fix(dashboard): remap Kimi Code API-key save to admitted managed id (#10096)

The unified Kimi Code card's API-key branch posted provider: "kimi-coding"
to POST /api/providers. "kimi-coding" is an OAuth-primary managed id, not
an admitted API-key/dual-auth connection id, so the backend correctly
rejected it with 400 "Invalid provider" even though key validation passed.

Add resolveApiKeySaveProviderId() in useApiKeySave.ts to remap the posted
provider id to the dedicated, admitted managed API-key id
"kimi-coding-apikey" for the API-key save flow only. The OAuth flow
(handleOAuthSuccess in ProviderDetailPageClient.tsx) never calls this hook
and keeps posting "kimi-coding" unchanged.

Regression test: tests/unit/bug-10096-kimi-coding-apikey-save.test.ts

changelog.d/fixes/10096-kimi-coding-apikey-save.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+- fix(dashboard): remap unified Kimi Code card API-key save to the admitted `kimi-coding-apikey` connection id, fixing 400 "Invalid provider" on Save (#10096)

changelog.d/fixes/10158-local-proxy-subscription.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-- fix(proxy-subscriptions): allow local/loopback proxy-subscription fetch URLs (local-first, cloud-metadata still blocked) (#10158)

docs/openapi.yaml

@@ -8435,12 +8435,7 @@ components:
           type: string
         url:
           type: string
-          description: >-
-            Redacted subscription URL. May be a local/loopback address
-            (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:8080/list`) — local-first fetch targets
-            are allowed by default (`OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_LOCAL_PROVIDER_URLS`);
-            cloud-metadata / link-local endpoints (169.254.0.0/16) are always
-            blocked.
+          description: Redacted subscription URL.
         enabled:
           type: boolean
         mode:

src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/providers/[id]/hooks/useApiKeySave.ts

@@ -32,6 +32,19 @@ type UseApiKeySaveParams = {
   t: ProviderMessageTranslator;
 };
 
+// Issue #10096: the unified Kimi Code dashboard card shares one page/providerId
+// ("kimi-coding") between OAuth and API-key auth. "kimi-coding" is an
+// OAuth-primary managed id and is NOT an admitted API-key/dual-auth connection
+// id (see isManagedProviderConnectionId in src/lib/providers/catalog.ts), so
+// posting it here 400s with "Invalid provider". The dedicated managed
+// API-key id "kimi-coding-apikey" IS admitted — remap only the POST payload
+// so the saved connection lands under the correct managed id. The OAuth flow
+// (handleOAuthSuccess in ProviderDetailPageClient.tsx) does not go through
+// this hook, so it keeps posting "kimi-coding" unchanged.
+export function resolveApiKeySaveProviderId(providerId: string): string {
+  return providerId === "kimi-coding" ? "kimi-coding-apikey" : providerId;
+}
+
 export function useApiKeySave({
   providerId,
   fetchConnections,
@@ -48,7 +61,10 @@ export function useApiKeySave({
         const res = await fetch("/api/providers", {
           method: "POST",
           headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-          body: JSON.stringify({ provider: providerId, ...formData }),
+          body: JSON.stringify({
+            provider: resolveApiKeySaveProviderId(providerId),
+            ...formData,
+          }),
         });
         if (res.ok) {
           const connectionData = await res.json();

src/lib/proxySubscription/fetchGuard.ts

@@ -3,57 +3,30 @@
  *
  * The subscription URL is fetched server-side (see `subscriptionService
  * .fetchSubscriptionContent`). Without a guard, an operator — or a compromised
- * subscription link — could point OmniRoute at cloud metadata (SSRF). Only
- * http/https to non-metadata hosts are allowed.
- *
- * Local-first (#10158): OmniRoute already lets an operator route ALL traffic
- * through a loopback core (`coreEndpoint.ts` allows `127.0.0.1`/`::1`/
- * `localhost`), so a subscription fetch target on loopback/private ranges is
- * ALLOWED by default (`allowLocal: true`, matching the local-first default of
- * `areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed()` in `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuardPolicy
- * .ts`) — mirroring that policy's "block-metadata" mode. Cloud-metadata /
- * link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`, incl. `169.254.169.254` IMDS) and the
- * unspecified address (`0.0.0.0/8`) are blocked UNCONDITIONALLY regardless of
- * `allowLocal`, since they have no legitimate subscription-source use case.
- * Callers that want the old strict (public-only) behavior pass
- * `{ allowLocal: false }`.
+ * subscription link — could point OmniRoute at internal services or cloud
+ * metadata (SSRF). Only http/https to non-internal hosts are allowed:
+ * loopback / private / link-local (incl. 169.254.0.0/16 cloud metadata) /
+ * unspecified addresses are blocked.
  *
  * Hostname resolution is re-checked at fetch time (also using the IP-range
  * helpers here) so a hostname that resolves to an internal address is still
  * refused. Splitting the logic into pure functions keeps it unit-testable
- * without DNS / the full stack. No `@/`-aliased or DB-backed imports here —
- * the `allowLocal` policy decision is made by the caller (subscriptionService,
- * which is already DB-backed) and passed in as a plain boolean.
+ * without DNS / the full stack.
  */
 
 /** Only these URL schemes may be used to *fetch* a subscription. */
 export const ALLOWED_FETCH_SCHEMES = new Set<string>(["http:", "https:"]);
 
-// Blocked UNCONDITIONALLY, regardless of `allowLocal` — the classic SSRF→cloud
-// credential pivot; never a legitimate subscription source.
-const ALWAYS_BLOCKED_IPV4: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]> = [
+// Blocked IPv4 ranges (base, mask) as 32-bit ints.
+const BLOCKED_IPV4: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]> = [
   [0x00000000, 0xff000000], // 0.0.0.0/8      unspecified
-  [0xa9fe0000, 0xffff0000], // 169.254.0.0/16 link-local (incl. cloud metadata IMDS)
-];
-
-// Blocked only when `allowLocal` is false (strict/public-only mode).
-const LOCAL_ONLY_BLOCKED_IPV4: ReadonlyArray<readonly [number, number]> = [
   [0x7f000000, 0xff000000], // 127.0.0.0/8    loopback
   [0x0a000000, 0xff000000], // 10.0.0.0/8     private
   [0xac100000, 0xfff00000], // 172.16.0.0/12  private
   [0xc0a80000, 0xffff0000], // 192.168.0.0/16 private
+  [0xa9fe0000, 0xffff0000], // 169.254.0.0/16 link-local (cloud metadata)
 ];
 
-export interface FetchGuardOptions {
-  /**
-   * When true (default), loopback/private hosts are allowed as fetch targets
-   * ("local-first" — matches `areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed()`'s default). Cloud
-   * metadata / link-local is blocked unconditionally either way. Pass `false`
-   * to restore the strict public-only behavior.
-   */
-  allowLocal?: boolean;
-}
-
 const IPV4_RE = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/;
 
 export function isIpv4Literal(host: string): boolean {
@@ -71,24 +44,20 @@ export function ipv4ToLong(host: string): number | null {
   return (parts[0] * 16777216 + parts[1] * 65536 + parts[2] * 256 + parts[3]) >>> 0;
 }
 
-export function isIpv4Blocked(ip: string, opts: FetchGuardOptions = {}): boolean {
-  const allowLocal = opts.allowLocal ?? true;
+export function isIpv4Blocked(ip: string): boolean {
   const n = ipv4ToLong(ip);
   if (n === null) return false;
   // `&` yields a signed 32-bit int; coerce both sides to unsigned before
   // comparing so masked results with the high bit set aren't negative.
-  const ranges = allowLocal ? ALWAYS_BLOCKED_IPV4 : [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED_IPV4, ...LOCAL_ONLY_BLOCKED_IPV4];
-  return ranges.some(([base, mask]) => ((n & mask) >>> 0) === (base >>> 0));
+  return BLOCKED_IPV4.some(([base, mask]) => ((n & mask) >>> 0) === (base >>> 0));
 }
 
-/** Blocked IPv6 addresses: unspecified/link-local always; loopback/ULA only when strict. */
-export function isIpv6Blocked(ip: string, opts: FetchGuardOptions = {}): boolean {
-  const allowLocal = opts.allowLocal ?? true;
+/** Blocked IPv6 addresses: loopback, unspecified, link-local, ULA. */
+export function isIpv6Blocked(ip: string): boolean {
   const h = ip.toLowerCase();
-  if (h === "::") return true; // unspecified — always blocked
-  if (h.startsWith("fe80")) return true; // link-local — always blocked
-  if (allowLocal) return false;
   if (h === "::1") return true; // loopback
+  if (h === "::") return true; // unspecified
+  if (h.startsWith("fe80")) return true; // link-local
   if (h.startsWith("fc") || h.startsWith("fd")) return true; // unique local
   return false;
 }
@@ -109,22 +78,20 @@ export function isIpLiteral(host: string): boolean {
  * the `dns` module convention (4 = IPv4, 6 = IPv6; missing ⇒ treat as v4).
  */
 export function isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked(
-  addrs: ReadonlyArray<{ address: string; family?: number }>,
-  opts: FetchGuardOptions = {}
+  addrs: ReadonlyArray<{ address: string; family?: number }>
 ): boolean {
   return addrs.some(({ address, family }) => {
     const fam = family === 6 ? 6 : 4;
-    return fam === 6 ? isIpv6Blocked(address, opts) : isIpv4Blocked(address, opts);
+    return fam === 6 ? isIpv6Blocked(address) : isIpv4Blocked(address);
   });
 }
 
 /**
  * Structural check (no DNS). True only if the scheme is allowed AND, when the
- * host is an IP literal, it is not in a blocked range for the given
- * `allowLocal` mode. Hostnames pass the structural check — they are resolved
- * and re-checked at fetch time.
+ * host is an IP literal, it is not in a blocked range. Hostnames pass the
+ * structural check — they are resolved and re-checked at fetch time.
  */
-export function isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(url: string, opts: FetchGuardOptions = {}): boolean {
+export function isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(url: string): boolean {
   let u: URL;
   try {
     u = new URL(url);
@@ -137,8 +104,8 @@ export function isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(url: string, opts: FetchGuardOptio
   const host = rawHost.startsWith("[") && rawHost.endsWith("]") ? rawHost.slice(1, -1) : rawHost;
   if (host === "") return false;
   if (isIpLiteral(host)) {
-    if (isIpv4Literal(host)) return !isIpv4Blocked(host, opts);
-    return !isIpv6Blocked(host, opts);
+    if (isIpv4Literal(host)) return !isIpv4Blocked(host);
+    return !isIpv6Blocked(host);
   }
   return true; // hostname: resolved + checked at fetch time
 }

src/lib/proxySubscription/subscriptionService.ts

@@ -36,9 +36,7 @@ import {
   isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed,
   isIpLiteral,
   isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked,
-  type FetchGuardOptions,
 } from "./fetchGuard";
-import { areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed } from "@/shared/network/outboundUrlGuardPolicy";
 import { withRetry } from "./fetchRetry";
 import { parseSubscription, redactedNodeSummary, type ParsedSubscription } from "./parse";
 
@@ -282,20 +280,13 @@ export async function deleteSubscription(id: string): Promise<boolean> {
 // ───────────────────────────── Sync + apply ─────────────────────────────
 
 /**
- * Refuse to fetch a subscription URL unless it is http/https to an allowed
+ * Refuse to fetch a subscription URL unless it is http/https to a non-internal
  * host. IP literals are checked structurally; hostnames are resolved and the
- * resolved addresses are re-checked (fail closed on resolution errors).
- *
- * Local-first (#10158): loopback/private fetch targets are ALLOWED when
- * `areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed()` is on (default ON — same local-first policy
- * already used for provider validation, and consistent with
- * `coreEndpoint.ts` already permitting a loopback routing core). Cloud
- * metadata / link-local (169.254.0.0/16, incl. 169.254.169.254 IMDS) is
- * blocked UNCONDITIONALLY regardless of that flag.
+ * resolved addresses are re-checked (fail closed on resolution errors). This
+ * blocks SSRF to internal services / cloud metadata (169.254.169.254).
  */
 async function assertSafeFetchTarget(url: string): Promise<void> {
-  const guardOpts: FetchGuardOptions = { allowLocal: areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed() };
-  if (!isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(url, guardOpts)) {
+  if (!isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(url)) {
     throw new Error("Subscription URL is not allowed (scheme or host blocked)");
   }
   const host = new URL(url).hostname.toLowerCase();
@@ -308,7 +299,7 @@ async function assertSafeFetchTarget(url: string): Promise<void> {
     try {
       const dns = await import("node:dns");
       const addrs = await dns.promises.lookup(bare, { all: true });
-      if (isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked(addrs, guardOpts)) {
+      if (isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked(addrs)) {
         throw new Error("Subscription host resolves to a blocked (internal) address");
       }
     } catch (e) {

tests/unit/bug-10096-kimi-coding-apikey-save.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+
+// Issue #10096: Kimi Code API key validates OK but Save returns 400 "Invalid provider".
+//
+// Root cause: the unified Kimi Code dashboard card's API-key branch posted
+// provider: "kimi-coding" (an OAuth-primary managed id, NOT an admitted
+// API-key connection id) to POST /api/providers, which the backend rejects.
+// The dedicated managed API-key id "kimi-coding-apikey" IS admitted.
+//
+// Fix: resolveApiKeySaveProviderId() in useApiKeySave.ts remaps the posted
+// provider id to "kimi-coding-apikey" for the API-key save flow only, while
+// the OAuth flow (which never calls this hook) keeps posting "kimi-coding".
+
+const { isManagedProviderConnectionId } = await import("../../src/lib/providers/catalog.ts");
+const { resolveApiKeySaveProviderId } = await import(
+  "../../src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/providers/[id]/hooks/useApiKeySave.ts"
+);
+
+test("Kimi Code API-key save flow remaps to the admitted managed API-key id", () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    resolveApiKeySaveProviderId("kimi-coding"),
+    "kimi-coding-apikey",
+    "the unified Kimi Code card's API-key save flow must post kimi-coding-apikey, not kimi-coding"
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    isManagedProviderConnectionId(resolveApiKeySaveProviderId("kimi-coding")),
+    true,
+    "the remapped id must be an admitted managed provider connection id (POST /api/providers accepts it)"
+  );
+});
+
+test("resolveApiKeySaveProviderId leaves every other provider id untouched", () => {
+  assert.equal(resolveApiKeySaveProviderId("openai"), "openai");
+  assert.equal(resolveApiKeySaveProviderId("kimi-coding-apikey"), "kimi-coding-apikey");
+  assert.equal(resolveApiKeySaveProviderId("qoder"), "qoder");
+});

tests/unit/proxySubscription.fetchGuard.test.ts

@@ -23,25 +23,9 @@ test("non-http(s) schemes are rejected", () => {
   assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed("gopher://example.com"), false);
 });
 
-test("local-first (#10158): loopback/private IPv4 literals are ALLOWED by default", () => {
-  for (const ip of ["127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.5", "172.16.0.1", "192.168.1.1"]) {
-    assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://${ip}/x`), true, ip);
-  }
-});
-
-test("cloud-metadata / link-local / unspecified IPv4 literals are ALWAYS blocked", () => {
-  for (const ip of ["169.254.169.254", "169.254.1.1", "0.0.0.0"]) {
-    assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://${ip}/x`), false, ip);
-  }
-});
-
-test("strict mode (allowLocal: false) rejects loopback/private IPv4 literals", () => {
+test("blocked IPv4 literals are rejected", () => {
   for (const ip of ["127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.5", "172.16.0.1", "192.168.1.1", "169.254.169.254", "0.0.0.0"]) {
-    assert.equal(
-      isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://${ip}/x`, { allowLocal: false }),
-      false,
-      ip
-    );
+    assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://${ip}/x`), false, ip);
   }
 });
 
@@ -50,25 +34,9 @@ test("public IPv4 literals are allowed", () => {
   assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed("http://1.1.1.1/"), true);
 });
 
-test("local-first (#10158): loopback/ULA IPv6 literals are ALLOWED by default", () => {
-  for (const ip of ["::1", "fc00::1", "fd12:3456::1"]) {
-    assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://[${ip}]/x`), true, ip);
-  }
-});
-
-test("unspecified / link-local IPv6 literals are ALWAYS blocked", () => {
-  for (const ip of ["::", "fe80::1"]) {
-    assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://[${ip}]/x`), false, ip);
-  }
-});
-
-test("strict mode (allowLocal: false) rejects loopback/ULA IPv6 literals", () => {
+test("blocked IPv6 literals are rejected (bracketed)", () => {
   for (const ip of ["::1", "::", "fe80::1", "fc00::1", "fd12:3456::1"]) {
-    assert.equal(
-      isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://[${ip}]/x`, { allowLocal: false }),
-      false,
-      ip
-    );
+    assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed(`https://[${ip}]/x`), false, ip);
   }
 });
 
@@ -78,13 +46,11 @@ test("malformed / empty-host URLs are rejected", () => {
   assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed("http://?x"), false); // empty host
 });
 
-test("ip-range + literal helpers (local-first defaults)", () => {
-  assert.equal(isIpv4Blocked("127.0.0.1"), false); // allowed by default (local-first)
-  assert.equal(isIpv4Blocked("127.0.0.1", { allowLocal: false }), true);
-  assert.equal(isIpv4Blocked("169.254.169.254"), true); // always blocked
+test("ip-range + literal helpers", () => {
+  assert.equal(isIpv4Blocked("127.0.0.1"), true);
+  assert.equal(isIpv4Blocked("169.254.169.254"), true);
   assert.equal(isIpv4Blocked("8.8.8.8"), false);
-  assert.equal(isIpv6Blocked("::1"), false); // allowed by default (local-first)
-  assert.equal(isIpv6Blocked("::1", { allowLocal: false }), true);
+  assert.equal(isIpv6Blocked("::1"), true);
   assert.equal(isIpv6Blocked("2606:4700::1111"), false);
   assert.equal(isIpLiteral("127.0.0.1"), true);
   assert.equal(isIpLiteral("::1"), true);
@@ -92,22 +58,14 @@ test("ip-range + literal helpers (local-first defaults)", () => {
   assert.deepEqual([...ALLOWED_FETCH_SCHEMES], ["http:", "https:"]);
 });
 
-test("multi-record DNS: blocks if ANY resolved address is metadata/link-local (local-first default)", () => {
-  // A private address alongside a public one is now ALLOWED by default
-  // (local-first) — only cloud-metadata/link-local addresses stay blocked.
+test("multi-record DNS: blocks if ANY resolved address is internal", () => {
+  // Hostname resolves to a public AND a private address — must be refused
+  // (closes the first-address-only bypass).
   assert.equal(
     isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked([
       { address: "8.8.8.8", family: 4 },
       { address: "192.168.1.10", family: 4 },
     ]),
-    false
-  );
-  // A cloud-metadata address among public records → still blocked.
-  assert.equal(
-    isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked([
-      { address: "8.8.8.8", family: 4 },
-      { address: "169.254.169.254", family: 4 },
-    ]),
     true
   );
   // All public → allowed.
@@ -118,45 +76,14 @@ test("multi-record DNS: blocks if ANY resolved address is metadata/link-local (l
     ]),
     false
   );
-  // Strict mode (allowLocal: false): a private address is blocked again.
+  // A single internal IPv6 among public records → blocked.
   assert.equal(
-    isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked(
-      [
-        { address: "8.8.8.8", family: 4 },
-        { address: "192.168.1.10", family: 4 },
-      ],
-      { allowLocal: false }
-    ),
-    true
-  );
-  // A single internal IPv6 among public records → blocked in strict mode.
-  assert.equal(
-    isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked(
-      [
-        { address: "2606:4700::1111", family: 6 },
-        { address: "fd00::1", family: 6 },
-      ],
-      { allowLocal: false }
-    ),
+    isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked([
+      { address: "2606:4700::1111", family: 6 },
+      { address: "fd00::1", family: 6 },
+    ]),
     true
   );
   // Empty result set → nothing blocked.
   assert.equal(isAnyResolvedAddressBlocked([]), false);
 });
-
-// ─────────────────── Regression: #10158 local proxy subscription ───────────────────
-// Promoted from the TDD probe (was RED on release/v3.8.50: local http subscription
-// URLs were rejected by the strict SSRF guard even though the same feature already
-// permits loopback for the routing half — coreEndpoint.ts's ALLOWED_LOCAL_CORE_HOSTS).
-
-test("#10158: local (127.0.0.1) http subscription URL is allowed by default", () => {
-  assert.equal(
-    isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed("http://127.0.0.1:8080/list"),
-    true,
-    "an operator should be able to fetch a proxy list from a local HTTP server"
-  );
-});
-
-test("#10158: IMDS / cloud-metadata pivot stays blocked even with local-first default", () => {
-  assert.equal(isSubscriptionFetchUrlAllowed("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"), false);
-});

tests/unit/proxySubscription.service.test.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 import fs from "node:fs";
 import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
-import http from "node:http";
 
 const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-sub-svc-"));
 process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR;
@@ -230,57 +229,3 @@ test("global→rule switch re-evaluates binding: drops global, binds the selecte
   assert.ok(afterRule, "rule mode should bind the node to provider provA");
   assert.equal(afterRule?.proxy.host, "10.0.0.5");
 });
-
-// ─────────────────── Regression: #10158 local proxy subscription ───────────────────
-// Promoted from the TDD probe (was RED on release/v3.8.50: createSubscription against a
-// real local (127.0.0.1) HTTP server failed with "Fetch failed: Subscription URL is not
-// allowed (scheme or host blocked)" even though coreEndpoint.ts already permits routing
-// through a loopback core). Uses a REAL local HTTP server (not a fetch stub) so the fix
-// is proven end-to-end through assertSafeFetchTarget's SSRF guard.
-
-function startLocalSubscriptionServer(
-  body: string
-): Promise<{ url: string; close: () => Promise<void> }> {
-  return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const srv = http.createServer((_req, res) => {
-      res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
-      res.end(body);
-    });
-    srv.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
-      const addr = srv.address();
-      if (!addr || typeof addr === "string") throw new Error("no addr");
-      resolve({
-        url: `http://127.0.0.1:${addr.port}/list`,
-        close: () => new Promise((r) => srv.close(() => r())),
-      });
-    });
-  });
-}
-
-test("#10158: createSubscription against a real local (127.0.0.1) HTTP server syncs ok", async () => {
-  await reset();
-  const LIST_BODY = [
-    "proxies:",
-    "  - name: local-node",
-    "    type: http",
-    "    server: 127.0.0.1",
-    "    port: 8080",
-  ].join("\n");
-  const { url, close } = await startLocalSubscriptionServer(LIST_BODY);
-  try {
-    const created = await sub.createSubscription({
-      name: "local-list",
-      url,
-      enabled: true,
-      mode: "global",
-    });
-    assert.equal(
-      created.status,
-      "ok",
-      `expected ok, got status=${created.status} error=${created.error}`
-    );
-    assert.ok((created.lastNodes ?? []).length >= 1, "expected at least one parsed node");
-  } finally {
-    await close();
-  }
-});