mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
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* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity * fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls * fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls * fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls * fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls * fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls * fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls * chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions) * fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes * docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança, CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos. Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket, suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas. Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última atividade. * fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted * fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field * docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely. That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and `/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits. Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT, Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>` attribution. Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note, and 41 i18n translations. * fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'. Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models, validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message. Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth is OK. Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers. * test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429), network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers. * feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading 'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning. Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers (same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the provider registry without any warning, since all registered models are functional via POST /chat/completions. * refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test - Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory - Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md * fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup * feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback Hybrid approach: - gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models - gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern * i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json * feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision (lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22). * fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth) Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow: - Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path - Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation Spec only - no code changes yet. * docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan 10 tasks covering: - TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses - Provider switch to import_token - Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback - OAuthModal UI override - i18n sync - Verification + PR steps * fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404 post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token. - windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token - generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli - tests: assert flowType + disabled stub * fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged. Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex regression check. * refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl, codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl, showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately. * fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6: - src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test. - Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md to satisfy the env/docs sync contract. * fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow. The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy. * fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes `providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with `mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as `accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it crashed with: SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second `if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the second block was unreachable but identical to the first. Adds two regression tests asserting that `provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate instead of the SQLite bind error in production. * feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows * test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894) Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6: - Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes through resolvePublicCred per rule #11. - Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not apply (false positive). * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895) * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877): - docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6) and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section. Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading. - any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any` (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly. - pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files" (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning. * feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868) * feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT) * fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections --------- Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute> * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool New providers: - huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription) - phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent - poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie) - venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie) - v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie) - kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie) - doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie) Additional: - Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md - Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073 - Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers - Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup) - All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials Closes #2885 * fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules * feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899) Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity. It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id + daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking, claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect: - token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON) - auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token) - browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow) - bulk / ZIP import New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}. Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml, ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration, the token parser, and route auth-hardening. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896) Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11). * Pr 2871 (#2897) * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure. * docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly. --------- Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local> Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local> Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se> Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me> Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru> Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br> Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com> Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
216 lines
8.4 KiB
JavaScript
Executable File
216 lines
8.4 KiB
JavaScript
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* OmniRoute CLI entry point.
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*
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* Special bypasses (handled before Commander):
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* --mcp Start MCP server over stdio
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* reset-encrypted-columns Recovery tool for broken encrypted credentials
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*
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* All other commands are routed through Commander (bin/cli/program.mjs).
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*/
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import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { join, dirname } from "node:path";
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import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
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import { homedir, platform } from "node:os";
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import updateNotifier from "update-notifier";
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import { isNativeBinaryCompatible } from "../scripts/build/native-binary-compat.mjs";
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import { getNodeRuntimeSupport, getNodeRuntimeWarning } from "./nodeRuntimeSupport.mjs";
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// Register tsx so dynamic imports of .ts source files (referenced as .js per
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// TypeScript conventions) resolve correctly. The build never emits .js for
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// src/lib/cli-helper/, so tsx handles the .ts → .js resolution at runtime.
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await import("tsx/esm");
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await import("../open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts");
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const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
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const __dirname = dirname(__filename);
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const ROOT = join(__dirname, "..");
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// MCP stdio transport uses stdout exclusively for JSON-RPC messages.
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// Redirect console.log/warn to stderr early (before loadEnvFile and DB init)
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// so no startup output corrupts the protocol.
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if (process.argv.includes("--mcp")) {
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const { Console } = await import("node:console");
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const stderrConsole = new Console({ stdout: process.stderr, stderr: process.stderr });
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console.log = stderrConsole.log.bind(stderrConsole);
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console.warn = stderrConsole.warn.bind(stderrConsole);
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}
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function loadEnvFile() {
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const envPaths = [];
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if (process.env.DATA_DIR) {
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envPaths.push(join(process.env.DATA_DIR, ".env"));
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|
}
|
|
|
|
const home = homedir();
|
|
if (home) {
|
|
if (platform() === "win32") {
|
|
const appData = process.env.APPDATA || join(home, "AppData", "Roaming");
|
|
envPaths.push(join(appData, "omniroute", ".env"));
|
|
} else {
|
|
envPaths.push(join(home, ".omniroute", ".env"));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
envPaths.push(join(process.cwd(), ".env"));
|
|
// Skip the repo-checkout .env when explicitly requested (used by isolation tests
|
|
// that need a deterministic environment without the development repo's defaults).
|
|
if (process.env.OMNIROUTE_CLI_SKIP_REPO_ENV !== "1") {
|
|
envPaths.push(join(ROOT, ".env"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const envPath of envPaths) {
|
|
try {
|
|
if (existsSync(envPath)) {
|
|
const content = readFileSync(envPath, "utf-8");
|
|
for (const line of content.split("\n")) {
|
|
const trimmed = line.trim();
|
|
if (!trimmed || trimmed.startsWith("#")) continue;
|
|
const eqIdx = trimmed.indexOf("=");
|
|
if (eqIdx > 0) {
|
|
const key = trimmed.slice(0, eqIdx).trim();
|
|
const value = trimmed.slice(eqIdx + 1).trim();
|
|
if (process.env[key] === undefined) {
|
|
process.env[key] = value.replace(/^["']|["']$/g, "");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
console.log(` \x1b[2m📋 Loaded env from ${envPath}\x1b[0m`);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// Ignore errors reading env files.
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
loadEnvFile();
|
|
|
|
// Generate STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY if not set (persisted to ~/.omniroute/.env)
|
|
// This ensures the key survives across upgrades and is not regenerated on each install.
|
|
// See: https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/issues/1622
|
|
{
|
|
const { randomBytes } = await import("node:crypto");
|
|
const { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } = await import("node:fs");
|
|
const { join } = await import("node:path");
|
|
const { homedir } = await import("node:os");
|
|
|
|
if (!process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY) {
|
|
// Persist the key into DATA_DIR when set — that's the directory mounted as a volume in
|
|
// Docker (where storage.sqlite lives), so the key survives `docker down` / `docker pull`.
|
|
// Writing only to ~/.omniroute (the container home, not a volume) silently lost the key on
|
|
// container recreation, leaving the persisted encrypted DB undecryptable (regression of #1622).
|
|
const dataDir = process.env.DATA_DIR || join(homedir(), ".omniroute");
|
|
const envPath = join(dataDir, ".env");
|
|
const dbPath = join(dataDir, "storage.sqlite");
|
|
|
|
// Safety guard: never auto-generate a fresh key when a database already exists in
|
|
// DATA_DIR. A new key cannot decrypt previously-encrypted credentials and would lock the
|
|
// user out (then the encryption layer aborts on every read). Mirrors bootstrapEnv's
|
|
// hasEncryptedCredentials guard. Restoring the previous key in DATA_DIR/.env recovers it.
|
|
// (#1622 follow-up — reported by Daniel Nach; original persistence by @Chewji9875)
|
|
if (existsSync(dbPath)) {
|
|
console.warn(
|
|
` \x1b[33m⚠ STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set but a database already exists at\x1b[0m\n` +
|
|
` \x1b[33m ${dbPath}\x1b[0m\n` +
|
|
` \x1b[33m Not auto-generating a new key — it could not decrypt existing data. Restore your\x1b[0m\n` +
|
|
` \x1b[33m previous key in ${envPath}, or move/remove the database to start fresh.\x1b[0m`
|
|
);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// First run (no database yet) — generate and persist a fresh key.
|
|
if (!existsSync(dataDir)) {
|
|
mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const key = randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
|
|
|
|
// Read existing .env content or start fresh
|
|
let content = "";
|
|
if (existsSync(envPath)) {
|
|
content = readFileSync(envPath, "utf-8");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Append key if not already present
|
|
if (!content.includes("STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=")) {
|
|
const separator = content.trim() ? "\n" : "";
|
|
const newContent = content.trimEnd() + separator + `STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=${key}`;
|
|
writeFileSync(envPath, newContent + "\n", "utf-8");
|
|
console.log(` \x1b[2m✨ Generated STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY in ${envPath}\x1b[0m`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set in process.env for immediate use
|
|
process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = key;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply --lang before Commander parses (program descriptions call t() during setup)
|
|
{
|
|
const langIdx = process.argv.findIndex((a) => a === "--lang");
|
|
const langArg = langIdx >= 0 ? process.argv[langIdx + 1] : null;
|
|
const langEnv = process.env.OMNIROUTE_LANG;
|
|
const chosen = langArg || langEnv;
|
|
if (chosen) {
|
|
const { setLocale } = await import(
|
|
pathToFileURL(join(ROOT, "bin", "cli", "i18n.mjs")).href
|
|
);
|
|
setLocale(chosen);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Register update notifier — checks npm once per 24h, notifies on exit via stderr.
|
|
const _pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(ROOT, "package.json"), "utf8"));
|
|
const _notifier = updateNotifier({ pkg: _pkg, updateCheckInterval: 1000 * 60 * 60 * 24 });
|
|
process.on("exit", () => {
|
|
if (process.env.OMNIROUTE_NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER) return;
|
|
if (process.env.CI) return;
|
|
if (process.argv.includes("--quiet") || process.argv.includes("-q")) return;
|
|
const outputIdx = process.argv.indexOf("--output");
|
|
const outputVal = outputIdx >= 0 ? process.argv[outputIdx + 1] : null;
|
|
if (outputVal === "json" || outputVal === "jsonl" || outputVal === "csv") return;
|
|
if (process.argv.some((a) => a.startsWith("--output=json") || a.startsWith("--output=jsonl") || a.startsWith("--output=csv"))) return;
|
|
if (_notifier.update) {
|
|
_notifier.notify({
|
|
defer: false,
|
|
isGlobal: true,
|
|
message:
|
|
`Update available: ${_notifier.update.current} → ${_notifier.update.latest}\n` +
|
|
"Run `npm install -g omniroute` or `omniroute update --apply`",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (process.argv.includes("--mcp")) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const { startMcpCli } = await import(pathToFileURL(join(ROOT, "bin", "mcp-server.mjs")).href);
|
|
await startMcpCli(ROOT);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
console.error("\x1b[31m✖ Failed to start MCP server:\x1b[0m", err.message || err);
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
process.exit(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (process.argv.includes("reset-encrypted-columns")) {
|
|
const { runResetEncryptedColumns } = await import(
|
|
pathToFileURL(join(ROOT, "bin", "cli", "commands", "reset-encrypted-columns.mjs")).href
|
|
);
|
|
const exitCode = await runResetEncryptedColumns(process.argv.slice(2));
|
|
process.exit(exitCode ?? 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const { createProgram } = await import(
|
|
pathToFileURL(join(ROOT, "bin", "cli", "program.mjs")).href
|
|
);
|
|
const program = createProgram();
|
|
await program.parseAsync(process.argv);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
if (err.exitCode !== undefined) process.exit(err.exitCode);
|
|
console.error("\x1b[31m✖", err.message, "\x1b[0m");
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|