Files
3x-ui/internal/mtproto/manager_test.go
T
MHSanaei b177b98ce8 feat(mtproto): expose mtg-multi's per-IP pending-handshake limit
mtg-multi v1.16.0 adds [defense.pending-handshakes] max-per-ip, which
closes new connections from an IP already holding that many
unauthenticated handshakes, so one address cannot pin the workers other
clients need. The MTProto inbound form now carries it as
pendingHandshakesMaxPerIp; the key is written only when set above 0, so
existing inbounds render a byte-identical config and are not restarted.
A change to it moves the structural fingerprint and restarts the sidecar.

dry-run is left out on purpose: it only feeds the pending_handshake_limit
Prometheus metric, which the panel does not surface. The hint warns that
clients behind carrier NAT share the limit.
2026-10-14 16:46:20 +02:00

317 lines
13 KiB
Go

package mtproto
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
)
func TestInstanceFromInbound(t *testing.T) {
aliceSecret := "ee0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef6578616d706c652e636f6d"
ib := &model.Inbound{
Id: 3,
Tag: "inbound-3",
Listen: "0.0.0.0",
Port: 8443,
Protocol: model.MTProto,
Settings: `{"fakeTlsDomain":"example.com",` +
`"debug":true,"proxyProtocolListener":true,"preferIp":"prefer-ipv4",` +
`"domainFronting":{"ip":"127.0.0.1","port":9443,"proxyProtocol":true},` +
`"throttleMaxConnections":5000,"pendingHandshakesMaxPerIp":64,` +
`"routeThroughXray":true,"routeXrayPort":50000,` +
`"adTag":" 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef ",` +
`"clients":[` +
`{"email":"alice","secret":"` + aliceSecret + `","adTag":"fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210","enable":true,"totalGB":1073741824,"expiryTime":1893456000000},` +
`{"email":"bob","secret":"","enable":true},` +
`{"email":"carol","secret":"eeaa","enable":false}]}`,
}
inst, ok := InstanceFromInbound(ib)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected a usable instance")
}
if len(inst.Secrets) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("only the enabled client with a secret should be served, got %d: %+v", len(inst.Secrets), inst.Secrets)
}
if inst.Secrets[0].Name != "alice" {
t.Fatalf("secret name should be the client email, got %q", inst.Secrets[0].Name)
}
if inst.Secrets[0].Secret != aliceSecret {
t.Fatalf("a valid secret must be preserved, got %q", inst.Secrets[0].Secret)
}
if inst.Secrets[0].AdTag != "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210" {
t.Fatalf("the client ad-tag must be parsed, got %q", inst.Secrets[0].AdTag)
}
if inst.Secrets[0].QuotaBytes != 1073741824 {
t.Fatalf("totalGB must map to the byte quota, got %d", inst.Secrets[0].QuotaBytes)
}
if inst.Secrets[0].ExpiresUnix != 1893456000 {
t.Fatalf("expiryTime (ms) must map to a unix-second deadline, got %d", inst.Secrets[0].ExpiresUnix)
}
if inst.Port != 8443 || inst.Id != 3 {
t.Fatalf("bad instance %+v", inst)
}
if !inst.Debug || !inst.ProxyProtocolListener || inst.PreferIP != "prefer-ipv4" {
t.Fatalf("scalar options not parsed: %+v", inst)
}
if inst.FrontingIP != "127.0.0.1" || inst.FrontingPort != 9443 || !inst.FrontingProxyProtocol {
t.Fatalf("domain-fronting not parsed: %+v", inst)
}
if inst.ThrottleMaxConnections != 5000 {
t.Fatalf("throttle not parsed: %+v", inst)
}
if inst.PendingHandshakesMaxPerIP != 64 {
t.Fatalf("pending-handshake limit not parsed: %+v", inst)
}
if !inst.RouteThroughXray || inst.XrayRoutePort != 50000 {
t.Fatalf("xray routing not parsed: %+v", inst)
}
if _, ok := InstanceFromInbound(&model.Inbound{Protocol: model.VLESS}); ok {
t.Fatal("non-mtproto inbound should not produce an instance")
}
noSecrets := &model.Inbound{Protocol: model.MTProto, Settings: `{"clients":[{"email":"x","secret":"","enable":true}]}`}
if _, ok := InstanceFromInbound(noSecrets); ok {
t.Fatal("an inbound with no active secret should not produce an instance")
}
badTags := &model.Inbound{Protocol: model.MTProto, Settings: `{"clients":[{"email":"x","secret":"ee00","adTag":"deadbeef","enable":true}]}`}
badInst, ok := InstanceFromInbound(badTags)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected a usable instance despite a malformed ad tag")
}
if badInst.Secrets[0].AdTag != "" {
t.Fatalf("a malformed ad tag must be dropped so the generated config stays valid, got %q", badInst.Secrets[0].AdTag)
}
}
func TestRenderConfig(t *testing.T) {
// A bare instance emits only the required keys, api-bind-to, and the
// [secrets] section, with no optional keys and no [domain-fronting].
bare := renderConfig(Instance{
Secrets: []SecretEntry{{Name: "alice", Secret: "ee00"}},
Listen: "0.0.0.0", Port: 8443,
}, 5000, "")
for _, unwanted := range []string{"debug", "proxy-protocol-listener", "prefer-ip", "[domain-fronting]", "[stats.prometheus]", "[throttle]", "[defense.pending-handshakes]", "[secret-ad-tags]", "api-token"} {
if strings.Contains(bare, unwanted) {
t.Fatalf("bare config should not contain %q:\n%s", unwanted, bare)
}
}
if !strings.Contains(bare, `bind-to = "0.0.0.0:8443"`) {
t.Fatalf("missing bind-to:\n%s", bare)
}
if !strings.Contains(bare, `api-bind-to = "127.0.0.1:5000"`) {
t.Fatalf("api-bind-to must always be present:\n%s", bare)
}
if !strings.Contains(bare, "[secrets]") || !strings.Contains(bare, `"alice" = "ee00"`) {
t.Fatalf("secrets block must carry the client secret:\n%s", bare)
}
// A fully configured instance emits every option, the fronting section (as
// host, not the fork-deprecated ip), the throttle block, the per-client
// ad-tag overrides, and [secrets] last.
full := renderConfig(Instance{
Secrets: []SecretEntry{
{Name: "alice", Secret: "ee11"},
{Name: "bob", Secret: "ee22", AdTag: "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"},
},
Listen: "0.0.0.0", Port: 443,
Debug: true, ProxyProtocolListener: true, PreferIP: "only-ipv6",
FrontingIP: "127.0.0.1", FrontingPort: 9443, FrontingProxyProtocol: true,
ThrottleMaxConnections: 5000,
PendingHandshakesMaxPerIP: 64,
PublicIPv4: "1.2.3.4",
PublicIPv6: "2001:db8::1",
}, 6000, "sesame")
for _, want := range []string{
"debug = true\n",
"proxy-protocol-listener = true\n",
`prefer-ip = "only-ipv6"`,
`api-token = "sesame"`,
`public-ipv4 = "1.2.3.4"`,
`public-ipv6 = "2001:db8::1"`,
"[domain-fronting]",
`host = "127.0.0.1"`,
"port = 9443",
"proxy-protocol = true\n",
"[throttle]",
"max-connections = 5000",
"[defense.pending-handshakes]\nmax-per-ip = 64\n",
"[secret-ad-tags]",
`"bob" = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"`,
} {
if !strings.Contains(full, want) {
t.Fatalf("full config missing %q:\n%s", want, full)
}
}
if strings.Contains(full, `ip = "127.0.0.1"`) {
t.Fatalf("domain-fronting must use host, not the deprecated ip key:\n%s", full)
}
if strings.Contains(full, "ad-tag =") {
t.Fatalf("no global ad-tag must be emitted, tags are per client:\n%s", full)
}
if strings.Contains(full, `"alice" = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"`) || strings.Contains(full, `"alice" = ""`) {
t.Fatalf("a client without a tag must not appear in [secret-ad-tags]:\n%s", full)
}
// TOML requires top-level keys before any [section] header, and [secrets]
// must be the final section so trailing keys are not swallowed by a table.
if strings.Index(full, "prefer-ip") > strings.Index(full, "[domain-fronting]") {
t.Fatalf("top-level keys must precede the [domain-fronting] section:\n%s", full)
}
if strings.LastIndex(full, "[secrets]") < strings.Index(full, "[domain-fronting]") {
t.Fatalf("[secrets] must be the final section:\n%s", full)
}
if strings.LastIndex(full, "[secrets]") < strings.Index(full, "[throttle]") {
t.Fatalf("[throttle] must precede [secrets]:\n%s", full)
}
if strings.LastIndex(full, "[secrets]") < strings.Index(full, "[defense.pending-handshakes]") {
t.Fatalf("[defense.pending-handshakes] must precede [secrets]:\n%s", full)
}
if strings.LastIndex(full, "[secrets]") < strings.Index(full, "[secret-ad-tags]") {
t.Fatalf("[secret-ad-tags] must precede [secrets]:\n%s", full)
}
}
func TestRenderConfigXrayEgress(t *testing.T) {
// Routing through Xray emits a [network] proxies upstream pointing at the
// loopback SOCKS bridge, before the [secrets] section.
routed := renderConfig(Instance{
Secrets: []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee22"}},
Listen: "0.0.0.0", Port: 443,
RouteThroughXray: true, XrayRoutePort: 50000,
}, 7000, "")
if !strings.Contains(routed, "[network]") ||
!strings.Contains(routed, `proxies = ["socks5://127.0.0.1:50000"]`) {
t.Fatalf("routed config must emit the SOCKS upstream:\n%s", routed)
}
if strings.Index(routed, "[network]") > strings.Index(routed, "[secrets]") {
t.Fatalf("[network] must precede [secrets]:\n%s", routed)
}
// Without the flag (or without a port) the section is omitted.
for _, inst := range []Instance{
{Secrets: []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee"}}, Listen: "0.0.0.0", Port: 443},
{Secrets: []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee"}}, Listen: "0.0.0.0", Port: 443, RouteThroughXray: true},
} {
if got := renderConfig(inst, 7000, ""); strings.Contains(got, "[network]") {
t.Fatalf("unrouted config must omit [network]:\n%s", got)
}
}
}
func TestRenderConfigSecretLimits(t *testing.T) {
cfg := renderConfig(Instance{
Secrets: []SecretEntry{
{Name: "alice", Secret: "ee11", QuotaBytes: 1073741824, ExpiresUnix: 1893456000},
{Name: "bob", Secret: "ee22", QuotaBytes: 500},
{Name: "carol", Secret: "ee33"},
},
Listen: "0.0.0.0", Port: 443,
}, 6000, "")
for _, want := range []string{
"[secret-limits.\"alice\"]",
`quota = "1073741824B"`,
`expires = "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z"`,
"[secret-limits.\"bob\"]",
`quota = "500B"`,
} {
if !strings.Contains(cfg, want) {
t.Fatalf("limits config missing %q:\n%s", want, cfg)
}
}
if strings.Contains(cfg, "[secret-limits.\"carol\"]") {
t.Fatalf("a client without a limit must not get a table:\n%s", cfg)
}
if strings.LastIndex(cfg, "[secrets]") < strings.Index(cfg, "[secret-limits.\"alice\"]") {
t.Fatalf("[secret-limits] must precede the final [secrets] section:\n%s", cfg)
}
if strings.Contains(cfg, "usage-state-file") {
t.Fatalf("no usage-state-file must be emitted; quota is an in-memory guard:\n%s", cfg)
}
}
func TestSecretsPayloadLimits(t *testing.T) {
body := secretsPayload(Instance{Secrets: []SecretEntry{
{Name: "alice", Secret: "ee11", QuotaBytes: 1073741824, ExpiresUnix: 1893456000},
{Name: "bob", Secret: "ee22"},
}})
if got := body.Secrets["alice"].Quota; got != "1073741824B" {
t.Fatalf("quota must be sent as an exact byte count, got %q", got)
}
if got := body.Secrets["alice"].Expires; got != "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z" {
t.Fatalf("expiry must be sent as RFC3339, got %q", got)
}
if body.Secrets["bob"].Quota != "" || body.Secrets["bob"].Expires != "" {
t.Fatalf("an unlimited client must carry no quota/expiry: %+v", body.Secrets["bob"])
}
}
func TestFingerprintSplit(t *testing.T) {
base := Instance{Secrets: []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee"}}, Listen: "0.0.0.0", Port: 443}
for name, mutate := range map[string]func(*Instance){
"debug": func(i *Instance) { i.Debug = true },
"listener": func(i *Instance) { i.ProxyProtocolListener = true },
"preferIp": func(i *Instance) { i.PreferIP = "only-ipv4" },
"frontingIP": func(i *Instance) { i.FrontingIP = "127.0.0.1" },
"frontingPort": func(i *Instance) { i.FrontingPort = 9443 },
"frontingProxy": func(i *Instance) { i.FrontingProxyProtocol = true },
"throttle": func(i *Instance) { i.ThrottleMaxConnections = 5000 },
"pendingHandshakes": func(i *Instance) { i.PendingHandshakesMaxPerIP = 64 },
"routeXray": func(i *Instance) { i.RouteThroughXray = true },
"routeXrayPort": func(i *Instance) { i.XrayRoutePort = 50000 },
"port": func(i *Instance) { i.Port = 8443 },
"listen": func(i *Instance) { i.Listen = "127.0.0.1" },
"publicIpv4": func(i *Instance) { i.PublicIPv4 = "1.2.3.4" },
"publicIpv6": func(i *Instance) { i.PublicIPv6 = "2001:db8::1" },
} {
t.Run("structural/"+name, func(t *testing.T) {
changed := base
mutate(&changed)
if base.structuralFingerprint() == changed.structuralFingerprint() {
t.Fatalf("structural fingerprint must change when %s changes", name)
}
if base.secretsFingerprint() != changed.secretsFingerprint() {
t.Fatalf("secrets fingerprint must stay put when %s changes", name)
}
})
}
for name, mutate := range map[string]func(*Instance){
"add": func(i *Instance) { i.Secrets = append(i.Secrets, SecretEntry{Name: "b", Secret: "ff"}) },
"rekey": func(i *Instance) { i.Secrets = []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee99"}} },
"remove": func(i *Instance) { i.Secrets = nil },
"rename": func(i *Instance) { i.Secrets = []SecretEntry{{Name: "a2", Secret: "ee"}} },
"clientAdTag": func(i *Instance) {
i.Secrets = []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee", AdTag: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"}}
},
"quota": func(i *Instance) { i.Secrets = []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee", QuotaBytes: 1 << 30}} },
"expiry": func(i *Instance) { i.Secrets = []SecretEntry{{Name: "a", Secret: "ee", ExpiresUnix: 1893456000}} },
} {
t.Run("secrets/"+name, func(t *testing.T) {
changed := base
changed.Secrets = append([]SecretEntry(nil), base.Secrets...)
mutate(&changed)
if base.secretsFingerprint() == changed.secretsFingerprint() {
t.Fatalf("secrets fingerprint must change on a %s", name)
}
if base.structuralFingerprint() != changed.structuralFingerprint() {
t.Fatalf("structural fingerprint must stay put on a %s", name)
}
})
}
t.Run("orderInsensitive", func(t *testing.T) {
forward := Instance{Secrets: []SecretEntry{{Name: "alice", Secret: "ee11"}, {Name: "bob", Secret: "ee22"}}}
reversed := Instance{Secrets: []SecretEntry{{Name: "bob", Secret: "ee22"}, {Name: "alice", Secret: "ee11"}}}
if got, want := forward.secretsFingerprint(), "alice=ee11;tag=;q=0;exp=0|bob=ee22;tag=;q=0;exp=0"; got != want {
t.Fatalf("secrets fingerprint must join sorted pairs: got %q, want %q", got, want)
}
if forward.secretsFingerprint() != reversed.secretsFingerprint() {
t.Fatal("secrets fingerprint must not depend on client order")
}
})
}