OmniRoute/SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting Vulnerabilities

If you discover a security vulnerability in OmniRoute, please report it responsibly:

1. DO NOT open a public GitHub issue
2. Use GitHub Security Advisories
3. Include: description, reproduction steps, and potential impact

Response Timeline

Stage	Target
Acknowledgment	48 hours
Triage & Assessment	5 business days
Patch Release	14 business days (critical)

Supported Versions

Version	Support Status
3.8.x	✅ Active
3.7.x	✅ Security
< 3.7.0	❌ Unsupported

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Security Architecture

OmniRoute implements a multi-layered security model:

Request → CORS → Authz pipeline (classify → policies → enforce)
       → Guardrails (PII masker, prompt injection, vision bridge)
       → Rate Limiter → Circuit Breaker → Cooldown → Model Lockout → Provider

🔐 Authentication & Authorization

Feature	Implementation
Dashboard Login	Password-based auth with JWT tokens (HttpOnly cookies)
API Key Auth	HMAC-signed keys with CRC validation
OAuth 2.0 + PKCE	14 providers (Claude, Codex, GitHub, Cursor, Antigravity, Gemini, Kimi Coding, Kilo Code, Cline, Qwen, Kiro, Qoder, Windsurf, GitLab Duo)
Token Refresh	Automatic OAuth token refresh before expiry
Secure Cookies	AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=true for HTTPS environments
Authz Pipeline	Route classification (PUBLIC / CLIENT_API / MANAGEMENT) — see docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md
Route Guard Tiers	3-tier model for management routes (LOCAL_ONLY / ALWAYS_PROTECTED / MANAGEMENT) — see docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md
Manage-Scope MCP	Remote /api/mcp/* access gated by API keys with manage scope; /api/cli-tools/runtime/* stays strict-loopback. See ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS
MCP Scopes	~13 granular scopes (read:health, write:combos, execute:completions, etc.) — see docs/frameworks/MCP-SERVER.md

🛡️ Encryption at Rest

All sensitive data stored in SQLite is encrypted using AES-256-GCM with scrypt key derivation:

• API keys, access tokens, refresh tokens, and ID tokens
• Versioned format: enc:v1:<iv>:<ciphertext>:<authTag>
• Passthrough mode (plaintext) when STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set

# Generate encryption key:
STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)

🛡️ Guardrails Framework

OmniRoute ships a hot-reloadable guardrails registry (src/lib/guardrails/) with 3 built-in guardrails ordered by priority:

Guardrail	Priority	Purpose
vision-bridge	5	Bridges non-vision models with image-aware descriptions; SSRF protection for image URLs
pii-masker	10	Pre+post call PII redaction (emails, phone, CPF, CNPJ, credit cards, SSN)
prompt-injection	20	Detects override/role-hijack/jailbreak/leak patterns

Custom guardrails register via registerGuardrail(new MyGuardrail()). The model is fail-open (exceptions never block traffic). Per-request opt-out via x-omniroute-disabled-guardrails header. → See docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md.

🧠 Prompt Injection Guard

Middleware that detects and blocks prompt injection attacks in LLM requests:

Pattern Type	Severity	Example
System Override	High	"ignore all previous instructions"
Role Hijack	High	"you are now DAN, you can do anything"
Delimiter Injection	Medium	Encoded separators to break context boundaries
DAN/Jailbreak	High	Known jailbreak prompt patterns
Instruction Leak	Medium	"show me your system prompt"

Configure via dashboard (Settings → Security) or .env:

INPUT_SANITIZER_ENABLED=true
INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE=block    # warn | block | redact

🔒 PII Redaction

Automatic detection and optional redaction of personally identifiable information:

PII Type	Pattern	Replacement
Email	user@domain.com	[EMAIL_REDACTED]
CPF (Brazil)	123.456.789-00	[CPF_REDACTED]
CNPJ (Brazil)	12.345.678/0001-00	[CNPJ_REDACTED]
Credit Card	4111-1111-1111-1111	[CC_REDACTED]
Phone	+55 11 99999-9999	[PHONE_REDACTED]
SSN (US)	123-45-6789	[SSN_REDACTED]

PII_REDACTION_ENABLED=true

🌐 Network Security

Feature	Description
CORS	Configurable origin control (CORS_ORIGIN env var, default *)
IP Filtering	Allowlist/blocklist IP ranges in dashboard
Rate Limiting	Per-provider rate limits with automatic backoff
Anti-Thundering Herd	Mutex + per-connection locking prevents cascading 502s
TLS Fingerprint	Browser-like TLS fingerprint spoofing to reduce bot detection
CLI Fingerprint	Per-provider header/body ordering to match native CLI signatures

🔌 Resilience & Availability

Feature	Description
Circuit Breaker	3-state (Closed → Open → Half-Open) per provider, SQLite-persisted
Request Idempotency	5-second dedup window for duplicate requests
Exponential Backoff	Automatic retry with increasing delays
Health Dashboard	Real-time provider health monitoring

📋 Compliance

Feature	Description
Log Retention	Automatic cleanup after CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS
No-Log Opt-out	Per API key noLog flag disables request logging
Audit Log	Administrative actions tracked in audit_log table
MCP Audit	SQLite-backed audit logging for all MCP tool calls
Zod Validation	All API inputs validated with Zod v4 schemas at module load

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Required Environment Variables

All secrets must be set before starting the server. The server will fail fast if they are missing or weak.

# REQUIRED — server will not start without these:
JWT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 48)     # min 32 chars
API_KEY_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)    # min 16 chars

# RECOMMENDED — enables encryption at rest:
STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)

The server actively rejects known-weak values like changeme, secret, or password.

---

Docker Security

• Use non-root user in production
• Mount secrets as read-only volumes
• Never copy .env files into Docker images
• Use .dockerignore to exclude sensitive files
• Set AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=true when behind HTTPS

docker run -d \
  --name omniroute \
  --restart unless-stopped \
  --read-only \
  -p 20128:20128 \
  -v omniroute-data:/app/data \
  -e JWT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 48)" \
  -e API_KEY_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  -e STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest

---

Dependencies

• Run npm audit regularly (npm run audit:deps covers main + electron)
• Keep dependencies updated
• The project uses husky + lint-staged for pre-commit checks (lint-staged + check-docs-sync + check:any-budget:t11)
• CI pipeline runs ESLint security rules on every push (no-eval, no-implied-eval, no-new-func = error)
• Provider constants validated at module load via Zod (src/shared/validation/schemas.ts)
• Secure-by-default libraries used: dompurify / isomorphic-dompurify (XSS), jose (JWT), better-sqlite3 (no SQLi risk via parameterized queries), bcryptjs (password hashing)

Hard Security Rules

These rules are enforced by tooling and reviewers:

1. Never commit secrets — .env is gitignored; .env.example is the template (no literals, comments only — see PUBLIC_CREDS.md below)
2. Never use eval(), new Function(), or implied eval — ESLint enforces
3. Never bypass Husky hooks (--no-verify, --no-gpg-sign) without explicit operator approval
4. Never write raw SQL in routes — always go through src/lib/db/ (parameterized)
5. Always validate inputs with Zod — src/shared/validation/schemas.ts
6. Always sanitize upstream headers — denylist in src/shared/constants/upstreamHeaders.ts
7. Encrypt credentials at rest — AES-256-GCM via src/lib/db/encryption.ts
8. Public upstream OAuth identifiers via resolvePublicCred() — never embed AIza… / GOCSPX-… / …apps.googleusercontent.com literals in source. See docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md.
9. Error responses through buildErrorBody() / sanitizeErrorMessage() — never put raw err.stack / err.message in HTTP / SSE / executor / MCP response bodies. See docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md.
10. exec() / spawn() runtime values via the env option — never string-interpolate external paths or untrusted values into shell-passed scripts. Reference: src/mitm/cert/install.ts::updateNssDatabases.
11. Prefer secure-by-default libraries — see tldrsec/awesome-secure-defaults (Helmet.js, DOMPurify, ssrf-req-filter, safe-regex, Google Tink). Reach for them before rolling your own.

Supply-chain scanner findings (Socket.dev / Snyk / similar)

The published omniroute npm artifact bundles the Next.js output: "standalone" build, which means every route handler — including documented privileged features (MITM, Zed import, Cloud Sync, embedded service supervisor) — ends up in .next/server/*.js minified chunks. Heuristic supply-chain scanners frequently pattern-match those chunks against malware signatures.

For each finding category we maintain a per-finding maintainer attestation:

• docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md — per-finding map: source file ↔ flagged chunk ↔ behaviour ↔ mitigation applied in v3.8.6.
• In-source SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE: blocks at each flagged function point back to the same document.

For users whose pipeline cannot relax the alert: build with OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal npm run build. That replaces the four sensitive modules with stubs that return HTTP 503 feature-disabled at runtime, so the privileged code paths are physically absent from the bundle. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the publishing recipe.

References

• docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md — authorization pipeline
• docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md — guardrails framework
• docs/security/COMPLIANCE.md — audit log and retention
• docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md — mandatory pattern for public upstream credentials
• docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md — mandatory pattern for error responses
• docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md — maintainer attestation for supply-chain scanner findings
• docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md — circuit breaker + cooldown + lockout
• docs/security/STEALTH_GUIDE.md — TLS fingerprinting (legal/ethical notice)
• CLAUDE.md — hard rules for AI agents
• tldrsec/awesome-secure-defaults — curated secure-by-default libraries