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28ce4cacb2c45461fbb4dff89c67afd3bf67e987
8781 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Paco Cartones
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28ce4cacb2 |
fix(streaming): track progress across chunk boundaries (#13839)
Co-authored-by: Paco Cartones <pacocartones@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Paco Cartones
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1deb77a00d |
test(dashboard): reactivate discovery page coverage (#13842)
Co-authored-by: Paco Cartones <pacocartones@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Paco Cartones
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6f2eafd138 |
test(dashboard): reactivate API endpoints coverage (#13841)
Co-authored-by: Paco Cartones <pacocartones@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Paco Cartones
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4be690736c |
test(dashboard): reactivate webhook wizard coverage (#13844)
Co-authored-by: Paco Cartones <pacocartones@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Paco Cartones
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44d1760c3a |
fix(nlpcloud): restore chatbot endpoint coverage (#13845)
Co-authored-by: Paco Cartones <pacocartones@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Bob.Hou
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c40a5f0432 |
fix(build): externalize @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to heal MCP initialize 500 on standalone builds (#13859)
* build/mcp: externalize @modelcontextprotocol/sdk in standalone server bundle The SDK client graph contains a module-level class-extends-Client cycle against the top-level-await Client module. Webpack's TLA runtime evaluates that circular subgraph out of order when it is inlined into route chunks, throwing "Cannot access 'l' before initialization" during module evaluation. Every request to /api/mcp/stream then answers HTTP 500 on initialize and the failed module is evicted and re-evaluated per request, which floods the logs with the same ReferenceError. Node's native ESM loader resolves the same circular graph through live bindings, so keep the SDK external to the server bundle like the other packages that break only when bundled. Signed-off-by: Minxi Hou <houminxi@gmail.com> * changelog: record @modelcontextprotocol/sdk externalize fix (#13859) Signed-off-by: Minxi Hou <houminxi@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Minxi Hou <houminxi@gmail.com> |
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Fouad Salkini
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2387d051c1 |
fix(sse): strip Codex temperature on native Responses passthrough (#12585)
* fix(sse): strip Codex temperature on native Responses passthrough Codex /responses rejects sampling params with FastAPI 400 Unsupported parameter: temperature. Native passthrough returned before the Responses allowlist, so client temperature reached upstream on combo traffic. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(sse): extract Codex passthrough param strip under file-size cap Keep temperature/top_p (and #3317 client-only fields) stripped before native Codex /responses passthrough returns. Move the call to open-sse/executors/codex/stripPassthroughRejectedParams.ts so executors/codex.ts stays under its frozen 1505-line cap. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Fouad Salkini
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fc6b240328 |
fix(oauth): classify an embedded invalid_grant in a refresh error body (#13466)
* fix(oauth): classify an embedded invalid_grant in a refresh error body
Cline answers a dead refresh_token with
400 {"data":"","error":"failed to refresh token: invalid_grant","success":false}
The code is the tail of a sentence — neither a bare code nor an
"error":"<code>" field pair — so extractOAuthErrorCode returned null.
A null classification means refreshClineToken emits no unrecoverable
sentinel, so a permanently consumed refresh_token is handled as a
TRANSIENT failure. tokenHealthCheck therefore never reaches its
unrecoverable branch, and never runs the credentialsChangedSinceSweep
race guard, the "please re-authenticate this account" message, or the
dead-token clear for rotating providers. The connection instead stays
active with errorCode "refresh_failed", retries the same consumed token
3x per sweep behind an exponential backoff, and 401s every request
routed to it indefinitely with no actionable operator signal.
Scan for a known unrecoverable code embedded in the error value as a
last resort, after the exact-match and nested-JSON paths, delimited on
both sides so server_error, xinvalid_grant, my_invalid_grant_flag and a
502 HTML page all still classify as null.
Also add cline to ROTATION_LOCK_GROUP: refreshClineToken reads a new
refreshToken out of every response body and a measured refresh rotated a
connection's stored token, so sibling connections must not refresh
concurrently. cline was already listed in tokenHealthCheck's
ROTATING_REFRESH_PROVIDERS but missing from the serializer.
* docs(changelog): add fragment for cline refresh token error classification
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
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Fouad Salkini
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ec60915d91 |
fix(api): accept blockedModels in the key permissions schema (#13666)
* fix(api): accept blockedModels in the key permissions schema `PATCH /api/keys/[id]` already destructures `blockedModels`, forwards it into the update payload, and `updateApiKeyPermissions()` writes it to the `blocked_models` column. Only the first link was missing: `updateKeyPermissionsSchema` never declared the field, so Zod stripped it from the parsed body and the destructured value was always `undefined`. The request answered 200 and wrote nothing. The API Manager permissions modal sends `blockedModels` on every save (ApiManagerPageClient.tsx), so the Claude-Code family-blocking control silently did nothing and an existing deny-list could not be cleared. `blockedModels` is the deny-list half of the model policy — read by `isModelAllowedForKey()` before the allow-list and winning over it — so that half was only reachable by editing the database by hand. Declare the field mirroring `allowedModels` (trimmed, non-empty, max 1000) and count it in the "No valid fields to update" guard so a body carrying only `blockedModels` is a valid update. Left out of `createKeySchema` deliberately: the create route does not read `blockedModels`, so declaring it there would be dead weight. * docs(changelog): add fragment for blockedModels key schema fix Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Innokentiy Solntsev
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c97f61b2ac |
fix(sse): prevent Anthropic 400s for Claude-native handoffs (#12668)
* fix(sse): prevent Anthropic 400s for Claude-native handoffs * docs(changelog): add fragment for Claude-native handoff 400 fix * refactor(sse): satisfy file-size and complexity ratchets Keep the Claude wire-body guard while staying under the frozen per-file line baselines and the complexity ratchets measured against release/v3.8.51. Extract the final constraint coordinator, split system-message normalization into focused helpers, and isolate handoff response parsing. Reflow the universal-handoff explanation to absorb the added source-format argument without growing the frozen file. |
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Innokentiy Solntsev
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dd70dbdaa0 |
fix(sse): Anthropic OAuth 403 "Request not allowed" is a per-request refusal — cooldown with backoff instead of an instant ban (#12859) (#12864)
* fix(sse): Anthropic OAuth 403 "Request not allowed" is a per-request refusal, not a ban
A single upstream 403 on the `claude` OAuth connection was classified
FORBIDDEN and written as the terminal `banned` connection state
(chatCore -> writeTerminalStatus). From then on every request to that
provider was short-circuited with "All 1 connection(s) banned by
upstream - please reconnect in the dashboard" without touching Anthropic,
until an operator reconnected.
Anthropic's OAuth surface answers a small fraction of otherwise-valid
requests with 403 {"type":"permission_error","message":"Request not
allowed"}. On the reporting install the same token returned 200 forty
seconds before the 403 and again right after the connection was
re-enabled; a revoked or expired token is a 401 authentication_error, not
this. It is a refusal of one request, not of the credential.
Classify it as the new non-terminal PROVIDER_ERROR_TYPES.REQUEST_REJECTED
(scoped to provider `claude` and the "Request not allowed" body) and list
that type in authTerminalStatus.isNonTerminalProviderError, mirroring the
Cloudflare FINGERPRINT_REJECTION precedent. The combo layer still falls
through to the next target for the failing request; the connection stays
active for the next one. Any other claude 403 keeps its previous
classification.
Tests: error-classifier.test.ts covers the Anthropic body, the
gateway-flattened "[403]: Request not allowed" message, the same body from
a non-Anthropic provider (still FORBIDDEN), other claude 403s (unchanged),
and the helpers; anthropic-request-not-allowed-not-a-ban.test.ts pins
resolveTerminalConnectionStatus() -> null for the new type even with a
`permanent` fallback verdict, and `banned` for a generic claude 403.
* fix(sse): cooldown with backoff and streak escalation for REQUEST_REJECTED (#12859)
Not "ignore the 403" either: if Anthropic ever made "Request not allowed"
systematic, re-sending every request into it would be the wrong thing to
do to an OAuth account. chatCore now handles REQUEST_REJECTED explicitly:
- exclude the connection via setConnectionRateLimitUntil for a growing
cooldown (5 -> 15 -> 45 min) so a sporadic refusal costs minutes, not a
reconnect, and a systematic one cannot become a stream of 403s;
- escalate to the terminal `banned` state only for 3 refusals within a
60-minute window (services/requestRejectedStreak.ts, in-memory per
connection; a restart forgets the streak, erring towards more cooldowns
rather than an operator-undone ban), with a last_error that says so;
- probe-origin failures record but never cool down or ban (#9817).
The existing "request not allowed" text rule (5 s) is unaffected:
markAccountUnavailable skips a connection that already has a future
rateLimitedUntil, so the minute-scale cooldown written here wins.
Tests: request-rejected-streak.test.ts pins the window/threshold/backoff
arithmetic; anthropic-request-not-allowed-cooldown-escalation.test.ts drives
the real chat route against a mocked 403 upstream on a `claude` OAuth
connection: 300 s cooldown, then 900 s, then banned on the third refusal;
a different claude 403 body still bans on the first response.
* chore(changelog): name the #12859 fragment after its PR (#12864)
* refactor(sse): move the REQUEST_REJECTED branch into a chatCore leaf; register its tests for mutation coverage
chatCore.ts is frozen at 5984 lines by the file-size ratchet; the branch
body now lives in open-sse/handlers/chatCore/requestRejectedFailure.ts
(chatCore: 5974 -> 5983). stryker.conf.json tap.testFiles gains the two new
DB-backed tests so their mutant kills count (check:mutation-test-coverage).
* fix(sse): count refusal episodes, reset on success, keep the dashboard honest (#12859 review)
Review findings on the first cut of the REQUEST_REJECTED handling:
- A burst of in-flight requests that all got the 403 within seconds
produced streak 1, 2, 3 and a ban from one upstream event. The streak
now counts cooldown *episodes*: a refusal that lands while the
connection is already excluded is the same event and is not counted.
- Nothing reset the streak on a healthy response, so sporadic refusals
on a busy install could still accumulate to a ban. chatHelpers'
onRequestSuccess now clears it (only a real success does - the recovery
tick's clearAccountError is an elapsed cooldown, not a success).
Clearing the cooldown by hand in the dashboard clears it too.
- The third rung of the ladder was unreachable (the third refusal
escalates): the ladder is now 5 -> 15 min, sourced from COOLDOWN_MS next
to the existing 5 s "request not allowed" rule, with a note on why that
rule is superseded for claude. The 60-min window becomes a 24 h
staleness bound - "consecutive" is defined by successes, not by time.
- Probe-origin refusals no longer touch the streak (#9817).
- The cooldown is written like every other connection-level cooldown:
ISO rateLimitedUntil + testStatus "unavailable" (+ lastErrorAt), so the
dashboard shows the countdown and the recovery tick restores "active".
- One refusal is re-seeded from the persisted row after a restart so a
crash loop cannot reset the count on every boot.
Docs: RESILIENCE_GUIDE terminal states + CODEBASE_DOCUMENTATION resilience
row mention the streak module. Tests cover the burst, the success reset,
the seed, and the ISO/unavailable shape end-to-end through the chat route.
* chore(sse): drop unrelated Prettier churn in auth.ts / providers route
* style(api): keep providers route Prettier-clean
* refactor(sse): share the "exclude connection for a cooldown" leaf between GEO_BLOCKED, GCP_PROJECT_REQUIRED and the new branch
The release tip moved chatCore.ts to its frozen 5984 lines, so the
REQUEST_REJECTED branch cannot add a single net line. The GEO_BLOCKED and
GCP_PROJECT_REQUIRED branches were the same eight statements with different
constants and log wording; both now call
open-sse/handlers/chatCore/connectionCooldown.ts::excludeConnectionForCooldown
(behaviour, probe guard and log lines preserved verbatim). chatCore.ts ends
9 lines below the base it branched from.
* chore(chatCore): tighten the cooldown comments to keep the file under its size ceiling
After merging release/v3.8.51, chatCore.ts sat at 6150 lines against a
frozen ceiling of 6146. Condense the explanatory comments this PR added
to the GEO_BLOCKED and GCP_PROJECT_REQUIRED branches; no code change.
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: insoln <is@careerum.com>
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
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Innokentiy Solntsev
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47159ed56b |
fix(combo): answer 503 + Retry-After, not 404, when a weighted pool is only cooling down (#12956)
* fix(combo): answer 503 + Retry-After, not 404, when a weighted pool is only cooling down The weighted strategy filters targets before dispatch (open circuit breaker, provider cooldown, model lockout, availability probe) and drops them silently. When that emptied the pool the host returned the 404 "Combo has no executable targets" with the "switch combo / reconnect the missing providers" recovery hint — for a pool that was configured, connected and merely cooling down. Claude Code renders a 404 from /v1/messages as "this model may not exist". - targetResolution.ts: the eligibility predicate now reports which gate excluded a target and, for the resilience gates, the remaining time; the exclusions of fully-excluded steps travel out of resolveWeightedSelection. When the weighted pool ends empty and at least one exclusion is a resilience timer, the pipeline returns an early 503 and logs the reasons at warn level. - pinRecovery.ts: buildAllTargetsCoolingDownResponse() — 503 `all_targets_cooling_down`, Retry-After = earliest exclusion to lapse, every excluded target in diagnostics.excluded, `wait` recovery hint with retry_after_seconds; formatPreDispatchExclusions() for the log line. - error.ts: `all_targets_cooling_down` joins the public error identifiers. - A pool emptied only by the availability probe keeps the 404. - docs: RESILIENCE_GUIDE debugging entry; changelog fragment. * chore(changelog): name the fragment after PR #12956 and link issue #12954 * refactor(combo): keep weighted exhaustion below complexity ratchet --------- Co-authored-by: insoln <is@careerum.com> |
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Innokentiy Solntsev
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bc7f68fb91 |
fix(resilience): lock the exact model, not the quota family, on 5xx model-lockout failures (#12957)
* fix(resilience): lock the exact model, not the quota family, on 5xx model-lockout failures A 5xx model-lockout failure — a transport error (terminated, EHOSTUNREACH, connect timeout), an upstream server error, or OmniRoute's own synthesized 502 from quality validation — is evidence about one model endpoint at that moment, not about the account's quota family. recordModelLockoutFailure() wrote it under the quota-family key regardless, so for codex (whose family key is the whole `codex` scope, i.e. every gpt-5* model) one empty stream on gpt-5.6-luna removed gpt-5.6-sol and gpt-5.6-terra from routing too, for 2–30 min with exponential escalation, while the quota was untouched. - exactModelLock.ts: resolveLockoutScope(status, explicit) — 429/403/402 (and 404, already narrowed by getModelLockKey) keep the family key; any other status uses the exact provider/connection/model key. An explicit `scope` option still wins. - recordModelLockoutFailure() resolves the scope once for key + lock fn. - decayModelFailureCount() now walks every key shape (family, not_found, exact) so success-decay reaches exact-scope locks; null model stays a no-op. - getAllModelLockouts() parses the `exact:` marker out of the key so the Model Cooldowns card lists the bare model and can clear it by that name. - docs: RESILIENCE_GUIDE §3 key-scope-by-status; changelog fragment. * chore(changelog): name the fragment after PR #12957 and link issue #12955 --------- Co-authored-by: insoln <is@careerum.com> |
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Nguyen Thanh Dat
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21d756d7f0 |
fix(combos): accept isHidden in updateComboSchema (#12898)
* fix(combos): accept isHidden in updateComboSchema A combo's visibility is stored on the record and honoured by the builder option list and the dashboard grid, but updateComboSchema never listed isHidden. The PUT handler spreads the validated body, so zod stripped the field: a visibility-only update was rejected as "No valid fields to update", and a mixed update succeeded while dropping the visibility change. Closes #12836 * docs(changelog): fragment for #12898 |
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Lance Woodson
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8074e3d596 |
fix(resilience): honor declared effort vocabulary in reasoning rule gate (#12686)
* fix(resilience): honor declared effort vocabulary in reasoning rule gate The reasoning-routing rule capabilityFor() hardcoded a gpt-5.6-(sol|terra|luna) whitelist for forced max/ultra, rejecting every other thinking-capable model even when the model's resolved capabilities declare the requested tier (synced supportedThinkingEfforts or an operator Model Overrides reasoning_efforts override). This 400'd direct calls with "Reasoning effort 'max' is not supported by the configured target" for models like Merge Gateway zai/glm-5.3-flash, which natively accepts low|high|max. The gate now treats a declared vocabulary containing the requested tier as authoritative, mirroring the dispatch-time sanitizer (open-sse/executors/base/reasoningEffort.ts) which already forwards declared tiers verbatim. Undeclared models keep the legacy gpt-5.6 regex verdicts and the unknown passthrough. * fix(resilience): gate forced max against the static registry the sanitizer clamps with Adversarial review finding: the gate read supportedThinkingEfforts from getResolvedModelCapabilities, which prefers the DB override over the registry. For a registered model with a narrow registry vocabulary and a widening operator override, the gate passed forced max but the dispatch-time sanitizer (executors/base/reasoningEffort.ts) clamps against the STATIC registry and would silently downgrade max to the registry ceiling — converting a loud 400 into a silent wrong-effort request. Order of precedence in the gate now: 1. static registry vocabulary (authoritative — matches sanitizer clamping) 2. declared/overridden vocabulary for unregistered providers (#8057 path) 3. legacy gpt-5.6 regex, then unknown/unsupported verdicts Also pins the test fixture to a synthetic model id so a future models.dev sync row cannot flip the unknown-precondition assertion. * fix(resilience): gate registry lookup mirrors the dispatch sanitizer exactly Review findings on the forced max/ultra gate: - resolve the registry through getProviderModels (id->alias namespace) and match entry aliases, mirroring reasoningEffort.ts — a raw provider id or alias-spelled model no longer skips the registry branch and diverges from dispatch clamping - treat an empty declared vocabulary as no declaration (falls through), matching the sanitizer's declaredRanked.length>0 guard — before, a model declaring [] was gated to unsupported while dispatch forwarded verbatim - an operator-declared vocabulary that excludes the forced tier is terminal; the legacy gpt-5.6 regex can no longer resurrect a tier the override narrowed away - rewrite the registry-outranks-override test: create the matching rule so the decision is non-null, assert unconditionally, pin gpt-5.6 narrowing, alias namespace parity, and use the deterministic xai/grok-4.6 fixture * docs(changelog): clarify override scope for registry-declared models * test: drop placeholder issue reference from test names * chore(changelog): name fragment after PR #12686 |
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Lance Woodson
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821d02ba13 |
fix(providers): parse per-vendor-route reasoning.effort_values in discovery (#12730)
OpenAI-compatible model discovery does not recognize per-vendor-route reasoning vocabularies declared under vendors.<vendor>.capabilities.reasoning in GET /v1/models (Merge Gateway's documented catalog shape), so synced models carry no supportedThinkingEfforts/defaultThinkingEffort and operator effort data resets on every model sync; models whose upstream accepts a native max tier cannot be used with forced-max reasoning rules. Parse the shape into the existing supportedThinkingEfforts pipeline, intersected across vendor routes: the same canonical model declares different vocabularies per route and unpinned requests self-narrow to a route honoring the requested level, so a synced tier must be honored on every route the model can land on. Routes without effort_values declare no effort control and are excluded; disjoint vocabularies produce an authoritative empty list (no fall-through to generic tier shapes). detectDefaultThinkingEffort falls back to the intersection's highest tier ranked by the canonical effort order — only when the vendors shape is the record's winning vocabulary source, never escaping a flat or nested declared list. Detection is shape-gated, not provider-gated; Zod-validated (Hard Rule #7) with malformed vendor and tier entries dropped individually (discarding a whole route would widen the intersection, fail-open). Precedence: flat field > reasoning.supported_efforts / metadata (#7694) > vendor-route intersection > capabilities.effort_tiers (#9160) / supported_reasoning_levels / thinking.levels (#8347). |
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Aaron Scherer
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7e0c9f526a |
feat(sse): allow disabling conversation tracking (#13150)
* feat(sse): allow disabling conversation tracking * docs: document OMNIROUTE_DISABLE_CONVERSATION_TRACKING |
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Aaron Scherer
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30451e63af |
fix(sse): preserve Fable mid-conversation cache prefixes (#13173)
* fix(sse): preserve Fable mid-conversation cache prefixes * docs(changelog): add fragment for fable cache prefix fix |
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Aaron Scherer
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46730700f1 |
feat(usage): show separate Fable weekly limits (#13266)
* feat(usage): show separate Fable weekly limits * docs(changelog): add fragment for fable weekly usage |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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2fa6ef0bdd |
security(runtime): harden TLS provenance, lifecycle, and public error boundaries (#11742)
* security(deps): pin and verify tls-client native artifacts * docs(changelog): link tls-client provenance PR * security(runtime): harden TLS and public error boundaries * security(runtime): resolve CodeQL error-boundary findings * security(lmarena): close public stream error boundary * fix(lmarena): normalize public error statuses * chore(quality): rebaseline chatCore.ts for the surviving log-boundary hardening open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts 6219 -> 6287. This is the one part of #11742 that survived the rebase: sanitizeErrorMessage on the plugin onError hook, on the semaphore-timeout path and on failureMessage before it reaches console.log and the call log, sanitizeUpstreamDetails on the malformed-response log, and getSafeErrorMetadata + try/catch where hostile (Proxy) metadata could throw. That is the LOG boundary, which is broader than Hard Rule #12 (responses). The rest of the PR was dropped as already landed on the tip. |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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57729db54d |
chore(quality): rebaseline the four ceilings the 2026-09-17 merge wave moved (#14002)
Measured on the clean tip (
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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83fa4328f3 |
feat(providers): add xKiro (#12648)
* test(catalog): pin the 2026-09-02 free-tier re-audit facts for gemini, ollama-cloud, groq, nara and mistral * feat(providers): add xKiro (5M tokens/day free plan, 39 pinned free models) * fix(catalog): re-audit gemini, ollama-cloud, groq, nara and mistral against official pages * docs(providers): xKiro in the provider reference, counts and free-tier headline (~1.66B) * fix(catalog): restore the console-verified Mistral 1B pool and harden its regression test * docs(free-tiers): move headline to the re-audited ~1.50B and refresh pool counts * chore(free-tiers): retire stale Groq free-tier text and preset model; fix catalog header * docs(providers): align the remaining visible provider/executor counts with the catalog * docs(providers): align remaining free-tier count chips and metadata * docs(free-tiers): state the evidence-comment rule honestly and retire the last "14.4K RPD" Groq texts * docs(free-tiers): retire the stale Gemini onboarding quota text * docs(free-tier): refresh catalog-entry counts to 442 after base sync * docs(providers): re-sync provider and free-tier counts after merging release/v3.8.51 * docs(providers): re-sync residual counts after the base merge * docs(free-tiers): restore README spacing lost in the merge and re-sync the guide counts * docs(free-tiers): re-sync numbers after merging release/v3.8.51 (Cerebras reclassified upstream) * fix(docs): keep the NaraRouter plans endpoint out of the API-path checker; rebaseline gateways.ts (+3) * chore(quality): rebaseline gateways.ts file-size cap for the xKiro entry (+20) --------- Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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b6975537c1 |
fix(providers): remove the chipotle/pepper provider (#13131) (#13913)
* fix(providers): remove the chipotle/pepper provider (#13131) amelia.chipotle.com (the reverse-engineered Amelia chat-widget backend chipotle/pepper-1 talked to) now returns 404 on every route, including root, from its Azure Application Gateway — confirmed live 2026-09-15. This regressed from a WS handshake timeout (#4037, June 2026) to a fully decommissioned host, so the upstream protocol cannot be fixed. Owner decided to retire the provider entirely (Option B), following the phind/kluster quiet-removal precedent: no REMOVED_PROVIDERS.md entry (reserved for operator takedowns), just a one-line note under FREE_TIERS.md "Removed / no free tier". Removed every surface: executor, registry entry, executors/index.ts and providers/index.ts wiring, noauth provider catalog entry, ProviderIcon generic-fallback set, the autoCombo exclusion-list comment, the chipotle_error code from the sanitizer allowlist, PROVIDER_REFERENCE.md (regenerated), and every doc/test reference. Regression test: tests/unit/issue-13131-chipotle-provider-removed.test.ts asserts the provider is fully gone from the executor registry, the provider REGISTRY and the noauth catalog, and that the executor module no longer resolves — not a live-network repro (flaky/third-party). Several existing tests used "chipotle" only as a generic noAuth-provider example (proxy scoping, error classification, onboarding, fallback text) with no chipotle-specific behavior under test; those were re-pointed at another still-existing noAuth provider (cloudflare-playground / duckduckgo-web) rather than weakened. * test(providers): document the agnes-cn/chipotle count coincidence (#13131) provider-node-reserved-prefix.test.ts's REGISTRY id+alias walk was already red on the base tip (414 vs. expected 412) from agnes-cn (#13399, +id/+alias). Removing chipotle's REGISTRY id/alias in this PR nets it back to 412, making the test pass again without a numeric edit — record why in a comment so it doesn't read as an untracked coincidence later. |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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872376bdc1 |
fix(chat): reject null/non-object entries in messages[] (#12643) (#13755)
* fix(chat): reject null/non-object entries in messages[] (#12643) A messages array containing null (or any non-object entry, e.g. [null] or [42]) passed every existing entry guard in chat.ts (#5110/#6402/#6407/#6412) and reached downstream translators/session helpers that read `.role` / `.content` directly off each entry (openai-to-claude.ts, sessionManager.ts, contextManager.ts's fixToolPairs), crashing with a raw TypeError and surfacing as an HTTP 500 instead of a clean 400. The route's Zod schema is intentionally wide (z.array(z.unknown())), so this shape check belongs in the handler's guard chain. Adds one more entry-shape guard clause to the same chokepoint, rejecting the request with a clear 400 before any routing or upstream call. Regression test: tests/unit/chat-messages-entry-objects-12643.test.ts PR #12644 (@soroush5) proposed this exact fix but was closed without merging on 2026-09-12; this re-implements it fresh against the current tip using the same guard shape and error message. Originally-proposed-by: @soroush5 in #12644 Co-authored-by: soroush5 <mrsoroushahmadi@gmail.com> * chore(quality): refix the chat.ts ceiling for the merged tree This branch rebaselined src/sse/handlers/chat.ts against an older tip. After merging the current release tip the combined file is 2520 lines, so the 2500 ceiling no longer covers it. The tip alone is already at 2509 — above the 2500 this PR had frozen — so most of the gap is inherited, not introduced here. This PR's own contribution is the +10 of the messages-entry guard itself. Ceiling refixed at the value the gate reports for the merged tree. --------- Co-authored-by: soroush5 <mrsoroushahmadi@gmail.com> |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
d6f720bceb |
feat(i18n): new-key gate rejects __MISSING__ markers; skills translate new keys in parallel (#13996)
On 2026-09-16 eight feature PRs added 61 keys to src/i18n/messages/en.json and stamped `__MISSING__:<en>` into all 65 locales instead of translating. check-new-key-coverage accepted the marker as "the key reached the locale", so nothing blocked the PRs, and the blocking real-translation ratio gate then failed on the release tip for everybody (pt-BR 3.2 % > 2.5 % + 0.5). - scripts/i18n/check-new-key-coverage.mjs: a leaf whose value starts with `__MISSING__:` is judged exactly like an absent leaf; the FAIL message names the marker as the cause and prints the per-locale sync-ui-keys command and the parallel runner. Header/JSDoc updated. - tests/unit/i18n-new-key-coverage.test.ts: "a new key that only carries a __MISSING__ marker is flagged" (was the inverse case, which encoded the old contract); the other six cases unchanged and green. - scripts/i18n/translate-new-keys.sh (+ `npm run i18n:translate-new-keys`): committed, detached-safe runner — flock queue, N workers (default 5), 3 attempts per locale of `sync-ui-keys.mjs --translate-markers --batch-size=40`, per-locale logs/.exit + batch.log/batch.status/batch.rc/batch.pid under _artifacts/i18n-new-keys/, non-zero exit while any locale still carries a marker, refuses to start (exit 2, names the five OMNIROUTE_TRANSLATION_* vars) when the backend env is absent. Reads only the OMNIROUTE_TRANSLATION_* lines of the repo .env; kills nothing, matches nothing by name. - docs: QUALITY_GATES.md (gate table + check-new-key-coverage section) and I18N.md (gate table + "Translating the keys a branch adds" subsection). The implementation/port/merge skills reference the new shared snippet `.agents/skills/_shared/i18n-translate-new-keys.md` (skills repo, separate). |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
ceafa55824 |
fix(providers): select and verify the requested gemini-web model/mode before answering (#13381) (#13919)
Root cause: GeminiWebExecutor.execute() opened the identical fixed https://gemini.google.com/app URL and ran the identical Playwright interaction sequence for every advertised gweb/<model> id. `model` was read only AFTER the response was captured, purely to stamp the OpenAI-shaped response — never to influence what was actually clicked/typed, so two different advertised models produced byte-identical automation and the response `model` field was a caller-supplied label, not an observed fact. Fix (owner decision, Option B): a new model -> Gemini UI mode map (open-sse/executors/gemini-web/modeSelection.ts) drives an in-browser selection step before anything is typed — try the mode control, read back the active-mode indicator, and only proceed on a confirmed match. An unconfirmed model, or a requested Extended Thinking control that cannot be confirmed (#13381 follow-up comment), fails closed with 400 unsupported_control_for_provider instead of silently running the account default under the requested label. The selectors involved are UNVALIDATED (no live Gemini account from this checkout) — see the PR's "Selector set is UNVALIDATED" section and the required live smoke. Regression test: tests/unit/issue-13381-gemini-web-model-selection.test.ts |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
d8ad12f22d |
docs(agents): advance the documented Bun pin to 1.4.2 (#13946)
#13661 bumped the exact `bun` devDependency (and `@types/bun`) from 1.4.0 to 1.4.2, and #12977 moved the `oven/bun` image to 1.4.2-slim. AGENTS.md still documented 1.4.0, so the guide disagreed with package.json for every agent reading it as authority. Version string only. The surrounding policy is deliberately unchanged: Bun stays confined to the allow-listed gate/generator scripts plus the `test:bun:db` smoke suite, and Node remains the only supported runtime. Operator approved editing this protected surface for this change. |
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initguru
|
b7192b72e2 |
fix(thinking): parse/scrub DSML tool-call markers and recognize adaptive thinking (#12905)
* fix(thinking): recognize adaptive thinking + parse/scrub DSML tool-call markers
Two defects combined to break DeepSeek-V4-Flash turns and raise 502
empty_response on Claude Code autocompact.
Defect 1 — DSML tool-call markers leaked as visible content:
DeepSeek-V4-Flash occasionally emits tool calls in a non-standard DSML
text format using full-width pipes instead of the OpenAI tool_calls JSON.
Two shapes appear in production call logs:
- complete block: <｜DSML｜:Read><path>...</path></｜DSML｜:Read>
- stray closers (truncated call): </｜DSML｜parameter></｜DSML｜invoke>
</｜DSML｜tool_calls>, sometimes trailing a system-prompt echo
The openai-compatible path never parsed these, so the markers leaked to
the client as visible content and the turn ended incomplete.
Fix: add open-sse/utils/dsmlToolCalls.ts — parseDsmlToolCalls() converts
complete DSML blocks into OpenAI tool_calls and strips stray closing
markers from content (streaming-safe via a holdback for partial openers).
Wire it into the response translator before extractXmlInvokeBlocks so
DSML and XML invoke tool calls share the same pending queue.
Defect 2 — adaptive thinking silently suppressed:
A prior inline === 'enabled' check on body.thinking.type silently
suppressed adaptive (the intent Claude Code actually sends), so
reasoning was dropped. The model then emitted DSML tool-call markers
as plain text, producing an incomplete stop finish. Fix: use
hasActiveClaudeThinking() (which recognizes enabled AND adaptive) to
set requestedThinking, thread it through stream.ts and translator
state, and gate thinking block emission on state.requestedThinking
so upstream reasoning_content only relays when the client opted in.
Tests: 29/29 (6 dsml-tool-calls, 5 thinking-active-claude-adapter,
3 translator-resp-dsml-integration, 15 translator-resp-openai-to-claude
incl. requestedThinking suppression regression). typecheck:core clean.
* fix(sse): strip echoed system-prompt preamble + preserve large analysis/summary blocks
DeepSeek-V4 and similar models echo the OMNIROUTE_SYSTEM_INSTRUCTION_APPEND
directive (appended to the system tail by claude-to-openai.ts) and whole chunks
of the system prompt (<analysis>/<system-reminder>/<summary> blocks, prose
reproductions of the superpowers skill section) verbatim at the START of their
reply — the 'system message leak' persisting after the request-side fix.
Add two streaming-safe preamble strippers in directivePreambleStripper.ts:
- createDirectivePreambleStripper(directive): drops a leading reproduction of
the exact configured directive across arbitrary SSE chunk boundaries.
- createSystemPreambleStripper(): removes <analysis>/<system-reminder>/
<summary> echo blocks and known prose heads (Phase B) from the very start
of a stream, only while the stream is still a preamble.
Wire both into openai-to-claude.ts content-delta path: chain the exact-directive
stripper then the system-echo stripper before DSML/XML-invoke parsing, so a
leading system echo is dropped before it reaches the client.
Preserve large blocks (>= SYSTEM_ECHO_THRESHOLD=1000 chars) and blocks with no
trailing content — these are the model's real response (e.g. a Claude Code
autocompact summary), not a short system-echo. Stops the autocompact
empty-response regression where a whole-summary <analysis> block was stripped
to empty (3a8515).
Regression: origin's markdown-boundary feature (bufferedPrefix /
splitMarkdownBoundary, commit
|
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Koosha Paridehpour
|
20f3900889 |
fix(claude-web): add charset=utf-8 to Content-Type headers to fix Arabic/Persian UTF-8 mojibake (#13416) (#13419)
* fix(claude-web): add charset=utf-8 to Content-Type headers to fix Arabic/Persian UTF-8 mojibake Fixes #13416 The Claude Web endpoint and the outer SSE streaming pipeline were returning Content-Type headers without an explicit charset parameter: - stream.ts responseHeaders() returned 'application/json' and 'text/event-stream' without charset - responseHeaders.ts buildStreamingResponseHeaders() returned 'text/event-stream' without charset While RFC 8259 defaults JSON to UTF-8 and the SSE spec defaults text/event-stream to UTF-8, some HTTP clients (notably VS Code Chat on Windows) fall back to ISO-8859-1/Latin-1 when no charset is declared, causing multi-byte UTF-8 characters to appear as mojibake. For example, the Persian word for hello (سلام, UTF-8 bytes D8 B3 D9 84 D8 A7 D9 85) was decoded as Latin-1, producing the garbled output 'سلام'. Fix: - claude-web/stream.ts: append '; charset=utf-8' to the Content-Type header in the responseHeaders() helper, with a guard to avoid double appending if the caller already includes a charset - chatCore/responseHeaders.ts: hardcode 'text/event-stream; charset=utf-8' in buildStreamingResponseHeaders() Tests: - 11 new regression tests in claude-web-utf8-mojibake-13416.test.ts covering Persian, Arabic, mixed-script, emoji, and chunk-boundary-split scenarios across both streaming and buffered response paths - All 7 existing claude-web-stream tests pass - All 13 response header tests pass - All 8 adaptive-admission-lifecycle tests pass * test(sse): confirm streaming charset header and add byte-level UTF-8 repro (#13416) Independently verified the mojibake root cause before trusting the charset fix: OmniRoute's claude-web decoder already reconstructs a Persian/Arabic multi-byte UTF-8 sequence split across a chunk boundary correctly because it decodes with TextDecoder({ stream: true }); a naive per-chunk decode (without stream state) is what actually produces the U+FFFD garbling. Updated the 2 exact Content-Type assertions in chat-pipeline.test.ts to match the new "text/event-stream; charset=utf-8" header, which is already the convention used by the other streaming executors (uc.ts, maxai.ts, codex-app-server.ts, etc). Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Koosha Pari <koosha@phenotype.ai> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Koosha Paridehpour
|
f5ff7c1e1b |
fix(compression): skip RTK dedup and truncation for non-shell tool results (#13521)
* fix(db): union customModels with syncedAvailableModels in dispatch path * fix(compression): skip RTK dedup and truncation for non-shell tool results RTK's line deduplication and truncation were applied to all tool results including non-shell tools (read, grep, glob, edit, write). This collapsed structurally meaningful repeated lines in file content (e.g. JSON closing braces, repeated key names), silently corrupting what the model received. Now skipFilters (set for non-shell tools) and isDocumentLikeRead both gate dedup and truncation, so file content survives byte-identical. Fixes #13388 * fix(compression): restrict RTK truncation skip to document-like reads The non-shell truncation-skip (options.skipFilters) disabled the generic line/char cap for every non-shell tool result, including grep/glob/search output that #4559 deliberately did NOT exempt. Only isDocumentLikeRead now gates the generic truncation cap; the broader skip stays for dedup, which is the operation that actually corrupts structured JSON content. Also drops docs/omniroute-pr-body.md, an out-of-scope file carried by an unrelated commit on this branch, and fixes the regression test's broken relative import (tests/unit/compression -> open-sse is 3 levels up, not 2 — this is why the test file could not even load before this commit), adjusts its truncation fixture to a genuinely document-like (non-JSON) read so it actually exercises the isDocumentLikeRead exemption, and adds a negative case asserting large non-shell grep output still gets truncated by the generic cap. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> * test(compression): make the RTK preservation test an actual regression guard The four cases all passed against the tip WITHOUT this branch's fix, so they guarded nothing — the next RTK refactor could reopen #13388 in silence. Two causes, both fixed here: - The fixture's repeated lines were not consecutive, and deduplicateRepeatedLines only collapses consecutive runs, so dedup never ran on it. Replaced with a matrix of identical rows, where collapsing them CORRUPTS the data rather than just reformatting it — which is the damage the fix prevents. - Both central assertions sat inside `if (result.stats)`. With the old fixture the engine reported no stats, so the assertion bodies were skipped entirely and the test passed by doing nothing. They now run unconditionally. Verified in both directions on the current tip: with this branch's fix → tests 4 | pass 4 | fail 0 against the tip's engine → tests 4 | pass 3 | fail 1 ✖ RTK should NOT dedup file content from a non-shell 'read' tool --------- Co-authored-by: Forge <forge@kooshapari.local> Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <kooshapari@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Koosha Paridehpour
|
7a0b0c64fb |
fix(compression): track only the recursion path in isStrictlySerializable (#13154) (#13423)
* fix(compression): remove isStrictlySerializable gate that rejects valid bodies (#13154) Fixes #13154 isCompressionWorkerEligible used isStrictlySerializable to pre-validate bodies before posting them to a worker thread. The gate is stricter than structuredClone (which postMessage uses natively), rejecting: - undefined values (common in optional config fields) - Date, Map, Set, Uint8Array, RegExp (all structuredClone-compatible) - Shared (non-cyclic) sub-objects (misread as cycles) This caused compression to fall back to inline execution on the main event loop, blocking every concurrent request for the duration of compression passes — the exact failure mode of #10300. The serializability walk is a slower, buggier duplicate of the check postMessage already performs. Removing it: - Eliminates a recursive walk of the entire body on the main thread - Fixes false rejections that prevent worker offload - Allows the catch block at the call site to properly fall through to inline compression instead of silently shipping uncompressed * fix(compression): track only the recursion path, not the whole tree, in isStrictlySerializable (#13154) Restores the cycle-detection gate instead of removing it: the original bug was a single `seen` set shared across the entire recursion tree, never backtracked, so two sibling branches referencing the SAME non-cyclic sub-object were misread as a cycle. Adding to `seen` before descending and removing it after (try/finally) fixes the false positive while a genuine cycle is still rejected before it ever reaches postMessage/the worker. Also reverts the worker-failure catch in runCompressionAsync back to returning the body uncompressed: a worker timeout means the compression was already too heavy for the worker's own budget, so falling through to run that same heavy compression synchronously on the main event loop defeats the point of offloading it to a worker in the first place. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Koosha Pari <koosha@phenotype.ai> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Koosha Paridehpour
|
9c5d60027e |
fix(api): stream /api/logs/export with row cap to prevent V8 heap OOM (#13123) (#13428)
* fix(api): stream /api/logs/export with row cap to prevent V8 heap OOM (#13123) Fixes #13123 GET /api/logs/export buffered every matching row into a single JSON.stringify call with pretty-printing (null,2), roughly doubling the string size. On tables with tens of thousands of rows this crashed the Node process with a V8 heap OOM, taking the gateway down for minutes. Changes: - Stream the response via ReadableStream, serializing one row at a time so peak memory stays bounded regardless of table size. - Add a configurable row cap (limit query param, default 10000, max 50000) so callers cannot accidentally request unbounded exports. - Remove pretty-printing (callers can pretty-print client-side). - Include cap metadata (capped, limit, totalAvailable) when the cap fires so callers know they received a truncated result. - Preserve backward-compatible response envelope: { count, hours, type, logs, ... }. * fix(api): push the /api/logs/export row cap down into the DB layer (#13123) The route-layer streaming + cap from the previous pass still called exportCallLogsSince()/exportProxyLogsSince(), which hydrated and buffered EVERY matching row (including rows beyond the limit) before the cap was ever applied — peak V8 heap was essentially unchanged. Adds countCallLogsSince()/countProxyLogsSince() (cheap COUNT(*), no row hydration, used for totalAvailable) and iterateCallLogsSince()/ iterateProxyLogsSince() that bound the query with SQL LIMIT and yield/hydrate one row at a time: a generator over a LIMIT-bounded id list for call_logs, and fixed-size LIMIT/OFFSET pages for proxy_logs (the shared SqliteAdapter only exposes run/get/all, not a `.iterate()` cursor, so LIMIT/OFFSET pagination is the available cursor-equivalent without widening that interface across all 4 driver adapters). The route now streams from these instead, so the full matching row set is never buffered. Also moves capped/limit/totalAvailable into the response header instead of only the trailer, so a client consuming the stream incrementally learns about truncation before processing every row. Rewrote the test to call the real route.GET handler against a seeded test database instead of a local reimplementation of the stream builder, so a regression in the route or its DB-layer delegates is actually caught. Documents the pre-existing (now more clearly load-bearing) breaking change in a changelog fragment: `limit` defaults to 10,000 rows, so exports that previously returned everything are silently truncated. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Koosha Pari <koosha@phenotype.ai> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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initguru
|
36df9e505a |
fix(codex): fail fast and release per-account Responses WS leases (#12911)
* fix(codex): fail fast and release per-account Responses WS leases * chore(changelog): add fragment for Codex WS lease fail-fast fix Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(codex): carry the reasoning-rule context through the leased WS path --------- Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
c3e966eeb9 |
docs(changelog): reconcile the v3.8.51 living section — round 2 (2026-09-15) (#13731)
Second `npm run release:reconcile` pass on `release/v3.8.50..release/v3.8.51` (091589089c..c0f92ec98a, 916 non-merge commits, 877 merged PRs): - fold the 173 changelog.d fragments accumulated since #12971 under `## [3.8.51]` and delete them - generate bullets for the 58 cycle commits that had no fragment (4 features / 42 fixes / 12 maintenance), each with the merged PR link and `— thanks @author` - link 137 fragment bullets to the PR of the commit that added them and credit the author; two prefix/origin mismatches reviewed (#12945→#13392, #13001→#13379, both maintainer rebaselines of other people's PRs) - refresh "Release by the numbers" + Top-25 and regenerate the `### 🙌 Contributors` hall (112 external contributors + maintainer; every non-bot author of the 877 merged PRs present) - closed-PR credit audit for the window: nothing to add (#13215→#13361 and #13059→#13690 are still open, #12998 was independently fixed earlier by #12853); no human co-author trailers, no commits without a PR - resync the 58 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors Gates: check:changelog-integrity OK, check:docs-sync PASS. |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
8587665669 |
fix(routing): fail over when Auggie's quota-exhausted text exits clean (#12949) (#13751)
Root cause: when a user's Augment/Auggie quota is exhausted, the local
`auggie` CLI prints its "You have run out of usage for ..." warning to
stdout and exits with code 0. AuggieExecutor treated any clean exit as
a successful completion and wrapped that text as a normal 200 assistant
reply, so combo/fallback routing never saw a failure and kept sending
requests to the same exhausted connection.
Fix: detect the CLI's known quota-exhausted phrasing before wrapping
stdout as a completion. Non-streaming returns a 429 in-band error body
(mirroring blackbox-web.ts's precedent for HTTP-200 in-band errors);
streaming buffers the first ~2KB of stdout, and on a match emits the
existing {error:...} SSE envelope (reusing the #7880 combo quality-gate
detection) instead of forwarding the text as a delta.
Regression test: tests/unit/issue-12949-auggie-quota-exhausted-200.test.ts
|
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
d92046064e |
fix(api): restore MCP namespace identity on follow-up Responses turns (#12996) (#13769)
Root cause: resolveRequestToolIdentity (the #7936/#9780 seam) only ever
resolved a streamed/non-streamed Responses function_call item's
{namespace, name} from the CURRENT request's own requestToolIdentityMap,
built solely from that request's own tools:[{type:"namespace",...}]
declarations. OmniRoute is a stateless-upstream-by-default proxy for the
Responses API, so nothing persisted namespace identity across separate
top-level HTTP requests in the same Codex/MCP session — a follow-up turn
that relies on previous_response_id/session continuity instead of
re-declaring its namespace tools silently lost the namespace field.
Fix: a deterministic wire-name fallback that splits a flattened
mcp__-namespaced wire name on its last "__" separator (mirroring
flattenNamespaceToolName's own construction), scoped to the mcp__
container-name convention so it cannot misfire on an unrelated flat tool
name that happens to contain "__". Applied symmetrically to the
non-streaming path.
Regression test: tests/unit/issue-12996-responses-streaming-namespace-followup.test.ts
|
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
d032431a5f |
test(catalog): stop the yield guard from dying on production's build budget (#13906)
tests/unit/9147-catalog-eventloop-yield.test.ts exists to prove the /v1/models builder yields to the event loop while assembling a catalog-scale dataset. It asserts res.status === 200 first, and only then the two checks that carry the invariant: the max event-loop gap and the traversal to the last seeded model. The case did not set CATALOG_BUILD_TIMEOUT_MS, so it inherited production's 8s cold-path budget. When the seeded build overruns that on a loaded runner, getUnifiedModelsResponse answers 503 catalog_build_timeout and the status check fails BEFORE either real assertion runs — the guard goes silently dead exactly when the machine is under the load that would make a pin most visible. CI hit it at 8350ms, right at the bound. Measured on the release tip, pristine file, 3 runs at load ~21: 2 pass with max gaps of 247ms and 180ms, 1 fails with 503 !== 200 — roughly a 1-in-3 flake, and the flake has nothing to do with yielding. Pinning a 120s budget lets the invariant be evaluated. The 800ms gap bound is untouched, and with the budget pinned the builder measures 261ms (idle) to 790ms (loaded) against it — still failing a true pin, which is seconds. Build-latency budgeting is a separate concern from this case. Refs #12732 |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
209112df36 |
fix(cli): persist supervisor give-up crash diagnostics to disk (#13538) (#13908)
Root cause: ServerSupervisor.handleExit()'s give-up branch only printed the crash summary/log via console.error(). In --tray/--tray-worker mode this process is launched detached with stdio:"ignore" on Windows and Linux (bin/cli/tray/detachedTray.mjs buildTrayLaunch()), so that output is discarded by the OS and nothing ever explained why the tray + gateway disappeared together. Fix (Part A only, see plan-file for Part B — a restart-on-failure policy, out of scope here): best-effort append the crash summary + buffered log to <DATA_DIR>/server/crash.log, wrapped in try/catch so the write can never block shutdown. Surface the same file from `omniroute doctor`. Regression test: tests/unit/issue-13538-tray-crash-diagnostics-lost.test.ts |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
21772f40f3 |
fix(security): generate a random per-install CLI token salt (#13679) (#13909)
Both src/lib/machineToken.ts::getActiveSalt() and its mirror in
bin/cli/utils/cliToken.mjs derived the CLI/management bearer token as
HMAC-SHA256(raw machine-id, salt) with a checked-in literal default salt
("omniroute-cli-auth-v1"). Since /etc/machine-id is commonly world-readable,
any local user who never set OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT could derive the same
bearer token as the server.
getActiveSalt() now generates a random 64-char-hex salt on first use and
persists it under <DATA_DIR>/cli-token-salt.json (falling back to the
literal only when neither the env override nor a persisted/writable salt
can be established). Both implementations use the same resolution order
and the same wx-flag create-race handling so the CLI and server keep
deriving the same token. OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT stays the explicit operator
override, unchanged.
Regression test: tests/unit/machine-token-random-salt-13679.test.ts
|
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
e7b82783f2 |
fix(sse): classify a 2xx body as a disguised upstream failure (#13461) (#13910)
Pollinations and Perplexity-web can answer a genuine failure (expired session, exhausted free-tier credits) with HTTP 200 and a structurally normal completion whose assistant text is just the provider's own error prose. classifyProviderError() only inspects the body for 400/401/402/403/429, and detectMalformedNonStream() only checked structural emptiness, so the error text reached the client as a real answer and combo/auto-fallback never triggered. Adds classifyFakeSuccessBody() in errorClassifier.ts — allowlisted to pollinations/perplexity-web, reusing the existing CREDITS_EXHAUSTED_SIGNALS/ACCOUNT_DEACTIVATED_SIGNALS phrase lists, gated on short content with a dominant signal match — and wires it into detectMalformedNonStream() so the existing malformed-200 / combo-failover path picks it up with no other handler changes. Regression test: tests/unit/diagnostics-fake-success-13461.test.ts |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
|
de369fcc59 |
fix(security): container/Fly REQUIRE_API_KEY posture + free-tier usage leak (#13679) (#13911)
PR E of the #13679 insecure-defaults umbrella (items #6, #7; item #8 analyzed as by-design, no change). The published Docker image and fly.toml shipped without REQUIRE_API_KEY set, so a bare `docker run` (README/QUICK-START one-liners, no --env-file) or a `fly deploy` combined "keyless" with "world-reachable" for the anonymous /v1 LLM proxy. docker-compose.yml already mitigates this via loopback-only binding (#12568) and correctly keeps following the operator's own .env, so it is untouched. The npm/CLI local-first REQUIRE_API_KEY=false default in featureFlagDefinitions.ts is also untouched per the owner's decision. /api/free-tier/summary ships an unconditional Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*" and always included the operator's own local usedThisMonth/remaining usage regardless of auth — a low-severity info leak to any reachable origin. Both fields are now withheld from unauthenticated callers while the intentionally public catalog data stays served to everyone. The gemini-SSE (openai-to-gemini-sse.ts) sub-finding needed no code change: /v1beta/models/*:streamGenerateContent is already classified CLIENT_API and fronted by clientApiPolicy through src/proxy.ts before the translator ever runs, and its CORS-header echo was already hardened fail-closed by #12573. REQUIRE_API_KEY=true (this PR's container/Fly default) closes the dependency that finding cited. Added a locking regression test confirming this chain. Regression tests: - tests/unit/issue-13679-container-posture-require-api-key.test.ts - tests/unit/issue-13679-free-tier-summary-usage-leak.test.ts - tests/unit/issue-13679-gemini-sse-requires-api-key.test.ts (confirmation) Refs #13679 |
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initguru
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3e080877f2 |
fix(sse): bound active streams without terminal events (#12913)
* fix(sse): bound active streams without terminal events * fix(sse): derive the active-stream ceiling from the largest registered model budget The watchdog is a hard lifetime cap that never resets on bytes, so a flat 15-minute default killed models the registry already allows to run for 20 minutes (the Codex entries declare timeoutMs: 1_200_000). The default is now that maximum plus a one-minute margin, and a new test re-derives the maximum from the registry so a future larger budget fails the gate instead of silently re-opening the bug. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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initguru
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4c4d5c7fbe |
fix(resilience): allow maxWaitMs=0 as disable sentinel for execution expiration (#12902)
* fix(resilience): allow maxWaitMs=0 as disable sentinel for execution expiration
maxWaitMs normalization clamped the value to min:1, silently rewriting
an operator's 0 ("disable the limiter-managed execution deadline") into
1 — a 1ms expiration that killed every long-running job instantly. This
broke long-running reasoning models (GLM-5.2 with reasoning.effort=max
spends minutes before the first token, exceeding any practical
maxWaitMs; the TTB safety net is FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS, default 600s).
Fix: lower the floor to min:0 so 0 is preserved as the disable sentinel.
Issue #4165 follow-up.
Tests: 7/7 (resilience-normalize-maxwaitms-disable 5 + rate-limit-
maxwaitms-disable-execution 2). typecheck:core clean.
* fix(resilience): relax requestQueueSettingsSchema.maxWaitMs to allow 0
normalizeRequestQueueSettings already treats maxWaitMs=0 as an explicit
disable sentinel (queue-wait budget off), but the settings API schema
still rejected 0 with min(1), so an operator could never actually reach
the fix through PATCH /api/resilience. executionMaxWaitMs is untouched
(stays min(1) — separate field, separate decision, see #12902 item 4).
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(resilience): prove maxWaitMs=0 vs #12715's queue-wait gate behavior
Answers the open technical question from #12902's review: does a
GLOBAL maxWaitMs=0 reintroduce the unbounded-queue regression #12715
fixed (a request hanging ~6min until the client aborts)?
Evidence, exercising the real gate chatCore.ts actually calls
(accountSemaphore.acquireMany({ timeoutMs: requestQueue.maxWaitMs }),
not the Bottleneck reservoir the PR's own tests cover) under real
contention (maxConcurrency=1, two concurrent acquires):
- No: it does not hang. setTimeout(reject, 0) fires on the next
tick, so a second contending request is rejected with
SEMAPHORE_TIMEOUT in low milliseconds, never minutes.
- But it is also not a genuine 'no cap' — an operator setting 0
expecting 'wait as long as it takes' instead gets near-zero
tolerance for even momentary contention on any configured
concurrency gate (global/provider/account). This is a real
asymmetry vs. the Bottleneck reservoir path (where 0 truly means
unbounded) left for the maintainer to decide how to resolve —
not something this pass can decide unilaterally.
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Jihyun Son <jihyun.son@sk.com>
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
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Koosha Paridehpour
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28557418db |
fix(proxy): add combo scope to fail-closed proxy guard (#13551)
* fix(proxy): add combo scope to fail-closed proxy guard (fixes #13469) The hasBlockingProxyAssignment guard only checked account, provider, and global scopes. Combo-scoped proxy assignments were not checked, so a fully dead combo pool fell through to direct egress — leaking the host IP. - Add combo scope to the SQL guard query - Add optional comboName parameter to hasBlockingProxyAssignment - A dead combo pool now blocks egress like the other three scopes * fix(proxy): thread comboName through safeResolveProxy to the combo-scope guard (#13469) hasBlockingProxyAssignment() gained a comboName parameter and a combo-scope SQL clause, but its only caller, safeResolveProxy() in chatHelpers.ts, never passed it — the clause always bound NULL and never matched a real combo scope_id, so a fully dead combo-scoped proxy pool still fell through to direct egress. Thread comboName from handleSingleModelChat (where it is already in scope) through safeResolveProxy into the guard, and add tests covering both the guard predicate and the end-to-end wiring. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Koosha Pari <koosha@phenotype.ai> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Koosha Paridehpour
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2dae6df518 |
feat(sse): retry transient 5xx backend errors with jitter (global-fallback call site) (#12695) (#13143)
* feat(sse): retry transient 5xx backend errors with jitter (global-fallback call site) (#12695) Per Diego's review feedback on the original PR (which was closed for base drift + over-broad scope): - Helper in tests/unit/ (not open-sse/__tests__) - 7 node:test cases - Drop 429 from retryable set (keep 502/503/504) - 429 must respect the RateLimit-Reset header and be surfaced, not silently retried - Touch ONLY the global-fallback call site in chat.ts - the combo-target loop has its own retry semantics already The wrap uses decorrelated full-jitter exponential backoff (per AWS retry guidance), abort-aware (client disconnect cancels immediately), and respects the AbortSignal via a sleep that throws on abort. Re-cherry-pick: dropped all unrelated drift from the original PR (videoBridgeLog plumbing, forcedConnectionId refactor, comboCheckProvider/ghComboGate, getPassthroughProviders, Moonshot quota fetcher, withSelectedConnectionHeader, classifyProviderBreakerResult, reanchorVideoBridgeRedaction, etc.). chat.ts is now +20/-16 — purely the import + the wrap around handleSingleModelChat in the global-fallback block. Diego should now see a clean, focused diff. Fixes #12695 * fix(sse): address kilo-code-bot review on transientBackendRetry helper Per the review comment on the previous commit: - Jitter formula now matches documented AWS decorrelated jitter (temp = min(cap, random(base, prev*3))) instead of an ad-hoc baseMs + rand*prev*2 approximation - AbortSignal is honoured by the default sleep implementation (was previously only honoured by the loop's pre-attempt check) - 'source' option added to TransientRetryOptions so callers can propagate an observability label (e.g. 'global-fallback') through onRetry Adds 3 tests: - default sleep respects AbortSignal without custom sleep - onRetry receives source label - decorrelated jitter is bounded by capMs 10/10 unit tests pass. --------- Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <kooshapari@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Koosha Paridehpour
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5455740faa |
fix(compression): log warnings for unreadable settings rows (#13522)
* fix(compression): log warnings for unreadable settings rows getCompressionSettings() silently skipped non-string (BLOB) and invalid-JSON settings rows, making it impossible to diagnose config drift between the panel and the runtime. Now logs a warn-level message for each unreadable row, including the key name and a remediation hint (re-save from the Storage panel). Also warns when the 'engines' row exists but yields no valid toggles, so operators know their panel-configured engines map is being silently replaced by the legacy fallback. Fixes #13456 * test(compression): cover getCompressionSettings warnings for unreadable rows The test for #13456 only asserted a stubbed console.warn recorded a message and never called getCompressionSettings(), so it never exercised the production change. Seed a BLOB row, an invalid-JSON row, and an 'engines' row that isn't a usable object, and assert the resulting warnings; also assert a legitimately empty (but valid) 'engines' map does not warn. Also stop warning on a valid-but-empty 'engines' row: parseStoredEnginesMap returns null both for an unreadable row and for a well-formed {} (an operator who deliberately disabled every engine), so only warn when the stored value isn't a usable object at all. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Koosha Pari <koosha@phenotype.ai> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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cdcf1d2589 |
fix(i18n): translate the 3,719 __MISSING__ markers eight base PRs added on 2026-09-16 (#13974)
61 keys × 61 locales stamped as __MISSING__ by eight PRs on 2026-09-16 translated with sync-ui-keys --translate-markers; ratio gate green again on the release tip. ⚠️ base-red inherited: #12732 |
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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0d089e7e39 |
fix(quality): clear the release/v3.8.51 base-reds (#13947)
* fix(quality): clear the release/v3.8.51 base-reds
19 failing unit tests plus the API Route Typecheck and mutation-test-coverage
gates, all reproduced on the clean tip before touching anything.
Ten of the failures share one cause. #13452/#13798 made `*-compatible-*`
buildUrl() refuse a connection with no baseUrl instead of quietly defaulting to
the real OpenAI/Anthropic API — which would ship the operator's stored key to a
public third party. The guard is right; three fixtures still built those
connections unhydrated, and one of them put baseUrl at the top level of
credentials, where the chat path never reads it.
The rest:
- modelDiscovery.ts missed the VertexModelMetadataProvenance cast that its
read-path twin in db/models/synced.ts already had — both written by #12471.
- A provider-test regexp carried raw 0x00/0x1f bytes, which makes git, GitHub
and ripgrep treat the file as binary. Same character class, written
with escapes instead of the bytes themselves.
- #13399 (Agnes AI China) adds "agnes-cn" + "agnescn": the only two provider
prefixes since the count was last set (412 -> 414). Everything else added in
that range is model ids.
- The free-tier budget card SVG was stale (443 -> 452 models); regenerated by
its own script.
- Three new tests were missing from stryker.conf.json tap.testFiles, so the
mutants they kill did not count.
Three guards asserted syntax rather than the invariant they protect, and broke
when the source legitimately changed. Each was re-expressed and then verified by
mutating the source back:
- #2331 required modelEffort to head the rawEffort chain; #13556 deliberately
put the server-selected force rule first. The real invariant is relative —
modelEffort outranks the defaults a client injects — and it still trips when
explicitReasoning is moved ahead of it.
- The OAuth loopback guard matched the isLocalhost arm literally; #9944 added
`&& !opts?.manualLoopback`. It now matches the arm whatever guards it, and
still fails when the hint stops being built.
- The i18n scanner flagged dynamically-built keys — t("effort." + mode) reaches
it as a literal prefix, never a string. It now accepts a prefix that resolves
to a namespace holding messages, and still fails when the namespace is gone.
tests/unit/sse-auth.test.ts (#12080) expected a bare null where #13879 now
returns the key-policy diagnostic — the same sentinel shape the terminal-state
path has used since #12441. The assertion was rewritten to the constraint #12080
actually protects: nothing usable comes back and neither connection leaks. The
contract risk that remains — those sentinels are truthy, and executeWebSearch
treats any truthy value as a credential — is filed as #13945 rather than
widened into this PR.
Refs #13866
* fix(quality): clear the second wave of release/v3.8.51 base-reds
The tip moved 13 commits while the first pass was running and brought its own
reds. All reproduced locally on the merged tree first.
vitest 4.1.11 -> 5.0.0 in the #13661 development-group bump is a major, and
vitest 5 moved `vite` from a dependency to a peerDependency. This repo only ever
declared `vite` under `overrides`, which pins a version but installs nothing, so
`npm ci` stopped providing it and the Vitest job died at startup with
ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND. Declared as the devDependency it actually is — the same
^8.0.16 the override already pinned, and what @vitejs/plugin-react asks for as a
peer — and regenerated the lockfile: 684 lines added, none changed.
#12909 filtered a mapped array with `toolCall is JsonRecord`, but the element
type is the tool-call literal or null, and a predicate's type has to be
assignable to the parameter's (TS2677). Narrowed by the element's own type
instead; the literal still satisfies JsonRecord at the return.
#12906 added `|| result.errorCode === "empty_response"` to the stream-failure
condition and Prettier rewrapped it, so the #8928 probe — which located the
branch by an exact four-line string — stopped finding it. It now matches on what
the branch tests rather than how it is typeset, and still fails when the
eviction call is removed.
probe-7293 is the visible half of a real conflict, filed as #13948. #7293 merges
a mid-array system into index 0; #12908, landed later, demotes it to "user" in
place instead. Both target the same constraint and only one can win, and the
combination also reorders: the pre-translation hoist moves the turn forward
expecting it to stay a system message, then the demotion converts it where it
now sits, ahead of the conversation. Choosing between the two strategies is a
product call, not a base-red one, so the test was realigned to assert the half
that protects the caller — the instruction survives, as a user turn — and pins
the current ordering with a pointer to the issue, so the eventual decision shows
up as a deliberate test change instead of a silent regression.
Refs #13866, #13948
* fix(quality): allowlist vite, rebaseline tip growth, drop a dead import
Third pass on the release/v3.8.51 base-reds. Declaring `vite` in the previous
commit was correct but incomplete: check-deps is a human review point against
typosquatting, so a newly declared package has to be vouched for by name.
Recorded in dependency-allowlist.json with why it is needed — the official Vite
build tool, already pinned through overrides, and a required peer of both
vitest 5 and @vitejs/plugin-react. That also turns check-deps.test.ts green.
check-file-size went red on nine files. One is mine: sse-auth.test.ts grew when
the #12080 assertion was rewritten. Three of the four assertions I had added
were redundant with the strict deepEqual that follows them, so they are gone and
the file grows by 4 lines instead of 8; the cap absorbs the rest.
The other eight are production and test files this PR does not touch, grown by
other work and never rebaselined — which is the whole reason a base-red drain
exists. Each is attributed to the commit that grew it: #12906 (chat.ts,
chatHelpers.ts, proxyFetch.ts, stream.ts), #12904 + #12910 (chatCore.ts), and
batch_api.test.ts from the same wave. Two of them predate the wave entirely and
were already over cap on
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Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
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b637350680 |
fix(docs): re-sync the 65 documentation mirror sets; section-level docs pipeline; drift gate blocking (#13940)
1,104 mirrors rewritten over five passes of run-translation on the 22-source core set: the 14 sources edited since their translation, the 322 mirrors that were still English copies, and the frontmatter the old extractor leaked into the newer locales' bodies. The pipeline now caches per-`## `-section hashes and retranslates only changed sections, never reuses a section that is still English, rebuilds English-copy / leaked mirrors even when the source is unchanged, merges the state on save (parallel runs), and the drift gate (scoped to the core set) is blocking. Final audit: 0 stale, 0 English copies, 0 leaked frontmatter across 1,430 core mirrors. ⚠️ base-red inherited: #12732 |
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anhtahaylove
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cb9740b78d |
fix(adobe-firefly): do not spawn Chrome for CDP warm under test runners (#13289)
The CDP session-warm path gated only on ADOBE_FIREFLY_BROWSER_REFRESH, so a unit test exercising the image-edit route spawned a real headed Chrome. The browser holds an OS handle on its profile directory under DATA_DIR, so teardown that rmSync()s the temp DATA_DIR failed with EPERM on Windows, and the CDP socket kept the runner alive for the full 75s warm timeout. Gate the browser path on the same test-runner detection diskSessionsEnabled() already uses. 8510-adobe-firefly-edits-route: 1 pass/4 fail in 63s -> 4 pass/0 fail in 2.5s. |