Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/release/v3.8.50' into feat/agentrouter-lock-scope

The raw-403 test for the agentrouter connection-scope combo-skip branch only
asserted Set contents, which markAuthLevelExhaustion produces identically for
a 403 with a connectionId — deleting the new branch would have left it green.
Add a local log spy and assert the emitted message is the new branch's
(#10334 / "account quota exhausted"), not markAuthLevelExhaustion's (#8133 /
"auth failure").

Also fixes a pre-existing tsc error in the same file: getProviderConnectionById
returns rateLimitedUntil as unknown, which new Date() can't accept directly.

docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md

@@ -330,32 +330,75 @@ excludeMarkers, defaultRetryAfterMs}`), matched via `applyStatusRestatement()`.
 
 Permanent errors (agentrouter's `无权访问模型` — no access to this model) are
 NEVER restated: `excludeMarkers` vetoes the rule even when `textMarkers` hit,
-so the error keeps its original status and nothing retries it forever. A
-separate provider classification rule
-(`agentrouter-model-access-denied` in `open-sse/config/providerErrorRules.ts`)
-declares an `auth_error`/scope-`model` match for this text, but it does not
-fire on the live production path today: the rule only matches `status ===
-403`, and `checkFallbackError`'s apikey-category `FORBIDDEN` branch
-(`open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts`) returns early for a plain 403
-*before* the provider-rule lookup ever runs. In practice a `无权访问模型` 403
-is handled the same way as the base apikey-provider 403 path (see Connection
-Cooldown, §2), not as a 6h model lockout. The rule still exists as a
-declarative classification consumable by future callers of `classifyError`
-with context — wiring it into the production `checkFallbackError` path is
-tracked as a follow-up, not yet done.
+so the error keeps its original status and nothing retries it forever. The
+matching provider classification rule
+(`agentrouter-model-access-denied` in `open-sse/config/providerErrorRules.ts`:
+`reason: "auth_error"`, `scope: "model"`, a `6h` declared base cooldown) is
+consulted by `checkFallbackError` (`open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts`)
+*before* the generic apikey-category `FORBIDDEN` early-return, gated on
+`honorsRuleLockScope(provider)` (#10334 — currently agentrouter-exclusive via
+the `HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS` allowlist in
+`providerErrorRules.ts`). The rule's declared 6h cooldown flows through as
+`fallbackResult.baseCooldownMs`, but it still feeds the pre-existing
+per-model-quota lockout path (`lockModelIfPerModelQuota()` /
+`recordModelLockoutFailure()`, unchanged by #10334 except for the cooldown
+source): it is clamped down to the operator's `mlSettings.maxCooldownMs`
+(default `1_800_000ms` / 30min), like every other model lockout, and the
+*persisted lockout reason* stays the pre-existing hardcoded `"forbidden"`,
+not the rule's `"auth_error"` — only the cooldown duration is honored
+end-to-end, not the reason string. The connection itself stays active;
+sibling models on the same connection are unaffected.
 
-Restated quota errors (`额度不足`) do reach a provider rule in production
-(`agentrouter-user-quota-exhausted`, scope `"connection"`), but `scope` on
-`ProviderErrorRuleMatch` is currently informational — the persistence path
-(`checkFallbackError` → `combo.ts`) only consumes `reason` and `cooldownMs`,
-never `scope`. What actually happens for agentrouter (`passthroughModels:
-true` → `hasPerModelQuota()` returns `true`) is a **per-model** lockout via
-`recordModelLockoutFailure()`: the connection itself is never cooled down for
-this error (`combo.ts` skips `recordProviderCooldown` for 429 when
-`hasPerModelQuota` is true), so other models on the same account keep being
-tried — each one burns one call and its own lockout before combo routing
-moves on. Honoring `scope` end-to-end (so a `"connection"` match actually
-locks the connection) is tracked as a follow-up.
+Restated quota errors (`额度不足`) reach a provider rule in production
+(`agentrouter-user-quota-exhausted`: `reason: "quota_exhausted"`, `scope:
+"connection"`, no declared cooldown of its own — the persistence layer's
+scaled backoff default applies). Since #10334, `scope` on
+`ProviderErrorRuleMatch` IS consumed end-to-end, but **only** for providers in
+the `HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS` allowlist (`providerErrorRules.ts` —
+today only `"agentrouter"`, gated via `honorsRuleLockScope()`). For every
+other provider `scope` remains informational, exactly as before #10334.
+`checkFallbackError` surfaces the matched rule's scope as
+`fallbackResult.ruleScope`; `isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope()`
+(`src/sse/services/auth.ts`) is the shared guard that confirms a
+`ruleScope` is genuinely safe to honor as a connection-wide, self-recovering
+signal (scope `"connection"`, reason `quota_exhausted`, never `permanent`,
+never `creditsExhausted` — a defense against a future rule pairing scope
+`"connection"` with a permanent account state). Two consumers call it:
+
+- **Persistence** (`markAccountUnavailable()`, `src/sse/services/auth.ts`):
+  instead of falling into the passthrough-provider **per-model** lockout
+  branch (agentrouter is `passthroughModels: true` → `hasPerModelQuota()`
+  returns `true`), it applies a **temporary connection cooldown** —
+  `testStatus: "unavailable"` + `rateLimitedUntil`, never a terminal status
+  (`credits_exhausted`/`banned`/`expired`) — so the connection self-recovers
+  once the cooldown lapses instead of requiring a manual credential reset.
+  Skipped for connections with `disableCooling: true` (#2997): that opt-out
+  falls through to the per-model lockout instead (a documented trade-off —
+  see the code comment above the branch).
+- **Same-request combo routing** (`applyComboTargetExhaustion()`,
+  `open-sse/services/combo/targetExhaustion.ts`): the same guard marks the
+  connection into the in-memory `exhaustedConnections` set, keyed
+  `${provider}:${connectionId}`. This only skips a remaining SAME-REQUEST
+  target that *itself already carries that exact `connectionId`* on its own
+  target object (`getExhaustedTargetSkipReason()`,
+  `open-sse/services/combo/comboPredicates.ts`, `if (provider &&
+connectionId)` before the `exhaustedConnections` lookup) — a plain
+  model-list combo, where sibling targets carry no pinned `connectionId` of
+  their own and one is only resolved per-dispatch from the response's
+  `X-OmniRoute-Selected-Connection-Id` header, never hits that key match. For
+  that common case, the real protection against a remaining leg reusing the
+  just-exhausted account is NOT this Set — it is the persistence layer above
+  (the connection's `rateLimitedUntil` is now in the future) combined with
+  this same guard suppressing `transientRateLimitedProviders` for the
+  failure (see "Two-stage design" and the code comment on the
+  `isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope` branch in `targetExhaustion.ts`): with
+  that Set left unmarked, `combo.ts`'s `allowRateLimitedConnection` force-allow
+  (`open-sse/services/combo.ts:1005-1013`, `:2734-2738`) does NOT kick in for
+  the provider's remaining legs, so credential selection's `rateLimitedUntil`
+  filter (`src/sse/services/auth.ts:1238`) is honored normally and a
+  remaining leg either picks a different, still-eligible agentrouter
+  connection or fails with no credentials available — it does not force its
+  way back onto the connection this branch just cooled down.
 
 ### Two-stage design: status restatement, then classification
 
@@ -380,6 +423,15 @@ allowlisted providers, the structured error otherwise. Adding a provider to
 that the default path for every provider not on the list stays
 byte-for-byte unchanged.
 
+A rule's `scope` (`model` / `provider` / `connection`) is a separate opt-in
+from `FULL_TEXT_RULE_PROVIDERS`: `checkFallbackError` only surfaces it as
+`fallbackResult.ruleScope`, and downstream consumers only honor it as
+anything other than an informational label, for providers in the
+`HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS` allowlist in the same file (`gated via
+honorsRuleLockScope()` — today only `"agentrouter"`). See "Restated quota
+errors" above for what a `scope: "connection"` match actually does once a
+provider is on that allowlist.
+
 ### Adding a new quota-misstating gateway
 
 1. Register one rule array in `statusRestatementRegistry`
@@ -395,7 +447,15 @@ byte-for-byte unchanged.
    `checkFallbackError` only ever hands the rule the structured
    `{code, type}` error and a body-text rule will never match live traffic.
    Rules that match purely on `status`/`headers` (like Opencode's or
-   Minimax's) do not need this opt-in.
+   Minimax's) do not need this opt-in. Separately, if the rule declares
+   `scope: "connection"` and the intent is an actual connection-wide cooldown
+   plus same-request combo skip (not just an informational label), add the
+   provider id to `HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS` in the same file — this
+   is what gates `isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope()`-style consumption in
+   `markAccountUnavailable()` (`src/sse/services/auth.ts`) and
+   `applyComboTargetExhaustion()`
+   (`open-sse/services/combo/targetExhaustion.ts`); without it, `scope`
+   still flows through `fallbackResult.ruleScope` but nothing acts on it.
 3. Add unit tests mirroring `tests/unit/upstream-status-restatement.test.ts`
    and `tests/unit/agentrouter-error-rules.test.ts` (including the
    not-permanent / not-creditsExhausted guards, and — if the provider needs

open-sse/config/providerErrorRules.ts

@@ -30,13 +30,15 @@ export type ProviderErrorRule = {
 export type ProviderErrorRuleMatch = {
   reason: ConfiguredErrorReason;
   /**
-   * Intended lock scope. NOTE: this field is currently INFORMATIONAL — no
-   * consumer of `getProviderErrorRuleMatch` (checkFallbackError, combo.ts)
-   * reads `scope` today; only `reason` and `cooldownMs` are consulted. The
-   * actual lock scope applied at runtime is decided independently by each
-   * call site (e.g. `hasPerModelQuota()` deciding model- vs connection-level
-   * lockout). Honoring this field end-to-end is tracked as a follow-up —
-   * see `docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md` §7.
+   * Intended lock scope. #10334: this field is CONSUMED end-to-end only for
+   * providers in `HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS` (agentrouter-exclusive
+   * today, gated by `honorsRuleLockScope()`) — for those, `checkFallbackError`
+   * surfaces it as `ruleScope` on its return value for the persistence layer
+   * to honor instead of re-deriving scope from `hasPerModelQuota()`. For
+   * every other provider it remains INFORMATIONAL: `getProviderErrorRuleMatch`
+   * callers still read only `reason`/`cooldownMs`, and the actual lock scope
+   * is decided independently by each call site. Widening the allowlist is
+   * tracked as a follow-up — see `docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md` §7.
    */
   scope: "model" | "provider" | "connection";
   /** Optional explicit cooldown; falls back to the existing per-reason defaults. */
@@ -188,31 +190,29 @@ function buildOpenrouterRules(): ProviderErrorRule[] {
 // agentrouter.org misstates temporary quota exhaustion as 403/400 with a
 // Chinese body. upstreamStatusRestatement.ts rewrites the status to 429
 // BEFORE classification, so rules here accept both the raw 403/400 and the
-// restated 429 (text is the real discriminator either way). In production,
-// the raw 403 path is what actually matters here: checkFallbackError's
-// apikey-category FORBIDDEN branch (~line 1699) returns EARLY for a plain
-// 403, before these rules are ever consulted — these rules fire on the
-// RESTATED 429 (chatCore's upstreamStatusRestatement hook runs first) via
-// resolveRuleMatchBody, which is the only path in checkFallbackError that
-// hands these rules the full error text instead of just {code, type}.
+// restated 429 (text is the real discriminator either way). Both the raw 403
+// path AND the restated 429 path reach these rules in production:
+// checkFallbackError's `honorsRuleLockScope("agentrouter")` pre-check
+// (#10334) consults these rules BEFORE the generic apikey-category FORBIDDEN
+// branch, and the restated 429 reaches them via the existing provider-rule
+// lookup in the configured-rule branch. Both paths use resolveRuleMatchBody,
+// the only mechanism in checkFallbackError that hands agentrouter's rules the
+// full error text instead of just {code, type}.
 //  - "额度不足": account-wide temporary quota → quota_exhausted, scope
 //    "connection" (mirror of the Opencode account-wide rationale above).
-//    NOTE: `scope` on ProviderErrorRuleMatch is currently informational —
-//    checkFallbackError/combo.ts only consume `reason` and `cooldownMs`, not
-//    `scope`. For agentrouter specifically (passthroughModels: true →
-//    hasPerModelQuota() is true), this quota_exhausted match actually
-//    resolves to a PER-MODEL lockout (recordModelLockoutFailure), not a
-//    connection-wide lock — other models on the same account keep being
-//    tried by combo routing (each burning one call) until they lock out
-//    individually. Honoring `scope` end-to-end is tracked as a follow-up.
+//    `scope` on ProviderErrorRuleMatch is CONSUMED for agentrouter (#10334,
+//    exclusive allowlist via `honorsRuleLockScope`): checkFallbackError
+//    surfaces it as `ruleScope` on its return value. Whether the persistence
+//    layer (markAccountUnavailable / combo target exhaustion) actually
+//    switches from `hasPerModelQuota()`-derived scope to honoring `ruleScope`
+//    is Tasks 2/3 of #10334 — this task only surfaces the field.
 //  - "无权访问模型": declares auth_error/scope "model" (intent: lock only the
 //    model so the connection keeps serving the rest — Model Lockout tier).
-//    This rule does NOT fire on the production path today: it only matches
-//    `status === 403`, but checkFallbackError's apikey FORBIDDEN branch
-//    returns early for a plain 403 before this rule is ever consulted (see
-//    the note above). A live `无权访问模型` 403 is handled like the base
-//    apikey-provider 403 today. Wiring this rule into that path is tracked
-//    as a follow-up.
+//    This rule now fires on the production 403 path (#10334): the
+//    `honorsRuleLockScope` pre-check matches it and returns its declared
+//    reason/cooldown/scope before the generic apikey-FORBIDDEN early-return
+//    ever runs. A live `无权访问模型` 403 therefore no longer falls through to
+//    the base apikey-provider 403 handling.
 function buildAgentrouterRules(): ProviderErrorRule[] {
   const AGENTROUTER_ERROR_STATUSES = new Set([400, 403, 429]);
   return [
@@ -231,8 +231,15 @@ function buildAgentrouterRules(): ProviderErrorRule[] {
         if (status !== 403) return null;
         const text = JSON.stringify(body ?? "").toLowerCase();
         if (!text.includes("无权访问模型")) return null;
-        // 6h: effectively "until the operator fixes the key's model grants",
-        // without being an unrecoverable terminal state.
+        // Declares a 6h cooldown, but the effective cooldown is NOT 6h: the
+        // model-lockout persistence layer (recordModelLockoutFailure, called from
+        // markAccountUnavailable) clamps every base cooldown — this one included —
+        // to the configured model-lockout maxCooldownMs, which defaults to
+        // 1_800_000ms / 30min (src/lib/resilience/modelLockoutSettings.ts,
+        // DEFAULT_MODEL_LOCKOUT_SETTINGS.maxCooldownMs). So in practice this is
+        // "locked for ~30min by default (up to 6h if an operator raises the model-
+        // lockout cap in settings)", not "until the operator fixes the key's model
+        // grants" — it is a recoverable window, not a real fix-driven unlock.
         return { reason: "auth_error", scope: "model", cooldownMs: 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000 };
       },
     },
@@ -255,6 +262,21 @@ export const providerRuleRegistry = new Map<string, ProviderErrorRule[]>([
   ["agentrouter", buildAgentrouterRules()],
 ]);
 
+/**
+ * Providers whose ProviderErrorRuleMatch.scope is actually CONSUMED at the
+ * persistence layer (markAccountUnavailable / combo target exhaustion) to pick
+ * connection-vs-model lock scope. EXCLUSIVE allowlist by owner decision
+ * (2026-08-14, issue #10334) — deliberately SEPARATE from
+ * FULL_TEXT_RULE_PROVIDERS: that set controls what body a rule matches against
+ * (input), this one controls whether the matched scope changes caller behavior
+ * (output). A provider could need one without the other.
+ */
+const HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS = new Set(["agentrouter"]);
+
+export function honorsRuleLockScope(provider: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  return !!provider && HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS.has(provider.toLowerCase());
+}
+
 /**
  * Providers whose rules match on the FULL upstream error text.
  * checkFallbackError's rule lookup normally passes only the structured

open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,11 @@ import {
   serviceSupervisorCooldown,
   isNimFunctionDegraded,
 } from "../config/errorConfig.ts";
-import { getProviderErrorRuleMatch, resolveRuleMatchBody } from "../config/providerErrorRules.ts";
+import {
+  getProviderErrorRuleMatch,
+  resolveRuleMatchBody,
+  honorsRuleLockScope,
+} from "../config/providerErrorRules.ts";
 import * as rot from "./rotationConfig.ts";
 import { getPassthroughProviders, getProviderCategory } from "../config/providerRegistry.ts";
 import {
@@ -1458,6 +1462,11 @@ export function checkFallbackError(
   /** #6061: the provider-configured cooldown (ms) before backoff scaling, surfaced so the
    * caller can persist an explicit reset window instead of the engine's scaled cooldown. */
   configuredCooldownMs?: number;
+  /** #10334 — the matched ProviderErrorRule's declared lock scope, surfaced so the
+   * persistence layer can honor it instead of re-deriving scope from
+   * hasPerModelQuota(). Populated ONLY when honorsRuleLockScope(provider) is true;
+   * always undefined for every other provider, so existing consumers are unaffected. */
+  ruleScope?: "model" | "provider" | "connection";
 } {
   // #10360: an executor-result contract violation is OUR bug, not the provider's.
   // Retrying reproduces it verbatim, and cooling the connection down (or tripping
@@ -1712,6 +1721,36 @@ export function checkFallbackError(
       return { shouldFallback: false, cooldownMs: 0, reason: RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN };
     }
 
+    // #10334 — agentrouter EXCLUSIVE: consult the provider rules BEFORE the
+    // apikey-FORBIDDEN early-return below, so a recognized 403 body (e.g.
+    // "无权访问模型") carries the rule's declared reason/cooldown/scope instead of
+    // the generic short auth cooldown. Gated on honorsRuleLockScope — for any
+    // other provider this block is a no-op and the early-return stays identical.
+    if (status === HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN && provider && honorsRuleLockScope(provider)) {
+      const forbiddenMatch = getProviderErrorRuleMatch(
+        provider,
+        status,
+        headers,
+        resolveRuleMatchBody(provider, structuredError ?? null, errorStr)
+      );
+      if (forbiddenMatch) {
+        const scaled = getScaledBaseCooldown(
+          forbiddenMatch.reason as RateLimitReasonValue,
+          backoffLevel
+        );
+        const ruleCooldownMs = forbiddenMatch.cooldownMs;
+        return {
+          shouldFallback: true,
+          cooldownMs: ruleCooldownMs ?? scaled.cooldownMs,
+          baseCooldownMs: ruleCooldownMs ?? scaled.baseCooldownMs,
+          configuredCooldownMs: ruleCooldownMs,
+          newBackoffLevel: ruleCooldownMs !== undefined ? 0 : scaled.newBackoffLevel,
+          reason: forbiddenMatch.reason,
+          ruleScope: forbiddenMatch.scope,
+        };
+      }
+    }
+
     if (
       status === HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN &&
       provider &&
@@ -1764,6 +1803,8 @@ export function checkFallbackError(
         providerMatch?.cooldownMs !== undefined && providerMatch.cooldownMs > 0
           ? providerMatch.cooldownMs
           : undefined;
+      const ruleScope =
+        providerMatch && honorsRuleLockScope(provider) ? providerMatch.scope : undefined;
       const fallback = buildRetryableFallback(reason);
       if (providerCooldownMs !== undefined) {
         return {
@@ -1771,9 +1812,10 @@ export function checkFallbackError(
           cooldownMs: providerCooldownMs,
           baseCooldownMs: providerCooldownMs,
           configuredCooldownMs: providerCooldownMs,
+          ruleScope,
         };
       }
-      return fallback;
+      return { ...fallback, ruleScope };
     }
     // #6842: non-backoff configured rules (e.g. status_402) previously never
     // consulted providerRuleRegistry, so a provider-specific rule (like
@@ -1789,12 +1831,15 @@ export function checkFallbackError(
         )
       : null;
     const cooldownMs = providerMatch?.cooldownMs ?? configuredRule.cooldownMs ?? 0;
+    const ruleScope =
+      providerMatch && honorsRuleLockScope(provider) ? providerMatch.scope : undefined;
     return {
       shouldFallback: true,
       cooldownMs,
       baseCooldownMs: cooldownMs,
       configuredCooldownMs: cooldownMs,
       reason: providerMatch?.reason ?? configuredRule.reason ?? RateLimitReason.UNKNOWN,
+      ruleScope,
     };
   }
 

open-sse/services/combo/targetExhaustion.ts

@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ import {
 import { RateLimitReason } from "../../config/constants.ts";
 import { isProviderCircuitOpenResult, isRequestScopedUpstreamFailure } from "./comboPredicates.ts";
 import { isCloudflareFingerprintRejection } from "../errorClassifier.ts";
+// #10334 — agentrouter-exclusive predicate shared with the persistence layer
+// (markAccountUnavailable) so the same-request combo skip and the persisted
+// connection cooldown agree on exactly which fallbackResult shapes qualify.
+import { isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope } from "@/sse/services/auth";
 import type { ComboLogger, ResolvedComboTarget } from "./types.ts";
 
 // Connection-level failure statuses: the provider connection itself is likely bad (upstream
@@ -60,7 +64,13 @@ export type ComboExhaustionSets = {
 
 export type ApplyComboTargetExhaustionOptions = {
   result: { status: number; headers?: Headers | null };
-  fallbackResult: Parameters<typeof isProviderExhaustedReason>[0];
+  fallbackResult: Parameters<typeof isProviderExhaustedReason>[0] & {
+    /** #10334 — agentrouter-exclusive; see isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope
+     * (src/sse/services/auth.ts). Populated only for providers in
+     * HONORS_RULE_LOCK_SCOPE_PROVIDERS (today: agentrouter only). */
+    ruleScope?: "model" | "provider" | "connection";
+    permanent?: boolean;
+  };
   errorText: string;
   rawModel: string;
   isTokenLimitBreach: boolean;
@@ -86,6 +96,56 @@ export function applyComboTargetExhaustion(
   const { result, sets, log, tag, errorText, structuredError } = opts;
   const provider = target.provider;
 
+  // #10334: agentrouter-exclusive account-wide quota exhaustion ("额度不足")
+  // must skip remaining SAME-CONNECTION targets within THIS request too, not
+  // just via the persisted cooldown markAccountUnavailable applies for
+  // whichever leg runs next. agentrouter is a passthroughModels provider
+  // (hasPerModelQuota() === true), so without this branch the classification
+  // below would fall straight through isProviderQuotaExhausted's
+  // !hasPerModelQuota() guard, and — for the restated-429 case —
+  // markConnectionLevelExhaustion's connection-level guard (429 is not in
+  // CONNECTION_LEVEL_ERROR_STATUSES), marking nothing: combo would keep
+  // burning one upstream call per remaining model of the same exhausted
+  // account. isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope is the same guard
+  // markAccountUnavailable uses, so both consumers agree on exactly which
+  // fallbackResult shapes qualify (never a permanent/credits-exhausted
+  // result, even one carrying ruleScope "connection").
+  //
+  // Runs BEFORE the auth-level (401/403) branch below. This is deliberate,
+  // not incidental: the "额度不足" rule matches statuses {400, 403, 429}
+  // (buildAgentrouterRules, providerErrorRules.ts), and Task 1's FORBIDDEN
+  // pre-check (accountFallback.ts ~1729-1751) surfaces `ruleScope:
+  // "connection"` for a RAW 403 carrying that body too — so this branch can
+  // also fire on a 403, not just the restated 429. That is safe: for a 403
+  // this branch and markAuthLevelExhaustion below write the SAME set with
+  // the SAME `${provider}:${connId}` key and both return `true` — they are
+  // set-equivalent for agentrouter on that status. The Cloudflare-1010 and
+  // Alibaba free-tier EXEMPTIONS further down in the 401/403 branch cannot
+  // apply here regardless of ordering: 1010 is a CDN fingerprint rejection
+  // agentrouter's own text never carries, and the Alibaba exemption is
+  // gated on isAlibabaModelStudioProvider(provider), which agentrouter is
+  // not.
+  //
+  // Unlike the connection-level/auth-level branches, this path deliberately
+  // does NOT fall through to markTransientOrConnectionLevel, so
+  // sets.transientRateLimitedProviders is NEVER populated for this failure.
+  // That is required, not just incidental: combo.ts (both dispatchers, see
+  // the `allowRateLimitedConnection` reads keyed off
+  // transientRateLimitedProviders) uses that set to force-allow reusing a
+  // rate-limited CONNECTION for the provider's remaining legs — i.e. it
+  // bypasses the very `rateLimitedUntil` filter this branch (and Task 2's
+  // markAccountUnavailable) just set. Marking it here would silently
+  // re-open the account this branch just cooled down. One secondary
+  // consequence: a SIBLING agentrouter connection that is merely
+  // rate-limited (not the one this branch exhausted) will also no longer be
+  // force-allowed for a later leg on the same provider — a remaining leg
+  // can now resolve to "no credentials available" instead of retrying a
+  // rate-limited sibling account, which is the intended, safer outcome.
+  if (isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope(provider, opts.fallbackResult)) {
+    markAgentrouterConnectionQuotaExhaustion(target, { sets, log, tag });
+    return true;
+  }
+
   // #8133/#8137: auth-level failures (401/403) mean that connection's credentials are bad.
   // Split out to keep applyComboTargetExhaustion under the complexity ceiling.
   // Cloudflare 1010 (a 403 carrying error_code 1010 / browser_signature_banned) is NOT an
@@ -259,6 +319,35 @@ function markAuthLevelExhaustion(
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * #10334: agentrouter-exclusive connection-scope account quota exhaustion. Mirrors
+ * markAuthLevelExhaustion's connectionId-present/absent split — when the target carries a
+ * connectionId, only that connection's account is exhausted (sibling agentrouter connections
+ * for the same user may still have quota); fall back to whole-provider exhaustion only when no
+ * connectionId is available.
+ */
+function markAgentrouterConnectionQuotaExhaustion(
+  target: ResolvedComboTarget,
+  opts: Pick<ApplyComboTargetExhaustionOptions, "sets" | "log" | "tag">
+): void {
+  const { sets, log, tag } = opts;
+  const provider = target.provider;
+  const connId = target.connectionId ?? undefined;
+  if (connId) {
+    sets.exhaustedConnections.add(`${provider}:${connId}`);
+    log.info(
+      tag,
+      `Provider ${provider} connection ${connId} account quota exhausted (rule scope=connection) — marking for skip on remaining targets (#10334)`
+    );
+  } else {
+    sets.exhaustedProviders.add(provider as string);
+    log.info(
+      tag,
+      `Provider ${provider} account quota exhausted (rule scope=connection, no connectionId) — marking for skip on remaining targets (#10334)`
+    );
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * #1731v2: connection-level errors (408/5xx, excluding the OmniRoute circuit-open signal) suggest
  * the provider connection itself is bad → skip remaining same-connection (or same-provider, when

src/sse/services/auth.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ import {
 } from "@omniroute/open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts";
 import { isLocalProvider } from "@omniroute/open-sse/config/providerRegistry.ts";
 import { COOLDOWN_MS, RateLimitReason } from "@omniroute/open-sse/config/constants.ts";
+import { honorsRuleLockScope } from "@omniroute/open-sse/config/providerErrorRules.ts";
 import {
   preflightQuota,
   isQuotaPreflightEnabled,
@@ -1981,6 +1982,46 @@ export async function getProviderCredentialsWithQuotaPreflight(
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * #10334 — Guard for the agentrouter-exclusive "connection scope" quota
+ * cooldown branch in markAccountUnavailable. The "never terminal" invariant of
+ * that branch is NOT structurally guaranteed by `ruleScope === "connection"`
+ * alone — it also depends on the provider rule table only ever pairing scope
+ * "connection" with a genuinely transient reason. Today
+ * (`buildAgentrouterRules()` in providerErrorRules.ts) that is true: the only
+ * rule declaring scope "connection" is the quota-exhausted one. But a FUTURE
+ * agentrouter rule for a permanent account state (e.g. "账号已封禁") — or a 402
+ * added to `AGENTROUTER_ERROR_STATUSES` with scope "connection", a natural-
+ * looking choice for an account ban — would otherwise be silently downgraded
+ * to a transient cooldown here instead of going through
+ * resolveTerminalConnectionStatus()/auto-disable below. Require the
+ * reason/permanent/creditsExhausted signals checkFallbackError already
+ * computes to explicitly confirm "this is quota, not a permanent state"
+ * before taking the early return.
+ *
+ * Exported (not just inlined) so a synthetic permanent/credits-exhausted
+ * `fallbackResult` can be tested directly — no rule in the table produces
+ * that combination today, so this predicate is the only way to pin the guard
+ * without editing the (production) rule table just for a test.
+ */
+export function isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope(
+  provider: string | null | undefined,
+  fallbackResult: {
+    ruleScope?: "model" | "provider" | "connection";
+    reason?: string;
+    permanent?: boolean;
+    creditsExhausted?: boolean;
+  }
+): boolean {
+  return (
+    honorsRuleLockScope(provider) &&
+    fallbackResult.ruleScope === "connection" &&
+    fallbackResult.reason === RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED &&
+    !fallbackResult.permanent &&
+    !fallbackResult.creditsExhausted
+  );
+}
+
 /** Persist exponential-backoff state for an unavailable provider connection. */
 export async function markAccountUnavailable(
   connectionId: string,
@@ -2101,6 +2142,53 @@ export async function markAccountUnavailable(
     const disableCooling = connProviderSpecificData.disableCooling === true;
 
     const isPerModelQuotaProvider = hasPerModelQuota(provider, model, connectionPassthroughModels);
+
+    // #10334 — agentrouter EXCLUSIVE: the matched provider rule declared scope
+    // "connection" for account-wide quota exhaustion ("额度不足"). agentrouter is
+    // a passthroughModels provider (isPerModelQuotaProvider === true), so without
+    // this branch the next `if` would treat it like any other passthrough 429 and
+    // lock a SINGLE model — leaving combo routing to burn one upstream call per
+    // remaining model of the same exhausted account. Must run BEFORE that block.
+    // Deliberately ignores persistUnavailableState/isCombo: for combo the caller
+    // downgrades persistUnavailableState to false, and the generic path further
+    // below would then lock per MODEL instead of cooling the connection — exactly
+    // what this scope must override. NEVER sets a terminal status: this is a
+    // renewing quota window, not "credits_exhausted"/"banned"/"expired".
+    //
+    // The "never terminal" invariant above is NOT structurally guaranteed by
+    // ruleScope === "connection" alone — see isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope's
+    // doc comment for why (a future permanent-state rule could pair scope
+    // "connection" with a non-quota reason). That predicate is the actual guard.
+    const ruleScopeIsConnection = isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope(provider, fallbackResult);
+    // #2997's disableCooling opt-out is respected here (`!disableCooling` below):
+    // a connection with disableCooling=true skips this branch entirely and falls
+    // into the per-model-quota block further down, which locks the model for up
+    // to ~30min (mlSettings.maxCooldownMs) instead of cooling the connection for
+    // the rule's shorter transient window. That is a deliberate, if counter-
+    // intuitive, consequence of #2997's scope (opt-out was designed only for the
+    // CONNECTION-level cooldown, never extended to model lockout) — "opting out
+    // of cooldown" ends up producing a LONGER effective block for this one rule.
+    // Not addressed here; flagged for a future #2997 follow-up if it proves to be
+    // a real operator complaint.
+    if (ruleScopeIsConnection && provider && !disableCooling) {
+      const connectionCooldownMs =
+        fallbackResult.cooldownMs > 0 ? fallbackResult.cooldownMs : COOLDOWN_MS.rateLimit;
+      await updateProviderConnection(connectionId, {
+        lastErrorType: fallbackResult.reason || RateLimitReason.QUOTA_EXHAUSTED,
+        lastError: `Account quota exhausted (${provider})`,
+        lastErrorAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        errorCode: status,
+        backoffLevel: fallbackResult.newBackoffLevel ?? backoffLevel,
+        rateLimitedUntil: getUnavailableUntil(connectionCooldownMs),
+        testStatus: "unavailable",
+      });
+      log.info(
+        "AUTH",
+        `Connection-scoped cooldown for ${provider}:${connectionId.slice(0, 8)} — ${status} ${fallbackResult.reason} ${Math.ceil(connectionCooldownMs / 1000)}s (rule scope=connection, overrides per-model lockout)`
+      );
+      return { shouldFallback: true, cooldownMs: connectionCooldownMs };
+    }
+
     const isNvidiaModelGone = provider === "nvidia" && status === 410;
     const modelLockoutOptions = { maxCooldownMs: effectiveProviderProfile?.maxCooldownMs };
     if (

stryker.conf.json

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
       "tests/unit/adaptive-admission-runtime.test.ts",
       "tests/unit/adobe-firefly.test.ts",
       "tests/unit/agentrouter-error-rules.test.ts",
+      "tests/unit/agentrouter-lock-scope-10334.test.ts",
       "tests/unit/alibaba-free-tier-exhaustion.test.ts",
       "tests/unit/anthropic-thinking-signature-recovery.test.ts",
       "tests/unit/antigravity-429-quota-tdd.test.ts",

tests/unit/agentrouter-error-rules.test.ts

@@ -11,18 +11,17 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
  * Status matching accepts both the raw upstream 403 AND the restated 429
  * (upstreamStatusRestatement.ts rewrites 403→429 before classification).
  *
- * IMPORTANT — `scope` above is what the rule DECLARES, not what production
- * enforces: `ProviderErrorRuleMatch.scope` is not consumed by
- * checkFallbackError/combo.ts today (only `reason`/`cooldownMs` are). For
- * agentrouter (passthroughModels: true → hasPerModelQuota() true), the
- * quota_exhausted match actually resolves to a PER-MODEL lockout in
- * production, not a connection-wide lock — other models on the same account
- * keep being tried by combo routing until they lock out individually. And
- * the "无权访问模型" rule never reaches production traffic at all today: it
- * only matches raw `status === 403`, but checkFallbackError's apikey
- * FORBIDDEN branch returns early for a plain 403 before any provider rule is
- * consulted (see A7). See `docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md` §7 for the
- * full writeup and the tracked follow-up to honor `scope`.
+ * #10334 — `ProviderErrorRuleMatch.scope` is now CONSUMED for agentrouter:
+ * `checkFallbackError` surfaces it as `ruleScope` on its return value (see
+ * A11/A12 below), and a raw 403 is no longer an early-return dead end for
+ * this provider — `honorsRuleLockScope("agentrouter")` gates a dedicated
+ * pre-check that consults the provider rules BEFORE the generic apikey
+ * FORBIDDEN branch (see A7/A12). This is an EXCLUSIVE allowlist
+ * (`honorsRuleLockScope`, A14): every other provider's `scope` stays
+ * declared-but-unconsumed exactly as before (A13). See
+ * `docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md` §7 for the full writeup — Tasks 2/3
+ * of #10334 wire the surfaced `ruleScope` into the persistence layer
+ * (markAccountUnavailable / combo target exhaustion).
  */
 
 const { providerRuleRegistry, getProviderErrorRuleMatch } = await import(
@@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ test("A3: quota body also matches the raw (pre-restatement) 403", () => {
   assert.equal(match.reason, "quota_exhausted");
 });
 
-test("A4: 无权访问模型 → auth_error scope model, at the RULE layer only (getProviderErrorRuleMatch directly) — this rule never receives production traffic (see A7): checkFallbackError's apikey FORBIDDEN branch returns early for a plain 403 before reaching this rule", () => {
+test("A4: 无权访问模型 → auth_error scope model, at the RULE layer (getProviderErrorRuleMatch directly) — since #10334 this rule DOES receive production traffic for agentrouter via the honorsRuleLockScope pre-check in checkFallbackError (see A12)", () => {
   const match = getProviderErrorRuleMatch("agentrouter", 403, {}, {
     error: { message: "无权访问模型 claude-sonnet-4" },
   });
@@ -86,14 +85,15 @@ test("A6: guard — restated quota error is retryable, never terminal, and now a
 });
 
 test("A7: guard — raw 403 quota (hook bypassed) is still not account-deactivation", () => {
-  // A raw (pre-restatement) 403 never actually reaches the agentrouter provider
-  // rules in production: checkFallbackError's apikey-category FORBIDDEN branch
-  // (status === 403 && getProviderCategory(provider) === "apikey") returns
-  // EARLY via resolveApiKeyForbiddenFallback before the provider-rule lookup
-  // is ever consulted. In the real pipeline, chatCore's upstreamStatusRestatement
-  // hook (Task 2) already converts 403→429 before checkFallbackError ever sees
-  // it, so this early-return path is what a hook-bypassed raw 403 hits — and it
-  // must still not be misclassified as permanent account deactivation.
+  // Since #10334, a raw (pre-restatement) 403 for agentrouter DOES reach the
+  // provider rules: checkFallbackError's honorsRuleLockScope pre-check runs
+  // BEFORE the generic apikey-category FORBIDDEN branch and matches the
+  // "额度不足" rule here (reason quota_exhausted, scope connection — see A11).
+  // In the real pipeline, chatCore's upstreamStatusRestatement hook (Task 2)
+  // still converts 403→429 before checkFallbackError sees it, so this raw-403
+  // path is what a hook-bypassed request hits — and it must still not be
+  // misclassified as permanent account deactivation, regardless of which
+  // branch (pre-check or the old apikey-FORBIDDEN fallback) ultimately fires.
   const result = checkFallbackError(403, "用户额度不足", 0, null, "agentrouter", null);
   assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
   assert.ok(!result.permanent);
@@ -139,3 +139,39 @@ test("A10: other providers' checkFallbackError behavior is unchanged (exclusivit
   assert.equal(result.reason, "rate_limit_exceeded");
   assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 3000);
 });
+
+test("A11: checkFallbackError surfaces ruleScope=connection for agentrouter quota", () => {
+  const result = checkFallbackError(429, "用户额度不足", 0, null, "agentrouter", null);
+  assert.equal(result.ruleScope, "connection");
+  assert.equal(result.reason, "quota_exhausted");
+  assert.ok(!result.permanent);
+});
+
+test("A12: checkFallbackError 403 无权访问模型 carries the rule's scope + cooldown", () => {
+  const result = checkFallbackError(403, "无权访问模型 claude-opus-5", 0, null, "agentrouter", null);
+  assert.equal(result.ruleScope, "model");
+  assert.equal(result.reason, "auth_error");
+  assert.equal(result.baseCooldownMs, 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+});
+
+test("A13: exclusivity — ruleScope stays undefined for other providers", () => {
+  const opencode = checkFallbackError(
+    429,
+    '{"error":{"message":"organization_quota_exceeded"}}',
+    0,
+    null,
+    "opencode",
+    null
+  );
+  assert.equal(opencode.ruleScope, undefined);
+  const openrouter = checkFallbackError(402, "credits exhausted", 0, null, "openrouter", null);
+  assert.equal(openrouter.ruleScope, undefined);
+});
+
+test("A14: honorsRuleLockScope allowlist is agentrouter-only", async () => {
+  const { honorsRuleLockScope } = await import("../../open-sse/config/providerErrorRules.ts");
+  assert.equal(honorsRuleLockScope("agentrouter"), true);
+  assert.equal(honorsRuleLockScope("AgentRouter"), true);
+  assert.equal(honorsRuleLockScope("opencode"), false);
+  assert.equal(honorsRuleLockScope(null), false);
+});

tests/unit/agentrouter-lock-scope-10334.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,638 @@
+// #10334 — agentrouter EXCLUSIVE: markAccountUnavailable must honor the
+// provider rule's declared lock scope instead of always deriving it from
+// hasPerModelQuota(). agentrouter is a passthroughModels provider, so a
+// naive account-wide quota exhaustion ("额度不足") would otherwise be treated
+// as a per-model 429 and lock only ONE model, leaving combo routing to burn
+// one upstream call per remaining model of the same exhausted account. This
+// suite pins the connection-scoped cooldown behavior AND its invariants:
+// never a terminal status, must also win when the caller is combo (isCombo),
+// must not lock the model, and must be EXCLUSIVE to agentrouter — every other
+// passthroughModels/compatible provider keeps today's per-model lockout.
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-agentrouter-lock-"));
+process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR;
+
+const core = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
+const providersDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/providers.ts");
+const auth = await import("../../src/sse/services/auth.ts");
+const accountFallback = await import("../../open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts");
+const { applyComboTargetExhaustion } = await import(
+  "../../open-sse/services/combo/targetExhaustion.ts"
+);
+const { classifyProviderError } = await import("../../open-sse/services/errorClassifier.ts");
+
+const QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429 = '{"error":{"message":"账户额度不足，请充值后重试"}}';
+const MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_403 = '{"error":{"message":"无权访问模型 claude-opus-5"}}';
+
+async function resetStorage() {
+  core.resetDbInstance();
+  fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  fs.mkdirSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true });
+}
+
+async function seedConnection(
+  provider: string,
+  overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+): Promise<string> {
+  const conn = await providersDb.createProviderConnection({
+    provider,
+    authType: "apikey",
+    apiKey: `${provider}-key`,
+    isActive: true,
+    testStatus: "active",
+    ...overrides,
+  });
+  return (conn as Record<string, unknown>).id as string;
+}
+
+test.after(() => {
+  core.resetDbInstance();
+  fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+test("agentrouter 429 account quota exhausted -> connection cooldown, never terminal", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("agentrouter");
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "agentrouter",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+  assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0, "connection cooldown must be positive");
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  assert.equal(after.testStatus, "unavailable");
+  assert.notEqual(after.testStatus, "credits_exhausted");
+  assert.ok(after.rateLimitedUntil, "connection must carry a rateLimitedUntil");
+  assert.ok(
+    new Date(String(after.rateLimitedUntil)).getTime() > Date.now(),
+    "rateLimitedUntil must be in the future"
+  );
+});
+
+test("agentrouter 429 quota exhausted with isCombo: true still cools the connection (not a model lock)", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("agentrouter");
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "agentrouter",
+    "claude-opus-5",
+    null,
+    { isCombo: true, persistUnavailableState: false }
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+  assert.ok(result.cooldownMs > 0);
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  assert.equal(after.testStatus, "unavailable");
+  assert.notEqual(after.testStatus, "credits_exhausted");
+  assert.ok(after.rateLimitedUntil, "connection must be cooled down even for combo callers");
+});
+
+test("agentrouter quota cooldown does NOT lock the model", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("agentrouter");
+
+  await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "agentrouter",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  const lockout = accountFallback.getModelLockoutInfo("agentrouter", connId, "claude-opus-5");
+  assert.equal(lockout, null, "connection-scoped quota must not also record a model lockout");
+});
+
+test("agentrouter 403 model-access-denied -> model lockout, connection stays active", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("agentrouter");
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    403,
+    MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_403,
+    "agentrouter",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  assert.equal(after.testStatus, "active");
+  assert.ok(!after.rateLimitedUntil, "connection must not be rate-limited by a model-scoped rule");
+
+  // #3027's existing per-model-quota-provider branch handles this 403 (it is
+  // unmodified by #10334 except that it now reads the rule's declared
+  // cooldown via fallbackResult.baseCooldownMs) — the recorded reason stays
+  // the pre-existing hardcoded "forbidden", not the rule's "auth_error".
+  const lockout = accountFallback.getModelLockoutInfo("agentrouter", connId, "claude-opus-5");
+  assert.equal(lockout?.reason, "forbidden");
+  // The 6h base cooldown declared by the "agentrouter-model-access-denied"
+  // rule (open-sse/config/providerErrorRules.ts) must flow through as
+  // fallbackResult.baseCooldownMs instead of the generic
+  // COOLDOWN_MS.serviceUnavailable (2s) default — it then gets clamped down
+  // to the model-lockout maxCooldownMs setting (default 1_800_000ms / 30min)
+  // by recordModelLockoutFailure, same as every other model lockout. What
+  // this pins is that the rule's cooldown was consulted at all: a plain 2s
+  // default would be immediately visible as a tiny remainingMs, not ~max.
+  assert.ok(
+    lockout && lockout.remainingMs > 1_700_000,
+    `expected the rule cooldown to be clamped to ~maxCooldownMs (1_800_000ms), got ${lockout?.remainingMs}ms`
+  );
+});
+
+test("exclusivity: ollama-cloud with an equivalent account-wide-looking 429 keeps today's per-model lockout, no connection cooldown", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("ollama-cloud");
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "ollama-cloud",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  // ollama-cloud is NOT in the honorsRuleLockScope allowlist: today's
+  // per-model-quota behavior for a 429 must be unchanged — connection stays
+  // active, no rateLimitedUntil.
+  assert.equal(after.testStatus, "active");
+  assert.ok(!after.rateLimitedUntil, "non-agentrouter providers must not gain connection cooldown");
+
+  // Positive assertion, not just the negative: the model lockout must have
+  // actually been recorded. Without this, a future refactor that stops
+  // locking anything for these providers would pass this test silently.
+  const lockout = accountFallback.getModelLockoutInfo("ollama-cloud", connId, "claude-opus-5");
+  assert.ok(lockout, "expected the pre-existing per-model lockout to be recorded");
+});
+
+test("exclusivity: vertex with an equivalent account-wide-looking 429 keeps today's per-model lockout, no connection cooldown", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("vertex");
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "vertex",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  assert.equal(after.testStatus, "active");
+  assert.ok(!after.rateLimitedUntil, "non-agentrouter providers must not gain connection cooldown");
+
+  // Positive assertion, not just the negative — see the ollama-cloud case above.
+  const lockout = accountFallback.getModelLockoutInfo("vertex", connId, "claude-opus-5");
+  assert.ok(lockout, "expected the pre-existing per-model lockout to be recorded");
+});
+
+// ─── Fix round 1 (#10334 review) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// Important finding: the "never terminal" invariant is not structurally
+// guaranteed by `ruleScope === "connection"` alone — it depends on the
+// provider rule table only ever pairing scope "connection" with a genuinely
+// transient reason. isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope() is the actual guard;
+// pin its predicate directly with synthetic fallbackResult shapes, since no
+// rule in the current table produces a permanent/credits-exhausted result
+// with scope "connection" (exercising it end-to-end would require editing
+// the production rule table just for a test).
+test("isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope: rejects a permanent rule result even with scope connection", () => {
+  const permanentConnectionScopeResult = {
+    ruleScope: "connection" as const,
+    reason: "auth_error",
+    permanent: true,
+  };
+  assert.equal(
+    auth.isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope("agentrouter", permanentConnectionScopeResult),
+    false,
+    "a future permanent-state rule with scope connection must NOT take the transient-cooldown branch"
+  );
+});
+
+test("isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope: rejects a credits-exhausted rule result even with scope connection", () => {
+  const creditsExhaustedConnectionScopeResult = {
+    ruleScope: "connection" as const,
+    reason: "quota_exhausted",
+    creditsExhausted: true,
+  };
+  assert.equal(
+    auth.isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope("agentrouter", creditsExhaustedConnectionScopeResult),
+    false,
+    "a future credits-exhausted rule with scope connection must NOT take the transient-cooldown branch"
+  );
+});
+
+test("isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope: accepts the real quota-exhausted/connection shape", () => {
+  const quotaConnectionScopeResult = {
+    ruleScope: "connection" as const,
+    reason: "quota_exhausted",
+  };
+  assert.equal(
+    auth.isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope("agentrouter", quotaConnectionScopeResult),
+    true,
+    "today's only connection-scope rule result (quota_exhausted, no permanent/creditsExhausted) must pass"
+  );
+});
+
+test("isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope: rejects non-agentrouter providers regardless of shape", () => {
+  const quotaConnectionScopeResult = {
+    ruleScope: "connection" as const,
+    reason: "quota_exhausted",
+  };
+  assert.equal(
+    auth.isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope("ollama-cloud", quotaConnectionScopeResult),
+    false,
+    "honorsRuleLockScope must still gate every provider outside the agentrouter allowlist"
+  );
+});
+
+// Minor finding: guard the branch's POSITION in markAccountUnavailable. If a
+// future refactor moved the branch above the terminal-status guard (~line
+// 2023) or the anti-thundering-herd guard (~line 2038), a credits_exhausted
+// connection would be silently overwritten, or a live cooldown would be
+// shortened — and the 6 tests above would stay green because none of them
+// seed a connection with pre-existing terminal/cooldown state.
+test("position guard: a connection already credits_exhausted stays terminal through an agentrouter quota 429", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("agentrouter", { testStatus: "credits_exhausted" });
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "agentrouter",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+  assert.equal(result.cooldownMs, 0, "terminal-status short-circuit returns cooldownMs 0");
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  assert.equal(
+    after.testStatus,
+    "credits_exhausted",
+    "the connection-scope branch must never overwrite a pre-existing terminal status"
+  );
+});
+
+test("position guard: an existing live cooldown is not shortened by the connection-scope branch", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const futureCooldown = new Date(Date.now() + 10 * 60 * 1000).toISOString();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("agentrouter", {
+    testStatus: "unavailable",
+    rateLimitedUntil: futureCooldown,
+  });
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "agentrouter",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  assert.equal(
+    after.rateLimitedUntil,
+    futureCooldown,
+    "the anti-thundering-herd guard must win: an existing live cooldown must not be reset/shortened"
+  );
+});
+
+// Minor finding: disableCooling=true skips the connection-scope branch (the
+// `!disableCooling` condition), so the #10334 bug survives for connections
+// with that opt-out — they fall into the ~30min per-model lockout instead of
+// the shorter connection cooldown. Documented in the block comment above the
+// branch; pin the behavior so a future change to the guard is deliberate.
+test("disableCooling=true skips the connection-scope branch and falls back to per-model lockout", async () => {
+  await resetStorage();
+  const connId = await seedConnection("agentrouter", {
+    providerSpecificData: { disableCooling: true },
+  });
+
+  const result = await auth.markAccountUnavailable(
+    connId,
+    429,
+    QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+    "agentrouter",
+    "claude-opus-5"
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(result.shouldFallback, true);
+
+  const after = await providersDb.getProviderConnectionById(connId);
+  // Connection is NOT cooled down — disableCooling's documented CONNECTION-
+  // level opt-out (#2997) is honored.
+  assert.equal(after.testStatus, "active");
+  assert.ok(!after.rateLimitedUntil, "disableCooling must keep the connection selectable");
+
+  // But the model IS locked out instead (the #10334 bug's exact symptom for
+  // disableCooling connections — a deliberate, documented trade-off).
+  const lockout = accountFallback.getModelLockoutInfo("agentrouter", connId, "claude-opus-5");
+  assert.ok(
+    lockout,
+    "expected a per-model lockout when disableCooling bypasses the connection branch"
+  );
+});
+
+// ─── Task 3 (#10334): combo skips the exhausted agentrouter connection
+// WITHIN THE SAME REQUEST ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// The tests above pin markAccountUnavailable's PERSISTED connection cooldown
+// — that only protects the NEXT request. applyComboTargetExhaustion (the
+// #1731/#1731v2 shared classifier both combo dispatchers call after every
+// target's upstream error — open-sse/services/combo/targetExhaustion.ts) is
+// what decides whether remaining targets of the CURRENT request are skipped.
+// Without a matching gate there, a combo with 5 legs on the same exhausted
+// agentrouter account would still burn all 5 upstream calls before the
+// persisted cooldown from the tests above ever kicks in.
+
+function comboSets() {
+  return {
+    exhaustedProviders: new Set<string>(),
+    exhaustedConnections: new Set<string>(),
+    transientRateLimitedProviders: new Set<string>(),
+  };
+}
+
+function comboTarget(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
+  return {
+    kind: "model",
+    executionKey: "ek",
+    modelStr: "agentrouter/claude-opus-5",
+    provider: "agentrouter",
+    providerId: null,
+    connectionId: "conn-agentrouter-1",
+    ...overrides,
+  } as Parameters<typeof applyComboTargetExhaustion>[0];
+}
+
+const comboLog = { info() {}, warn() {}, error() {}, debug() {} };
+
+const comboBaseOpts = {
+  errorText: QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_429,
+  rawModel: "claude-opus-5",
+  isTokenLimitBreach: false,
+  allAccountsRateLimited: false,
+  requestScopedFailure: false,
+  log: comboLog,
+  tag: "COMBO",
+  exhaustedLogLevel: "info" as const,
+};
+
+// The real shape checkFallbackError surfaces for agentrouter's restated 429
+// (open-sse/config/providerErrorRules.ts's "agentrouter-user-quota-exhausted"
+// rule: reason "quota_exhausted", scope "connection") — same shape pinned by
+// isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope's own tests above.
+const CONNECTION_SCOPE_FALLBACK_RESULT = {
+  ruleScope: "connection" as const,
+  reason: "quota_exhausted",
+};
+
+test("combo in-request skip: agentrouter connection-scope quota marks exhaustedConnections (#10334)", () => {
+  const sets = comboSets();
+  const exhausted = applyComboTargetExhaustion(comboTarget(), {
+    ...comboBaseOpts,
+    result: { status: 429 },
+    fallbackResult: CONNECTION_SCOPE_FALLBACK_RESULT,
+    sets,
+  });
+  assert.equal(
+    exhausted,
+    true,
+    "combo must treat this like an exhausted target — no same-target retry"
+  );
+  assert.ok(
+    sets.exhaustedConnections.has("agentrouter:conn-agentrouter-1"),
+    "the exhausted account's connection must be marked so remaining same-connection targets are skipped this request"
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    sets.exhaustedProviders.size,
+    0,
+    "must NOT exhaust the whole provider — sibling agentrouter connections keep their own quota"
+  );
+  // Important finding (review round 1): unlike markConnectionLevelExhaustion's
+  // path, this branch must NEVER populate transientRateLimitedProviders. That
+  // set drives combo.ts's `allowRateLimitedConnection` force-allow
+  // (open-sse/services/combo.ts:1005-1013 and :2734-2738), which bypasses the
+  // `rateLimitedUntil` filter in credential selection (src/sse/services/auth.ts:1238)
+  // for the provider's remaining legs this request. Marking it here would
+  // silently re-open the very connection Task 2's markAccountUnavailable (and
+  // this branch) just cooled down.
+  assert.equal(
+    sets.transientRateLimitedProviders.size,
+    0,
+    "must NOT mark transientRateLimitedProviders — that would force-allow reusing the connection this branch just exhausted"
+  );
+});
+
+test("combo in-request skip: no connectionId falls back to whole-provider exhaustion", () => {
+  const sets = comboSets();
+  const exhausted = applyComboTargetExhaustion(comboTarget({ connectionId: null }), {
+    ...comboBaseOpts,
+    result: { status: 429 },
+    fallbackResult: CONNECTION_SCOPE_FALLBACK_RESULT,
+    sets,
+  });
+  assert.equal(exhausted, true);
+  assert.ok(
+    sets.exhaustedProviders.has("agentrouter"),
+    "no connectionId to scope to — must fall back to whole-provider, mirroring markAuthLevelExhaustion"
+  );
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedConnections.size, 0);
+});
+
+test("exclusivity: an equivalent connection-scope-shaped result for ollama-cloud marks nothing (#10334 is agentrouter-only)", () => {
+  const sets = comboSets();
+  // Synthetic: production never actually produces ruleScope for a
+  // non-allowlisted provider (honorsRuleLockScope gates it upstream inside
+  // checkFallbackError) — feeding it here directly proves
+  // applyComboTargetExhaustion ALSO re-checks the provider via
+  // isAgentrouterConnectionQuotaScope rather than trusting whatever shape
+  // it is handed.
+  const exhausted = applyComboTargetExhaustion(
+    comboTarget({ provider: "ollama-cloud", connectionId: "conn-ollama-1" }),
+    {
+      ...comboBaseOpts,
+      result: { status: 429 },
+      fallbackResult: CONNECTION_SCOPE_FALLBACK_RESULT,
+      sets,
+    }
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    exhausted,
+    false,
+    "ollama-cloud must fall through to today's per-model-quota behavior unchanged"
+  );
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedConnections.size, 0);
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedProviders.size, 0);
+});
+
+test("exclusivity: vertex with the same synthetic connection-scope result marks nothing", () => {
+  const sets = comboSets();
+  const exhausted = applyComboTargetExhaustion(
+    comboTarget({ provider: "vertex", connectionId: "conn-vertex-1" }),
+    {
+      ...comboBaseOpts,
+      result: { status: 429 },
+      fallbackResult: CONNECTION_SCOPE_FALLBACK_RESULT,
+      sets,
+    }
+  );
+  assert.equal(exhausted, false);
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedConnections.size, 0);
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedProviders.size, 0);
+});
+
+test("guard: a permanent agentrouter fallbackResult with scope connection does NOT mark the connection exhausted here either", () => {
+  const sets = comboSets();
+  const exhausted = applyComboTargetExhaustion(comboTarget(), {
+    ...comboBaseOpts,
+    result: { status: 429 },
+    fallbackResult: { ruleScope: "connection" as const, reason: "auth_error", permanent: true },
+    sets,
+  });
+  assert.equal(exhausted, false);
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedConnections.has("agentrouter:conn-agentrouter-1"), false);
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedProviders.size, 0);
+});
+
+test("guard: a credits-exhausted agentrouter fallbackResult with scope connection does NOT mark the connection exhausted here either", () => {
+  const sets = comboSets();
+  const exhausted = applyComboTargetExhaustion(comboTarget(), {
+    ...comboBaseOpts,
+    result: { status: 429 },
+    fallbackResult: {
+      ruleScope: "connection" as const,
+      reason: "quota_exhausted",
+      creditsExhausted: true,
+    },
+    sets,
+  });
+  assert.equal(exhausted, false);
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedConnections.has("agentrouter:conn-agentrouter-1"), false);
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedProviders.size, 0);
+});
+
+// Minor finding (review round 1): the connection-scope branch is NOT
+// 429-only. The "额度不足" rule (buildAgentrouterRules, providerErrorRules.ts)
+// matches statuses {400, 403, 429}, and Task 1's FORBIDDEN pre-check
+// (accountFallback.ts ~1729-1751, gated on honorsRuleLockScope) surfaces
+// `ruleScope: "connection"` for a RAW 403 carrying that body too — before the
+// generic apikey FORBIDDEN early-return, and before markAuthLevelExhaustion
+// below ever sees it. Pin that a raw 403 with this shape takes the SAME
+// connection-scope branch (not markAuthLevelExhaustion) and lands in the SAME
+// set with the SAME key — the two paths are set-equivalent for agentrouter on
+// this status, so this is not a behavior change, just documenting which
+// branch actually runs.
+//
+// Fix round 2 finding: the Set-content assertions alone (exhausted===true,
+// the connection key present, the other two sets empty) do NOT discriminate
+// which branch ran — markAuthLevelExhaustion (the 401/403 branch below)
+// produces the byte-identical Set effects for a 403 with a connectionId (same
+// key, same untouched sibling sets, same `true` return), so deleting the new
+// branch entirely would leave this test green. Use a log spy — the one real
+// observable difference between the two paths — to prove the NEW branch
+// actually fired: its message is tagged `#10334` / "account quota exhausted"
+// (markAgentrouterConnectionQuotaExhaustion), never `#8133` / "auth failure"
+// (markAuthLevelExhaustion).
+function makeLogSpy() {
+  const calls: { level: string; tag: string; message: string }[] = [];
+  const record = (level: string) => (tag: string, message: string) => {
+    calls.push({ level, tag, message });
+  };
+  return {
+    calls,
+    log: {
+      info: record("info"),
+      warn: record("warn"),
+      error: record("error"),
+      debug: record("debug"),
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+test("combo in-request skip: a RAW 403 with connection-scope quota also takes this branch (not markAuthLevelExhaustion)", () => {
+  const sets = comboSets();
+  const spy = makeLogSpy();
+  const exhausted = applyComboTargetExhaustion(comboTarget(), {
+    ...comboBaseOpts,
+    result: { status: 403 },
+    fallbackResult: CONNECTION_SCOPE_FALLBACK_RESULT,
+    sets,
+    log: spy.log,
+  });
+  assert.equal(exhausted, true);
+  assert.ok(
+    sets.exhaustedConnections.has("agentrouter:conn-agentrouter-1"),
+    "a raw 403 carrying ruleScope=connection must exhaust the connection just like the restated-429 case"
+  );
+  assert.equal(sets.exhaustedProviders.size, 0);
+  assert.equal(
+    sets.transientRateLimitedProviders.size,
+    0,
+    "same suppression as the 429 case — must not force-allow reusing this connection"
+  );
+  // The discriminant: prove the NEW (#10334) branch emitted the log, not
+  // markAuthLevelExhaustion's (#8133) — the Set assertions above cannot tell
+  // the two apart on their own.
+  assert.equal(spy.calls.length, 1, "exactly one log call expected for this failure");
+  assert.match(
+    spy.calls[0].message,
+    /#10334/,
+    "must be markAgentrouterConnectionQuotaExhaustion's log line, not markAuthLevelExhaustion's"
+  );
+  assert.ok(
+    /account quota exhausted/.test(spy.calls[0].message),
+    "must carry the new branch's wording, not markAuthLevelExhaustion's 'auth failure'"
+  );
+  assert.doesNotMatch(
+    spy.calls[0].message,
+    /#8133/,
+    "must NOT be markAuthLevelExhaustion's log line"
+  );
+});
+
+// ─── Invariant sentinel ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// classifyProviderError (open-sse/services/errorClassifier.ts) must NEVER
+// classify agentrouter's restated 429 body ("用户额度不足") as quota_exhausted.
+// If it ever does, open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts's providerFailure handling
+// (~line 3835-3856) can reach the terminal `else` branch
+// (`testStatus: "credits_exhausted"`) for agentrouter whenever
+// lockModelIfPerModelQuota does not itself claim the failure — turning a
+// transient, self-recovering account-quota window into a connection that
+// requires a manual operator reset. agentrouter is an apikey-category
+// provider (not oauth), so shouldPreserveQuotaSignalsFor429 in
+// errorClassifier.ts returns false for it and the 429 branch falls through
+// to RATE_LIMITED instead — pin that this stays true.
+test("sentinel: classifyProviderError never returns quota_exhausted for agentrouter's restated 429 body", () => {
+  const classification = classifyProviderError(429, "用户额度不足", "agentrouter");
+  assert.notEqual(
+    classification,
+    "quota_exhausted",
+    "a quota_exhausted classification here would route agentrouter's transient account quota into chatCore's terminal credits_exhausted branch (~chatCore.ts:3849)"
+  );
+});