mirror of
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* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity * fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls * fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls * fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls * fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls * fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls * fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls * chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions) * fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes * docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança, CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos. Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket, suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas. Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última atividade. * fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted * fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field * docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely. That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and `/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits. Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT, Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>` attribution. Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note, and 41 i18n translations. * fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'. Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models, validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message. Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth is OK. Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers. * test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429), network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers. * feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading 'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning. Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers (same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the provider registry without any warning, since all registered models are functional via POST /chat/completions. * refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test - Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory - Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md * fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup * feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback Hybrid approach: - gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models - gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern * i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json * feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision (lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22). * fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth) Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow: - Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path - Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation Spec only - no code changes yet. * docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan 10 tasks covering: - TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses - Provider switch to import_token - Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback - OAuthModal UI override - i18n sync - Verification + PR steps * fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404 post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token. - windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token - generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli - tests: assert flowType + disabled stub * fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged. Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex regression check. * refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl, codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl, showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately. * fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6: - src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test. - Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md to satisfy the env/docs sync contract. * fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow. The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy. * fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes `providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with `mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as `accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it crashed with: SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second `if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the second block was unreachable but identical to the first. Adds two regression tests asserting that `provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate instead of the SQLite bind error in production. * feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows * test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894) Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6: - Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes through resolvePublicCred per rule #11. - Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not apply (false positive). * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895) * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877): - docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6) and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section. Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading. - any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any` (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly. - pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files" (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning. * feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868) * feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT) * fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections --------- Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute> * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool New providers: - huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription) - phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent - poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie) - venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie) - v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie) - kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie) - doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie) Additional: - Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md - Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073 - Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers - Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup) - All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials Closes #2885 * fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules * feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899) Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity. It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id + daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking, claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect: - token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON) - auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token) - browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow) - bulk / ZIP import New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}. Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml, ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration, the token parser, and route auth-hardening. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896) Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11). * Pr 2871 (#2897) * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure. * docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly. --------- Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local> Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local> Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se> Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me> Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru> Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br> Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com> Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
461 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
461 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
# ERROR_SCENARIOS.md - DeepSeek Web Error Handling
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## HTTP Status Codes & Responses
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### 400 Bad Request
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**Trigger**: Malformed JSON, invalid field values, missing required fields
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**Response**:
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```json
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{
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"error": {
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"message": "Invalid request payload",
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"type": "invalid_request_error",
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"param": "messages",
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"code": "invalid_value"
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}
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}
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```
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**Examples**:
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```json
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// Missing required field
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{
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"error": {
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"message": "'model' is required",
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"type": "invalid_request_error",
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"code": "missing_field"
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}
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}
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// Invalid JSON
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{
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"error": {
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"message": "Invalid JSON in request body",
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"type": "parse_error",
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"code": "invalid_json"
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}
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}
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// Unsupported model
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{
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"error": {
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"message": "Model 'invalid-model' does not exist",
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"type": "invalid_request_error",
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"code": "model_not_found"
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}
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}
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```
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**Recovery Strategy**:
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- Validate payload before sending
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- Check required fields: `model`, `messages`
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- Ensure JSON is valid (use JSON.stringify + JSON.parse for validation)
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- Use supported models only
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---
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### 401 Unauthorized
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**Trigger**: Invalid/expired session, missing cookies, authentication failed
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**Response**:
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```json
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{
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"error": {
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"message": "Unauthorized. Please log in.",
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"type": "unauthorized",
|
|
"code": "invalid_session"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Examples**:
|
|
```json
|
|
// Session expired
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Session has expired",
|
|
"type": "unauthorized",
|
|
"code": "session_expired"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Missing authentication
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Missing authentication token",
|
|
"type": "unauthorized",
|
|
"code": "missing_auth"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Invalid API key (if using API auth)
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Invalid API key provided",
|
|
"type": "unauthorized",
|
|
"code": "invalid_api_key"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery Strategy**:
|
|
- Check if cookies are present and valid
|
|
- If expired: re-authenticate (login again)
|
|
- Refresh session before expiry
|
|
- Store cookies persistently
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
### 429 Too Many Requests
|
|
|
|
**Trigger**: Rate limit exceeded (requests/min or tokens/day)
|
|
|
|
**Response Headers**:
|
|
```http
|
|
HTTP/1.1 429 Too Many Requests
|
|
X-RateLimit-Limit-Requests: 60
|
|
X-RateLimit-Remaining-Requests: 0
|
|
X-RateLimit-Limit-Tokens: 100000
|
|
X-RateLimit-Remaining-Tokens: 0
|
|
Retry-After: 60
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Response Body**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Rate limit exceeded. Please retry after 60 seconds.",
|
|
"type": "rate_limit_error",
|
|
"code": "rate_limit_exceeded"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Examples**:
|
|
```json
|
|
// Requests limit
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "You have exceeded the 60 requests per minute limit",
|
|
"type": "rate_limit_error",
|
|
"code": "requests_limit_exceeded"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Token limit (daily)
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "You have exceeded the 100000 tokens per day limit",
|
|
"type": "rate_limit_error",
|
|
"code": "tokens_limit_exceeded"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery Strategy**:
|
|
- Read `Retry-After` header
|
|
- Wait specified seconds before retrying
|
|
- Implement exponential backoff: 1s, 2s, 4s, 8s...
|
|
- Queue requests locally for batch processing
|
|
- Monitor usage with `X-RateLimit-Remaining-*` headers
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
### 500 Internal Server Error
|
|
|
|
**Trigger**: Server-side error, unexpected exception
|
|
|
|
**Response**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Internal server error",
|
|
"type": "internal_error",
|
|
"code": "internal_server_error"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Examples**:
|
|
```json
|
|
// Database error
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Database connection failed",
|
|
"type": "internal_error",
|
|
"code": "db_error"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Processing error
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Failed to process completion request",
|
|
"type": "internal_error",
|
|
"code": "processing_error"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery Strategy**:
|
|
- Retry with exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s)
|
|
- Max retries: 3-5
|
|
- Log error for debugging
|
|
- Inform user: "Temporary service issue, retrying..."
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
### 503 Service Unavailable
|
|
|
|
**Trigger**: Server overloaded, maintenance, temporarily down
|
|
|
|
**Response Headers**:
|
|
```http
|
|
HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable
|
|
Retry-After: 120
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Response Body**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Service temporarily unavailable due to high traffic",
|
|
"type": "service_unavailable",
|
|
"code": "service_overloaded"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery Strategy**:
|
|
- Read `Retry-After` header (retry after 120s)
|
|
- Implement exponential backoff
|
|
- Queue request for later retry
|
|
- Show user: "Service temporarily unavailable, please try again in a few minutes"
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## SSE Stream Errors
|
|
|
|
### Mid-Stream Error (Within SSE)
|
|
|
|
**Pattern**: Error JSON sent as `data:` line within stream
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"Hello"}}]}
|
|
data: {"error":{"message":"Connection lost","code":"stream_error"}}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery**:
|
|
- Detect error in stream parsing
|
|
- Close connection gracefully
|
|
- Retry from last known checkpoint
|
|
- Store partial messages for recovery
|
|
|
|
### Stream Connection Timeout
|
|
|
|
**Trigger**: No data received for 30+ seconds
|
|
|
|
**Error**:
|
|
```
|
|
TIMEOUT: No data received for 30 seconds
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery**:
|
|
- Close connection
|
|
- Retry request with exponential backoff
|
|
- Inform user about timeout
|
|
|
|
### Incomplete Stream (Premature Termination)
|
|
|
|
**Pattern**: Stream ends without `[DONE]` marker
|
|
|
|
**Example**:
|
|
```
|
|
data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"Hello"}}]}
|
|
data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":" world"}}]}
|
|
# Connection dropped here - no [DONE]
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery**:
|
|
- Detect missing `[DONE]`
|
|
- Treat as incomplete response
|
|
- Retry or use partial response
|
|
- Log for debugging
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Network & Connection Errors
|
|
|
|
### Connection Refused
|
|
|
|
**Cause**: Server not reachable, firewall blocking
|
|
|
|
**Recovery**:
|
|
- Check network connectivity: `ping api.deepseek.com`
|
|
- Check firewall rules
|
|
- Retry with backoff
|
|
- Use proxy if behind corporate firewall
|
|
|
|
### DNS Resolution Failed
|
|
|
|
**Cause**: Cannot resolve `api.deepseek.com`
|
|
|
|
**Recovery**:
|
|
- Check DNS: `nslookup api.deepseek.com`
|
|
- Try alternative DNS (8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1)
|
|
- Retry later
|
|
|
|
### SSL/TLS Certificate Error
|
|
|
|
**Cause**: Certificate validation failed
|
|
|
|
**Error**:
|
|
```
|
|
SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery** (Production: Never Skip):
|
|
- Use Node.js with proper CA bundle
|
|
- Do NOT use `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` (except dev)
|
|
- Update system certificates
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Validation Errors
|
|
|
|
### Invalid Model Parameter
|
|
|
|
**Request**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{"model": "invalid-model-name"}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Response**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Model 'invalid-model-name' does not exist",
|
|
"type": "invalid_request_error",
|
|
"code": "model_not_found"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Valid Models**:
|
|
- `deepseek-v4-flash`
|
|
- `deepseek-v4-pro`
|
|
- `deepseek-r1`
|
|
- `deepseek-v3`
|
|
|
|
### Invalid Message Format
|
|
|
|
**Request**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{"messages": [{"role": "invalid-role", "content": "test"}]}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Response**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Invalid role 'invalid-role'. Valid roles: 'user', 'assistant', 'system'",
|
|
"type": "invalid_request_error",
|
|
"code": "invalid_role"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Missing Required Field
|
|
|
|
**Request**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{"model": "deepseek-v4-flash"}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Response**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "'messages' field is required",
|
|
"type": "invalid_request_error",
|
|
"code": "missing_field"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Concurrent Request Handling
|
|
|
|
### Too Many Concurrent Requests
|
|
|
|
**Limit**: ~10-50 concurrent per account (tier-dependent)
|
|
|
|
**Response**:
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"error": {
|
|
"message": "Too many concurrent requests. Please retry after a brief delay.",
|
|
"type": "resource_limit_error",
|
|
"code": "concurrency_limit_exceeded"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Recovery**:
|
|
- Queue requests locally
|
|
- Limit concurrent: `Promise.all([...]).then(...)` → max 5-10 parallel
|
|
- Implement semaphore pattern
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Testing Error Scenarios
|
|
|
|
### Test 400 Error
|
|
```bash
|
|
curl -X POST https://api.deepseek.com/api/v0/chat/completions \
|
|
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
|
-d '{}' # Invalid - missing fields
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Test 401 Error
|
|
```bash
|
|
curl -X POST https://api.deepseek.com/api/v0/chat/completions \
|
|
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
|
-d '{"model":"deepseek-v4","messages":[]}'
|
|
# No auth header
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Test 429 Error
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Make 61+ requests in 60 seconds
|
|
for i in {1..65}; do
|
|
curl -X POST https://api.deepseek.com/api/v0/chat/completions ...
|
|
done
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Test 503 Error
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Simulate during maintenance window or high traffic
|
|
# Expected: 503 with Retry-After header
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## Error Recovery Checklist
|
|
|
|
- [ ] Validate request payload before sending
|
|
- [ ] Handle 401: Re-authenticate
|
|
- [ ] Handle 429: Exponential backoff + Retry-After
|
|
- [ ] Handle 500: Exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s)
|
|
- [ ] Handle 503: Exponential backoff with Retry-After
|
|
- [ ] Parse SSE stream for errors
|
|
- [ ] Detect stream timeouts (>30s no data)
|
|
- [ ] Detect incomplete streams (no [DONE])
|
|
- [ ] Queue requests on rate limit
|
|
- [ ] Log all errors with context
|
|
|