mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-08-24 16:12:23 +03:00
Validated on a 2-PR combined board: routeGuard 36/36 (within the 68/68 focused-file total), a2a-task-owner-idor 7/7, a2a-tasks-auth, search-baseurl-ssrf-guard, cli-serve-hostname, spawn-capable-prefixes-client-safe all green, typecheck:core + dashboard-typecheck clean, gates within baseline. Five real High-severity advisories fixed with TDD (each failing-then-passing): settings export/import-json ALWAYS_PROTECTED completion, MITM route LOCAL_ONLY+SPAWN_CAPABLE gating, search baseUrl SSRF/IMDS guard, A2A REST task auth+ownership (previously none at all), and the loud boot exposure warning. GHSA-cjv9 confirmed already closed on this base (verified). Round 3 of the advisory sweep.
54 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
54 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Shared A2A authentication + caller-owner resolution (GHSA-jcm5-6wpp-wjj8).
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*
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* The JSON-RPC router (/a2a) grew its own authenticate() for GHSA-v54m, but
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* the REST task routes under /api/a2a/tasks/ had no auth call at all. Both
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* surfaces now share this single implementation so they cannot drift again:
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* same REQUIRE_API_KEY posture as /v1, same keyless local-first default, and
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* a stable owner id (hashed API key) used to scope task visibility.
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*/
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import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
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import type { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { extractApiKey, isValidApiKey } from "@/sse/services/auth";
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import { isRequireApiKeyEnabled } from "@/shared/utils/featureFlags";
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function tokensMatch(provided: string, expected: string): boolean {
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const a = Buffer.from(provided);
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const b = Buffer.from(expected);
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if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
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return timingSafeEqual(a, b);
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}
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/**
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* Whether the request may use the A2A surface at all. Mirrors the JSON-RPC
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* posture: when a client key is required, demand a valid OmniRoute key;
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* otherwise honor the legacy explicit A2A key; otherwise stay keyless (the
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* same local-first default as /v1).
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*/
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export async function authenticateA2ARequest(req: NextRequest | Request): Promise<boolean> {
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const apiKey = extractApiKey(req as NextRequest);
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if (isRequireApiKeyEnabled()) {
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return apiKey ? await isValidApiKey(apiKey) : false;
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}
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const configuredKey = process.env.OMNIROUTE_API_KEY;
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if (configuredKey) {
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return apiKey ? tokensMatch(apiKey, configuredKey) : false;
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}
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// No API key required and none configured — allow (keyless local-first).
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Owner id for task scoping (GHSA-jcm5-6wpp-wjj8): a stable hash of the
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* caller's API key, or `undefined` when the call carries no key (keyless
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* posture — ownerless tasks stay visible to everyone, by design).
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*/
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export function resolveA2AOwner(req: NextRequest | Request): string | undefined {
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const apiKey = extractApiKey(req as NextRequest);
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if (!apiKey) return undefined;
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return createHash("sha256").update(apiKey).digest("hex").slice(0, 32);
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}
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