Replaces 15 raw console.log/console.error calls in src/mitm/manager.ts with
structured pino logger calls via createLogger("mitm-manager"), aligning with
the project convention documented in docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md.
Multi-arg console calls are converted to pino object form: logger.info({ x, y }, "msg").
Add src/mitm/inspector/pricing.ts with a 10-entry USD/1M-token table and
estimateCost() helper. Wire it into extractLlmMetadata() replacing the
hardcoded null. Tests: 11 new in inspector-pricing.test.ts + 4 new
assertions in inspector-llm-metadata.test.ts (25 pass total).
recordRequestStart() now performs a cheap DB lookup (isCustomHost) before
building the InterceptedRequest. Hosts registered in inspector_custom_hosts
with enabled=1 receive source="custom-host" and agent=undefined, so they
appear correctly under the "Custom" profile filter instead of being
silently routed to "agent-bridge" entries.
Added isCustomHost() helper to inspectorCustomHosts.ts and a unit test
covering enabled custom-host, non-custom host, and disabled custom-host cases.
Wires the previously-dead appendSessionRequest() DB function to a new
POST /api/tools/traffic-inspector/sessions/[id]/requests route.
appendSessionRequest now returns the inserted seq so callers can confirm order.
InspectorSessionRequestAppendSchema (1 MB cap) guards the endpoint.
Integration test covers seq increments 1-2-3, requestCount sync, 400/404 paths,
and stack-trace-free error responses.
The round-3 C1 fix added `server.on("connect", ...)` to satisfy plan 11 §4.6's
text. R4 architectural review confirmed the handler is essentially dead code
on port 443: `https.Server` runs the HTTP parser ABOVE TLS, so a
`server.on("connect")` handler only fires for CONNECT-tunneled-inside-TLS
(HTTPS-proxy-tunneled-in-TLS), not for the "no config required" AgentBridge
DNS-spoof flow where the IDE opens TLS directly to 127.0.0.1:443. Passthrough
for unmapped hosts is structurally handled elsewhere (DNS scoping for default
mode; httpProxyServer.ts:8080 for System-wide proxy mode). Genuine on-wire
bypass-without-decrypt at :443 under direct TLS would require SNI sniffing on
the raw 'connection' event — intentionally out of scope for this release.
This commit:
- adds a block comment above the CONNECT handler explaining the real scope
so future contributors don't assume it covers the primary AgentBridge flow
- guards the `connection` listener with `socket.__mitmCounted` so the
CONNECT "target" branch's `server.emit("connection", clientSocket)`
re-entry doesn't double-increment `stats.activeConnections`
- adds 2 source-grep regression tests asserting both the doc comment and
the guard remain in place
C2 (x-omniroute-source/agent headers) was already correct and is unchanged.
The local type annotation for `recordRequestStart` in `loadAgentBridgeHook`
omitted `sourceModel`, but the call site at line 217-222 passes
`sourceModel: this.extractSourceModel(body)` — which works at runtime
(JavaScript ignores extra properties) but a future strict-mode caller relying
on the narrower local type would silently drop the field.
Add `sourceModel?: string | null` to the local recordRequestStart type to
match the actual `agentBridgeHook.recordRequestStart` shape.
Round-3 F-I18N covered ConversationTab, StatsTab, StatsCharts, and labels in
TimingWaterfall, but missed:
- TimingTab.tsx — 5 user-visible labels (Timestamp, Method, Status, Request
size, Response size) were hardcoded English.
- TimingWaterfall.tsx — empty state ("No timing data available.") and Total
latency label were also hardcoded.
- common.understand — RiskNoticeModal calls
`useTranslations("common")("understand")` but the key did not exist;
only the `|| "I understand"` fallback rescued it, leaving pt-BR users
seeing English.
Adds the missing 7 trafficInspector.timing* keys and common.understand to both
en.json and pt-BR.json, wires `useTranslations` in both components, and adds a
source-grep test asserting no English literals remain in JSX and that all 8
keys exist in both locales.
`upstreamTrust.ts` imported `Agent` and `setGlobalDispatcher` from undici at
the top level. Importing the module — which happens transitively from every
MITM handler via `base.ts` — eagerly loaded undici's full index, which in turn
instantiates `CacheStorage` and calls `webidl.util.markAsUncloneable`. That
helper is not available in the test runner's Node version, so any test that
touched the import chain crashed with `TypeError: webidl.util.markAsUncloneable
is not a function`.
Move the require inside `configureUpstreamCa()` via `node:module/createRequire`
so undici is only loaded when a CA is actually being configured. Preserves the
synchronous void return type (no caller signature change) and the Hard Rule
#12-compliant safe error message.
After: `mitm-upstream-trust.test.ts` 5/5 green (was 0/5 since F1 wrote it).
`Button.tsx` exposes only a default export, but `RiskNoticeModal.tsx` was
importing `{ Button }` (named) — so `Button` resolved to `undefined` and every
render of the modal crashed with React's "Element type is invalid".
The modal opens on first DNS activation for every agent, so this bug
effectively broke DNS interception for every agent in production. It went
undetected through 3 rounds of code review because two test artifacts masked
the failure:
1. `tests/unit/ui/agent-card.test.tsx > calls onDnsToggle when DNS button
clicked` failed since round 3 with the exact error "Element type is
invalid... Check the render method of RiskNoticeModal", but was repeatedly
dismissed as "pre-existing / flaky".
2. `tests/unit/ui/agent-card-risk-modal.test.tsx` (rodada 3) mocked Button
as a named export — which made the test green even though the production
import was broken. Classic "test alignment to broken code" anti-pattern.
This commit:
- switches RiskNoticeModal to `import Button from "@/shared/components/Button"`
- adds a regression-guard test that source-greps for the default-import shape
and asserts Button.tsx remains default-only
- updates the named mock in agent-card-risk-modal.test.tsx to `default:` so
tests now reflect the real module shape (no more masking)
- updates the agent-card.test.tsx DNS-click test to seed the per-agent
risk-accepted localStorage flag, isolating the DNS-toggle path from the
risk-modal path (the modal flow is covered by the risk-modal spec)
After: agent-card.test.tsx 4/4 green; agent-card-risk-modal.test.tsx 5/5 green;
new regression guard prevents recurrence of either pattern.
- mitm-proxy-moved-page.test.tsx: 4 tests — banner renders pageMoved.title/message, goNow triggers router.replace, setTimeout auto-redirect fires at 2500ms
- agent-bridge-server-card-a11y.test.tsx: source-inspection tests for all 6 aria-label attributes in AgentBridgeServerCard + 2 for SessionRecorderBar
- conversation-tab-separators.test.tsx: +1 test that conversationNotAvailable key resolves when body is null
- AgentBridgeServerCard: aria-label on Start, Stop, Restart, Trust Cert, Download Cert, Regenerate Cert buttons/anchor — sourced from t() keys
- CertStatusIcon: switch title from hardcoded strings to useTranslations("agentBridge").certTrusted/certNotTrusted
- SessionRecorderBar: aria-label={t("recordSession")} and aria-label={t("stopSession")} on REC and Stop buttons
Converts bare server-side redirect() to a client component that shows
an amber "This page has moved" banner for 2.5 s, then auto-redirects to
/dashboard/tools/agent-bridge. User can also click "Go now" to jump
immediately. All strings use useTranslations("agentBridge.pageMoved").
- Add `snapshotSession(sessionId)` to inspectorSessions.ts per master-plan §3.8:
returns parsed InterceptedRequest[] in seq order, or null for non-existent sessions.
Silently skips rows that fail InterceptedRequestSchema validation (defensive).
- Restore canonical no-arg form of `MitmHandlerBase.hookBufferUpdate(intercepted)`
per master-plan §3.5: when opts is omitted, derive completion fields from
the intercepted object itself (status/responseHeaders/responseBody/responseSize/
*LatencyMs) rather than no-op'ing. Extended opts form preserved for legacy callers.
- Update Zod record() calls in InterceptedRequestSchema to current (key,value) signature.
- Add 3 unit tests for snapshotSession (happy path / non-existent / silent skip).
- Add 2 unit tests for hookBufferUpdate (no-arg form + extended opts form).
Cover the new CJS routing primitives and the bypass-JSON manager write
path so the C1/C2 contracts cannot regress silently.
- `mitm-server-connect.test.ts` (27 tests): exercises the
`_internal/bypass.cjs` shim used by `server.cjs`:
- DEFAULT_BYPASS_PATTERNS shape (≥4 regexes, all RegExp)
- Default bank / gov / okta / auth0 → bypass
- Bypass beats target match (precedence)
- Known target hostname → target
- Unknown hostname → passthrough
- User glob pattern → bypass
- Empty / undefined hostname → passthrough
- Set-vs-Array shape for targetHosts
- Case-insensitive hostname matching
- bypassGlobMatch wildcard semantics + ReDoS-safe linear walk
- parseBypassJson with valid / empty / malformed / wrong-shape inputs
- Spec assertions on server.cjs source — header injection (C2),
sanitizeErrorMessage wrapping (Hard Rule #12), and CONNECT handler
registration (C1). These three guard against future regressions
that would silently re-introduce the bugs the C1/C2 fixes closed.
- `mitm-manager-bypass-json.test.ts` (5 tests): exercises
`writeBypassJson()`:
- Creates the `mitm/` dir + valid JSON file shape
- Empty array roundtrips as empty patterns
- Falls back to `getUserBypassPatterns()` when no arg passed
- Default patterns from the DB are NOT written to the file
- Overwrites prior content
The CJS proxy in `src/mitm/server.cjs` cannot import the TS
`getUserBypassPatterns` directly. Mirror the `targets.json` pattern: on
`startMitm()` the manager now also writes `<DATA_DIR>/mitm/bypass.json`
with the user-defined glob patterns from `agent_bridge_bypass`. The CJS
proxy reads the file at boot via the `_internal/bypass.cjs` shim's
`parseBypassJson` helper.
Defaults (banks / gov / okta / auth0) live hardcoded in the CJS shim —
they are not persisted to the JSON file. This matches the privacy
contract: defaults always apply, even when the DB or the JSON file is
missing or unreadable.
Plan reference: 11-agent-bridge.plan.md §4.6 + master-plan-group-A.md §3.5.
Hard Rule #13: file I/O only — no shell interpolation.
`MitmHandlerBase.fetchRouter` already injects the AgentBridge correlation
headers, but the CJS proxy in `src/mitm/server.cjs` had never been
updated to match. As a result the running Antigravity flow was hitting
the OmniRoute router with no source/agent identification, breaking the
contract documented in master-plan-group-A.md §3.5 and §12 acceptance #17.
This commit adds:
- `x-omniroute-source: agent-bridge` — distinguishes AgentBridge traffic
from other inbound clients.
- `x-omniroute-agent: <id>` — IDE agent id resolved from the Host header
via the existing `TARGET_HOST_AGENT` map (populated by `targets.json`
+ the antigravity baseline). Defensive fallback to `"unknown"` for
hosts that were never registered, so router-side filters never get
an empty value.
Antigravity non-regression preserved: `daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com`
continues to resolve to `agentId="antigravity"` via the baseline seed in
`TARGET_HOST_AGENT.set(h, "antigravity")` at the top of the file.
Bring `src/mitm/server.cjs` into compliance with the AgentBridge MITM
contract (master plan §3.5 / §12 acceptance #16). Prior to this commit
the bypass/passthrough logic existed in TS (`src/mitm/passthrough.ts`,
`src/mitm/targets/index.ts::routeConnection`, `src/lib/db/agentBridgeBypass.ts`)
but was completely disconnected from the running CJS proxy.
Changes:
- Add `server.on("connect", ...)` so HTTPS proxy clients can still tunnel
to non-AgentBridge hosts without losing internet. Per host the handler
decides:
- bypass (default regex or user glob) → raw TCP pipe, NO TLS decrypt,
NO content logging (privacy: bypass = "never see content")
- target (in TARGET_HOSTS) → write 200 Connection
Established and emit `connection` so the existing
`https.createServer` decrypts and routes via the normal flow
- passthrough (anything else) → raw TCP pipe
- Introduce `src/mitm/_internal/bypass.cjs` shim that mirrors
`DEFAULT_BYPASS_PATTERNS` and `routeConnection` from the TS source.
Defaults stay hardcoded (banks, gov, okta, auth0); user patterns load
from `<DATA_DIR>/mitm/bypass.json` (written by manager — separate commit).
- Add a CJS port of `sanitizeErrorMessage` and wire it into the intercept
error path so HTTP/SSE error bodies never expose raw `err.message`.
Closes a pre-existing Hard Rule #12 violation in the file.
Defaults match `src/mitm/passthrough.ts::DEFAULT_BYPASS_PATTERNS` and
`shouldBypass` precedence is identical to `routeConnection`. Antigravity
non-regression preserved — known hosts still trigger TLS termination via
the existing request handler.
AgentCard.handleRiskAccept was calling markRiskAccepted() before opening the
RiskNoticeModal, which itself writes the same key via dontShowAgainKey on accept.
Remove the redundant markRiskAccepted call and delete the now-unused helper so
RiskNoticeModal (D16) is the sole canonical persistence owner. Add a spy-based
test asserting the key is written exactly once per accept.
11 assertions covering: dynamic import with ssr:false, absence of static
recharts import in StatsTab, absence of the discarded _rechartsPreload
pattern, and presence of recharts exports in StatsCharts.
Move all recharts rendering into StatsCharts.tsx and replace the orphaned
_rechartsPreload no-op with a proper next/dynamic() call (ssr: false), achieving
real bundle split so recharts is not included in the initial page chunk.
Convert CaptureModesToolbar, TopBarControls, CustomHostsManager,
HttpProxySnippetCard and SessionRecorderBar to consume useTranslations
instead of hardcoded English strings. Add 7 missing trafficInspector
keys (customHostsTitle, loading, copied, copy, httpProxyTitle,
notRecording, anyStatus) to both en.json and pt-BR.json.
