fix(auth): IP blacklist now blocks on direct connections via trusted peer stamp and re-reads config without restart (#9033) (#9385)

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>

changelog.d/fixes/9033-fix.plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+- fix(auth): IP blacklist now blocks on direct connections via trusted peer stamp and re-reads config without restart (#9033)

open-sse/services/ipFilter.ts

@@ -22,15 +22,16 @@ let _config = {
 // lazily loaded on first access. better-sqlite3 is synchronous, so both the load
 // and the save stay in the sync hot path without extra startup wiring. tempBans
 // are intentionally NOT persisted — they are ephemeral, TTL-swept runtime state.
+//
+// D2 (#9033): the _loaded one-shot gate was removed so a config persisted by the
+// dashboard settings route (a separate module instance, since @omniroute/open-sse
+// is bundled per-entry via transpilePackages) propagates to the proxy runtime
+// without a restart. A DB failure still degrades to the in-memory defaults, and
+// tempBans remain in-memory-only as before.
 const IP_FILTER_NAMESPACE = "ipFilter";
 const IP_FILTER_KEY = "config";
-let _loaded = false;
 
 function ensureLoaded() {
-  if (_loaded) return;
-  // Mark loaded up-front so a DB failure (build phase / cloud / migration not yet
-  // run) degrades to in-memory only instead of retrying on every request.
-  _loaded = true;
   try {
     const row = getDbInstance()
       .prepare("SELECT value FROM key_value WHERE namespace = ? AND key = ?")
@@ -235,9 +236,17 @@ export function createIPFilterMiddleware() {
 
 /**
  * For Next.js App Router — check IP from request object
+ *
+ * D1 (#9033): accepts an optional trustedPeerIp (resolved from the authenticated
+ * peer stamp, available on direct connections where the proxy runtime has no
+ * socket). When provided, it is checked FIRST before falling through to the
+ * forwarding headers, so a blacklisted IP on a direct connection (no XFF, no
+ * socket) is blocked. When behind a reverse proxy (via-proxy marker set), the
+ * caller passes null so the XFF path continues to work.
  */
-export function checkRequestIP(request) {
+export function checkRequestIP(request, trustedPeerIp) {
   const ip =
+    pickFirstValidIp(trustedPeerIp || null) ||
     pickFirstValidIp(request.headers?.get?.("cf-connecting-ip")) ||
     pickFirstValidIp(request.headers?.get?.("x-forwarded-for")) ||
     pickFirstValidIp(request.headers?.get?.("x-real-ip")) ||
@@ -329,7 +338,6 @@ function extractClientIP(req) {
  * Reset config (for testing)
  */
 export function resetIPFilter() {
-  _loaded = false;
   _config = {
     enabled: false,
     mode: "blacklist",

src/server/authz/pipeline.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,11 @@ import { applyCorsHeaders } from "../cors/origins";
 import { validateBrowserMutationOrigin } from "../origin/publicOrigin";
 import { classifyRoute } from "./classify";
 import { validateDashboardCsrfToken } from "./csrf";
-import { classifyStampedPeerLocality } from "./peerStamp";
+import {
+  classifyStampedPeerLocality,
+  resolveStampedPeer,
+  resolveStampedViaProxy,
+} from "./peerStamp";
 import { checkRequestIP } from "@omniroute/open-sse/services/ipFilter.ts";
 import { clientApiPolicy } from "./policies/clientApi";
 import { managementPolicy } from "./policies/management";
@@ -347,8 +351,23 @@ export async function runAuthzPipeline(
   // external surface. Loopback is exempt so the local operator can never lock
   // themselves out of the dashboard (they can always fix the list from
   // localhost). checkIP is a no-op when the filter is disabled.
+  //
+  // D1 (#9033): on a direct connection the proxy runtime has no socket, so
+  // checkRequestIP reads only forwarding headers + undefined request.ip and
+  // falls to "unknown", never blocking the blacklisted client. Resolve the
+  // trusted peer IP from the authenticated stamp and pass it to checkRequestIP,
+  // but only when NOT behind a reverse proxy (the via-proxy marker means the
+  // peer IP is the proxy hop, e.g. 127.0.0.1, and the real client is in XFF).
   if (peerLocality !== "loopback") {
-    const ipVerdict = checkRequestIP(request);
+    const trustedPeerIp = resolveStampedPeer(
+      request.headers.get(PEER_IP_HEADER),
+      process.env.OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN
+    );
+    const viaProxy = resolveStampedViaProxy(
+      request.headers.get(VIA_PROXY_HEADER),
+      process.env.OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN
+    );
+    const ipVerdict = checkRequestIP(request, viaProxy ? null : trustedPeerIp);
     if (!ipVerdict.allowed) {
       const blocked = NextResponse.json(
         { error: ipVerdict.reason || "Access denied" },

src/shared/validation/schemas/misc.ts

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ export const resetStatsActionSchema = z.object({
   action: z.literal("reset-stats"),
 });
 
-export const ipFilterModeSchema = z.enum(["blacklist", "whitelist"]);
+export const ipFilterModeSchema = z.enum(["blacklist", "whitelist", "whitelist-priority"]);
 
 export const tempBanSchema = z.object({
   ip: z.string().trim().min(1),

tests/unit/authz/probe-9033-repro.test.ts

@@ -55,11 +55,7 @@ test("D1: blacklisted IP is blocked on a DIRECT connection (trusted peer stamp,
     { enforce: true }
   );
 
-  assert.equal(
-    res.status,
-    403,
-    `direct blacklisted IP must be blocked, got status=${res.status}`
-  );
+  assert.equal(res.status, 403, `direct blacklisted IP must be blocked, got status=${res.status}`);
 });
 
 test("D2: persisted config written after first load is honored WITHOUT restart", async () => {
@@ -74,9 +70,7 @@ test("D2: persisted config written after first load is honored WITHOUT restart",
   // Now simulate a "settings route" write: write directly to the DB key_value table
   // with a DIFFERENT config (e.g. empty blacklist, effectively "allow all").
   const db = core.getDbInstance();
-  db.prepare(
-    "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO key_value (namespace, key, value) VALUES (?, ?, ?)"
-  ).run(
+  db.prepare("INSERT OR REPLACE INTO key_value (namespace, key, value) VALUES (?, ?, ?)").run(
     "ipFilter",
     "config",
     JSON.stringify({ enabled: true, mode: "blacklist", blacklist: [], whitelist: [] })
@@ -116,13 +110,11 @@ test("D3: behind reverse proxy (peer stamp=loopback + via-proxy marker + XFF=bla
 });
 
 test("Bonus: ipFilterModeSchema accepts whitelist-priority", async () => {
-  const { ipFilterModeSchema } = await import(
-    "../../../src/shared/validation/schemas/misc.ts"
-  );
+  const { ipFilterModeSchema } = await import("../../../src/shared/validation/schemas/misc.ts");
   const result = ipFilterModeSchema.safeParse("whitelist-priority");
   assert.equal(
     result.success,
     true,
     `ipFilterModeSchema must accept "whitelist-priority", got: ${JSON.stringify(result)}`
   );
-});
+});