fix(security): pin the public-only guard on client-supplied image URLs (#13748)

GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9. `fetchRemoteImage()` defaults to
`getProviderOutboundGuard()` — the OPERATOR outbound policy, local-first by
design so self-hosted providers on loopback/LAN keep working. Since #11062 added
the `block-metadata` middle tier, a default install resolves to that mode: the
string check only rejects 169.254/16 and the IMDS hostnames, and the DNS
validation step is skipped entirely (it only runs under `public-only`).

Three sinks feed that default with CALLER input, so a request body could make
the server fetch `http://127.0.0.1:…` or any RFC-1918 host and forward the bytes
upstream:

- imageGeneration.ts `resolveImageSource()` — `image_url`, `mask_url`, message parts
- imageUpscale/shared.ts `resolveUpscaleImageSource()` — 14 body aliases,
  `provider_options.*`, message parts (Stability, Topaz)
- visionBridgeHelpers.ts `fetchRemoteImageAsDataUri()` — chat `image_url` parts
  inlined into the vision self-call

plus the NanoBanana result-URL download, which is upstream-supplied rather than
OmniRoute-controlled.

Same trust confusion as GHSA-3f8g / GHSA-j7j4 on the search base URL: operator
config and caller input must not share a guard. Each site now passes
`guard: "public-only"` (string check + DNS validation of every answer), matching
the siblings that already did it right — embeddings, the audio bridge and the
AI Horde result download.

`pinDns` is set only on the vision bridge. The other three sites use
`globalThis.fetch`, and connection pinning would swap that for a raw undici
fetch — the same reason the AI Horde site leaves it off. On the vision bridge a
`fetchImpl` is injected, so `pinDns` there validates every DNS answer but cannot
pin the connection; commented in place.

Blind SSRF rather than full read: the bytes go upstream or into the vision
self-call, not back to the caller — but the status oracle and upstream
exfiltration are real.

Tests are red-first — per sink, `http://127.0.0.1:1/x.png` and
`http://192.168.1.50/x.png` are rejected with the injected fetch never called,
and a public host whose DNS resolves to a public IP still downloads.

changelog.d/fixes/ghsa-34rg-image-url-ssrf-public-only.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+- **fix(security):** client-supplied image URLs (`image_url` / `mask_url` / message parts on image generation and upscale, chat `image_url` parts inlined by the vision bridge) and the NanoBanana result download now pin the `public-only` outbound guard with DNS validation, instead of inheriting the operator provider policy — `block-metadata` on a default install let a request body make the server fetch loopback/LAN URLs and forward the bytes upstream (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)

open-sse/handlers/imageGeneration.ts

@@ -2243,7 +2243,15 @@ async function resolveImageSource(source) {
   }
 
   if (isHttpUrl(trimmed)) {
-    const remoteImage = await fetchRemoteImage(trimmed);
+    // GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9: this URL is caller input (`image_url` / `mask_url` / message
+    // parts) — pin `public-only` explicitly (string check + DNS validation of every
+    // resolved answer). Never let it fall back to the operator outbound policy
+    // (`getProviderOutboundGuard()`), which is `block-metadata` on a local-first default
+    // install and would let a request body make the server fetch loopback/LAN URLs and
+    // forward the bytes upstream. `pinDns` stays off on purpose: this handler's only
+    // transport is `globalThis.fetch` (no `fetchImpl` seam) and connection pinning
+    // replaces it with a raw undici fetch — same shape as the AI Horde result download.
+    const remoteImage = await fetchRemoteImage(trimmed, { guard: "public-only" });
     return {
       buffer: remoteImage.buffer,
       base64: remoteImage.buffer.toString("base64"),
@@ -3242,7 +3250,10 @@ async function normalizeNanoBananaTaskResult(taskData, body, log) {
 
     if (urlCandidates.length > 0) {
       const firstUrl = urlCandidates[0];
-      const remoteImage = await fetchRemoteImage(firstUrl);
+      // GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9: upstream-supplied result URL, not an OmniRoute-controlled
+      // host — pin `public-only` exactly like the AI Horde result download does, never
+      // the operator outbound policy (see `resolveImageSource` for why `pinDns` is off).
+      const remoteImage = await fetchRemoteImage(firstUrl, { guard: "public-only" });
       const base64 = remoteImage.buffer.toString("base64");
       return [{ b64_json: base64, revised_prompt: body.prompt }];
     }

open-sse/handlers/imageUpscale/shared.ts

@@ -71,7 +71,9 @@ export function extractUpscaleSourceImage(body: unknown): string | null {
   if (!body || typeof body !== "object") return null;
   const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
   const providerOptions =
-    b.provider_options && typeof b.provider_options === "object" && !Array.isArray(b.provider_options)
+    b.provider_options &&
+    typeof b.provider_options === "object" &&
+    !Array.isArray(b.provider_options)
       ? (b.provider_options as Record<string, unknown>)
       : {};
 
@@ -161,7 +163,15 @@ export async function resolveUpscaleImageSource(source: string): Promise<Upscale
   }
 
   if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(trimmed)) {
-    const remote = await fetchRemoteImage(trimmed);
+    // GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9: `source` is caller input (14 body aliases, `provider_options.*`,
+    // message parts) — pin `public-only` explicitly (string check + DNS validation of
+    // every resolved answer). Never let it fall back to the operator outbound policy
+    // (`block-metadata` on a local-first default install), which would let a request
+    // body make the server fetch loopback/LAN URLs and upload the bytes to the upscale
+    // provider. `pinDns` stays off on purpose: the download transport here is
+    // `globalThis.fetch` and connection pinning replaces it with a raw undici fetch —
+    // same shape as the AI Horde result download in `imageGeneration/providers/aihorde.ts`.
+    const remote = await fetchRemoteImage(trimmed, { guard: "public-only" });
     assertSourceBytes(remote.buffer);
     // fetchRemoteImage falls back to application/octet-stream; sniff whenever the
     // server did not send a usable image/* type so multipart uploads stay correct.
@@ -214,11 +224,7 @@ export function sniffImageMime(buffer: Buffer): string {
  */
 export function readImageDimensions(buffer: Buffer): { width: number; height: number } | null {
   try {
-    if (
-      buffer.length >= 24 &&
-      buffer[0] === 0x89 &&
-      buffer.toString("ascii", 1, 4) === "PNG"
-    ) {
+    if (buffer.length >= 24 && buffer[0] === 0x89 && buffer.toString("ascii", 1, 4) === "PNG") {
       // IHDR is always the first chunk: 8-byte signature + 4 length + 4 "IHDR".
       return { width: buffer.readUInt32BE(16), height: buffer.readUInt32BE(20) };
     }
@@ -308,10 +314,7 @@ export function scaleDimensions(
   const source = readImageDimensions(buffer);
   if (!source || source.width <= 0 || source.height <= 0) return null;
   const safeFactor = Number.isFinite(factor) && factor > 0 ? factor : 2;
-  const scale = Math.min(
-    safeFactor,
-    maxEdge / Math.max(source.width, source.height)
-  );
+  const scale = Math.min(safeFactor, maxEdge / Math.max(source.width, source.height));
   return {
     width: Math.max(1, Math.round(source.width * Math.max(1, scale))),
     height: Math.max(1, Math.round(source.height * Math.max(1, scale))),
@@ -365,9 +368,7 @@ export function saveUpscaleErrorResult(opts: {
     provider: opts.provider,
     duration: Date.now() - opts.startTime,
     error:
-      typeof opts.error === "string"
-        ? opts.error.slice(0, 500)
-        : String(opts.error).slice(0, 500),
+      typeof opts.error === "string" ? opts.error.slice(0, 500) : String(opts.error).slice(0, 500),
     requestBody: opts.requestBody ?? null,
   }).catch(() => {});
 

src/lib/guardrails/visionBridgeHelpers.ts

@@ -309,6 +309,14 @@ async function fetchRemoteImageAsDataUri(
   fetchImpl: typeof fetch = VISION_BRIDGE_UA_FETCH
 ): Promise<string> {
   const remoteImage = await fetchRemoteImage(imageUrl, {
+    // GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9: `imageUrl` is caller input (a chat `image_url` part) — pin
+    // `public-only` explicitly; never the operator outbound policy (`block-metadata` on a
+    // local-first default install), which would let a request body make the server
+    // fetch loopback/LAN URLs and inline the bytes into the vision self-call.
+    guard: "public-only",
+    // `pinDns` is validation-only here: with `fetchImpl` injected the library validates
+    // every DNS answer but cannot pin the connection (it never builds its own fetch).
+    pinDns: true,
     signal,
     // Bypass the runtime's hooked global fetch (ProxyFetch) — a dead local
     // proxy (e.g. 127.0.0.1:8317) would otherwise break the download.

tests/unit/guardrails/vision-bridge-claude-wire.test.ts

@@ -5,11 +5,28 @@
  */
 import test from "node:test";
 import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import dns from "node:dns";
 
-const {
-  isClaudeWireFormatModel,
-  ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire,
-} = await import("../../../src/lib/guardrails/visionBridgeHelpers.ts");
+// Stub DNS for fetchRemoteImage's GHSA-cmhj-wh2f-9cgx DNS-rebinding guard
+// (assertHostnameResolvesPublic in src/shared/network/remoteImageFetch.ts).
+// Since GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9 the vision bridge pins `guard: "public-only"`, so every
+// remote image hostname is resolved before the injected fetch is reached; the
+// example.com hosts below must not depend on real DNS in CI. Node --test runs each
+// file in its own process, so this rebinding does not leak across files.
+const originalDnsLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+(dns.promises as { lookup: unknown }).lookup = (async (
+  _hostname: string,
+  options?: { all?: boolean }
+) => {
+  const record = { address: "203.0.113.1", family: 4 };
+  return options && options.all ? [record] : record;
+}) as typeof dns.promises.lookup;
+process.on("exit", () => {
+  (dns.promises as { lookup: unknown }).lookup = originalDnsLookup;
+});
+
+const { isClaudeWireFormatModel, ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire } =
+  await import("../../../src/lib/guardrails/visionBridgeHelpers.ts");
 
 test("isClaudeWireFormatModel: true for anthropic and claude-format registry providers", () => {
   assert.strictEqual(isClaudeWireFormatModel("anthropic/claude-sonnet-4"), true);
@@ -61,7 +78,8 @@ test("ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire: keeps data-URI images as-is", async () =>
 });
 
 test("ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire: resolves remote URLs to base64 for claude-wire targets", async () => {
-  const pngBase64 = "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==";
+  const pngBase64 =
+    "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==";
   const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
   globalThis.fetch = async () =>
     new Response(new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(pngBase64, "base64")), {
@@ -127,3 +145,62 @@ test("ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire: fail-open when the remote fetch fails", a
     globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
   }
 });
+
+// GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9 — the vision bridge inlines a user-supplied `image_url` to base64 for
+// claude-wire targets (`visionBridge.ts` reroute) and for the Anthropic describe self-call.
+// `fetchRemoteImageAsDataUri()` called `fetchRemoteImage()` with only `{ signal, fetchImpl }`,
+// so the URL was validated under the OPERATOR outbound policy (`block-metadata` on a
+// default install: loopback/LAN allowed, DNS check skipped) instead of `public-only`. The
+// helper is fail-open, so the observable contract is: the injected fetch is NEVER invoked
+// for a private host and the part is left untouched (not inlined).
+for (const privateUrl of ["http://127.0.0.1:1/x.png", "http://192.168.1.50/x.png"]) {
+  test(`ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire: never fetches a private image_url (${privateUrl}) (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)`, async () => {
+    const fetchedUrls: string[] = [];
+    const body = {
+      model: "zai/glm-5",
+      messages: [
+        {
+          role: "user",
+          content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: privateUrl } }],
+        },
+      ],
+    };
+
+    const out = await ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire(body, "zai/glm-5", async (input) => {
+      fetchedUrls.push(String(input));
+      // Canary: on the vulnerable code these bytes are inlined into the rerouted body.
+      return new Response(new Uint8Array([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47]), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+      });
+    });
+
+    assert.deepStrictEqual(fetchedUrls, [], "the private URL must never be fetched");
+    const part = out.messages[0].content[0];
+    assert.strictEqual(part.image_url.url, privateUrl, "part must be left untouched (fail-open)");
+  });
+}
+
+test("ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire: still inlines a public image_url whose DNS resolves to a public IP (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)", async () => {
+  // The module-level DNS stub answers a public IP, so the `public-only` rebinding guard
+  // passes and the injected fetch is reached.
+  const fetchedUrls: string[] = [];
+  const body = {
+    model: "zai/glm-5",
+    messages: [
+      {
+        role: "user",
+        content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "https://cdn.example.com/public.png" } }],
+      },
+    ],
+  };
+  const out = await ensureBase64ImagesForClaudeWire(body, "zai/glm-5", async (input) => {
+    fetchedUrls.push(String(input));
+    return new Response(new Uint8Array([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47]), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+    });
+  });
+  assert.deepStrictEqual(fetchedUrls, ["https://cdn.example.com/public.png"]);
+  assert.ok(out.messages[0].content[0].image_url.url.startsWith("data:image/png;base64,"));
+});

tests/unit/guardrails/visionBridgeHelpers.callVisionModel.test.ts

@@ -417,3 +417,46 @@ test("callVisionModel propagates an external abort to fetch and stops before fal
     globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
   }
 });
+
+// GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9 — the Anthropic describe self-call inlines the user's image URL to
+// base64 through the same `fetchRemoteImageAsDataUri()` sink as the claude-wire reroute.
+// The DNS stub at the top of this file answers a public IP for every hostname, so only the
+// `public-only` string check stands between the request body and a loopback/RFC-1918 fetch.
+for (const privateUrl of ["http://127.0.0.1:1/x.png", "http://192.168.1.50/x.png"]) {
+  test(`callVisionModel never fetches a private image URL (${privateUrl}) for the Anthropic describe path (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)`, async () => {
+    const fetchedUrls: string[] = [];
+    const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (url) => {
+      const requestUrl = String(url);
+      fetchedUrls.push(requestUrl);
+      if (requestUrl === privateUrl) {
+        // Canary: on the vulnerable code these bytes are inlined into the Anthropic body.
+        return new Response(Buffer.from("intranet-bytes"), {
+          status: 200,
+          headers: { "Content-Type": "image/png" },
+        });
+      }
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ content: [{ type: "text", text: "described" }] }), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+      });
+    };
+
+    const config: VisionModelConfig = {
+      model: "anthropic/claude-3-haiku",
+      prompt: "Describe this image",
+      timeoutMs: 30000,
+      maxImages: 10,
+      fetchImpl,
+    };
+
+    await assert.rejects(
+      () => callVisionModel(privateUrl, config, "sk-ant", { maxFallbackAttempts: 1 }),
+      /blocked/i
+    );
+    assert.deepStrictEqual(
+      fetchedUrls,
+      [],
+      "neither the private download nor the self-call may happen"
+    );
+  });
+}

tests/unit/image-generation-handler.test.ts

@@ -2130,3 +2130,105 @@ test("handleImageGeneration (codex) does not mark an ordinary 400 as retryable",
     globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
   }
 });
+
+// GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9 — caller-supplied image URLs (`image_url` / `mask_url` / message
+// parts) reach `fetchRemoteImage()` through `resolveImageSource()`. Without an explicit
+// `guard`, the library falls back to `getProviderOutboundGuard()` — the OPERATOR outbound
+// policy, which is `block-metadata` on a default install (LAN/loopback allowed, DNS
+// rebinding check skipped) — so a request body could make the server fetch intranet
+// URLs and forward the bytes upstream. Caller input must be pinned to `public-only`
+// regardless of the operator policy. The DNS stub at the top of this file resolves every
+// hostname to a public IP, so the string check is the only thing standing between the
+// request body and the loopback/RFC-1918 fetch.
+for (const privateUrl of ["http://127.0.0.1:1/x.png", "http://192.168.1.50/x.png"]) {
+  test(`handleImageGeneration rejects a private image_url (${privateUrl}) before any fetch (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)`, async () => {
+    const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+    const fetchedUrls = [];
+
+    globalThis.fetch = async (url) => {
+      const stringUrl = String(url);
+      fetchedUrls.push(stringUrl);
+      if (stringUrl === privateUrl) {
+        // Canary: on the vulnerable code the sink downloads these bytes and
+        // forwards them to Stability as the multipart `image` part.
+        return new Response(new Uint8Array([4, 5]), {
+          status: 200,
+          headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+        });
+      }
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ image: "c3RhYmlsaXR5LWltYWdl" }), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      });
+    };
+
+    try {
+      const result = await handleImageGeneration({
+        body: {
+          model: "stability-ai/inpaint",
+          prompt: "replace the sky with aurora",
+          image_url: privateUrl,
+          mask: "",
+          response_format: "b64_json",
+        },
+        credentials: { apiKey: "stability-key" },
+        log: null,
+      });
+
+      assert.equal(result.success, false);
+      assert.match(String(result.error), /blocked/i);
+      assert.deepEqual(
+        fetchedUrls,
+        [],
+        "neither the private image download nor the upstream call may happen"
+      );
+    } finally {
+      globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+test("handleImageGeneration still downloads a public image_url whose DNS resolves to a public IP (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)", async () => {
+  const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+  const fetchedUrls = [];
+  let requestCapture;
+
+  globalThis.fetch = async (url, options = {}) => {
+    const stringUrl = String(url);
+    fetchedUrls.push(stringUrl);
+    if (stringUrl === "https://cdn.example.com/public-input.png") {
+      return new Response(new Uint8Array([4, 5, 6]), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+      });
+    }
+    if (stringUrl === "https://api.stability.ai/v2beta/stable-image/edit/inpaint") {
+      requestCapture = { body: options.body };
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ image: "c3RhYmlsaXR5LWltYWdl" }), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      });
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Unexpected URL: ${stringUrl}`);
+  };
+
+  try {
+    const result = await handleImageGeneration({
+      body: {
+        model: "stability-ai/inpaint",
+        prompt: "replace the sky with aurora",
+        image_url: "https://cdn.example.com/public-input.png",
+        mask: "",
+        response_format: "b64_json",
+      },
+      credentials: { apiKey: "stability-key" },
+      log: null,
+    });
+
+    assert.equal(result.success, true);
+    assert.equal(fetchedUrls[0], "https://cdn.example.com/public-input.png");
+    assert.equal((requestCapture.body.get("image") as Blob).size, 3);
+  } finally {
+    globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+  }
+});

tests/unit/image-upscale.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { test } from "node:test";
 import assert from "node:assert";
+import dns from "node:dns";
 import {
   DEFAULT_UPSCALE_FACTORS,
   UPSCALE_PROVIDERS,
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ import {
 import {
   extractUpscaleSourceImage,
   readImageDimensions,
+  resolveUpscaleImageSource,
   scaleDimensions,
   sniffImageMime,
 } from "../../open-sse/handlers/imageUpscale/shared.ts";
@@ -67,7 +69,12 @@ function jpegHeader(width: number, height: number): Buffer {
 const FAKE_JWT = (() => {
   const header = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ alg: "RS256" })).toString("base64url");
   const payload = Buffer.from(
-    JSON.stringify({ user_id: "TESTUSER@AdobeID", type: "access_token", created_at: "1", expires_in: "86400000" })
+    JSON.stringify({
+      user_id: "TESTUSER@AdobeID",
+      type: "access_token",
+      created_at: "1",
+      expires_in: "86400000",
+    })
   ).toString("base64url");
   return `${header}.${payload}.sig`;
 })();
@@ -104,7 +111,12 @@ test("adobe-firefly upscale models are Topaz only (video starlight/astra exclude
   const ids = UPSCALE_PROVIDERS["adobe-firefly"]!.models.map((m) => m.id);
   assert.deepEqual(ids, ["topaz", "topaz-standard", "topaz-bloom"]);
   for (const id of ids) assert.ok(id.startsWith("topaz"), `${id} must be a Topaz model`);
-  for (const forbidden of ["starlight-quality", "starlight-creative", "starlight-fast", "astra-2"]) {
+  for (const forbidden of [
+    "starlight-quality",
+    "starlight-creative",
+    "starlight-fast",
+    "astra-2",
+  ]) {
     assert.ok(!ids.includes(forbidden), `${forbidden} is a video upscaler and must not be listed`);
   }
 });
@@ -133,7 +145,10 @@ test("parseUpscaleModel accepts provider prefix, alias and bare model ids", () =
     provider: "stability-ai",
     model: "creative",
   });
-  assert.deepEqual(parseUpscaleModel("topaz-enhance"), { provider: "topaz", model: "topaz-enhance" });
+  assert.deepEqual(parseUpscaleModel("topaz-enhance"), {
+    provider: "topaz",
+    model: "topaz-enhance",
+  });
   assert.equal(parseUpscaleModel("openai/gpt-image-2").provider, null);
   assert.deepEqual(parseUpscaleModel(null), { provider: null, model: null });
 });
@@ -211,7 +226,10 @@ test("resolveAdobeUpscaleModel maps ids to upstream topaz versions and rejects o
     resolveAdobeUpscaleModel("adobe-firefly/topaz-bloom")?.spec.upstreamModelId,
     "topaz"
   );
-  assert.equal(resolveAdobeUpscaleModel("firefly/reimagine")?.spec.upstreamModelVersion, "reimagine");
+  assert.equal(
+    resolveAdobeUpscaleModel("firefly/reimagine")?.spec.upstreamModelVersion,
+    "reimagine"
+  );
   assert.equal(resolveAdobeUpscaleModel("nano-banana-pro"), null);
   assert.equal(resolveAdobeUpscaleModel(""), null);
   assert.equal(isAdobeFireflyUpscaleModel("topaz-bloom"), true);
@@ -232,7 +250,10 @@ test("resolveAdobeCreativityLevel maps 0-100 % onto the 0-1 upsample wire float"
   assert.equal(resolveAdobeCreativityLevel({ creativityPercent: 40 }), 0.4);
   assert.equal(resolveAdobeCreativityLevel({}), 0);
   // Explicit 0-1 wins over percent.
-  assert.equal(resolveAdobeCreativityLevel({ creativityPercent: 100, creativityLevel: 0.25 }), 0.25);
+  assert.equal(
+    resolveAdobeCreativityLevel({ creativityPercent: 100, creativityLevel: 0.25 }),
+    0.25
+  );
   // Legacy 1-5 integer scale (discovery docs) is mapped onto 0-1.
   assert.equal(resolveAdobeCreativityLevel({ creativityLevel: "4" }), 0.8);
   assert.equal(resolveAdobeCreativityLevel({ creativityLevel: 5 }), 1);
@@ -359,9 +380,15 @@ test("adobeFireflyUpscaleImage rejects a non-upscale model and a missing blob",
 // ── Shared helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 test("extractUpscaleSourceImage finds the first image across every alias", () => {
-  assert.equal(extractUpscaleSourceImage({ image: "" }), "");
+  assert.equal(
+    extractUpscaleSourceImage({ image: "" }),
+    ""
+  );
   assert.equal(extractUpscaleSourceImage({ image_url: "https://x/y.png" }), "https://x/y.png");
-  assert.equal(extractUpscaleSourceImage({ images: ["https://a/1.png", "https://a/2.png"] }), "https://a/1.png");
+  assert.equal(
+    extractUpscaleSourceImage({ images: ["https://a/1.png", "https://a/2.png"] }),
+    "https://a/1.png"
+  );
   assert.equal(
     extractUpscaleSourceImage({ image_url: { url: "https://obj/u.png" } }),
     "https://obj/u.png"
@@ -372,7 +399,9 @@ test("extractUpscaleSourceImage finds the first image across every alias", () =>
   );
   assert.equal(
     extractUpscaleSourceImage({
-      messages: [{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "https://m/1.png" } }] }],
+      messages: [
+        { role: "user", content: [{ type: "image_url", image_url: { url: "https://m/1.png" } }] },
+      ],
     }),
     "https://m/1.png"
   );
@@ -409,7 +438,10 @@ test("scaleDimensions multiplies the source size and clamps the long edge", () =
 // ── Dispatcher ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 test("handleImageUpscale rejects unknown / mismatched models before any network call", async () => {
-  const badModel = await handleImageUpscale({ body: { model: "openai/gpt-image-2" }, credentials: {} });
+  const badModel = await handleImageUpscale({
+    body: { model: "openai/gpt-image-2" },
+    credentials: {},
+  });
   assert.equal(badModel.success, false);
   assert.equal(badModel.status, 400);
   assert.match(String(badModel.error), /Invalid upscale model/);
@@ -428,7 +460,11 @@ test("handleImageUpscale rejects unknown / mismatched models before any network
 });
 
 test("handleImageUpscale requires a source image for every provider", async () => {
-  for (const model of ["adobe-firefly/topaz-standard", "stability-ai/fast", "topaz/topaz-enhance"]) {
+  for (const model of [
+    "adobe-firefly/topaz-standard",
+    "stability-ai/fast",
+    "topaz/topaz-enhance",
+  ]) {
     const result = await handleImageUpscale({
       body: { model },
       credentials: { apiKey: "k" },
@@ -590,7 +626,10 @@ test("topaz falls back to its own scale when the source dimensions are unreadabl
     credentials: { apiKey: "topaz-key" },
     fetchImpl: (async (_url: unknown, init?: RequestInit) => {
       form = init?.body as FormData;
-      return new Response(bytes(PNG_1X1), { status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "image/png" } });
+      return new Response(bytes(PNG_1X1), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+      });
     }) as unknown as typeof fetch,
   });
 
@@ -614,7 +653,10 @@ test("topaz honors an explicit WxH size over the factor and propagates upstream
     credentials: { apiKey: "topaz-key" },
     fetchImpl: (async (_url: unknown, init?: RequestInit) => {
       form = init?.body as FormData;
-      return new Response(bytes(PNG_1X1), { status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "image/png" } });
+      return new Response(bytes(PNG_1X1), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+      });
     }) as unknown as typeof fetch,
   });
   assert.equal(form!.get("output_width"), "1500");
@@ -633,3 +675,102 @@ test("topaz honors an explicit WxH size over the factor and propagates upstream
   assert.equal(failed.status, 402);
   assert.match(String(failed.error), /quota exceeded/);
 });
+
+// ── GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9 — caller-supplied source URL must be public-only ───
+//
+// `resolveUpscaleImageSource()` is fed straight from the request body (14 aliases,
+// `provider_options.*`, message parts). It called `fetchRemoteImage()` with no explicit
+// `guard`, so it inherited `getProviderOutboundGuard()` — the OPERATOR outbound policy,
+// `block-metadata` on a default install (loopback/LAN allowed, DNS check skipped) — and
+// a request body could make the server fetch intranet URLs and upload the bytes upstream.
+
+/** Public-IP DNS stub (rebinding guard needs a non-empty public answer for a fake host). */
+function withPublicDns<T>(run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+  const originalLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+  (dns.promises as { lookup: unknown }).lookup = (async (
+    _hostname: string,
+    options?: { all?: boolean }
+  ) => {
+    const record = { address: "203.0.113.1", family: 4 };
+    return options && options.all ? [record] : record;
+  }) as typeof dns.promises.lookup;
+  return run().finally(() => {
+    (dns.promises as { lookup: unknown }).lookup = originalLookup;
+  });
+}
+
+for (const privateUrl of ["http://127.0.0.1:1/x.png", "http://192.168.1.50/x.png"]) {
+  test(`resolveUpscaleImageSource rejects a private source URL (${privateUrl}) before any fetch (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)`, async () => {
+    const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+    const fetchedUrls: string[] = [];
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (url: string | URL | Request) => {
+      fetchedUrls.push(String(url));
+      return new Response(bytes(PNG_1X1), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+      });
+    }) as unknown as typeof fetch;
+
+    try {
+      await assert.rejects(() => resolveUpscaleImageSource(privateUrl), /blocked/i);
+      assert.deepEqual(fetchedUrls, [], "the private URL must never be fetched");
+    } finally {
+      globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+    }
+  });
+
+  test(`stability upscale never uploads bytes from a private image_url (${privateUrl}) (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)`, async () => {
+    const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+    const fetchedUrls: string[] = [];
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (url: string | URL | Request) => {
+      fetchedUrls.push(String(url));
+      // Canary: on the vulnerable code these bytes become the multipart `image` part.
+      return new Response(bytes(PNG_1X1), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+      });
+    }) as unknown as typeof fetch;
+    let upstreamCalls = 0;
+
+    try {
+      const result = await handleStabilityImageUpscale({
+        model: "fast",
+        provider: "stability-ai",
+        providerConfig: { baseUrl: "https://api.stability.ai" },
+        body: { image_url: privateUrl, response_format: "b64_json" },
+        credentials: { apiKey: "sk-test" },
+        fetchImpl: (async () => {
+          upstreamCalls += 1;
+          return jsonResponse({ image: PNG_1X1.toString("base64") });
+        }) as unknown as typeof fetch,
+      });
+
+      assert.equal(result.success, false);
+      assert.match(String(result.error), /blocked/i);
+      assert.deepEqual(fetchedUrls, [], "the private URL must never be fetched");
+      assert.equal(upstreamCalls, 0, "nothing may be uploaded to the provider");
+    } finally {
+      globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+test("resolveUpscaleImageSource still downloads a public URL whose DNS resolves to a public IP (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)", async () => {
+  const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+  const fetchedUrls: string[] = [];
+  globalThis.fetch = (async (url: string | URL | Request) => {
+    fetchedUrls.push(String(url));
+    return new Response(bytes(PNG_1X1), { status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "image/png" } });
+  }) as unknown as typeof fetch;
+
+  try {
+    const source = await withPublicDns(() =>
+      resolveUpscaleImageSource("https://cdn.example.com/public.png")
+    );
+    assert.equal(source.contentType, "image/png");
+    assert.equal(source.buffer.length, PNG_1X1.length);
+    assert.deepEqual(fetchedUrls, ["https://cdn.example.com/public.png"]);
+  } finally {
+    globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+  }
+});

tests/unit/nanobanana-image-handler.test.ts

@@ -142,3 +142,66 @@ test("handleImageGeneration(nanobanana): response_format=b64_json converts URL t
     globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
   }
 });
+
+// GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9 — the `response_format=b64_json` path re-fetches the result URL the
+// upstream task reports. That URL is upstream-supplied (lower risk than a request-body
+// URL), but it went through `fetchRemoteImage()` with no explicit `guard`, i.e. under the
+// OPERATOR outbound policy (`block-metadata` on a default install: LAN/loopback allowed,
+// DNS check skipped). Pin it to `public-only`, mirroring the AI Horde result download.
+for (const privateUrl of ["http://127.0.0.1:1/x.png", "http://192.168.1.50/x.png"]) {
+  test(`handleImageGeneration(nanobanana): b64_json never downloads a private result URL (${privateUrl}) (GHSA-34rg-3pqj-35g9)`, async () => {
+    const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+    const fetchedUrls: string[] = [];
+
+    globalThis.fetch = async (url) => {
+      const u = String(url);
+      fetchedUrls.push(u);
+
+      if (u.includes("/generate")) {
+        return new Response(
+          JSON.stringify({ code: 200, msg: "success", data: { taskId: "task-ssrf-1" } }),
+          { status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } }
+        );
+      }
+
+      if (u.includes("/record-info")) {
+        return new Response(
+          JSON.stringify({
+            code: 200,
+            msg: "success",
+            data: { successFlag: 1, response: { resultImageUrl: privateUrl } },
+          }),
+          { status: 200, headers: { "content-type": "application/json" } }
+        );
+      }
+
+      if (u === privateUrl) {
+        // Canary: on the vulnerable code these bytes come back to the caller as b64_json.
+        return new Response(new Uint8Array([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47]), { status: 200 });
+      }
+
+      throw new Error(`Unexpected URL: ${u}`);
+    };
+
+    try {
+      const result = await handleImageGeneration({
+        body: {
+          model: "nanobanana/nanobanana-flash",
+          prompt: "galaxy test",
+          response_format: "b64_json",
+        },
+        credentials: { apiKey: "test-key" },
+        log: null,
+      });
+
+      assert.equal(result.success, false);
+      assert.match(String(result.error), /blocked/i);
+      assert.ok(
+        !fetchedUrls.includes(privateUrl),
+        `the private result URL must never be fetched (fetched: ${fetchedUrls.join(", ")})`
+      );
+    } finally {
+      globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+    }
+  });
+}