Files
OmniRoute/docs/security/COMPLIANCE.md
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza 5ac4637816 docs: reorganize docs/ + accuracy audit + drop Node 20 (rebased onto current release tip) (#5262)
* docs: move superpowers/research artifacts to isolated _tasks repo + docs tree cleanup

- Move docs/superpowers/{plans,specs} and docs/research/* into the gitignored,
  separately-versioned _tasks/ repo; untrack the two tracked research design docs.
- Add CLAUDE.md "Planning & Research Artifacts" section overriding the superpowers
  default save paths (docs/... -> _tasks/...); align REPOSITORY_MAP and
  DOCUMENTATION_OVERHAUL_PLAN with the new convention.
- Drop 4 now-obsolete /api/discovery/* entries from check-docs-symbols allowlist
  (stale-enforcement) and refresh code/spec path comments to _tasks/...
- Sweeps in concurrent docs-tree restructuring (root-level provider/guide docs,
  compression spec cleanup, .mcp.json.example removal).

* docs: reorganize docs/ tree + fix stale facts across ~26 docs

Phase A — reorganization:
- Move 7 orphan root docs into subfolders (providers/ created; TIERS+USAGE_QUOTA→guides/;
  plugins+PLUGIN_SDK→frameworks/); delete 8 obsolete/redundant docs (SUBMIT_PR superseded
  by CONTRIBUTING; DOCUMENTATION_OVERHAUL_PLAN; INCIDENT_RESPONSE/PERF_BUDGETS/THREAT_MODEL;
  3 ops snapshots). Rebuild README index (was missing ~40 files) + per-folder meta.json nav.
- Clean 14 dangling doc-path references in bin/ ops scripts, scripts/, workflow, tests;
  fix the dockerignore-docs-coverage required-docs path (PROVIDERS→providers/CLAUDE_WEB).

Phase B — content accuracy (verified against code, not the audit summary):
- Functional: ENVIRONMENT flag defaults (INPUT_SANITIZER/MCP_ENFORCE_SCOPES=true,
  COMPRESS_DESCRIPTIONS=false, dynamic heap); MCP-SERVER notion tool names (omniroute_*→
  notion_*) + counts 87→94; coverage gate 75/70→60/60/60/60 (RELEASE_CHECKLIST, COVERAGE_PLAN,
  ERROR_SANITIZATION, CONTRIBUTING); pre-push hook description; regenerate PROVIDER_REFERENCE (237).
- Count drift: providers 237, executors 70, migrations 106, db modules 94, oauth 19,
  strategies 17, MCP 94, flags 38, TS 6.0, open-sse ~900/services 294 across architecture/
  frameworks/ops docs; AUTO-COMBO 9→12 factors w/ correct DEFAULT_WEIGHTS; REASONING +2
  patterns; STEALTH UA defaults; AGENT_PROTOCOLS +cursor-cloud/list-capabilities;
  LANGUAGE_PACKS +id pack.
- Kept Node 20 (runtime guard accepts 20.20.2+; only engines is stricter) and MCP scopes=13
  (mcpScopes.ts) — both were correct in the docs; corrected only the attribution.

* docs: finish content refresh — compression engines, CLI_TOKEN merge, metadata sweep

- Compression: document the additional built-in engines (CCR, headroom, ionizer,
  session-dedup) in COMPRESSION_ENGINES; clarify LLMLingua-2 is the ultra-mode SLM
  backend + cross-ref the extra engines in EXTENDING_COMPRESSION; add the id
  (Indonesian) language pack to LANGUAGE_PACKS.
- AUTO-COMBO: replace the orphan 'How tiers fit' weight table (stale weights) with a
  pointer to the canonical 12-factor DEFAULT_WEIGHTS table.
- Security: merge CLI_TOKEN_AUTH.md (legacy 32-char SHA-256 format) into CLI_TOKEN.md
  as a 'Legacy format — still accepted' section (server accepts both HMAC + legacy),
  delete CLI_TOKEN_AUTH.md, drop it from the index + security nav.
- Metadata: bump stale frontmatter (version/lastUpdated) to 3.8.40/2026-06-28 across the
  doc set audited this pass, and normalize the in-body 'Last updated' header lines to match.

* fix(runtime): drop Node 20 from supported range + align all docs/diagrams/counts

- Node minimum is now 22 (aligned with package.json engines). SUPPORTED_NODE_RANGE in
  src/shared/utils/nodeRuntimeSupport.ts (and the bin/ mirror) drops the 20.x line →
  '>=22.22.2 <23 || >=24.0.0 <27'; getNodeRuntimeSupport now rejects Node 20 as
  unsupported-major. Test updated (TDD): node-runtime-support.test.ts asserts Node 20
  rejected. Docs aligned (TROUBLESHOOTING ×2, TERMUX, RELEASE_CHECKLIST, CODEBASE,
  CLI-TOOLS, README, llm.txt + 42 i18n llm.txt mirrors, skills/cli-serve).
- Diagrams regenerated: mcp-tools-87 -> mcp-tools-94 (34 base + pool 6 = 94) and
  auto-combo-9factor -> auto-combo-12factor (correct DEFAULT_WEIGHTS); SVGs re-rendered
  via mermaid-cli; doc refs + diagrams/README updated; fixed a pre-existing broken
  resilience-3layers image path.
- CLAUDE.md + AGENTS.md aligned to real counts (237 providers, 94 MCP tools / 34 base,
  106 migrations, 94 db modules, 12-factor auto-combo, 17 strategies); README provider
  count 231 -> 237; executor count corrected to 68 (provider executors, excl base/index)
  and OAuth to 18 across architecture docs. check:docs-all now passes (0 strict drift,
  0 broken links); removed dead .mcp.json.example doc link.

* fix(services): update installer Node hint to >=22.22.2 (aligned with dropped Node 20)

* docs: realign counts to current release tip after rebase

The release tip advanced while this work was in flight (Gemini CLI provider/executor
removed by #5246, plus other PRs). Re-counted against the current code and updated:
providers 237->236, executors 68->67, OAuth modules 18->17, open-sse services 294->298;
regenerated PROVIDER_REFERENCE.md (236). check:docs-all passes (0 strict drift).

* docs(changelog) + i18n: record Node 20 drop + fix nodeIncompatibleHint

- CHANGELOG: add [3.8.40] entries for the Node 20.x removal (runtime) and the docs
  reorganization/accuracy audit.
- i18n: nodeIncompatibleHint across all 42 locales no longer lists Node 20.x as
  supported (ASCII + CJK full-width variants), aligned with the dropped Node 20.

* fix(docs): repair CI breakages from the doc moves

- test: cli-plugin-system asserted docs/dev/plugins.md exists; the file moved to
  docs/frameworks/PLUGINS.md — point the test at the new path (Unit fast-path 2/2 fix).
- frontmatter: PLUGINS.md and PLUGIN_SDK.md moved into the fumadocs-indexed
  docs/frameworks/ which requires a 'title' frontmatter; the missing frontmatter
  failed the Next.js MDX build (dast-smoke 'invalid frontmatter'). Added frontmatter
  to both, plus the providers/ docs (consistency; that folder is not indexed).
2026-06-28 22:07:18 -03:00

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Markdown

---
title: "Compliance & Audit"
version: 3.8.40
lastUpdated: 2026-06-28
---
# Compliance & Audit
> **Source of truth:** `src/lib/compliance/`, `src/app/api/compliance/`
> **Last updated:** 2026-06-28 — v3.8.40
OmniRoute records administrative actions, authentication events, provider
credential lifecycle changes, and MCP tool invocations to SQLite-backed audit
tables. This page covers what gets logged, where it lives, how long it is
retained, how API keys can opt out, and how to query the data.
The implementation lives in `src/lib/compliance/index.ts` (T-43 — "Compliance
Controls") and `src/lib/compliance/providerAudit.ts`. Audit writes never throw:
on any failure the call is silently swallowed so audit logging cannot break the
main request flow.
## What Gets Logged
### Administrative audit events (`audit_log`)
Every call to `logAuditEvent({ action, actor, target, details, ... })` produces
one row. Action strings follow a `domain.verb` (or `domain.verb.outcome`)
pattern. Confirmed in-tree action types include:
| Action | Source |
| ------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------- |
| `auth.login.success` | `src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `auth.login.failed` | `src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `auth.login.locked` | `src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `auth.login.error` | `src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `auth.login.misconfigured` | `src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `auth.login.setup_required` | `src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts` |
| `auth.logout.success` | `src/app/api/auth/logout/route.ts` |
| `provider.credentials.created` | `src/app/api/providers/route.ts` |
| `provider.credentials.updated` | `src/app/api/providers/[id]/route.ts` |
| `provider.credentials.revoked` | `src/app/api/providers/[id]/route.ts` |
| `provider.credentials.batch_revoked` | `src/app/api/providers/route.ts` |
| `sync.token.created` | `src/app/api/sync/tokens/route.ts` |
| `sync.token.revoked` | `src/app/api/sync/tokens/[id]/route.ts` |
| `compliance.cleanup` | `src/lib/compliance/index.ts` |
Each entry captures `action`, `actor` (defaults to `"system"`), `target`,
`details`/`metadata` (JSON), `ip_address`, `resource_type`, `status`,
`request_id`, and `timestamp`. Sensitive keys (`apiKey`, `accessToken`,
`refreshToken`, `password`, anything matching `*token`/`*secret`/`*apikey`,
etc.) are recursively redacted to `"[redacted]"` before the row is written.
### MCP tool calls (`mcp_tool_audit`)
Every MCP tool invocation writes a row through
`open-sse/mcp-server/audit.ts`. Schema (from
`src/lib/db/migrations/002_mcp_a2a_tables.sql`):
| Column | Notes |
| ---------------- | ----------------------------------- |
| `id` | autoincrement |
| `tool_name` | MCP tool identifier |
| `input_hash` | sha256 of input (no payload stored) |
| `output_summary` | short, truncated summary |
| `duration_ms` | wall time |
| `api_key_id` | caller (nullable) |
| `success` | `1` / `0` |
| `error_code` | terminal error code on failure |
| `created_at` | ISO timestamp |
### Request / usage logs
These are operational telemetry (not strictly admin audit) but share the same
retention pipeline:
- `usage_history` — per-request usage roll-up
- `call_logs` — full per-request log (subject to row-cap, see below)
- `proxy_logs` — proxy traffic log (subject to row-cap)
- `request_detail_logs` — legacy detailed request log (still pruned if present)
## Storage Schema
`audit_log` is created lazily by `ensureAuditLogSchema()` on first use:
```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
action TEXT NOT NULL,
actor TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'system',
target TEXT,
details TEXT,
ip_address TEXT,
resource_type TEXT,
status TEXT,
request_id TEXT,
metadata TEXT
);
```
Indexes are created on `timestamp`, `action`, `actor`, `resource_type`,
`status`, and `request_id`. Missing columns on legacy DBs are added via
`ALTER TABLE` on demand.
## Retention & Cleanup
Two separate retention windows are honoured:
| Env var | Default | Applies to |
| --------------------------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `APP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS` | `7` | `audit_log`, `mcp_tool_audit` |
| `CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS` | `7` | `usage_history`, `call_logs`, `proxy_logs`, `request_detail_logs` |
| `CALL_LOGS_TABLE_MAX_ROWS` | `100000` | Row-cap trim for `call_logs` |
| `PROXY_LOGS_TABLE_MAX_ROWS` | `100000` | Row-cap trim for `proxy_logs` |
`cleanupExpiredLogs()` runs the retention pass. It is invoked on server startup
from `src/server-init.ts` and `src/instrumentation-node.ts`. Each run logs a
`compliance.cleanup` audit event with the per-table delete counts. Proxy/call
log trimming is batched (`BATCH_SIZE = 5000`) to avoid long write locks.
Manual request-history cleanup is separate from retention. The Request Logs
page calls `POST /api/settings/purge-request-history`, which deletes `call_logs`,
legacy `request_detail_logs`, and local request artifacts under
`${DATA_DIR}/call_logs/`.
Defaults are defined in `src/lib/logEnv.ts`
(`DEFAULT_APP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS = 7`, `DEFAULT_CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS = 7`).
## `noLog` Opt-Out (per API key)
API keys can be flagged so their downstream call traffic is not logged. The
flag lives on the `api_keys` table (`no_log INTEGER DEFAULT 0`) and is mirrored
into an in-memory set for hot-path lookups.
```bash
# Create a no-log key (management auth required)
curl -X POST http://localhost:20128/api/keys \
-H "Cookie: auth_token=..." \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "Privacy key", "noLog": true}'
```
Helpers (`src/lib/compliance/index.ts`):
- `setNoLog(apiKeyId, true|false)` — toggle the in-memory entry
- `isNoLog(apiKeyId)` — checked on the request path; falls back to a 30 s
cached read from `api_keys.no_log`
- `NO_LOG_API_KEY_IDS` (env, comma-separated) — preloaded into the in-memory
set on boot; useful when you cannot toggle the column directly
Administrative audit events (login, provider changes, MCP tool calls, etc.)
are **not** affected by `noLog` — only per-request traffic logging is opted
out.
## REST API
| Endpoint | Method | Description | Auth |
| --------------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------ | ---------- |
| `/api/compliance/audit-log` | `GET` | Paginated admin audit entries with filters | management |
| `/api/mcp/audit` | `GET` | Paginated MCP tool audit entries | (open-sse) |
| `/api/mcp/audit/stats` | `GET` | Aggregated MCP audit stats | (open-sse) |
No CSV export endpoint is shipped today — export from the dashboard or query
the SQLite database directly.
### Querying `/api/compliance/audit-log`
Supported query params (all optional, all use `LIKE %value%` matching for
text filters):
- `action`, `actor`, `target`, `resourceType` (or `resource_type`),
`status`, `requestId` (or `request_id`)
- `from` / `since`, `to` / `until` — ISO timestamps
- `limit` (default `50`, min `1`, max `500`)
- `offset` (default `0`, max `10_000`)
The response is a JSON array. Pagination metadata is returned in headers:
`x-total-count`, `x-page-limit`, `x-page-offset`.
```bash
curl "http://localhost:20128/api/compliance/audit-log?action=provider.credentials&from=2026-05-01" \
-H "Cookie: auth_token=..."
```
## Dashboard
The dashboard exposes audit data at **`/dashboard/audit`**
(`src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/audit/page.tsx`). The page has two tabs:
- **Compliance** (`ComplianceTab.tsx`) — admin audit events from
`/api/compliance/audit-log`. Filters by event type, severity (info / warning
/ critical, derived from action + status), and date range. Severity is
computed client-side from the action/status strings.
- **MCP** (`McpAuditTab.tsx`) — MCP tool audit from `/api/mcp/audit`, with
filters by tool name and success/failure.
Both tabs paginate with page sizes of `50` (compliance) and `25` (MCP).
## Provider Credential Helpers
`src/lib/compliance/providerAudit.ts` provides shaping helpers used by the
provider-management routes when they emit credential events:
- `summarizeProviderConnectionForAudit(connection)` — strips `apiKey`,
`accessToken`, `refreshToken`, `idToken`, and
`providerSpecificData.consoleApiKey` before the connection snapshot is
written to `details`.
- `getProviderAuditTarget(connection)` — composes a stable
`"<provider>:<name|id>"` string for the `target` field.
- `extractProviderWarnings(...payloads)` — scans provider responses for
policy/safety warnings (`[sanitizer]`, `prompt injection detected`,
`content has been filtered`, `safety filter`, `policy violation`) and
surfaces up to 5 hits, each truncated to 400 chars.
## Best Practices
- Flag API keys handling PII (legal, medical, etc.) with `noLog: true`.
- Tune `APP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS` / `CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS` to meet your
retention policy. The 7-day defaults are conservative.
- Export the audit table off-platform (`sqlite3 dump`) on whatever cadence
your compliance program requires — no built-in archival exists.
- Track `auth.login.failed` and `auth.login.locked` counts for brute-force
detection.
- When adding new admin endpoints, call `logAuditEvent({ ... })` with a stable
`domain.verb.outcome` action string and pass the request context via
`getAuditRequestContext(request)` so IP and `requestId` are captured
automatically.
## See Also
- [`docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md`](./GUARDRAILS.md) — PII masking, prompt injection
- [`docs/frameworks/MCP-SERVER.md`](../frameworks/MCP-SERVER.md) — MCP tool catalog and scopes
- [`docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md`](../reference/ENVIRONMENT.md) — full env var reference
- Source: `src/lib/compliance/`, `src/app/api/compliance/`,
`src/app/api/mcp/audit/`, `src/lib/logEnv.ts`