errors like most 401, 403, or 429 cases. Those usually belong to connection cooldown or model lockout. A generic API-key provider 403 should be recoverable unless it is classified as a terminal provider/account error.

The breaker uses lazy recovery, not a background timer. When OPEN expires, reads such as getStatus(), canExecute(), and getRetryAfterMs() refresh the state to HALF_OPEN, so dashboards and combo candidate builders do not keep excluding an expired provider forever.

Connection Cooldown

Scope: one provider connection/account/key.

Purpose: temporarily skip one bad key/account while allowing other connections for the same provider to continue serving requests.

Implementation:

• Write/update path: src/sse/services/auth.ts::markAccountUnavailable()
• Account selection/filtering: src/sse/services/auth.ts::getProviderCredentials...
• Cooldown calculation: open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts::checkFallbackError()
• Settings: src/lib/resilience/settings.ts

Important fields on provider connections:

rateLimitedUntil;
testStatus: "unavailable";
lastError;
lastErrorType;
errorCode;
backoffLevel;

During account selection, a connection is skipped while:

new Date(rateLimitedUntil).getTime() > Date.now();

Cooldowns are also lazy: when rateLimitedUntil is in the past, the connection becomes eligible again. On successful use, clearAccountError() clears testStatus, rateLimitedUntil, error fields, and backoffLevel.

Default connection cooldown behavior:

• OAuth base cooldown: 5s.
• API-key base cooldown: 3s.
• API-key 429 should prefer upstream retry hints (Retry-After, reset headers, or parseable reset text) when available.
• Repeated recoverable failures use exponential backoff:

baseCooldownMs * 2 ** failureIndex;

The anti-thundering-herd guard prevents concurrent failures on the same connection from repeatedly extending the cooldown or double-incrementing backoffLevel.

Terminal states are not cooldowns. banned, expired, and credits_exhausted are intended to stay unavailable until credentials/settings change or an operator resets them. Do not overwrite terminal states with transient cooldown state.

Model Lockout

Scope: provider + connection + model.

Purpose: avoid disabling a whole connection when only one model is unavailable or quota-limited for that connection.

Examples:

• Per-model quota providers returning 429.
• Local providers returning 404 for one missing model.
• Provider-specific mode/model permission failures such as selected Grok modes.

Model lockout lives in open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts and lets the same connection continue serving other models.

Debugging Guidance

• If all keys for a provider are skipped, inspect both provider breaker state and each connection's rateLimitedUntil/testStatus.
• If a provider appears permanently excluded after the reset window, check whether code is reading raw state instead of using getStatus()/canExecute().
• If one provider key fails but others should work, prefer connection cooldown over provider breaker.
• If only one model fails, prefer model lockout over connection cooldown.
• If a state should self-recover, it should have a future timestamp/reset timeout and a read path that refreshes expired state. Permanent statuses require manual credential or config changes.

---

Key Conventions

Code Style

• 2 spaces, semicolons, double quotes, 100 char width, es5 trailing commas (enforced by lint-staged via Prettier)
• Imports: external → internal (@/, @omniroute/open-sse) → relative
• Naming: files=camelCase/kebab, components=PascalCase, constants=UPPER_SNAKE
• ESLint: no-eval, no-implied-eval, no-new-func = error everywhere; no-explicit-any = warn in open-sse/ and tests/
• TypeScript: strict: false, target ES2022, module esnext, resolution bundler. Prefer explicit types.

Database

• Always go through src/lib/db/ domain modules — never write raw SQL in routes or handlers
• Never add logic to src/lib/localDb.ts (re-export layer only)
• Never barrel-import from localDb.ts — import specific db/ modules instead
• DB singleton: getDbInstance() from src/lib/db/core.ts (WAL journaling)
• Migrations: src/lib/db/migrations/ — versioned SQL files, idempotent, run in transactions

Error Handling

• try/catch with specific error types, log with pino context
• Never swallow errors in SSE streams — use abort signals for cleanup
• Return proper HTTP status codes (4xx/5xx)

Security

• Never use eval(), new Function(), or implied eval
• Validate all inputs with Zod schemas
• Encrypt credentials at rest (AES-256-GCM)
• Upstream header denylist: src/shared/constants/upstreamHeaders.ts — keep sanitize, Zod schemas, and unit tests aligned when editing
• Public upstream credentials (Gemini/Antigravity/Windsurf-style OAuth client_id/secret + Firebase Web keys extracted from public CLIs): MUST be embedded via resolvePublicCred() from open-sse/utils/publicCreds.ts — never as string literals. See docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md for the mandatory pattern.
• Error responses (HTTP / SSE / executor / MCP handler): MUST route through buildErrorBody() or sanitizeErrorMessage() from open-sse/utils/error.ts — never put raw err.stack or err.message in a response body. See docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md.
• Shell commands built from variables: when calling exec()/spawn() with a script that needs runtime values, pass them via the env option (shell-escaped automatically) — never string-interpolate untrusted/external paths into the script body. Reference: src/mitm/cert/install.ts::updateNssDatabases.
• Secure-by-default libraries (tldrsec/awesome-secure-defaults): prefer Helmet.js, DOMPurify, ssrf-req-filter, safe-regex, Google Tink over custom implementations whenever adding new security-sensitive surfaces.

---

Common Modification Scenarios

Adding a New Provider

1. Register in src/shared/constants/providers.ts (Zod-validated at load)
2. Add executor in open-sse/executors/ if custom logic needed (extend BaseExecutor)
3. Add translator in open-sse/translator/ if non-OpenAI format
4. Add OAuth config in src/lib/oauth/constants/oauth.ts if OAuth-based — if the upstream CLI ships a public client_id/secret, embed via resolvePublicCred() (see docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md), never as a literal
5. Register models in open-sse/config/providerRegistry.ts
6. Write tests in tests/unit/ (include the publicCreds shape assertion if you added a new embedded default)

Adding a New API Route

1. Create directory under src/app/api/v1/your-route/
2. Create route.ts with GET/POST handlers
3. Follow pattern: CORS → Zod body validation → optional auth → handler delegation
4. Handler goes in open-sse/handlers/ (import from there, not inline)
5. Error responses use buildErrorBody() / errorResponse() from open-sse/utils/error.ts (auto-sanitized — never put err.stack or err.message raw in the body). See docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md.
6. Add tests — including at least one assertion that error responses do not leak stack traces (!body.error.message.includes("at /"))

Adding a New DB Module

1. Create src/lib/db/yourModule.ts — import getDbInstance from ./core.ts
2. Export CRUD functions for your domain table(s)
3. Add migration in src/lib/db/migrations/ if new tables needed
4. Re-export from src/lib/localDb.ts (add to the re-export list only)
5. Write tests

Adding a New MCP Tool

1. Add tool definition in open-sse/mcp-server/tools/ with Zod input schema + async handler
2. Register in tool set (wired by createMcpServer())
3. Assign to appropriate scope(s)
4. Write tests (tool invocation logged to mcp_audit table)

Adding a New A2A Skill

1. Create skill in src/lib/a2a/skills/ (5 already exist: smart-routing, quota-management, provider-discovery, cost-analysis, health-report)
2. Skill receives task context (messages, metadata) → returns structured result
3. Register in A2A_SKILL_HANDLERS in src/lib/a2a/taskExecution.ts
4. Expose in src/app/.well-known/agent.json/route.ts (Agent Card)
5. Write tests in tests/unit/
6. Document in docs/frameworks/A2A-SERVER.md skill table

Adding a New Cloud Agent

1. Create agent class in src/lib/cloudAgent/agents/ extending CloudAgentBase (3 already exist: codex-cloud, devin, jules)
2. Implement createTask, getStatus, approvePlan, sendMessage, listSources
3. Register in src/lib/cloudAgent/registry.ts
4. Add OAuth/credentials handling if needed (src/lib/oauth/providers/)
5. Tests + document in docs/frameworks/CLOUD_AGENT.md

Adding a New Embedded Service

1. Create installer in src/lib/services/installers/{name}.ts modeled on ninerouter.ts (use runNpm from installers/utils.ts — no shell interpolation, hard rule #13).
2. Register the service in src/lib/services/bootstrap.ts (add to SERVICES[] array and extend buildSpawnArgsFactory()).
3. Add a DB seed row for the new service in src/lib/db/migrations/ (version_manager table, status='not_installed', auto_start=0).
4. Create 7 API endpoints under src/app/api/services/{name}/ (_lib.ts, install, start, stop, restart, update, status, auto-start). All delegate errors through createErrorResponse(). The shared logs endpoint is already wired via [name]/logs/route.ts.
5. Verify /api/services/ is in LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES in src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts; add a test asserting isLocalOnlyPath() returns true for the new prefix if you add one (hard rule #17).
6. Add a UI tab in src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/providers/services/tabs/ reusing ServiceStatusCard, ServiceLifecycleButtons, ServiceLogsPanel.
7. Document in docs/frameworks/EMBEDDED-SERVICES.md (update §1 service table + §4 API reference) and docs/reference/openapi.yaml.
8. Write tests: unit (tests/unit/services/), integration (tests/integration/services/, gated by RUN_SERVICES_INT=1), and update docs/ops/RELEASE_CHECKLIST.md smoke section.

Adding a New Guardrail / Eval / Skill / Webhook event

• Guardrail: src/lib/guardrails/ → docs: docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md
• Eval suite: src/lib/evals/ → docs: docs/frameworks/EVALS.md
• Skill (sandbox): src/lib/skills/ → docs: docs/frameworks/SKILLS.md
• Webhook event: src/lib/webhookDispatcher.ts → docs: docs/frameworks/WEBHOOKS.md

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Reference Documentation

For any non-trivial change, read the matching deep-dive first:

Area	Doc
Repo navigation	docs/architecture/REPOSITORY_MAP.md
Architecture	docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md
Engineering reference	docs/architecture/CODEBASE_DOCUMENTATION.md
Auto-Combo (9-factor scoring, 14 strategies)	docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md
Resilience (3 mechanisms)	docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md
Reasoning replay	docs/routing/REASONING_REPLAY.md
Skills framework	docs/frameworks/SKILLS.md
Memory system (FTS5 + Qdrant)	docs/frameworks/MEMORY.md
Cloud agents	docs/frameworks/CLOUD_AGENT.md
Guardrails (PII / injection / vision)	docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md
Public upstream credentials (Gemini/etc.)	docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md
Error message sanitization	docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md
Evals	docs/frameworks/EVALS.md
Compliance / audit	docs/security/COMPLIANCE.md
Webhooks	docs/frameworks/WEBHOOKS.md
Authorization pipeline	docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md
Stealth (TLS / fingerprint)	docs/security/STEALTH_GUIDE.md
Agent protocols (A2A / ACP / Cloud)	docs/frameworks/AGENT_PROTOCOLS_GUIDE.md
MCP server	docs/frameworks/MCP-SERVER.md
A2A server	docs/frameworks/A2A-SERVER.md
API reference + OpenAPI	docs/reference/API_REFERENCE.md + docs/reference/openapi.yaml
Provider catalog (auto-generated)	docs/reference/PROVIDER_REFERENCE.md
Release flow	docs/ops/RELEASE_CHECKLIST.md
Embedded services	docs/frameworks/EMBEDDED-SERVICES.md

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Testing

What	Command
Unit tests	npm run test:unit
Single file	node --import tsx/esm --test tests/unit/file.test.ts
Vitest (MCP, autoCombo)	npm run test:vitest
E2E (Playwright)	npm run test:e2e
Protocol E2E (MCP+A2A)	npm run test:protocols:e2e
Ecosystem	npm run test:ecosystem
Coverage gate	npm run test:coverage (40/40/40/40 — statements/lines/functions/branches)
Coverage report	npm run coverage:report

PR rule: If you change production code in src/, open-sse/, electron/, or bin/, you must include or update tests in the same PR.

Test layer preference: unit first → integration (multi-module or DB state) → e2e (UI/workflow only). Encode bug reproductions as automated tests before or alongside the fix.

Copilot coverage policy: When a PR changes production code and coverage is below 40% (statements/lines/functions/branches), do not just report — add or update tests, rerun the coverage gate, then ask for confirmation. Include commands run, changed test files, and final coverage result in the PR report.

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Git Workflow

# Never commit directly to main
git checkout -b feat/your-feature
git commit -m "feat: describe your change"
git push -u origin feat/your-feature

Branch prefixes: feat/, fix/, refactor/, docs/, test/, chore/

Commit format (Conventional Commits): feat(db): add circuit breaker — scopes: db, sse, oauth, dashboard, api, cli, docker, ci, mcp, a2a, memory, skills

Husky hooks:

• pre-commit: lint-staged + check-docs-sync + check:any-budget:t11
• pre-push: npm run test:unit

---

Environment

• Runtime: Node.js ≥20.20.2 <21 || ≥22.22.2 <23 || ≥24 <25, ES Modules
• TypeScript: 5.9+, target ES2022, module esnext, resolution bundler
• Path aliases: @/* → src/, @omniroute/open-sse → open-sse/, @omniroute/open-sse/* → open-sse/*
• Default port: 20128 (API + dashboard on same port)
• Data directory: DATA_DIR env var, defaults to ~/.omniroute/
• Key env vars: PORT, JWT_SECRET, API_KEY_SECRET, INITIAL_PASSWORD, REQUIRE_API_KEY, APP_LOG_LEVEL
• Setup: cp .env.example .env then generate JWT_SECRET (openssl rand -base64 48) and API_KEY_SECRET (openssl rand -hex 32)

---

Hard Rules

1. Never commit secrets or credentials
2. Never add logic to localDb.ts
3. Never use eval() / new Function() / implied eval
4. Never commit directly to main
5. Never write raw SQL in routes — use src/lib/db/ modules
6. Never silently swallow errors in SSE streams
7. Always validate inputs with Zod schemas
8. Always include tests when changing production code
9. Coverage must stay ≥40% (statements, lines, functions, branches).
10. Never bypass Husky hooks (--no-verify, --no-gpg-sign) without explicit operator approval.
11. Never embed public upstream OAuth client_id/secret or Firebase Web keys as string literals — always go through resolvePublicCred() (open-sse/utils/publicCreds.ts). See docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md.
12. Never return raw err.stack / err.message in HTTP / SSE / executor responses — always route through buildErrorBody() or sanitizeErrorMessage() (open-sse/utils/error.ts). See docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md.
13. Never string-interpolate external paths or runtime values into shell scripts passed to exec()/spawn() — pass via the env option instead. Reference: src/mitm/cert/install.ts::updateNssDatabases.
14. Never dismiss a CodeQL / Secret-Scanning alert without (a) first checking the pattern docs above to see if the helper applies, and (b) recording the technical justification in the dismissal comment. Precedent: js/stack-trace-exposure raised on callsites that already route through sanitizeErrorMessage() is a known CodeQL limitation (custom sanitizers not recognized) — dismiss as false positive referencing docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md.
15. Never expose routes that spawn child processes (/api/mcp/, /api/cli-tools/runtime/) without isLocalOnlyPath() classification in src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts. Loopback enforcement happens unconditionally before any auth check — leaked JWT via tunnel cannot trigger process spawning. See docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md.
16. Never include Co-Authored-By trailers that credit an AI assistant, LLM, or automation account (e.g. names containing "Claude", "GPT", "Copilot", "Bot"; emails at anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com addresses). Such trailers route attribution to the bot account on GitHub, hiding the real author (diegosouzapw) in PR history. Human collaborators — including upstream PR authors and issue reporters being ported into OmniRoute — MAY and SHOULD be credited with standard Co-authored-by: Name <email> trailers; the upstream-port workflows (/port-upstream-features, /port-upstream-issues) depend on this.
17. Never expose routes under /api/services/ or /dashboard/providers/services/*/embed/ without isLocalOnlyPath() classification in src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts. These routes can spawn child processes (npm install, node). Loopback enforcement happens unconditionally before any auth check — a leaked JWT via tunnel cannot trigger process spawning. See docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md.

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PII & Stream Sanitization Learnings

1. Regex Security (ReDoS)

All regex patterns matching variable-length strings (e.g. IPv6 address, credit cards) must use strictly bounded, non-overlapping sequences (e.g., limit occurrences with bounded ranges {1,7}) to prevent catastrophic backtracking when processing untrusted inputs.

2. SSE Snapshot Handling

When parsing streaming LLM responses (e.g. Responses API), check if a chunk represents a final snapshot (done or completed events). Snapshot text must be sanitized directly as a standalone string (bypassing rolling delta buffers) to prevent text duplication at the end of the stream.

3. Database Handles in Tests

Ensure that any unit tests that trigger database migrations or establish SQLite connections call resetDbInstance() and properly clean up/close all DB handles in a test.after(...) hook. Failure to release database connection handles will cause Node's native test runner to hang indefinitely.