fix(i18n): split oversized docs sections before translating

chunkMarkdown only cut on '## ' headings, so a single long section (README.md carries a 16 KB one, USER_GUIDE.md a 20 KB one) became one oversized request. On the slow fallback model that request could not finish inside the backend's 10-minute fetch timeout, and the three biggest docs of every new locale failed with 'fetch failed' on every retry — Odia burned eight attempts on them. A section still longer than maxChars is now split again on sub-headings and paragraph boundaries, never inside a fenced code block; a block that is itself larger than the limit stays whole rather than being cut mid-paragraph.
fix(i18n): keep the ICU literal escape around angle placeholders when translating
2026-09-12 01:42:27 +03:00 · 2026-09-11 16:08:49 -03:00 · 2026-09-10 12:39:15 -03:00
17 changed files with 239 additions and 333 deletions
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -124,21 +124,6 @@ DISABLE_SQLITE_AUTO_BACKUP=false
 # Host port for the compose Redis sidecar. Default: 6379.
 # REDIS_PORT=6379

-# Host interface docker-compose publishes the app's own ports (dashboard,
-# API, live-WS) on for the base/web/cli/host profiles and docker-compose.prod.yml.
-# Default: 127.0.0.1 (loopback only). Combined with REQUIRE_API_KEY=false
-# (the default below), an unqualified publish spec would expose the anonymous
-# /v1 LLM proxy to your whole LAN/WAN. Only set this to 0.0.0.0 once you've
-# confirmed REQUIRE_API_KEY=true, or that a reverse proxy in front of this
-# instance already enforces its own authentication. (#12568)
-# APP_BIND_HOST=127.0.0.1
-# Host interface docker-compose publishes the Qdrant memory sidecar on.
-# Default: 127.0.0.1 (loopback only). Same LAN-exposure reasoning as Redis.
-# QDRANT_BIND_HOST=127.0.0.1
-# Host interface docker-compose publishes the Bifrost router sidecar on.
-# Default: 127.0.0.1 (loopback only). Same LAN-exposure reasoning as Redis.
-# BIFROST_BIND_HOST=127.0.0.1
-
 # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 # 3. NETWORK & PORTS
 # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -388,8 +373,6 @@ AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=false
 # Require an API key for all /v1/* proxy endpoints.
 # Used by: API middleware — rejects unauthenticated requests to the proxy API.
 # Default: false  |  Set true for multi-user/public deployments.
-# Leaving this false is only safe when the app is reachable on loopback only
-# (see APP_BIND_HOST above) or sits behind a reverse proxy doing its own auth.
 REQUIRE_API_KEY=false

 # Allow revealing full API key values in the Dashboard UI.
@@ -2094,13 +2077,6 @@ APP_LOG_TO_FILE=true
 # Management key for an externally managed instance. Embedded instances use
 # OmniRoute's encrypted service key.
 # CLIPROXYAPI_MANAGEMENT_KEY=
-# Host interface docker-compose publishes the cliproxyapi sidecar on (the
-# --profile cliproxyapi Docker service, port 8317). Default: 127.0.0.1
-# (loopback only) — its data volume holds provider OAuth/API credentials, and
-# the pinned image has no env-based data-plane api-keys override (only a
-# mounted config.yaml), so an unqualified publish spec would put a
-# credential-bearing service on your whole LAN. (#12578)
-# CLIPROXY_BIND_HOST=127.0.0.1

 # ── Mux embedded service ──
 # Override the port where the embedded Mux (coder/mux) agent-orchestration
--- a/changelog.d/fixes/12568-compose-loopback-bind.md
+++ b/changelog.d/fixes/12568-compose-loopback-bind.md
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
- fix(docker): default docker-compose app ports (dashboard/API/live-WS) to loopback instead of `0.0.0.0`, closing the anonymous `/v1` LAN/WAN exposure gap left open by `REQUIRE_API_KEY=false` (#12568)
--- a/changelog.d/fixes/12578-cliproxyapi-loopback-bind.md
+++ b/changelog.d/fixes/12578-cliproxyapi-loopback-bind.md
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
- fix(docker): scope the cliproxyapi/qdrant/bifrost sidecars to loopback by default and forward `CLIPROXYAPI_MANAGEMENT_KEY` into the cliproxyapi container so its management API is not left both unauthenticated and LAN-published (#12578)
--- a/docker-compose.prod.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.prod.yml
@@ -63,22 +63,17 @@ services:
      - DASHBOARD_PORT=${DASHBOARD_PORT:-${PORT:-20128}}
      - API_PORT=${API_PORT:-20129}
      - LIVE_WS_PORT=${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}
-      - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+      - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
      - LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-http://localhost:${PROD_DASHBOARD_PORT:-20130},http://127.0.0.1:${PROD_DASHBOARD_PORT:-20130}}
-      - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
-      # HOSTNAME intentionally not hardcoded to 0.0.0.0 (#12568) — let the
-      # app's own loopback-first default apply unless the operator sets it.
+      - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
+      - HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0
      - DATA_DIR=/app/data
      - OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH=${OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH:-}
      - CHATGPT_WEB_CODEX_CDP_URL=http://chatgpt-web-codex-browser:9223
    ports:
-      # Loopback-only by default (#12568) — see docker-compose.yml's
-      # APP_BIND_HOST comment for the rationale. Override for a LAN/WAN prod
-      # deployment only once REQUIRE_API_KEY=true or a reverse proxy in front
-      # of this instance is confirmed to enforce its own auth.
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${PROD_DASHBOARD_PORT:-20130}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-${PORT:-20128}}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${PROD_API_PORT:-20131}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${PROD_LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
+      - "${PROD_DASHBOARD_PORT:-20130}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-${PORT:-20128}}"
+      - "${PROD_API_PORT:-20131}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
+      - "${PROD_LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
    volumes:
      - omniroute-prod-data:/app/data
    healthcheck:
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ x-common: &common
    - PORT=${PORT:-20128}
    - DASHBOARD_PORT=${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}
    - API_PORT=${API_PORT:-20129}
-    - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+    - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
    - LIVE_WS_PORT=${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}
-    - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+    - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
    - LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-http://localhost:20128,http://127.0.0.1:20128}
    - REDIS_URL=${REDIS_URL:-redis://redis:6379}
    - NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=2048
@@ -99,14 +99,9 @@ services:
        OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH: ${OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH:-}
    image: omniroute:base
    ports:
-      # Loopback-only by default (#12568): with REQUIRE_API_KEY=false shipping
-      # as the .env.example default, an unqualified publish spec here binds
-      # 0.0.0.0 and exposes the anonymous /v1 LLM proxy on every LAN/WAN
-      # interface. Set APP_BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0 only once you've confirmed
-      # REQUIRE_API_KEY=true or an upstream reverse proxy enforces its own auth.
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
+      - "${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
+      - "${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
+      - "${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
    profiles:
      - base

@@ -131,17 +126,17 @@ services:
      - PORT=${PORT:-20128}
      - DASHBOARD_PORT=${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}
      - API_PORT=${API_PORT:-20129}
-      - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+      - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
      - LIVE_WS_PORT=${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}
-      - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+      - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
      - LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-http://localhost:20128,http://127.0.0.1:20128}
      - REDIS_URL=${REDIS_URL:-redis://redis:6379}
      - OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH=${OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH:-}
      - CHATGPT_WEB_CODEX_CDP_URL=http://chatgpt-web-codex-browser:9223
    ports:
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
+      - "${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
+      - "${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
+      - "${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
    profiles:
      - web

@@ -170,9 +165,9 @@ services:
        OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH: ${OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH:-}
    image: omniroute:cli
    ports:
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
+      - "${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
+      - "${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
+      - "${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
    volumes:
      - ./data:/app/data
      # SECURITY: mounting the host Docker socket gives this container full
@@ -199,17 +194,17 @@ services:
        OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH: ${OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH:-}
    image: omniroute:base
    ports:
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
-      - "${APP_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
+      - "${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}:${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}"
+      - "${API_PORT:-20129}:${API_PORT:-20129}"
+      - "${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}:${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}"
    environment:
      - DATA_DIR=/app/data
      - PORT=${PORT:-20128}
      - DASHBOARD_PORT=${DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128}
      - API_PORT=${API_PORT:-20129}
-      - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+      - API_HOST=${API_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
      - LIVE_WS_PORT=${LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132}
-      - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-127.0.0.1}
+      - LIVE_WS_HOST=${LIVE_WS_HOST:-0.0.0.0}
      - LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-http://localhost:20128,http://127.0.0.1:20128}
      - CLI_MODE=host
      - CLI_EXTRA_PATHS=/host-local/bin:/host-node/bin
@@ -248,8 +243,8 @@ services:
    container_name: omniroute-qdrant
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
-      - "${QDRANT_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${QDRANT_PORT:-6333}:6333"
-      - "${QDRANT_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${QDRANT_GRPC_PORT:-6334}:6334"
+      - "${QDRANT_PORT:-6333}:6333"
+      - "${QDRANT_GRPC_PORT:-6334}:6334"
    volumes:
      - qdrant-data:/qdrant/storage
    environment:
@@ -276,7 +271,7 @@ services:
    container_name: omniroute-bifrost
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
-      - "${BIFROST_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${BIFROST_PORT:-8080}:8080"
+      - "${BIFROST_PORT:-8080}:8080"
    volumes:
      - bifrost-data:/data
    environment:
@@ -299,22 +294,12 @@ services:
    image: docker.io/eceasy/cli-proxy-api:v6.9.7
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
-      # Loopback-only by default: this sidecar's data volume
-      # (cliproxiapi-data:/root/.cli-proxy-api) holds provider OAuth/API
-      # credentials, and the pinned image only reads api-keys from a mounted
-      # config.yaml (not env vars), so an unqualified "8317:8317" publish spec
-      # would put a credential-bearing service with no compose-configured
-      # data-plane auth on every LAN interface. Same reasoning as Redis above.
-      - "${CLIPROXY_BIND_HOST:-127.0.0.1}:${CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317}:${CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317}"
+      - "${CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317}:${CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317}"
    volumes:
      - cliproxyapi-data:/root/.cli-proxy-api
    environment:
      - PORT=${CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317}
      - HOST=0.0.0.0
-      # Forwards to the one auth-related env var the pinned binary actually
-      # reads (MANAGEMENT_PASSWORD) — secures the management API only; the
-      # data-plane completions endpoints have no env-based override upstream.
-      - MANAGEMENT_PASSWORD=${CLIPROXYAPI_MANAGEMENT_KEY:-}
    healthcheck:
      test:
        ["CMD", "wget", "--spider", "-q", "http://127.0.0.1:${CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317}/v1/models"]
--- a/docs/guides/DOCKER_GUIDE.md
+++ b/docs/guides/DOCKER_GUIDE.md
@@ -338,8 +338,6 @@ Beyond the defaults documented in [ENVIRONMENT.md](../reference/ENVIRONMENT.md),
 | `AUTO_UPDATE_HOST_REPO_DIR`   | Host path mounted into `cli` profile at `/workspace/omniroute` for self-update workflows                                                                                   | `.` (current directory)  |
 | `OMNIROUTE_MEMORY_MB`         | Runtime Node heap ceiling for the Docker standalone server; overrides the image default above. Coding agents: `8192`+ (see [runtime RAM](#runtime-ram-for-coding-agents)). | `1024`                   |
 | `DASHBOARD_PORT` / `API_PORT` | Override exposed ports for dashboard (20128) and API (20129)                                                                                                               | `20128` / `20129`        |
-| `APP_BIND_HOST`               | Host interface docker-compose publishes the dashboard/API/live-WS ports on. With `REQUIRE_API_KEY=false` (the default), `0.0.0.0` exposes the anonymous `/v1` proxy to the LAN — only widen with `REQUIRE_API_KEY=true` or a reverse proxy in front. | `127.0.0.1`              |
-| `CLIPROXY_BIND_HOST`          | Host interface docker-compose publishes the `cliproxyapi` sidecar on — its data volume holds provider credentials.                                                        | `127.0.0.1`              |
 | `OMNIROUTE_PLUGINS_DIR`       | Directory the runtime plugin scanner reads and installs into. Set it when plugins are bind-mounted: the default follows `HOME`, which an image need not export.            | `~/.omniroute/plugins`   |
 | `OMNIROUTE_BASE_PATH`         | URL subpath when the app is published behind a reverse proxy (e.g. `/omniroute`)                                                                                           | _(empty = root)_         |
 | `NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_URL`        | Public browser origin including the subpath (e.g. `https://host/omniroute`)                                                                                                | unset                    |
--- a/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
+++ b/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
@@ -1072,7 +1072,6 @@ desktop install.
 | `CLIPROXYAPI_API_KEY`                          | _(empty)_                               | `open-sse/handlers/chatCore/cliproxyapiCredentials.ts`                             | Data-plane key fallback when the `cliproxyapi_api_key` setting is absent.                                   |
 | `CLIPROXYAPI_MANAGEMENT_KEY`                   | _(empty)_                               | `src/lib/services/cliproxyAccountHealth.ts`                                        | Management key for account-health reads from an externally managed CLIProxyAPI instance.                   |
 | `CLIPROXYAPI_CONFIG_DIR`                       | `~/.cli-proxy-api`                     | `src/lib/versionManager/processManager.ts`                                         | CLIProxyAPI config directory.                                                                               |
-| `CLIPROXY_BIND_HOST`                           | `127.0.0.1`                             | `docker-compose.yml`                                                               | Host interface docker-compose publishes the `cliproxyapi` sidecar on (#12578). Its data volume holds provider OAuth/API credentials and the pinned image has no env-based data-plane `api-keys` override (only a mounted `config.yaml`), so `0.0.0.0` exposes a credential-bearing service to the whole LAN. |
 | `MUX_SERVICE_PORT`                             | `8322`                                 | `src/lib/services/bootstrap.ts`                                                    | Override the port where the embedded Mux (coder/mux) agent-orchestration daemon listens (always 127.0.0.1). |
 | `DARIO_HOST`                                   | `127.0.0.1`                            | `open-sse/executors/dario.ts`                                                      | Dario embedded-service bind/connect host (loopback only by default).                                        |
 | `DARIO_PORT`                                   | `3456`                                 | `open-sse/executors/dario.ts`                                                      | Dario embedded-service port.                                                                                |
@@ -1382,9 +1381,6 @@ Provider quota endpoints, network tunnels (Tailscale, Ngrok, MITM debug proxy),
 | `OMNIROUTE_REDIS_BIND_HOST`                 | `127.0.0.1`                                                                 | `bin/cli/commands/redis.mjs`                                              | Host interface the 1-click Redis launcher publishes on. The launcher starts Redis WITHOUT a password, so binding `0.0.0.0` hands every host on your LAN an unauthenticated Redis — only widen this if you also set a password on the instance yourself.                                                                                                                |
 | `REDIS_BIND_HOST`                           | `127.0.0.1`                                                                 | `docker-compose.yml`                                                      | Host interface docker-compose publishes the Redis sidecar on (#9286). The compose Redis runs without `requirepass`; app containers reach it over the compose network (`redis:6379`) — the published port exists only for host-side tooling. `0.0.0.0` exposes an unauthenticated Redis to the whole LAN.                                                              |
 | `REDIS_PORT`                                | `6379`                                                                      | `docker-compose.yml`                                                      | Host port for the compose Redis sidecar.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
-| `APP_BIND_HOST`                             | `127.0.0.1`                                                                 | `docker-compose.yml`, `docker-compose.prod.yml`                          | Host interface docker-compose publishes the app's own dashboard/API/live-WS ports on (#12568). With `REQUIRE_API_KEY=false` shipping as the `.env.example` default, `0.0.0.0` exposes the anonymous `/v1` LLM proxy to the whole LAN/WAN — only widen once `REQUIRE_API_KEY=true` or a reverse proxy in front enforces its own auth.                                    |
-| `QDRANT_BIND_HOST`                          | `127.0.0.1`                                                                 | `docker-compose.yml`                                                      | Host interface docker-compose publishes the Qdrant memory sidecar on (#12578). Same LAN-exposure reasoning as `REDIS_BIND_HOST`.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
-| `BIFROST_BIND_HOST`                         | `127.0.0.1`                                                                 | `docker-compose.yml`                                                      | Host interface docker-compose publishes the Bifrost router sidecar on (#12578). Same LAN-exposure reasoning as `REDIS_BIND_HOST`.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
 | `REDIS_KEY_PREFIX`                         | `omniroute:`                                                                | `src/shared/utils/rateLimiter.ts`                                         | Namespace prefix applied to every OmniRoute Redis key (rate limiter, auth cache, quota store). Prevents key collisions when the Redis instance is shared with other apps (#11042).                                                                                                                                                    |
 | `OMNIROUTE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN`          | _(unset — mechanism disabled)_                                              | `src/lib/api/internalServiceAuth.ts`                                      | Shared secret for identity-preserving internal REST hops (#9260): OmniRoute components calling other local OmniRoute routes send it as `x-omniroute-internal-service-token` so the original caller identity is preserved. Compared with `timingSafeEqual`.                                                                                                              |
 | `OMNIROUTE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE`     | _(unset)_                                                                   | `src/lib/api/internalServiceAuth.ts`                                      | Secret-file variant of the internal service token: path to a file whose trimmed content is the token. Only consulted when the inline var is unset.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
--- a/scripts/i18n/lib/translate-backend.mjs
+++ b/scripts/i18n/lib/translate-backend.mjs
@@ -119,6 +119,32 @@ export const TRANSLATION_SYSTEM = (englishName, native) =>
    `Keep punctuation and trailing whitespace identical to the source.`,
  ].join(" ");

+/**
+ * Restores the ICU literal escape the backends drop around angle placeholders.
+ *
+ * English writes `'<name>'`: those single quotes are ICU's escape, so the span
+ * renders as the literal text `<name>`. Translations come back as a bare
+ * `<nome>`, which ICU then parses as an (unclosed) tag and the message fails to
+ * compile — every locale in the first batch shipped two of these.
+ *
+ * Only messages whose English side quotes EVERY angle span are touched: when the
+ * source mixes real markup (`<b>`) with a literal span there is no safe way to
+ * tell which is which, so the translation is left exactly as it came back. An
+ * apostrophe inside the span is doubled, otherwise it closes the literal early.
+ */
+export function preserveIcuLiteralQuotes(englishValue, translated) {
+  if (typeof englishValue !== "string" || typeof translated !== "string") return translated;
+  if (!englishValue.includes("'<")) return translated;
+  // Every "<" in the source must be the start of an escaped span.
+  for (let i = 0; i < englishValue.length; i++) {
+    if (englishValue[i] === "<" && englishValue[i - 1] !== "'") return translated;
+  }
+  return translated.replace(
+    /(?<!')<([^<>]*)>(?!')/g,
+    (_m, inner) => `'<${inner.replace(/'/g, "''")}>'`
+  );
+}
+
 export async function translateString(englishValue, localeEntry, backend) {
  const englishName = localeEntry.english ?? localeEntry.name;
  const native = localeEntry.native ?? localeEntry.name;
@@ -127,7 +153,7 @@ export async function translateString(englishValue, localeEntry, backend) {
    { role: "user", content: englishValue },
  ];
  const out = await callChat(messages, backend);
-  return out.trim();
+  return preserveIcuLiteralQuotes(englishValue, out.trim());
 }

 // ----- Batch mode ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -198,8 +224,14 @@ export async function translateBatch(entries, localeEntry, backend) {
    { role: "user", content: JSON.stringify(payload) },
  ];
  const out = await callChat(messages, backend);
-  return parseBatchResponse(
+  const parsed = parseBatchResponse(
    out,
    entries.map((e) => e.id)
  );
+  for (const entry of entries) {
+    if (typeof parsed[entry.id] === "string") {
+      parsed[entry.id] = preserveIcuLiteralQuotes(entry.text, parsed[entry.id]);
+    }
+  }
+  return parsed;
 }
--- a/scripts/i18n/run-translation.mjs
+++ b/scripts/i18n/run-translation.mjs
@@ -380,16 +380,22 @@ const SYSTEM_PROMPT = (englishName, native) =>
    `Return ONLY the translated markdown — no preamble, no explanation, no surrounding fences.`,
  ].join(" ");

-// Splits a markdown body into chunks of <= maxChars, breaking on top-level `## ` headings only.
-function chunkMarkdown(markdown, maxChars = 6000) {
+// Splits a markdown body into chunks of <= maxChars. Top-level `## ` headings
+// are the preferred cut; a section that is still longer than maxChars is then
+// split again on `### ` headings and paragraph boundaries, never inside a
+// fenced code block. Before the second pass a single long section (README.md
+// has a 16 KB one, USER_GUIDE.md a 20 KB one) became one oversized request
+// that the slow fallback model could not answer inside the backend's
+// 10-minute fetch timeout, and the biggest docs failed on every retry.
+export function chunkMarkdown(markdown, maxChars = 6000) {
  if (markdown.length <= maxChars) return [markdown];
  const lines = markdown.split("\n");
-  const chunks = [];
+  const sections = [];
  let buf = [];
  let size = 0;
  for (const line of lines) {
    if (line.startsWith("## ") && size > maxChars * 0.5) {
-      chunks.push(buf.join("\n"));
+      sections.push(buf.join("\n"));
      buf = [line];
      size = line.length;
    } else {
@@ -397,7 +403,65 @@ function chunkMarkdown(markdown, maxChars = 6000) {
      size += line.length + 1;
    }
  }
-  if (buf.length) chunks.push(buf.join("\n"));
+  if (buf.length) sections.push(buf.join("\n"));
+  return sections.flatMap((section) =>
+    section.length <= maxChars ? [section] : splitOversizedSection(section, maxChars)
+  );
+}
+
+const FENCE_LINE = /^\s*(```|~~~)/;
+
+// Groups a section into blocks — a whole fenced code block, a heading-led run,
+// or a paragraph ending at a blank line — and packs them greedily. A block that
+// is itself larger than maxChars stays whole: cutting mid-paragraph or inside a
+// fence would hand the model a fragment it cannot translate faithfully.
+function splitOversizedSection(section, maxChars) {
+  const blocks = [];
+  let block = [];
+  let inFence = false;
+  for (const line of section.split("\n")) {
+    const isFence = FENCE_LINE.test(line);
+    if (inFence) {
+      block.push(line);
+      if (isFence) {
+        inFence = false;
+        blocks.push(block);
+        block = [];
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (isFence) {
+      if (block.length) blocks.push(block);
+      block = [line];
+      inFence = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (/^##+ /.test(line) && block.length) {
+      blocks.push(block);
+      block = [];
+    }
+    block.push(line);
+    if (line.trim() === "") {
+      blocks.push(block);
+      block = [];
+    }
+  }
+  if (block.length) blocks.push(block);
+
+  const chunks = [];
+  let current = [];
+  let size = 0;
+  for (const lines of blocks) {
+    const length = lines.join("\n").length + 1;
+    if (size > 0 && size + length > maxChars) {
+      chunks.push(current.join("\n"));
+      current = [];
+      size = 0;
+    }
+    current.push(...lines);
+    size += length;
+  }
+  if (current.length) chunks.push(current.join("\n"));
  return chunks;
 }

--- a/src/lib/apiBridgeServer.ts
+++ b/src/lib/apiBridgeServer.ts
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import http from "http";
 import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from "http";
 import net from "net";
 import { getRuntimePorts } from "@/lib/runtime/ports";
-import { warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey } from "@/lib/startup/nonLoopbackApiKeyGuard";
 import { getApiBridgeTimeoutConfig } from "@/shared/utils/runtimeTimeouts";
 import {
  attachRequestStreamGuards,
@@ -185,7 +184,6 @@ export function initApiBridgeServer(): void {
  if (apiPort === dashboardPort) return;

  const host = process.env.API_HOST || "127.0.0.1";
-  warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey("API bridge", host);

  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
    // Absorb client-abort errors (browser closes the socket during navigation/
--- a/src/lib/startup/nonLoopbackApiKeyGuard.ts
+++ b/src/lib/startup/nonLoopbackApiKeyGuard.ts
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-// Boot-time guard for issue #12568: docker-compose can be told to bind the
-// dashboard/API/live-WS ports to a non-loopback interface (APP_BIND_HOST,
-// API_HOST, LIVE_WS_HOST) while REQUIRE_API_KEY still defaults to `false`.
-// That combination puts the anonymous /v1 LLM proxy on the LAN/WAN with no
-// key required. This never hard-fails the boot (a reverse proxy in front of
-// OmniRoute may already be doing its own auth) — it only logs a loud warning
-// so the operator notices the exposure instead of discovering it from traffic.
-
-const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(["127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost", "::ffff:127.0.0.1"]);
-
-function isLoopbackHost(host: string): boolean {
-  return LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(host.trim().toLowerCase());
-}
-
-function isRequireApiKeyDisabled(): boolean {
-  const raw = (process.env.REQUIRE_API_KEY || "").trim().toLowerCase();
-  // Matches the feature-flag default: unset/empty falls back to "false".
-  return raw !== "true" && raw !== "1" && raw !== "yes";
-}
-
-/**
- * Logs a warning when `host` resolves to a non-loopback interface while
- * REQUIRE_API_KEY is disabled. Never throws and never blocks startup.
- */
-export function warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey(serverLabel: string, host: string): void {
-  if (isLoopbackHost(host)) return;
-  if (!isRequireApiKeyDisabled()) return;
-
-  console.warn(
-    `[startup] ${serverLabel} is bound to non-loopback host "${host}" while ` +
-      "REQUIRE_API_KEY is disabled — this exposes the anonymous /v1 proxy to " +
-      "every reachable network interface. Set REQUIRE_API_KEY=true, or bind " +
-      "back to 127.0.0.1, unless a reverse proxy in front of this instance " +
-      "already enforces its own authentication."
-  );
-}
--- a/src/server/ws/liveServer.ts
+++ b/src/server/ws/liveServer.ts
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ import type { DashboardEventName, DashboardEventMap, DashboardChannel } from "@/

 import { CHANNEL_EVENTS, getChannelForEvent } from "@/lib/events/types";
 import { isAutomatedTestProcess, isBuildProcess } from "@/shared/utils/testProcess";
-import { warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey } from "@/lib/startup/nonLoopbackApiKeyGuard";

 import {
  attachRequestStreamGuards,
@@ -651,7 +650,6 @@ export function isLiveWsEnabled(): boolean {
 if (!isBuildOrTest() && isLiveWsEnabled()) {
  const port = parseInt(process.env.LIVE_WS_PORT || String(DEFAULT_PORT), 10);
  const host = process.env.LIVE_WS_HOST || DEFAULT_HOST;
-  warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey("Live dashboard WebSocket", host);
  startLiveDashboardServer(port, host).catch((err) => {
    console.error("[LiveWS] Failed to start: %s", err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
  });
--- a/tests/unit/compose-app-ports-loopback-bind.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/compose-app-ports-loopback-bind.test.ts
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-import test from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import fs from "node:fs";
-import path from "node:path";
-
-const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dirname, "../..");
-
-// docker-compose.yml (base/web/cli/host profiles) and docker-compose.prod.yml
-// default API_HOST/LIVE_WS_HOST/HOSTNAME to 0.0.0.0 and publish the dashboard/
-// API/live-WS ports with a bare, unscoped spec — Docker expands that to every
-// interface. Combined with .env.example shipping REQUIRE_API_KEY=false by
-// default, this puts the anonymous /v1 LLM proxy on the LAN/WAN. Mirrors the
-// existing Redis precedent (tests/unit/compose-redis-loopback-bind.test.ts).
-// Issue #12568.
-
-function readCompose(file: string): string {
-  return fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, file), "utf8");
-}
-
-test("docker-compose.yml publishes the dashboard/API/live-WS ports on loopback by default", () => {
-  const compose = readCompose("docker-compose.yml");
-  const barePublishSpecs = [
-    /- "\$\{DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128\}:\$\{DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128\}"/,
-    /- "\$\{API_PORT:-20129\}:\$\{API_PORT:-20129\}"/,
-    /- "\$\{LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132\}:\$\{LIVE_WS_PORT:-20132\}"/,
-  ];
-  for (const re of barePublishSpecs) {
-    assert.doesNotMatch(compose, re, `unqualified publish spec ${re} binds 0.0.0.0`);
-  }
-  assert.match(
-    compose,
-    /- "\$\{APP_BIND_HOST:-127\.0\.0\.1\}:\$\{DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128\}:\$\{DASHBOARD_PORT:-20128\}"/
-  );
-  assert.doesNotMatch(compose, /API_HOST=\$\{API_HOST:-0\.0\.0\.0\}/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(compose, /LIVE_WS_HOST=\$\{LIVE_WS_HOST:-0\.0\.0\.0\}/);
-});
-
-test("docker-compose.prod.yml publishes the app's ports on loopback by default", () => {
-  const compose = readCompose("docker-compose.prod.yml");
-  assert.doesNotMatch(compose, /API_HOST=\$\{API_HOST:-0\.0\.0\.0\}/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(compose, /LIVE_WS_HOST=\$\{LIVE_WS_HOST:-0\.0\.0\.0\}/);
-  assert.doesNotMatch(compose, /HOSTNAME=0\.0\.0\.0/);
-  assert.match(compose, /\$\{APP_BIND_HOST:-127\.0\.0\.1\}:\$\{PROD_DASHBOARD_PORT/);
-});
-
-test(".env.example does not ship REQUIRE_API_KEY=false without a boot-time non-loopback guard", () => {
-  const env = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, ".env.example"), "utf8");
-  const requireApiKeyFalse = /^REQUIRE_API_KEY=false\s*$/m.test(env);
-  if (requireApiKeyFalse) {
-    const guardHits = ["src/server", "src/lib", "open-sse"].some((dir) => {
-      try {
-        const files = fs.readdirSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, dir), { recursive: true }) as string[];
-        return files.some((f) => {
-          if (!f.endsWith(".ts")) return false;
-          const full = path.join(REPO_ROOT, dir, f);
-          if (!fs.statSync(full).isFile()) return false;
-          const content = fs.readFileSync(full, "utf8");
-          return content.includes("non-loopback") && content.includes("REQUIRE_API_KEY");
-        });
-      } catch {
-        return false;
-      }
-    });
-    assert.ok(guardHits, "REQUIRE_API_KEY=false ships with no boot-time non-loopback guard");
-  }
-});
-
-test(".env.example documents APP_BIND_HOST and its default", () => {
-  const env = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, ".env.example"), "utf8");
-  assert.match(env, /# APP_BIND_HOST=127\.0\.0\.1/);
-});
--- a/tests/unit/compose-cliproxyapi-loopback-bind.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/compose-cliproxyapi-loopback-bind.test.ts
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-import test from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-import fs from "node:fs";
-import path from "node:path";
-
-const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dirname, "../..");
-
-// The optional `cliproxyapi` sidecar (profile `cliproxyapi`) proxies provider
-// credentials (its data volume is `cliproxyapi-data:/root/.cli-proxy-api`) and
-// carried no auth-related environment variable in its `environment:` block.
-// Docker/Podman expand an unqualified "8317:8317" publish spec to 0.0.0.0,
-// which puts this credential-bearing sidecar on every LAN interface the same
-// way a bare "6379:6379" would for Redis (see
-// tests/unit/compose-redis-loopback-bind.test.ts, the precedent this repo
-// already applied). Issue #12578.
-
-function readCompose(file: string): string {
-  return fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, file), "utf8");
-}
-
-test("docker-compose publishes cliproxyapi on loopback by default", () => {
-  const compose = readCompose("docker-compose.yml");
-  assert.match(
-    compose,
-    /- "\$\{CLIPROXY_BIND_HOST:-127\.0\.0\.1\}:\$\{CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317\}:\$\{CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317\}"/,
-    "cliproxyapi publish spec must default to 127.0.0.1 (matching the Redis precedent)"
-  );
-  assert.doesNotMatch(
-    compose,
-    /- "\$\{CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317\}:\$\{CLIPROXYAPI_PORT:-8317\}"/,
-    "unqualified cliproxyapi publish spec binds 0.0.0.0"
-  );
-});
-
-test("cliproxyapi service forwards a management/auth key into its environment", () => {
-  const compose = readCompose("docker-compose.yml");
-  const serviceMatch = compose.match(/ {2}cliproxyapi:\n(?:.*\n)*?(?=\n {2}\S|$)/);
-  assert.ok(serviceMatch, "cliproxyapi service block must exist in docker-compose.yml");
-  assert.match(
-    serviceMatch![0],
-    /CLIPROXYAPI_MANAGEMENT_KEY/,
-    "cliproxyapi environment block must forward CLIPROXYAPI_MANAGEMENT_KEY (already documented in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md) instead of leaving auth entirely to the upstream image's undocumented default"
-  );
-});
-
-test("qdrant and bifrost sidecars also publish on loopback by default", () => {
-  const compose = readCompose("docker-compose.yml");
-  assert.match(compose, /- "\$\{QDRANT_BIND_HOST:-127\.0\.0\.1\}:\$\{QDRANT_PORT:-6333\}:6333"/);
-  assert.match(
-    compose,
-    /- "\$\{QDRANT_BIND_HOST:-127\.0\.0\.1\}:\$\{QDRANT_GRPC_PORT:-6334\}:6334"/
-  );
-  assert.match(compose, /- "\$\{BIFROST_BIND_HOST:-127\.0\.0\.1\}:\$\{BIFROST_PORT:-8080\}:8080"/);
-});
-
-test(".env.example documents CLIPROXY_BIND_HOST and its default", () => {
-  const env = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, ".env.example"), "utf8");
-  assert.match(env, /# CLIPROXY_BIND_HOST=127\.0\.0\.1/);
-});
--- a/tests/unit/i18n-run-translation-chunking.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/i18n-run-translation-chunking.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { chunkMarkdown } from "../../scripts/i18n/run-translation.mjs";
+
+// The docs translator splits a page into chunks so one upstream call stays
+// short. It used to break only on `## ` headings, so a single long section
+// (README.md carries a 16 KB one, USER_GUIDE.md a 20 KB one) became one
+// oversized request that the slow fallback model could not answer inside the
+// backend's 10-minute fetch timeout — the three biggest docs of every locale
+// then failed with "fetch failed" on every retry.
+
+const para = (label: string, n = 12) =>
+  Array.from({ length: n }, (_, i) => `${label} sentence ${i + 1} with some filler text.`).join(
+    " "
+  );
+
+test("a section longer than maxChars is split on sub-headings and paragraphs", () => {
+  const body = [
+    "## Big",
+    para("a"),
+    "",
+    "### Part one",
+    para("b"),
+    "",
+    para("c"),
+    "",
+    "### Part two",
+    para("d"),
+  ].join("\n");
+  const chunks = chunkMarkdown(body, 700);
+  assert.ok(chunks.length > 1, "must split an oversized section");
+  for (const chunk of chunks) assert.ok(chunk.length <= 700, `chunk too big: ${chunk.length}`);
+  // Nothing lost: re-joining with blank lines reproduces every line of the source.
+  const lines = (s: string) => s.split("\n").filter((l) => l.trim() !== "");
+  assert.deepEqual(lines(chunks.join("\n\n")), lines(body));
+});
+
+test("never splits inside a fenced code block", () => {
+  const code = [
+    "```ts",
+    ...Array.from({ length: 30 }, (_, i) => `const v${i} = ${i};`),
+    "```",
+  ].join("\n");
+  const body = ["## Code", para("x"), "", code, "", para("y")].join("\n");
+  const chunks = chunkMarkdown(body, 500);
+  const withFence = chunks.filter((c) => c.includes("```"));
+  for (const chunk of withFence) {
+    assert.equal(
+      (chunk.match(/```/g) ?? []).length % 2,
+      0,
+      "fence must open and close in the same chunk"
+    );
+  }
+});
+
+test("keeps the old behaviour for short pages and for normal ## sections", () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(chunkMarkdown("# Title\n\nshort", 6000), ["# Title\n\nshort"]);
+  const body = ["## A", para("a", 4), "", "## B", para("b", 4), "", "## C", para("c", 4)].join(
+    "\n"
+  );
+  const chunks = chunkMarkdown(body, 400);
+  assert.ok(chunks.every((c) => c.length <= 400));
+  assert.ok(chunks.length > 1);
+  for (const chunk of chunks.slice(1)) assert.match(chunk, /^## /, "cuts land on ## boundaries");
+});
--- a/tests/unit/i18n-translate-backend-icu-quotes.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/i18n-translate-backend-icu-quotes.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { preserveIcuLiteralQuotes } from "../../scripts/i18n/lib/translate-backend.mjs";
+
+// The English catalog escapes angle placeholders for ICU: the single quotes in
+// '<name>' make the span literal text. Translation backends drop them, and the
+// message then parses as an unclosed ICU tag — every locale added in batch 1
+// shipped two such strings before CI caught them.
+test("re-escapes an angle span the translation left bare", () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    preserveIcuLiteralQuotes(
+      "Regenerate ~/.claude/profiles/'<name>'/settings.json",
+      "Regenerar ~/.claude/profiles/<nome>/settings.json"
+    ),
+    "Regenerar ~/.claude/profiles/'<nome>'/settings.json"
+  );
+});
+
+test("doubles an apostrophe inside the span, which would close the literal early", () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    preserveIcuLiteralQuotes("'<your OmniRoute API key>'", "<teie OmniRoute'i API-võti>"),
+    "'<teie OmniRoute''i API-võti>'"
+  );
+});
+
+test("leaves a translation that already carries the quotes untouched", () => {
+  const already = "'<seu token>'";
+  assert.equal(preserveIcuLiteralQuotes("'<your token>'", already), already);
+});
+
+test("does not touch messages whose English has a real unquoted tag", () => {
+  // <b> here is markup the translation must keep as markup, not literal text.
+  const translated = "Clique em <b>Salvar</b> e em '<nome>'";
+  assert.equal(preserveIcuLiteralQuotes("Click <b>Save</b> and '<name>'", translated), translated);
+});
+
+test("leaves messages without angle spans alone", () => {
+  assert.equal(preserveIcuLiteralQuotes("Settings", "Nastavitve"), "Nastavitve");
+  assert.equal(
+    preserveIcuLiteralQuotes("Restricted to {count} endpoints", "Omejeno na {count} točk"),
+    "Omejeno na {count} točk"
+  );
+});
--- a/tests/unit/non-loopback-api-key-guard.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/non-loopback-api-key-guard.test.ts
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-import test from "node:test";
-import assert from "node:assert/strict";
-
-import { warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey } from "@/lib/startup/nonLoopbackApiKeyGuard";
-
-// #12568: docker-compose can bind the app's ports to a non-loopback interface
-// while REQUIRE_API_KEY still defaults to false, exposing the anonymous /v1
-// proxy to the LAN/WAN. This guard warns (never blocks) when that combination
-// is detected at server startup.
-
-function withEnv<T>(vars: Record<string, string | undefined>, fn: () => T): T {
-  const prev: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
-  for (const key of Object.keys(vars)) {
-    prev[key] = process.env[key];
-    const value = vars[key];
-    if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
-    else process.env[key] = value;
-  }
-  try {
-    return fn();
-  } finally {
-    for (const key of Object.keys(prev)) {
-      const value = prev[key];
-      if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
-      else process.env[key] = value;
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-function captureWarn(fn: () => void): string[] {
-  const messages: string[] = [];
-  const original = console.warn;
-  console.warn = (...args: unknown[]) => {
-    messages.push(args.map(String).join(" "));
-  };
-  try {
-    fn();
-  } finally {
-    console.warn = original;
-  }
-  return messages;
-}
-
-test("warns when bound to 0.0.0.0 with REQUIRE_API_KEY unset (default false)", () => {
-  withEnv({ REQUIRE_API_KEY: undefined }, () => {
-    const messages = captureWarn(() => warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey("Test server", "0.0.0.0"));
-    assert.equal(messages.length, 1);
-    assert.match(messages[0], /non-loopback host "0\.0\.0\.0"/);
-    assert.match(messages[0], /REQUIRE_API_KEY/);
-  });
-});
-
-test("warns when bound to a LAN IP with REQUIRE_API_KEY=false", () => {
-  withEnv({ REQUIRE_API_KEY: "false" }, () => {
-    const messages = captureWarn(() => warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey("Test server", "192.168.1.5"));
-    assert.equal(messages.length, 1);
-  });
-});
-
-test("stays silent when bound to loopback regardless of REQUIRE_API_KEY", () => {
-  withEnv({ REQUIRE_API_KEY: "false" }, () => {
-    const messages = captureWarn(() => warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey("Test server", "127.0.0.1"));
-    assert.equal(messages.length, 0);
-  });
-  withEnv({ REQUIRE_API_KEY: "false" }, () => {
-    const messages = captureWarn(() => warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey("Test server", "::1"));
-    assert.equal(messages.length, 0);
-  });
-});
-
-test("stays silent when bound to 0.0.0.0 with REQUIRE_API_KEY=true", () => {
-  withEnv({ REQUIRE_API_KEY: "true" }, () => {
-    const messages = captureWarn(() => warnIfNonLoopbackWithoutApiKey("Test server", "0.0.0.0"));
-    assert.equal(messages.length, 0);
-  });
-});
				`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
				- fix(docker): default docker-compose app ports (dashboard/API/live-WS) to loopback instead of `0.0.0.0`, closing the anonymous `/v1` LAN/WAN exposure gap left open by `REQUIRE_API_KEY=false` (#12568)
				`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
				- fix(docker): scope the cliproxyapi/qdrant/bifrost sidecars to loopback by default and forward `CLIPROXYAPI_MANAGEMENT_KEY` into the cliproxyapi container so its management API is not left both unauthenticated and LAN-published (#12578)