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Author SHA1 Message Date
diegosouzapw
2690a23e33 fix(migrations): allow fresh install past mass-migration guard (#9934) 2026-08-10 10:57:23 -03:00
8 changed files with 194 additions and 206 deletions

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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
- fix(encryption): name failing credential + recovery path in decrypt errors, dedupe per connection (#9927)

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
- fix(migrations): don't abort on fresh install with only the 001 seed (#9934)

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@@ -14,35 +14,17 @@ import { buildErrorBody } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error";
* Returns a 424 (Failed Dependency) response with a clear, sanitized message
* when the connection carries that flag; otherwise null (proceed normally).
*/
const STALE_ENCRYPTION_MESSAGE =
"Stored API key cannot be decrypted (STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY changed or unset). Re-enter the API key.";
export function buildStaleEncryptionKeyResponse(
connection:
| {
credentialDecryptFailed?: unknown;
id?: unknown;
provider?: unknown;
}
| null
| undefined
connection: { credentialDecryptFailed?: unknown } | null | undefined
): NextResponse | null {
if (!connection || connection.credentialDecryptFailed !== true) return null;
// #9927 — surface WHICH credential failed plus the recovery path so the
// dashboard points the operator at the account to re-authenticate instead of
// a generic "API key cannot be decrypted".
const provider = typeof connection.provider === "string" ? connection.provider : "";
const id = typeof connection.id === "string" ? connection.id : "";
const identity = [provider && `provider "${provider}"`, id && `connection ${id}`]
.filter(Boolean)
.join(", ");
const message =
`Stored credential${identity ? ` for ${identity}` : ""} cannot be decrypted ` +
`(STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY changed or unset). Re-authenticate this account, or verify ` +
`STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY matches the key used to store it.`;
// buildErrorBody sanitizes the message (Rule #12); override the type so the
// client can key off the specific stale-encryption cause.
const body = buildErrorBody(424, message);
const body = buildErrorBody(424, STALE_ENCRYPTION_MESSAGE);
body.error.type = "storage_encryption_stale";
return NextResponse.json(body, { status: 424 });
}

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@@ -1045,13 +1045,35 @@ export function getDbInstance(): SqliteDatabase {
// This is needed so the migration runner skips the mass-migration safety abort
// that would otherwise trigger because heuristic seeding marks some migrations
// as applied, making the fresh DB look like a wiped existing DB (#1328).
const isNewDb = !fs.existsSync(sqliteFile);
// #9934: also classify as fresh a file that `omniroute setup` created with
// only the clipped skeleton schema (see the probe below) — even though the
// file exists, it has never had migrations run.
let isNewDb = !fs.existsSync(sqliteFile);
// Detect and handle old schema format — preserve data when possible (#146)
// Uses a single probe connection that becomes the real connection when possible.
if (fs.existsSync(sqliteFile)) {
try {
const probe = openSqliteDatabase(sqliteFile, { readonly: true });
// #9934: init asymmetry — bin/cli/sqlite.mjs::openOmniRouteDb (used by
// `omniroute setup`) creates storage.sqlite with only the partial inline
// schema (key_value + provider_connections) and never runs migrations.
// Purely file-existence-based freshness made that file look like an
// existing DB, so the first `serve` auto-seeded only the 001 marker and
// tripped the mass-migration safety abort on a brand-new install. A
// skeleton file has provider_connections but none of the tables the 001
// migration creates (combos) — treat it as fresh, not as a wiped DB.
const probeHasProviderConnections = !!probe
.prepare(
"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='provider_connections'"
)
.get();
const probeHasCombos = !!probe
.prepare("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='combos'")
.get();
if (probeHasProviderConnections && !probeHasCombos) {
isNewDb = true;
}
const hasOldSchema = probe
.prepare("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='schema_migrations'")
.get();

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@@ -51,31 +51,6 @@ export interface ConnectionFields {
[key: string]: unknown;
}
/**
* #9927 — dedupe tracker for credential-decrypt-failure messages. The health
* sweep / refresh / request routing re-decrypt the same corrupt row every
* cycle; we log the enriched, actionable message ONCE per
* (provider + connection + failing-ciphertext) state so it does not spam
* every sweep, while still re-logging if the row state actually changes
* (e.g. a different field starts failing) instead of permanently suppressing.
*/
const loggedDecryptFailures = new Set<string>();
function decryptFailureSignature(
connectionId: string,
provider: string,
failed: Array<{ field: string; value: unknown }>
): string {
const parts = failed
.map((f) => `${f.field}:${typeof f.value === "string" ? f.value : ""}`)
.sort()
.join("|");
return `${provider}::${connectionId}::${parts}`;
}
const RECOVERY_HINT =
"Re-authenticate this account, or verify STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY matches the key used to store it.";
/**
* Derive the PRIMARY encryption key using the static salt.
* This is the canonical key derivation that all new encryptions use.
@@ -182,10 +157,7 @@ export function encrypt(plaintext: string | null | undefined): string | null | u
* auto-migration: the next encrypt() call will re-encrypt it with the
* static-salt key, gradually migrating the database.
*/
export function decrypt(
ciphertext: string | null | undefined,
opts?: { quiet?: boolean }
): string | null | undefined {
export function decrypt(ciphertext: string | null | undefined): string | null | undefined {
if (!ciphertext || typeof ciphertext !== "string") return ciphertext;
// Not encrypted — return as-is (legacy plaintext or passthrough mode)
@@ -232,21 +204,14 @@ export function decrypt(
return decrypted;
}
// #9927 — the low-level generic log is suppressed when called through the
// connection-decryption path (quiet:true); decryptConnectionFields emits a
// single enriched message naming the credential + recovery path instead.
if (!opts?.quiet) {
console.error(
`[Encryption] Decryption failed. Ciphertext prefix: ${ciphertext.slice(0, 30)}... ` +
`Auth tag validation likely failed.`
);
}
console.error(
`[Encryption] Decryption failed. Ciphertext prefix: ${ciphertext.slice(0, 30)}... ` +
`Auth tag validation likely failed.`
);
return null;
} catch (err: unknown) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
if (!opts?.quiet) {
console.error("[Encryption] Decryption failed:", message);
}
console.error("[Encryption] Decryption failed:", message);
return null;
}
}
@@ -277,13 +242,10 @@ export function decryptConnectionFields<T extends ConnectionFields | null | unde
if (!row) return row;
if (!isEncryptionEnabled()) return row;
// quiet:true — the low-level generic decrypt() log is suppressed here so a
// single failure emits ONE enriched message (below) naming the credential
// and recovery path (#9927) instead of one generic line per field per cycle.
const apiKey = decrypt(row.apiKey, { quiet: true });
const accessToken = decrypt(row.accessToken, { quiet: true });
const refreshToken = decrypt(row.refreshToken, { quiet: true });
const idToken = decrypt(row.idToken, { quiet: true });
const apiKey = decrypt(row.apiKey);
const accessToken = decrypt(row.accessToken);
const refreshToken = decrypt(row.refreshToken);
const idToken = decrypt(row.idToken);
// #6148 — a stored credential that is still encrypted (`enc:v1:…`) but
// decrypts to null means the STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY changed or was unset.
@@ -295,31 +257,6 @@ export function decryptConnectionFields<T extends ConnectionFields | null | unde
(looksEncrypted(row.refreshToken) && refreshToken === null) ||
(looksEncrypted(row.idToken) && idToken === null);
if (credentialDecryptFailed) {
const failed: Array<{ field: string; value: unknown }> = [];
if (looksEncrypted(row.apiKey) && apiKey === null) failed.push({ field: "apiKey", value: row.apiKey });
if (looksEncrypted(row.accessToken) && accessToken === null)
failed.push({ field: "accessToken", value: row.accessToken });
if (looksEncrypted(row.refreshToken) && refreshToken === null)
failed.push({ field: "refreshToken", value: row.refreshToken });
if (looksEncrypted(row.idToken) && idToken === null) failed.push({ field: "idToken", value: row.idToken });
const connectionId = typeof row.id === "string" ? row.id : "";
const provider = typeof row.provider === "string" ? row.provider : "unknown";
const fields = failed.map((f) => f.field).join(", ");
// Dedupe per credential/row state: the sweep re-decrypts the same corrupt
// row every cycle — log ONCE unless the failing state actually changes.
const signature = decryptFailureSignature(connectionId, provider, failed);
if (!loggedDecryptFailures.has(signature)) {
loggedDecryptFailures.add(signature);
console.error(
`[Encryption] Failed to decrypt credential(s) [${fields}] for provider ` +
`"${provider}" (connection ${connectionId || "unknown"}). ${RECOVERY_HINT}`
);
}
}
return {
...row,
apiKey,

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@@ -922,9 +922,26 @@ export function runMigrations(db: SqliteAdapter, options?: { isNewDb?: boolean }
// interpolates this resolved value, so it auto-reflects any override.
const maxPendingMigrations = resolveMaxPendingMigrations();
// #9934: `omniroute setup`'s openOmniRouteDb writes a partial skeleton file
// (provider_connections + key_value) that has never had migrations run. When
// the first `serve` opens it and auto-seeds only the 001 marker, the applied
// set is exactly {001} — which would otherwise look like a wiped existing DB
// and trip this abort on a brand-new install. This is distinct from a real
// wiped/backup-restored database: that case has a non-trivial physical schema
// (baseline inference is non-null) and full data tables, so it still aborts.
// The 001-marker-only state on a provider_connections skeleton is the fresh
// auto-seed — let it through. A genuinely empty table is already exempt via
// `applied.size > 0`, and an upgraded DB has a non-trivial applied set.
const isFreshSeedOnly =
applied.size === 1 &&
applied.has("001") &&
inferPhysicalSchemaBaseline(db) === null &&
hasTable(db, "provider_connections");
if (
!isTestEnvironment &&
!isNewDb &&
!isFreshSeedOnly &&
process.env.DISABLE_SQLITE_AUTO_BACKUP !== "true" &&
maxPendingMigrations > 0 &&
applied.size > 0 &&

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@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import fs from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
import Database from "better-sqlite3";
import { resetDbInstance } from "../../src/lib/db/core.ts";
// Regression guard for #9934 — init asymmetry breaks a fresh install.
//
// `omniroute setup` (bin/cli/sqlite.mjs::openOmniRouteDb) creates
// storage.sqlite with the *partial* inline schema (key_value +
// provider_connections) but NEVER creates _omniroute_migrations and never runs
// migrations. That file flips the server's new-DB heuristic
// (src/lib/db/core.ts uses `!fs.existsSync(sqliteFile)`), so the first
// `omniroute serve` believes it is an existing DB, auto-seeds only the 001
// marker, and then trips the mass-migration safety abort because 139 pending
// migrations exceed the default threshold of 50 (#6260 gate).
//
// A DB whose ONLY applied migration is the 001 initial-schema auto-seed is a
// fresh install, not a wiped/backup-restored database — it must NOT abort.
const serial = { concurrency: false };
// Re-import a module so module-level env-derived constants (DATA_DIR,
// SQLITE_FILE) re-resolve after we set DATA_DIR. Static import cannot work
// here: the whole point is exercising the module-loading boundary.
async function importFresh(modulePath: string) {
const url = pathToFileURL(path.resolve(modulePath)).href;
return import(`${url}?test=${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`);
}
// Simulate a production (non-test) process so the #6260 mass-migration safety
// gate is actually LIVE: under `node --test` the runner would be detected and
// the gate skipped, making the bug invisible.
function withNonTestEnvironment<R>(fn: () => R): R {
const originalNodeEnv = process.env.NODE_ENV;
const originalVitest = process.env.VITEST;
const originalDisableAutoBackup = process.env.DISABLE_SQLITE_AUTO_BACKUP;
const originalArgv = [...process.argv];
const originalExecArgv = [...process.execArgv];
delete process.env.NODE_ENV;
delete process.env.VITEST;
delete process.env.DISABLE_SQLITE_AUTO_BACKUP;
process.argv = process.argv.filter((arg) => !arg.includes("test"));
process.execArgv = process.execArgv.filter((arg) => !arg.includes("test"));
try {
return fn();
} finally {
process.argv = originalArgv;
process.execArgv = originalExecArgv;
if (originalNodeEnv === undefined) delete process.env.NODE_ENV;
else process.env.NODE_ENV = originalNodeEnv;
if (originalVitest === undefined) delete process.env.VITEST;
else process.env.VITEST = originalVitest;
if (originalDisableAutoBackup === undefined) delete process.env.DISABLE_SQLITE_AUTO_BACKUP;
else process.env.DISABLE_SQLITE_AUTO_BACKUP = originalDisableAutoBackup;
}
}
function cleanupGlobalDb() {
try {
const g = globalThis as Record<string, { open?: boolean; close?: () => void }>;
if (g.__omnirouteDb?.open) g.__omnirouteDb.close?.();
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
delete (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).__omnirouteDb;
}
test.after(() => {
cleanupGlobalDb();
resetDbInstance();
});
test(
"fresh `omniroute setup` DB (only the 001 seed) survives first serve without mass-migration abort (#9934)",
serial,
async () => {
const dataDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-9934-"));
const originalDataDir = process.env.DATA_DIR;
process.env.DATA_DIR = dataDir;
try {
// Step 1 — mimic `omniroute setup`: the CLI opens the DB, writes the
// partial inline schema (key_value + provider_connections) and closes it,
// WITHOUT running migrations or creating _omniroute_migrations.
const cli = await importFresh("bin/cli/sqlite.mjs");
const setup = await cli.openOmniRouteDb();
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(setup.dbPath), "setup created storage.sqlite");
setup.db.close();
const onDisk = new Database(setup.dbPath, { readonly: true });
try {
const hasMigrationTable = !!onDisk
.prepare("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name=?")
.get("_omniroute_migrations");
assert.equal(
hasMigrationTable,
false,
"setup must NOT pre-create the migrations tracking table (bug premise)"
);
} finally {
onDisk.close();
}
// Step 2 — mimic the first `omniroute serve`: the real server opens the
// same DB, auto-seeds only the 001 marker and runs migrations. Under a
// live (non-test) safety gate this must NOT throw.
const core = await importFresh("src/lib/db/core.ts");
cleanupGlobalDb();
resetDbInstance();
let db: { prepare?: (sql: string) => { get: () => { maxV: number } | undefined } };
assert.doesNotThrow(() => {
withNonTestEnvironment(() => {
db = core.getDbInstance();
});
}, "first serve must not abort on a fresh setup DB that only has the 001 seed (#9934)");
// Prove the fresh DB actually got migrated past 001 to the latest version.
const maxRow = db.prepare(
"SELECT MAX(CAST(version AS INTEGER)) AS maxV FROM _omniroute_migrations"
).get();
assert.ok(
(maxRow?.maxV ?? 0) > 1,
`expected migrations beyond 001 to run, got max=${maxRow?.maxV}`
);
} finally {
if (originalDataDir === undefined) delete process.env.DATA_DIR;
else process.env.DATA_DIR = originalDataDir;
fs.rmSync(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
);

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@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import path from "node:path";
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
// #9927 — A credential that no longer decrypts (e.g. STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
// changed between restarts) must emit a single, enriched error naming the
// provider + connection id + failing field(s) and a recovery path, instead of
// the generic low-level `[Encryption] Decryption failed … Auth tag validation
// likely failed` line that carries no identity and is re-printed every sweep.
const ORIGINAL_STORAGE_KEY = process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
// Cache-busted fresh import so the encryption module re-derives its key from
// the current STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY and resets module-level dedupe state.
async function importFresh(modulePath: string) {
const url = pathToFileURL(path.resolve(modulePath)).href;
return import(`${url}?test=${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`);
}
test.after(() => {
if (ORIGINAL_STORAGE_KEY === undefined) {
delete process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
} else {
process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = ORIGINAL_STORAGE_KEY;
}
});
function captureConsoleError(fn: () => void): string[] {
const original = console.error;
const logs: string[] = [];
console.error = (...args: unknown[]) => {
logs.push(args.join(" "));
};
try {
fn();
} finally {
console.error = original;
}
return logs;
}
test("decryptConnectionFields logs failed credential identity + recovery path (#9927)", async () => {
// 1. Encrypt an apiKey under key A.
process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "stale-key-9927-A";
const encA = await importFresh("src/lib/db/encryption.ts");
const ciphertext = encA.encrypt("sk-real-secret-key");
assert.match(ciphertext, /^enc:v1:/, "expected a real enc:v1 ciphertext");
// 2. Read it back under a DIFFERENT key B (simulating a changed key).
process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "stale-key-9927-B";
const encB = await importFresh("src/lib/db/encryption.ts");
const logs = captureConsoleError(() => {
encB.decryptConnectionFields({
id: "conn-9927",
provider: "openai",
apiKey: ciphertext,
});
});
// Must flag the failure so callers can surface the cause.
const decrypted = encB.decryptConnectionFields({
id: "conn-9927",
provider: "openai",
apiKey: ciphertext,
});
assert.equal(decrypted.credentialDecryptFailed, true);
// The generic low-level log must NOT fire (quiet:true); instead ONE enriched
// message names provider + connection id + recovery path.
assert.equal(
logs.some((l) => /Auth tag validation likely failed/.test(l)),
false,
"generic low-level decrypt log must be suppressed on the connection path"
);
const enriched = logs.find((l) => l.includes("Failed to decrypt credential(s)"));
assert.ok(enriched, "expected an enriched credential-decrypt-failure log");
assert.match(enriched, /provider "openai"/, "log must name the provider");
assert.match(enriched, /conn-9927/, "log must name the connection id");
assert.match(enriched, /apiKey/, "log must name the failing field");
assert.match(
enriched,
/STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY matches the key used to store it/,
"log must include the recovery path"
);
});
test("credential-decrypt failure is logged once per connection (dedupe #9927)", async () => {
process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "stale-key-9927-dedupe-A";
const encA = await importFresh("src/lib/db/encryption.ts");
const ciphertext = encA.encrypt("sk-dedupe-key");
process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "stale-key-9927-dedupe-B";
const encB = await importFresh("src/lib/db/encryption.ts");
const row = { id: "conn-dedupe", provider: "openai", apiKey: ciphertext };
const logs = captureConsoleError(() => {
// Simulate the health sweep re-decrypting the same corrupt row repeatedly.
for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
encB.decryptConnectionFields(row);
}
});
const enriched = logs.filter((l) => l.includes("Failed to decrypt credential(s)"));
assert.equal(enriched.length, 1, "identical failure must be logged once per connection");
});