fix(relay): strip echoed credentials from relayed upstream responses

GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g: the standalone bifrost relay copied ALL upstream response
headers via `new Headers(upstream.headers)` and returned non-2xx bodies verbatim,
while its TypeScript sibling routed non-2xx through parseUpstreamError +
buildErrorBody + stripStaleEncodingHeaders.

The relay sends `Authorization: Bearer ${BIFROST_API_KEY}` to the sidecar, so
anything the sidecar or a further upstream echoes back — that header, its own
`set-cookie`, an `x-api-key` — reached whoever holds the relay token. `set-cookie`
matters as much as the credential: it is a session, and a browser would store it
against our origin.

Both fixes:

  - New shared `stripSensitiveResponseHeaders()` in upstreamResponseHeaders.ts,
    built on the `filterUpstreamResponseHeaderEntries` helper that already
    existed there unused. Drops authorization / proxy-authorization / x-api-key /
    x-goog-api-key / api-key / cookie / set-cookie on top of the stale framing
    set. Applied to BOTH relay routes — the TS sibling copied headers wholesale
    too, so fixing only the reported one would have left the same hole next door
    and a second copy waiting to drift, which is the exact failure mode of
    GHSA-v7g9 and GHSA-qv45.
  - The bifrost route normalizes non-2xx through parseUpstreamError +
    buildErrorBody + sanitizeErrorMessage, reaching parity with the sibling and
    Hard Rule #12.

tests/unit/bifrost-relay-response-leak-9m72.test.ts — 6 tests, red before the
fix: the helper's behaviour (including that it does not mutate its input), plus
source guards pinning BOTH routes to the shared strip with a negative assertion
that the wholesale copy has not come back.

Reported by @skeletonsec.

Closes GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g
This commit is contained in:
diegosouzapw
2026-09-03 12:53:32 -03:00
parent 03ea113145
commit df23f55c7b
4 changed files with 170 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -45,3 +45,36 @@ export function filterUpstreamResponseHeaderEntries(
}
export const STRIP_UPSTREAM_HEADER_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = STRIP_HEADER_NAMES;
/**
* Response headers that must never be relayed back to a client.
*
* A relay sends its own credential upstream (the bifrost route sends
* `Authorization: Bearer ${BIFROST_API_KEY}` to the sidecar). If that upstream
* echoes the header back — or sets its own session cookie — copying the response
* headers wholesale hands it to whoever holds the relay token
* (GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g). `set-cookie` matters as much as `authorization`: it is
* a session, and the browser would store it against OUR origin.
*/
const SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_HEADER_NAMES: ReadonlyArray<string> = [
"authorization",
"proxy-authorization",
"x-api-key",
"x-goog-api-key",
"api-key",
"cookie",
"set-cookie",
];
/**
* New Headers with the stale framing set AND any echoed credential/session
* header removed. Use this instead of `new Headers(upstream.headers)` on every
* path that relays an upstream response to a client. Does not mutate the input.
*/
export function stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(input: Headers): Headers {
return new Headers(
filterUpstreamResponseHeaderEntries(input.entries(), SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_HEADER_NAMES)
);
}
export { SENSITIVE_RESPONSE_HEADER_NAMES };

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
*/
import { CORS_HEADERS, handleCorsOptions } from "@/shared/utils/cors";
import { stripSensitiveResponseHeaders } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/upstreamResponseHeaders";
import { buildErrorBody, sanitizeErrorMessage } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error";
import { parseUpstreamError } from "@omniroute/open-sse/handlers/usageExtractor";
import { createInjectionGuard } from "@/middleware/promptInjectionGuard";
import { getRelayTokenByHash, checkRateLimit, recordRelayUsage } from "@/lib/db/relayProxies";
import { buildErrorBody } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error";
@@ -299,7 +302,11 @@ export async function POST(request: Request) {
});
};
const newHeaders = new Headers(upstream.headers);
// Never copy the upstream headers wholesale: the sidecar receives our
// `Authorization: Bearer ${BIFROST_API_KEY}` and anything it echoes back —
// that header, its own set-cookie — would reach the relay-token holder
// (GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g).
const newHeaders = stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(upstream.headers);
newHeaders.set("X-Routed-By", "bifrost");
newHeaders.set("X-Relay-Token", token.tokenPrefix + "...");
if (!wantsStream) {
@@ -321,6 +328,28 @@ export async function POST(request: Request) {
}
clearTimeout(tid);
// Normalize non-2xx through parseUpstreamError + buildErrorBody instead of
// relaying the sidecar body verbatim — parity with the TS sibling route and
// Hard Rule #12 (GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g).
if (!upstream.ok) {
const parsed = await parseUpstreamError(upstream, null);
const errorBody = buildErrorBody(
parsed.statusCode,
sanitizeErrorMessage(parsed.message),
parsed.responseBody
);
newHeaders.set("Content-Type", "application/json");
if (parsed.retryAfterMs && parsed.retryAfterMs > 0) {
newHeaders.set("Retry-After", String(Math.ceil(parsed.retryAfterMs / 1000)));
}
recordUsage("error", parsed.statusCode);
return new Response(JSON.stringify(errorBody), {
status: parsed.statusCode,
headers: newHeaders,
});
}
recordUsage(upstream.status < 500 ? "success" : "error", upstream.status);
return new Response(upstream.body, {

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
*/
import { CORS_HEADERS, handleCorsOptions } from "@/shared/utils/cors";
import { stripSensitiveResponseHeaders } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/upstreamResponseHeaders";
import { handleChat } from "@/sse/handlers/chat";
import { withChatAdmission } from "@/shared/middleware/withChatAdmission";
import { createInjectionGuard } from "@/middleware/promptInjectionGuard";
@@ -109,7 +110,9 @@ async function forwardToBifrost(
signal: ac.signal,
});
const headers = new Headers(upstream.headers);
// Same strip as the bifrost sibling: an echoed upstream credential or
// set-cookie must not reach the relay-token holder (GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g).
const headers = stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(upstream.headers);
headers.set("X-Routed-By", "bifrost");
headers.set("X-Routing-Backend", "bifrost");
headers.set("X-Relay-Token", token.tokenPrefix + "...");

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
/**
* GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g — the standalone bifrost relay route copied ALL upstream
* response headers (`new Headers(upstream.headers)`) and returned non-2xx bodies
* verbatim, while its TypeScript sibling routed non-2xx through
* parseUpstreamError + buildErrorBody + stripStaleEncodingHeaders.
*
* The relay sends `Authorization: Bearer ${BIFROST_API_KEY}` to the sidecar, so
* anything the sidecar (or a further upstream) echoes back — that header, its own
* `set-cookie`, an `x-api-key` — reached the relay-token holder untouched.
*
* Both relay routes copy upstream headers, so the strip is a shared helper used
* by both rather than a fix in one and a second copy waiting to drift (the
* failure mode of GHSA-v7g9 and GHSA-qv45).
*
* Run with:
* node --import tsx/esm --test tests/unit/bifrost-relay-response-leak-9m72.test.ts
*/
import { describe, it } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { stripSensitiveResponseHeaders } from "../../open-sse/utils/upstreamResponseHeaders.ts";
const read = (rel: string) =>
readFileSync(fileURLToPath(new URL(`../../${rel}`, import.meta.url)), "utf8");
const BIFROST_ROUTE = "src/app/api/v1/relay/chat/completions/bifrost/route.ts";
const TS_ROUTE = "src/app/api/v1/relay/chat/completions/route.ts";
describe("stripSensitiveResponseHeaders", () => {
it("drops credentials and cookies the upstream echoed back", () => {
const upstream = new Headers([
["authorization", "Bearer sidecar-secret"],
["x-api-key", "op-key"],
["x-goog-api-key", "goog-key"],
["api-key", "azure-key"],
["cookie", "session=abc"],
["set-cookie", "session=abc; HttpOnly"],
["proxy-authorization", "Basic zzz"],
["content-type", "application/json"],
["x-request-id", "keep-me"],
]);
const out = stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(upstream);
for (const gone of [
"authorization",
"x-api-key",
"x-goog-api-key",
"api-key",
"cookie",
"set-cookie",
"proxy-authorization",
]) {
assert.equal(out.get(gone), null, `${gone} survived`);
}
assert.equal(out.get("content-type"), "application/json");
assert.equal(out.get("x-request-id"), "keep-me");
});
it("also drops the stale framing headers", () => {
const out = stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(
new Headers([
["content-encoding", "gzip"],
["content-length", "123"],
["transfer-encoding", "chunked"],
["x-keep", "yes"],
])
);
assert.equal(out.get("content-encoding"), null);
assert.equal(out.get("content-length"), null);
assert.equal(out.get("transfer-encoding"), null);
assert.equal(out.get("x-keep"), "yes");
});
it("does not mutate the input Headers", () => {
const input = new Headers([["authorization", "Bearer x"]]);
stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(input);
assert.equal(input.get("authorization"), "Bearer x");
});
});
describe("both relay routes use the shared strip (GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g)", () => {
for (const route of [BIFROST_ROUTE, TS_ROUTE]) {
it(`${route} strips sensitive upstream response headers`, () => {
const src = read(route);
assert.ok(
src.includes("stripSensitiveResponseHeaders"),
`${route} relays upstream headers verbatim — a sidecar-echoed credential reaches the caller`
);
assert.ok(
!/new Headers\(upstream\.headers\)/.test(src),
`${route} still copies upstream headers wholesale`
);
});
}
it("the bifrost route normalizes non-2xx through the error sanitizer", () => {
const src = read(BIFROST_ROUTE);
assert.ok(src.includes("buildErrorBody"), "bifrost non-2xx must not be relayed verbatim");
assert.ok(src.includes("sanitizeErrorMessage"), "bifrost non-2xx must be sanitized (HR#12)");
});
});