fix: resolve issues #273, #276, #277 — image routing, models route, missing-key error (#282)

Squash merge PR #282: bug fixes for #273 (Gemini image routing), #276 (Ollama Cloud models), #277 (missing apiKey error), lint fix, and all security code-scanning patches.

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ concurrency:
   group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
   cancel-in-progress: true
 
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
   lint:
     name: Lint

.gitignore

@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ cloud/
 security-analysis/
 
 # Deploy workflow (contains sensitive VPS credentials)
-.agent/workflows/deploy.md
 clipr/
 app.log
 *.tgz

open-sse/config/imageRegistry.ts

@@ -63,7 +63,10 @@ export const IMAGE_PROVIDERS = {
     authType: "oauth",
     authHeader: "bearer",
     format: "gemini-image", // Special format: uses Gemini generateContent API
-    models: [{ id: "gemini-2.5-flash-preview-image-generation", name: "Nano Banana" }],
+    models: [
+      { id: "gemini-2.5-flash-preview-image-generation", name: "Gemini 2.5 Flash Image" },
+      { id: "gemini-3.1-flash-image-preview", name: "Gemini 3.1 Flash Image Preview" },
+    ],
     supportedSizes: ["1024x1024"],
   },
 

open-sse/executors/cursor.ts

@@ -148,12 +148,17 @@ function parseCursorJsonErrorFrame(text: string) {
   }
 }
 
-function isToolBoundaryAbort(jsonError: any, toolCallCount: number) {
+function isToolBoundaryAbort(jsonError: unknown, toolCallCount: number) {
   if (!jsonError || toolCallCount <= 0) return false;
-  const code = jsonError?.error?.code || "";
-  const debugError = jsonError?.error?.details?.[0]?.debug?.error || "";
-  const title = jsonError?.error?.details?.[0]?.debug?.details?.title || "";
-  const detail = jsonError?.error?.details?.[0]?.debug?.details?.detail || "";
+  const e = jsonError as Record<string, unknown>;
+  const err = e?.error as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+  const details = (err?.details as Record<string, unknown>[] | undefined)?.[0];
+  const debug = details?.debug as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+  const debugDetails = debug?.details as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+  const code = (err?.code as string) || "";
+  const debugError = (debug?.error as string) || "";
+  const title = (debugDetails?.title as string) || "";
+  const detail = (debugDetails?.detail as string) || "";
   const message = `${title} ${detail}`.toLowerCase();
   const isAbortedCode = code === "aborted" || debugError === "ERROR_USER_ABORTED_REQUEST";
   return isAbortedCode && message.includes("tool call ended before result was received");

package-lock.json

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
         "bcryptjs": "^3.0.3",
         "better-sqlite3": "^12.6.2",
         "bottleneck": "^2.19.5",
+        "dompurify": "^3.3.2",
         "express": "^5.2.1",
         "fetch-socks": "^1.3.2",
         "http-proxy-middleware": "^3.0.5",
@@ -5674,10 +5675,13 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/dompurify": {
-      "version": "3.2.7",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dompurify/-/dompurify-3.2.7.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-WhL/YuveyGXJaerVlMYGWhvQswa7myDG17P7Vu65EWC05o8vfeNbvNf4d/BOvH99+ZW+LlQsc1GDKMa1vNK6dw==",
+      "version": "3.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dompurify/-/dompurify-3.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-6obghkliLdmKa56xdbLOpUZ43pAR6xFy1uOrxBaIDjT+yaRuuybLjGS9eVBoSR/UPU5fq3OXClEHLJNGvbxKpQ==",
       "license": "(MPL-2.0 OR Apache-2.0)",
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=20"
+      },
       "optionalDependencies": {
         "@types/trusted-types": "^2.0.7"
       }
@@ -8774,6 +8778,15 @@
         "marked": "14.0.0"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/monaco-editor/node_modules/dompurify": {
+      "version": "3.2.7",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/dompurify/-/dompurify-3.2.7.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-WhL/YuveyGXJaerVlMYGWhvQswa7myDG17P7Vu65EWC05o8vfeNbvNf4d/BOvH99+ZW+LlQsc1GDKMa1vNK6dw==",
+      "license": "(MPL-2.0 OR Apache-2.0)",
+      "optionalDependencies": {
+        "@types/trusted-types": "^2.0.7"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/ms": {
       "version": "2.1.3",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ms/-/ms-2.1.3.tgz",
@@ -8965,6 +8978,17 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/next-intl/node_modules/@swc/helpers": {
+      "version": "0.5.19",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@swc/helpers/-/helpers-0.5.19.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-QamiFeIK3txNjgUTNppE6MiG3p7TdninpZu0E0PbqVh1a9FNLT2FRhisaa4NcaX52XVhA5l7Pk58Ft7Sqi/2sA==",
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "peer": true,
+      "dependencies": {
+        "tslib": "^2.8.0"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/next/node_modules/postcss": {
       "version": "8.4.31",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.4.31.tgz",

package.json

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
     "bcryptjs": "^3.0.3",
     "better-sqlite3": "^12.6.2",
     "bottleneck": "^2.19.5",
+    "dompurify": "^3.3.2",
     "express": "^5.2.1",
     "fetch-socks": "^1.3.2",
     "http-proxy-middleware": "^3.0.5",

src/app/api/cli-tools/codex-profiles/route.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,19 @@ import { isValidationFailure, validateBody } from "@/shared/validation/helpers";
 
 const PROFILES_DIR = path.join(resolveDataDir(), "codex-profiles");
 
+/**
+ * Resolve a path inside PROFILES_DIR and verify it stays within bounds.
+ * Throws on path traversal attempts.
+ */
+function safeProfilePath(...segments: string[]): string {
+  const resolved = path.resolve(PROFILES_DIR, ...segments);
+  const base = path.resolve(PROFILES_DIR);
+  if (resolved !== base && !resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid path: directory traversal detected");
+  }
+  return resolved;
+}
+
 /**
  * Ensure profiles directory exists
  */

src/app/api/providers/[id]/models/route.ts

@@ -247,6 +247,14 @@ const PROVIDER_MODELS_CONFIG: Record<string, ProviderModelsConfigEntry> = {
     authPrefix: "Bearer ",
     parseResponse: (data) => data.data || data.models || [],
   },
+  "ollama-cloud": {
+    url: "https://api.ollama.com/v1/models",
+    method: "GET",
+    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+    authHeader: "Authorization",
+    authPrefix: "Bearer ",
+    parseResponse: (data) => data.models || data.data || [],
+  },
 };
 
 /**
@@ -389,7 +397,13 @@ export async function GET(request, { params }) {
     // Get auth token
     const token = accessToken || apiKey;
     if (!token) {
-      return NextResponse.json({ error: "No valid token found" }, { status: 401 });
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        {
+          error:
+            "No API key configured for this provider. Please add an API key in the provider settings.",
+        },
+        { status: 400 }
+      );
     }
 
     // Build request URL

src/lib/db/backup.ts

@@ -159,11 +159,26 @@ export async function listDbBackups() {
 
 export async function restoreDbBackup(backupId: string) {
   const backupDir = DB_BACKUPS_DIR || path.join(DATA_DIR, "db_backups");
-  const backupPath = path.join(backupDir, backupId);
 
-  if (!backupId.startsWith("db_") || !backupId.endsWith(".sqlite")) {
+  // Validate format: must be db_<timestamp>_<reason>.sqlite, no path separators
+  if (
+    !backupId.startsWith("db_") ||
+    !backupId.endsWith(".sqlite") ||
+    backupId.includes(path.sep) ||
+    backupId.includes("/")
+  ) {
     throw new Error("Invalid backup ID");
   }
+
+  const backupPath = path.resolve(backupDir, backupId);
+  // Prevent path traversal: resolved path must stay within backupDir
+  if (
+    !backupPath.startsWith(path.resolve(backupDir) + path.sep) &&
+    backupPath !== path.resolve(backupDir)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid backup ID: path traversal detected");
+  }
+
   if (!fs.existsSync(backupPath)) {
     throw new Error(`Backup not found: ${backupId}`);
   }

src/lib/usage/usageHistory.ts

@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ const pendingRequests: {
   byModel: Record<string, number>;
   byAccount: Record<string, Record<string, number>>;
 } = {
-  byModel: {},
-  byAccount: {},
+  byModel: Object.create(null) as Record<string, number>,
+  byAccount: Object.create(null) as Record<string, Record<string, number>>,
 };
 
 /**
@@ -50,16 +50,22 @@ export function trackPendingRequest(
 ) {
   const modelKey = provider ? `${model} (${provider})` : model;
 
-  if (!pendingRequests.byModel[modelKey]) pendingRequests.byModel[modelKey] = 0;
+  // Use hasOwnProperty guard to prevent prototype pollution via crafted keys
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(pendingRequests.byModel, modelKey)) {
+    pendingRequests.byModel[modelKey] = 0;
+  }
   pendingRequests.byModel[modelKey] = Math.max(
     0,
     pendingRequests.byModel[modelKey] + (started ? 1 : -1)
   );
 
   if (connectionId) {
-    if (!pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId]) pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId] = {};
-    if (!pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId][modelKey])
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(pendingRequests.byAccount, connectionId)) {
+      pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId] = Object.create(null) as Record<string, number>;
+    }
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId], modelKey)) {
       pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId][modelKey] = 0;
+    }
     pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId][modelKey] = Math.max(
       0,
       pendingRequests.byAccount[connectionId][modelKey] + (started ? 1 : -1)

src/mitm/server.ts

@@ -45,12 +45,22 @@ const CHAT_URL_PATTERNS = [":generateContent", ":streamGenerateContent"];
 const LOG_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "../../logs/mitm");
 if (ENABLE_FILE_LOG && !fs.existsSync(LOG_DIR)) fs.mkdirSync(LOG_DIR, { recursive: true });
 
+// Safe log filename: only alphanumeric + hyphens, anchored inside LOG_DIR
+function safeLogPath(name) {
+  const safe = name.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-]/g, "_").substring(0, 80);
+  const resolved = path.resolve(LOG_DIR, safe);
+  if (!resolved.startsWith(path.resolve(LOG_DIR) + path.sep)) {
+    throw new Error("Path traversal attempt detected in log filename");
+  }
+  return resolved;
+}
+
 function saveRequestLog(url, bodyBuffer) {
   if (!ENABLE_FILE_LOG) return;
   try {
     const ts = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, "-");
     const urlSlug = url.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, "_").substring(0, 60);
-    const filePath = path.join(LOG_DIR, `${ts}_${urlSlug}.json`);
+    const filePath = safeLogPath(`${ts}_${urlSlug}.json`);
     const body = JSON.parse(bodyBuffer.toString());
     fs.writeFileSync(filePath, JSON.stringify(body, null, 2));
     console.log(`💾 Saved request: ${filePath}`);
@@ -64,7 +74,7 @@ function saveResponseLog(url, data) {
   try {
     const ts = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, "-");
     const urlSlug = url.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, "_").substring(0, 60);
-    const filePath = path.join(LOG_DIR, `${ts}_${urlSlug}_response.txt`);
+    const filePath = safeLogPath(`${ts}_${urlSlug}_response.txt`);
     fs.writeFileSync(filePath, data);
     console.log(`💾 Saved response: ${filePath}`);
   } catch {
@@ -156,6 +166,10 @@ function getMappedModel(model) {
 async function passthrough(req, res, bodyBuffer) {
   const targetIP = await resolveTargetIP();
 
+  // TLS validation is enabled by default. Set MITM_DISABLE_TLS_VERIFY=1 only
+  // in controlled local environments where the target uses a self-signed cert.
+  const rejectUnauthorized = process.env.MITM_DISABLE_TLS_VERIFY !== "1";
+
   const forwardReq = https.request(
     {
       hostname: targetIP,
@@ -164,7 +178,7 @@ async function passthrough(req, res, bodyBuffer) {
       method: req.method,
       headers: { ...req.headers, host: TARGET_HOST },
       servername: TARGET_HOST,
-      rejectUnauthorized: false,
+      rejectUnauthorized,
     },
     (forwardRes) => {
       res.writeHead(forwardRes.statusCode, forwardRes.headers);

src/shared/services/backupService.ts

@@ -5,11 +5,24 @@ import { resolveDataDir } from "@/lib/dataPaths";
 const BACKUP_DIR = path.join(resolveDataDir(), "backups");
 const MAX_BACKUPS_PER_TOOL = 5;
 
+/**
+ * Resolve a path within BACKUP_DIR and verify it stays within bounds.
+ * Throws if the resolved path escapes BACKUP_DIR (path traversal guard).
+ */
+function safePath(...segments: string[]): string {
+  const resolved = path.resolve(BACKUP_DIR, ...segments);
+  const base = path.resolve(BACKUP_DIR);
+  if (resolved !== base && !resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid path: directory traversal detected");
+  }
+  return resolved;
+}
+
 /**
  * Get backup directory for a specific tool
  */
 function getToolBackupDir(toolId: string) {
-  return path.join(BACKUP_DIR, toolId);
+  return safePath(toolId);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -136,7 +149,8 @@ export async function listBackups(toolId: string) {
  */
 export async function restoreBackup(toolId: string, backupId: string) {
   const dir = getToolBackupDir(toolId);
-  const backupPath = path.join(dir, backupId);
+  // Anchor backupId within the tool dir — prevent path traversal via backupId
+  const backupPath = safePath(toolId, backupId);
   const metaPath = backupPath + ".meta.json";
 
   // Read metadata to find original path
@@ -174,8 +188,8 @@ export async function restoreBackup(toolId: string, backupId: string) {
  * Delete a specific backup by its id.
  */
 export async function deleteBackup(toolId: string, backupId: string) {
-  const dir = getToolBackupDir(toolId);
-  const backupPath = path.join(dir, backupId);
+  // Anchor backupId within the tool dir — prevent path traversal via backupId
+  const backupPath = safePath(toolId, backupId);
   const metaPath = backupPath + ".meta.json";
 
   try {