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17 de 18 checks verdes, **zero falhas** — incluindo os quatro shards de unit, Vitest, CodeQL, semgrep, Docs Gates, Merge integrity e o **Fast Quality Gates**, que era exatamente o que o rebaseline do `RoutingTab.tsx` (1606→1607, a linha do seletor que acompanha a nova versão de identidade) veio consertar. O único check restante, `No new ESLint warnings`, ficou enfileirado sem iniciar (duração 0) atrás da saturação de runners de hoje. Cobri os dois comandos que ele executa, localmente e sobre este HEAD: - `npm run check:codeql-ratchet` → **0 alertas abertos** contra baseline 6 (sem regressão). - `npx eslint --max-warnings 0` nos 9 arquivos de código que esta branch altera → **exit 0**, nenhum warning. Conteúdo: os dois commits do #12402 que não estavam subsumidos, com autoria do @ggiak preservada pelo cherry-pick `-x`, mais o rebaseline e o fragmento de changelog que faltava. `typecheck:core` limpo e **138/138** nos testes focados. As três versões (`claudeCodeClient.ts`, `Dockerfile`, `compose.yml`) conferem em 2.1.258, e `npm view @anthropic-ai/claude-code@2.1.258` resolve — o Dockerfile instala esse pin exato.
305 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
305 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: "Stealth Guide"
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version: 3.8.51
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lastUpdated: 2026-09-02
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---
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# Stealth Guide
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> **Source of truth:** `open-sse/utils/tlsClient.ts`, `open-sse/services/{tlsClientBase,claudeTlsClient,perplexityTlsClient,grokTlsClient,notionTlsClient,lmarenaTlsClient,claudeCodeCCH,claudeCodeFingerprint,claudeCodeObfuscation,claudeCodeCompatible}.ts`, `open-sse/config/cliFingerprints.ts`, `src/mitm/`
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> **Last updated:** 2026-09-02 — v3.8.51
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> **Audience:** Engineers maintaining provider-specific stealth integrations.
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OmniRoute integrates with providers whose edges actively fingerprint non-official clients (TLS JA3/JA4, header ordering, JSON body shape, integrity tokens). This page documents the stealth surfaces OmniRoute exposes and where they are implemented.
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## Legal and Ethical Notice
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Stealth features exist so OmniRoute can act as a compatibility layer between user-owned official accounts (Claude Code CLI, Codex, Antigravity, Cursor, etc.) and OmniRoute's unified API. They are **not** for evading fraud detection, sharing credentials, or violating provider Terms of Service. The maintainers expect operators to comply with the upstream ToS they signed when creating accounts.
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---
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## TLS Fingerprinting Layer
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### `open-sse/utils/tlsClient.ts` — wreq-js (Chrome 124)
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Persistent `wreq-js` sessions are created lazily per account scope and resolved proxy. The
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process-wide `TlsClient` pools at most 128 sessions that impersonate **Chrome 124 on macOS** for
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upstreams behind Cloudflare. `TlsClient.fetch()` fails closed when the native runtime is
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unavailable; a caller may explicitly select a fallback outside this wrapper.
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- Session profile: `browser: "chrome_124", os: "macos"`
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- Proxy resolution (priority): `HTTPS_PROXY` → `HTTP_PROXY` → `ALL_PROXY` (also lower-case)
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- Timeout: `TLS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_MS` (inherits from `FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS`, default 600000)
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- `wreq-js` Response is fetch-compatible (`headers`, `text()`, `json()`, `clone()`, `body`).
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### Web-cookie provider transport — wreq-js 3.2.0
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`open-sse/services/tlsClientBase.ts` is the shared adapter for the five specialized
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web-cookie transports below. Each thin provider wrapper selects a browser/OS profile. The adapter
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uses the single wreq runtime loader and transport pool in `open-sse/utils/tlsClient.ts`, keyed by
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profile + OS + resolved proxy, while every request uses `cookieMode: "ephemeral"`. Accounts and
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requests therefore share transport-level connections, but never a wreq session or cookie jar.
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| Provider | Profile | Emulated OS | Stream EOF policy |
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| ---------- | ------------- | ----------- | -------------------------------- |
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| Claude | `chrome_146` | Linux | include `[DONE]` |
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| Perplexity | `firefox_148` | macOS | include `event: end_of_stream` |
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| Grok | `chrome_146` | Linux | exclude `[DONE]` |
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| Notion | `chrome_146` | Windows | include `[DONE]` |
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| LMArena | `chrome_146` | Windows | no sentinel; close on native EOF |
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- Streaming consumes the native response `ReadableStream` directly; no temp file or sidecar is
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created.
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- Up to 256 initial bytes are inspected before exposing a stream. SSE providers buffer non-SSE
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errors; Grok/LMArena map Cloudflare challenges to `403` and HTML interstitials to `502`.
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- The native request timeout remains wrapped by an absolute JS hard deadline. A hang invalidates
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and closes only the affected profile/OS/proxy transport before the next request recreates it.
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- Proxy resolution priority is per-call `proxyUrl` → request-scoped account/dashboard context →
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`HTTPS_PROXY`/`HTTP_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY` (including lowercase variants). Resolution errors fail
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closed instead of leaking a direct connection. LMArena deliberately resolves against `arena.ai`.
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- `byteResponse` returns a content-typed `data:` URL without UTF-8 corruption.
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- Errors are `TlsClientUnavailableError` (package/addon unavailable), `TlsClientHangError`
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(deadline exceeded), and `WreqTransportCapacityError` (the shared session-capacity error code)
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when all 128 bounded profile/OS/proxy slots are active or closing.
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The generic `TlsClient` session above remains specialized for persistent browser-backed cookie
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state. Both paths reuse one cached wreq module loader and process lifecycle hook; their pools remain
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separate because their cookie lifetimes are intentionally different.
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The profiles are supported by the pinned package, but real WAF acceptance can change independently
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of local contract tests. Validate fingerprint changes against an explicitly authorized live account
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before claiming parity with an upstream browser.
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---
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## Claude Code Stealth Bundle
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When `cliCompatMode` is on, OmniRoute reshapes outgoing Claude requests so they are indistinguishable from `claude-cli` traffic. Three modules collaborate:
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### `claudeCodeFingerprint.ts`
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Computes the 3-char `cc_version` fingerprint embedded in the billing header:
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```
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SHA256(SALT + msg[4] + msg[7] + msg[20] + version)[:3]
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```
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- `FINGERPRINT_SALT = "59cf53e54c78"` (hardcoded; matches official client)
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- Inputs: chars at index 4, 7, 20 of the first user message text + version string
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- Output: 3-char hex prefix
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### `claudeCodeCCH.ts` (Client Content Hash)
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Server-side integrity check the official Claude Code CLI computes via Bun/Zig. OmniRoute reimplements with `xxhash-wasm`:
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1. Serialize body with `cch=00000;` placeholder
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2. `xxhash64(bytes, seed) & 0xFFFFF`
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3. Zero-padded 5-char lowercase hex
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4. Replace `cch=00000;` with the computed token
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Constants:
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- Seed: `0x6e52736ac806831e`
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- Pattern: `/\bcch=([0-9a-f]{5});/`
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### `claudeCodeObfuscation.ts`
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Inserts a Unicode **zero-width joiner** (`U+200D`) after the first character of "sensitive" client names so upstream filters cannot grep them. Default word list:
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```
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opencode, open-code, cline, roo-cline, roo_cline, cursor, windsurf,
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aider, continue.dev, copilot, avante, codecompanion
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```
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Applied to: `system` blocks, all `messages[].content`, and `tools[].description` / `tools[].function.description`. Operator-overridable via `setSensitiveWords()`.
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### `claudeCodeCompatible.ts` — `anthropic-compatible-cc-*` providers
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For third-party Anthropic relays that only accept "real Claude Code" traffic:
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- `CLAUDE_CODE_COMPATIBLE_USER_AGENT = "claude-cli/2.1.258 (external, sdk-cli)"`
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- `CLAUDE_CODE_COMPATIBLE_STAINLESS_PACKAGE_VERSION = "0.112.1"`
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- `CLAUDE_CODE_COMPATIBLE_STAINLESS_RUNTIME_VERSION = "v26.3.0"`
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- `anthropic-beta = "claude-code-20250219,interleaved-thinking-2025-05-14,effort-2025-11-24"` by default
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- The per-connection "Enable redact-thinking beta" toggle adds `redact-thinking-2026-02-12` when a CC Compatible upstream specifically requires redacted thinking streams
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- The per-connection "Enable summarized thinking display" toggle stores `providerSpecificData.requestDefaults.summarizeThinking` and adds `display: "summarized"` to CC Compatible thinking requests that did not already set a display mode
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- `CONTEXT_1M_BETA_HEADER = "context-1m-2025-08-07"` (Opus/Sonnet 4.x family)
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- Default path: `/v1/messages?beta=true`
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Sister modules in the same bundle:
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- `claudeCodeConstraints.ts` — temperature + cache-control rules
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- `claudeCodeToolRemapper.ts` — tool-name remapping
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- `claudeCodeExtraRemap.ts` — extra payload normalization
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---
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## Antigravity Stealth
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Antigravity requests preserve caller text byte-for-byte. OmniRoute does not insert zero-width characters into prompts or rename/inject tools to imitate an IDE client.
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### `antigravityHeaderScrub.ts`
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Strips Stainless SDK markers (`x-stainless-lang`, `x-stainless-package-version`, `x-stainless-os`, `x-stainless-arch`, `x-stainless-runtime`, `x-stainless-runtime-version`, `x-stainless-timeout`, `x-stainless-retry-count`, `x-stainless-helper-method`) before forwarding.
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### ⚠️ Risk: `ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS=always` (account-ban hot spot)
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`ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS=always` (consumed by `open-sse/executors/antigravity.ts`) routes **every** request through Antigravity AI Credit Overages (paid Google credits) instead of letting Google's free-tier quota gate things. This is documented as a feature, but it is **the single most common ToS-violation report we see** — multiple Google Ultra accounts have been banned with `403 / "service disabled for ToS violation" / insufficient_quota` after running for a few hours with `=always`.
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The upstream enforcement is on **Google's side**, not anything OmniRoute can prevent. The env var name and the existing docs make it sound like a safe knob to flip; it isn't.
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**Why this draws abuse detection more aggressively than free-tier-only usage:**
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- Sustained automated spend on a single Google account flags differently than free-tier hits-quota-and-stops.
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- Credit overages have no rate ceiling, so a misconfigured client can burn through several hundred USD in minutes and look like API-key resale or bot traffic.
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- Multiple OmniRoute users hitting overage credits in parallel from the same external IP compounds the signal.
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**Recommended posture:**
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1. Keep the default `ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS=off` unless the operator explicitly accepts paid-credit and account-enforcement risk. `retry` sends the normal request first and injects credits at most once after an eligible quota 429; `always` injects credits on the first request.
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2. **Spread load across providers via Auto-Combo** (`model: "auto"` or `kr/glm/etc`-combo) instead of saturating a single Antigravity account.
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3. **Set per-connection RPM limits** in the Antigravity provider's edit page (Dashboard → Providers → Antigravity → connection → rate limit). 30–60 RPM is a defensible upper bound for sustained use.
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4. **Use stable, operator-controlled upstream networking** and avoid sharing one account across unrelated users or workloads.
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5. **If banned**: appeal via `support.google.com` → "Restore Workspace/Account access" with the exact `quota_exceeded` / `service disabled` response body Google sent. Restoration is not guaranteed.
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The environment reference documents the account and spend implications of each credits mode.
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Touch points:
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- `open-sse/executors/antigravity.ts` — reads `process.env.ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS`
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- `src/lib/oauth/providers/antigravity.ts` — credential plumbing
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- Original incident report: Discussion [#1183](https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/discussions/1183)
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---
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## CLI Fingerprint Registry — `open-sse/config/cliFingerprints.ts`
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Per-provider table that pins **exact** header ordering and JSON body field ordering captured from mitmproxy traces of the official CLIs. Currently registered: `codex`, `claude`, plus runtime-derived profiles in `providerHeaderProfiles.ts` for `antigravity` and `github`.
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```ts
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interface CliFingerprint {
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headerOrder: string[]; // case-sensitive
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bodyFieldOrder: string[]; // top-level JSON keys
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userAgent?: string | (() => string);
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extraHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
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}
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```
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Toggle per provider via env (see below). When disabled, headers/body keys appear in whatever order Node/JSON gave them — easy to fingerprint.
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---
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## MITM Proxy (Antigravity, Linux/macOS/Windows)
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For CLIs whose binaries cannot be redirected via `OPENAI_BASE_URL`, OmniRoute runs a local TLS-terminating proxy. Endpoints live under `src/app/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm/`.
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| Method | Endpoint | Purpose |
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| ------ | --------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
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| GET | `/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm` | Status — running, pid, dnsConfigured, certExists |
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| POST | `/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm` | Start MITM (requires `apiKey` + `sudoPassword`) |
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| DELETE | `/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm` | Stop MITM |
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| GET | `/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm/alias` | List model aliases |
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| PUT | `/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm/alias` | Save model aliases for a tool |
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Target intercepted host: **`daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com`** (Antigravity's upstream).
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### Start sequence (`src/mitm/manager.ts::startMitm`)
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1. Generate self-signed cert via `selfsigned` (RSA-2048, SHA-256, 1y) — `cert/generate.ts`
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2. Install cert to system trust store — `cert/install.ts`
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3. Add hosts entry `127.0.0.1 daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com` — `dns/dnsConfig.ts`
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4. Spawn `src/mitm/server.cjs` with `ROUTER_API_KEY` + `MITM_LOCAL_PORT` (default `443`)
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5. Persist PID to `<DATA_DIR>/mitm/.mitm.pid`
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### Linux dynamic trust-store detection — `cert/install.ts`
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`getLinuxCertConfig()` walks a priority list and picks the first existing directory:
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| Distro family | Directory | Update command |
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| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------ |
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| Debian / Ubuntu | `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates` | `update-ca-certificates` |
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| Arch / CachyOS / Manjaro | `/etc/ca-certificates/trust-source/anchors` | `update-ca-trust` |
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| Fedora / RHEL / CentOS | `/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors` | `update-ca-trust` |
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| openSUSE | `/etc/pki/trust/anchors` | `update-ca-certificates` |
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Cert filename: `omniroute-mitm.crt`. Fingerprint match via `getCertFingerprint()` (SHA-1 of DER).
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Additionally, `updateNssDatabases()` installs into per-user NSS DBs when `certutil` is available: `~/.pki/nssdb`, `~/snap/chromium/.../nssdb`, all Firefox profiles (including snap), under the nickname **`OmniRoute MITM Root CA`**.
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### macOS / Windows
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- **macOS:** `security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain`
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- **Windows:** elevated PowerShell → `certutil -addstore Root`
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### Auth
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All MITM endpoints require management auth (`requireCliToolsAuth`). The sudo password is cached in module scope (never `globalThis`) and cleared on `stopMitm()`.
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---
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## User-Agent Overrides — env vars (`.env.example` section 12)
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| Variable | Default |
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| ------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `CLAUDE_USER_AGENT` | `claude-cli/2.1.258 (external, cli)` |
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| `CODEX_USER_AGENT` | `codex-cli/0.149.0 (Windows 10.0.26200; x64)` |
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| `GITHUB_USER_AGENT` | `GitHubCopilotChat/0.54.0` |
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| `ANTIGRAVITY_USER_AGENT` | `antigravity/2.0.1 linux/arm64 google-api-nodejs-client/10.3.0` |
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| `KIRO_USER_AGENT` | `AWS-SDK-JS/3.0.0 kiro-ide/1.0.0` |
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| `QODER_USER_AGENT` | `Qoder-Cli` |
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| `CURSOR_USER_AGENT` | `Cursor/3.4` |
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Consumed by `open-sse/executors/base.ts::buildHeaders()` via dynamic lookup. **Bump these when providers release new CLI versions** — stale UA strings start getting rejected as outdated clients.
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## CLI Compatibility Mode Toggles (`.env.example` section 13)
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| Variable | Effect |
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| -------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_CODEX=1` | Codex fingerprint |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_CLAUDE=1` | claude-cli fingerprint |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_GITHUB=1` | GitHub Copilot Chat fingerprint |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_ANTIGRAVITY=1` | Antigravity fingerprint |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_KIRO=1` | Kiro |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_CURSOR=1` | Cursor |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_KIMI_CODING=1` | Kimi Coding |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_KILOCODE=1` | KiloCode |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_CLINE=1` | Cline |
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| `CLI_COMPAT_ALL=1` | Enable all of the above |
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The provider IP is **always preserved** — the toggle only reshapes the request wire image, it does not switch IP egress.
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---
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## Inbound Header Sanitization
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OmniRoute scrubs inbound client headers before forwarding so a request that arrives from Cursor doesn't leak `User-Agent: Cursor/X.Y.Z` to a Claude upstream. See `src/shared/constants/upstreamHeaders.ts` for the denylist, kept in lockstep with the Zod schemas and unit tests.
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---
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## Updating Fingerprints When a Provider Rotates
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1. Capture official CLI traffic with `mitmproxy` (TLS interception + dump)
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2. Extract JA3/JA4 and the literal header order
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3. Update the relevant `CLI_FINGERPRINTS[...]` entry
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4. Bump matching `*_USER_AGENT` default in `.env.example`
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5. If the TLS handshake itself changed, update the relevant provider wrapper or the wreq-js `browser:` option
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6. Run the provider-specific TLS tests and a manual canary against the live provider
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7. Ship in a patch release; document in `CHANGELOG.md`
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---
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## Tests
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- `open-sse/services/__tests__/claudeTlsClient.test.ts` — shared TLS wrapper behavior
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- `tests/unit/anthropic-cache-fingerprint.test.ts` — fingerprint determinism
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- `tests/unit/chatgpt-web-source-retirement.test.ts` — common ChatGPT Web stealth source remains absent while Codex Web stays present
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---
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## See Also
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- [RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md](../architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md) — what happens when a stealth path gets a `403`
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- [TROUBLESHOOTING.md](../guides/TROUBLESHOOTING.md)
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- [ENVIRONMENT.md](../reference/ENVIRONMENT.md) — full env reference
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- [CLI-TOOLS.md](../reference/CLI-TOOLS.md) — operator view of the MITM workflow
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