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Author SHA1 Message Date
backryun
b9819343d1 fix(security): reword tinycms nonce comment so the CSPRNG regression test holds 2026-08-12 16:03:28 -03:00
backryun
e8245f6b63 Merge release/v3.8.50 into fix/security-alerts-0812 (keep base versions — #10188 landed the same fixes) 2026-08-12 16:01:04 -03:00
backryun
266ffc9756 fix(security): correct XML double-unescape and non-CSPRNG nonce from CodeQL sweep
Two real defects surfaced by the 2026-08-12 code-scanning triage.

decodeXmlText decoded `&` before `"`/`'`, so `"` — the encoding of
the literal text `"` — collapsed to `"` in a second pass. The decoded values feed the
workspace-root trust comparison in parseTrustedCodexEnvironment, so an encoded path could
decode into a different path than the client declared. Decoding `&` last fixes it.

The tinycms nonce fell back to `Date.now()` plus a non-cryptographic PRNG when
`crypto.randomUUID` was absent. That nonce is signed into the provider's anti-replay
payload, so the fallback produced a predictable value silently. It is now always
`randomUUID()` from node:crypto, which is present on every supported runtime.

Both guards are mutation-validated: reverting either fix makes the new test fail.

Refs #9985
2026-08-12 03:48:39 -03:00
2 changed files with 58 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ export class TinyCmsExecutor extends BaseExecutor {
// Security context: this nonce is signed into `x-secure-signature` and
// reused as the session id, so it must be unpredictable. `node:crypto`
// randomUUID() is always available on the supported runtime — never fall
// back to Math.random() (CodeQL js/insecure-randomness).
// back to a non-CSPRNG source (CodeQL js/insecure-randomness).
const nonceJs = randomUUID();
const securePayload = generateSecurePayload(

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@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import test from "node:test";
const REPO_ROOT = join(import.meta.dirname, "..", "..");
/**
* Regression guards for the CodeQL alerts triaged on 2026-08-12.
*
* Both are source-level invariants rather than behavioral round-trips: the functions they
* protect are module-private (`decodeXmlText`) or only reachable through a live upstream
* handshake (`tinycms` nonce), so the guard asserts the property on the source itself.
*/
test("decodeXmlText decodes & last so encoded entities do not double-unescape", () => {
const source = readFileSync(
join(REPO_ROOT, "open-sse/vendor/codex-chatgpt-web/adapters/chatgpt-web/environment.ts"),
"utf8"
);
const body = /function decodeXmlText\(value: string\): string \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/.exec(source)?.[1];
assert.ok(body, "decodeXmlText not found — update this guard if the helper was renamed");
const order = [...body.matchAll(/replaceAll\("(&[^"]+;)"/g)].map((match) => match[1]);
assert.ok(order.length >= 2, `expected several entity replacements, got ${order.length}`);
assert.equal(
order.at(-1),
"&",
`"&" must be the LAST entity decoded, otherwise """ decodes to '"' instead ` +
`of the literal """. Current order: ${order.join(" -> ")}`
);
// Mirror the implementation to document the property the ordering buys us.
const decode = (value: string) =>
order.reduce((acc, entity) => {
const plain = { "&lt;": "<", "&gt;": ">", "&quot;": '"', "&#39;": "'", "&amp;": "&" }[entity];
return plain === undefined ? acc : acc.replaceAll(entity, plain);
}, value);
assert.equal(decode("&amp;quot;"), "&quot;");
assert.equal(decode("&amp;#39;"), "&#39;");
assert.equal(decode("&amp;lt;"), "&lt;");
});
test("tinycms signs its anti-replay nonce with a CSPRNG, never Math.random", () => {
const source = readFileSync(join(REPO_ROOT, "open-sse/executors/tinycms.ts"), "utf8");
assert.match(
source,
/const nonceJs = randomUUID\(\)/,
"the tinycms nonce must come from node:crypto randomUUID"
);
assert.doesNotMatch(
source,
/Math\.random\(\)/,
"Math.random() is not a CSPRNG — the nonce is signed into the anti-replay payload"
);
});