Files
OmniRoute/docs/security/COMPLIANCE.md
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza 5ac4637816 docs: reorganize docs/ + accuracy audit + drop Node 20 (rebased onto current release tip) (#5262)
* docs: move superpowers/research artifacts to isolated _tasks repo + docs tree cleanup

- Move docs/superpowers/{plans,specs} and docs/research/* into the gitignored,
  separately-versioned _tasks/ repo; untrack the two tracked research design docs.
- Add CLAUDE.md "Planning & Research Artifacts" section overriding the superpowers
  default save paths (docs/... -> _tasks/...); align REPOSITORY_MAP and
  DOCUMENTATION_OVERHAUL_PLAN with the new convention.
- Drop 4 now-obsolete /api/discovery/* entries from check-docs-symbols allowlist
  (stale-enforcement) and refresh code/spec path comments to _tasks/...
- Sweeps in concurrent docs-tree restructuring (root-level provider/guide docs,
  compression spec cleanup, .mcp.json.example removal).

* docs: reorganize docs/ tree + fix stale facts across ~26 docs

Phase A — reorganization:
- Move 7 orphan root docs into subfolders (providers/ created; TIERS+USAGE_QUOTA→guides/;
  plugins+PLUGIN_SDK→frameworks/); delete 8 obsolete/redundant docs (SUBMIT_PR superseded
  by CONTRIBUTING; DOCUMENTATION_OVERHAUL_PLAN; INCIDENT_RESPONSE/PERF_BUDGETS/THREAT_MODEL;
  3 ops snapshots). Rebuild README index (was missing ~40 files) + per-folder meta.json nav.
- Clean 14 dangling doc-path references in bin/ ops scripts, scripts/, workflow, tests;
  fix the dockerignore-docs-coverage required-docs path (PROVIDERS→providers/CLAUDE_WEB).

Phase B — content accuracy (verified against code, not the audit summary):
- Functional: ENVIRONMENT flag defaults (INPUT_SANITIZER/MCP_ENFORCE_SCOPES=true,
  COMPRESS_DESCRIPTIONS=false, dynamic heap); MCP-SERVER notion tool names (omniroute_*→
  notion_*) + counts 87→94; coverage gate 75/70→60/60/60/60 (RELEASE_CHECKLIST, COVERAGE_PLAN,
  ERROR_SANITIZATION, CONTRIBUTING); pre-push hook description; regenerate PROVIDER_REFERENCE (237).
- Count drift: providers 237, executors 70, migrations 106, db modules 94, oauth 19,
  strategies 17, MCP 94, flags 38, TS 6.0, open-sse ~900/services 294 across architecture/
  frameworks/ops docs; AUTO-COMBO 9→12 factors w/ correct DEFAULT_WEIGHTS; REASONING +2
  patterns; STEALTH UA defaults; AGENT_PROTOCOLS +cursor-cloud/list-capabilities;
  LANGUAGE_PACKS +id pack.
- Kept Node 20 (runtime guard accepts 20.20.2+; only engines is stricter) and MCP scopes=13
  (mcpScopes.ts) — both were correct in the docs; corrected only the attribution.

* docs: finish content refresh — compression engines, CLI_TOKEN merge, metadata sweep

- Compression: document the additional built-in engines (CCR, headroom, ionizer,
  session-dedup) in COMPRESSION_ENGINES; clarify LLMLingua-2 is the ultra-mode SLM
  backend + cross-ref the extra engines in EXTENDING_COMPRESSION; add the id
  (Indonesian) language pack to LANGUAGE_PACKS.
- AUTO-COMBO: replace the orphan 'How tiers fit' weight table (stale weights) with a
  pointer to the canonical 12-factor DEFAULT_WEIGHTS table.
- Security: merge CLI_TOKEN_AUTH.md (legacy 32-char SHA-256 format) into CLI_TOKEN.md
  as a 'Legacy format — still accepted' section (server accepts both HMAC + legacy),
  delete CLI_TOKEN_AUTH.md, drop it from the index + security nav.
- Metadata: bump stale frontmatter (version/lastUpdated) to 3.8.40/2026-06-28 across the
  doc set audited this pass, and normalize the in-body 'Last updated' header lines to match.

* fix(runtime): drop Node 20 from supported range + align all docs/diagrams/counts

- Node minimum is now 22 (aligned with package.json engines). SUPPORTED_NODE_RANGE in
  src/shared/utils/nodeRuntimeSupport.ts (and the bin/ mirror) drops the 20.x line →
  '>=22.22.2 <23 || >=24.0.0 <27'; getNodeRuntimeSupport now rejects Node 20 as
  unsupported-major. Test updated (TDD): node-runtime-support.test.ts asserts Node 20
  rejected. Docs aligned (TROUBLESHOOTING ×2, TERMUX, RELEASE_CHECKLIST, CODEBASE,
  CLI-TOOLS, README, llm.txt + 42 i18n llm.txt mirrors, skills/cli-serve).
- Diagrams regenerated: mcp-tools-87 -> mcp-tools-94 (34 base + pool 6 = 94) and
  auto-combo-9factor -> auto-combo-12factor (correct DEFAULT_WEIGHTS); SVGs re-rendered
  via mermaid-cli; doc refs + diagrams/README updated; fixed a pre-existing broken
  resilience-3layers image path.
- CLAUDE.md + AGENTS.md aligned to real counts (237 providers, 94 MCP tools / 34 base,
  106 migrations, 94 db modules, 12-factor auto-combo, 17 strategies); README provider
  count 231 -> 237; executor count corrected to 68 (provider executors, excl base/index)
  and OAuth to 18 across architecture docs. check:docs-all now passes (0 strict drift,
  0 broken links); removed dead .mcp.json.example doc link.

* fix(services): update installer Node hint to >=22.22.2 (aligned with dropped Node 20)

* docs: realign counts to current release tip after rebase

The release tip advanced while this work was in flight (Gemini CLI provider/executor
removed by #5246, plus other PRs). Re-counted against the current code and updated:
providers 237->236, executors 68->67, OAuth modules 18->17, open-sse services 294->298;
regenerated PROVIDER_REFERENCE.md (236). check:docs-all passes (0 strict drift).

* docs(changelog) + i18n: record Node 20 drop + fix nodeIncompatibleHint

- CHANGELOG: add [3.8.40] entries for the Node 20.x removal (runtime) and the docs
  reorganization/accuracy audit.
- i18n: nodeIncompatibleHint across all 42 locales no longer lists Node 20.x as
  supported (ASCII + CJK full-width variants), aligned with the dropped Node 20.

* fix(docs): repair CI breakages from the doc moves

- test: cli-plugin-system asserted docs/dev/plugins.md exists; the file moved to
  docs/frameworks/PLUGINS.md — point the test at the new path (Unit fast-path 2/2 fix).
- frontmatter: PLUGINS.md and PLUGIN_SDK.md moved into the fumadocs-indexed
  docs/frameworks/ which requires a 'title' frontmatter; the missing frontmatter
  failed the Next.js MDX build (dast-smoke 'invalid frontmatter'). Added frontmatter
  to both, plus the providers/ docs (consistency; that folder is not indexed).
2026-06-28 22:07:18 -03:00

10 KiB

title, version, lastUpdated
title version lastUpdated
Compliance & Audit 3.8.40 2026-06-28

Compliance & Audit

Source of truth: src/lib/compliance/, src/app/api/compliance/ Last updated: 2026-06-28 — v3.8.40

OmniRoute records administrative actions, authentication events, provider credential lifecycle changes, and MCP tool invocations to SQLite-backed audit tables. This page covers what gets logged, where it lives, how long it is retained, how API keys can opt out, and how to query the data.

The implementation lives in src/lib/compliance/index.ts (T-43 — "Compliance Controls") and src/lib/compliance/providerAudit.ts. Audit writes never throw: on any failure the call is silently swallowed so audit logging cannot break the main request flow.

What Gets Logged

Administrative audit events (audit_log)

Every call to logAuditEvent({ action, actor, target, details, ... }) produces one row. Action strings follow a domain.verb (or domain.verb.outcome) pattern. Confirmed in-tree action types include:

Action Source
auth.login.success src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts
auth.login.failed src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts
auth.login.locked src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts
auth.login.error src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts
auth.login.misconfigured src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts
auth.login.setup_required src/app/api/auth/login/route.ts
auth.logout.success src/app/api/auth/logout/route.ts
provider.credentials.created src/app/api/providers/route.ts
provider.credentials.updated src/app/api/providers/[id]/route.ts
provider.credentials.revoked src/app/api/providers/[id]/route.ts
provider.credentials.batch_revoked src/app/api/providers/route.ts
sync.token.created src/app/api/sync/tokens/route.ts
sync.token.revoked src/app/api/sync/tokens/[id]/route.ts
compliance.cleanup src/lib/compliance/index.ts

Each entry captures action, actor (defaults to "system"), target, details/metadata (JSON), ip_address, resource_type, status, request_id, and timestamp. Sensitive keys (apiKey, accessToken, refreshToken, password, anything matching *token/*secret/*apikey, etc.) are recursively redacted to "[redacted]" before the row is written.

MCP tool calls (mcp_tool_audit)

Every MCP tool invocation writes a row through open-sse/mcp-server/audit.ts. Schema (from src/lib/db/migrations/002_mcp_a2a_tables.sql):

Column Notes
id autoincrement
tool_name MCP tool identifier
input_hash sha256 of input (no payload stored)
output_summary short, truncated summary
duration_ms wall time
api_key_id caller (nullable)
success 1 / 0
error_code terminal error code on failure
created_at ISO timestamp

Request / usage logs

These are operational telemetry (not strictly admin audit) but share the same retention pipeline:

  • usage_history — per-request usage roll-up
  • call_logs — full per-request log (subject to row-cap, see below)
  • proxy_logs — proxy traffic log (subject to row-cap)
  • request_detail_logs — legacy detailed request log (still pruned if present)

Storage Schema

audit_log is created lazily by ensureAuditLogSchema() on first use:

CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log (
  id            INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
  timestamp     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
  action        TEXT NOT NULL,
  actor         TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'system',
  target        TEXT,
  details       TEXT,
  ip_address    TEXT,
  resource_type TEXT,
  status        TEXT,
  request_id    TEXT,
  metadata      TEXT
);

Indexes are created on timestamp, action, actor, resource_type, status, and request_id. Missing columns on legacy DBs are added via ALTER TABLE on demand.

Retention & Cleanup

Two separate retention windows are honoured:

Env var Default Applies to
APP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS 7 audit_log, mcp_tool_audit
CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS 7 usage_history, call_logs, proxy_logs, request_detail_logs
CALL_LOGS_TABLE_MAX_ROWS 100000 Row-cap trim for call_logs
PROXY_LOGS_TABLE_MAX_ROWS 100000 Row-cap trim for proxy_logs

cleanupExpiredLogs() runs the retention pass. It is invoked on server startup from src/server-init.ts and src/instrumentation-node.ts. Each run logs a compliance.cleanup audit event with the per-table delete counts. Proxy/call log trimming is batched (BATCH_SIZE = 5000) to avoid long write locks.

Manual request-history cleanup is separate from retention. The Request Logs page calls POST /api/settings/purge-request-history, which deletes call_logs, legacy request_detail_logs, and local request artifacts under ${DATA_DIR}/call_logs/.

Defaults are defined in src/lib/logEnv.ts (DEFAULT_APP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS = 7, DEFAULT_CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS = 7).

noLog Opt-Out (per API key)

API keys can be flagged so their downstream call traffic is not logged. The flag lives on the api_keys table (no_log INTEGER DEFAULT 0) and is mirrored into an in-memory set for hot-path lookups.

# Create a no-log key (management auth required)
curl -X POST http://localhost:20128/api/keys \
  -H "Cookie: auth_token=..." \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Privacy key", "noLog": true}'

Helpers (src/lib/compliance/index.ts):

  • setNoLog(apiKeyId, true|false) — toggle the in-memory entry
  • isNoLog(apiKeyId) — checked on the request path; falls back to a 30 s cached read from api_keys.no_log
  • NO_LOG_API_KEY_IDS (env, comma-separated) — preloaded into the in-memory set on boot; useful when you cannot toggle the column directly

Administrative audit events (login, provider changes, MCP tool calls, etc.) are not affected by noLog — only per-request traffic logging is opted out.

REST API

Endpoint Method Description Auth
/api/compliance/audit-log GET Paginated admin audit entries with filters management
/api/mcp/audit GET Paginated MCP tool audit entries (open-sse)
/api/mcp/audit/stats GET Aggregated MCP audit stats (open-sse)

No CSV export endpoint is shipped today — export from the dashboard or query the SQLite database directly.

Querying /api/compliance/audit-log

Supported query params (all optional, all use LIKE %value% matching for text filters):

  • action, actor, target, resourceType (or resource_type), status, requestId (or request_id)
  • from / since, to / until — ISO timestamps
  • limit (default 50, min 1, max 500)
  • offset (default 0, max 10_000)

The response is a JSON array. Pagination metadata is returned in headers: x-total-count, x-page-limit, x-page-offset.

curl "http://localhost:20128/api/compliance/audit-log?action=provider.credentials&from=2026-05-01" \
  -H "Cookie: auth_token=..."

Dashboard

The dashboard exposes audit data at /dashboard/audit (src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/audit/page.tsx). The page has two tabs:

  • Compliance (ComplianceTab.tsx) — admin audit events from /api/compliance/audit-log. Filters by event type, severity (info / warning / critical, derived from action + status), and date range. Severity is computed client-side from the action/status strings.
  • MCP (McpAuditTab.tsx) — MCP tool audit from /api/mcp/audit, with filters by tool name and success/failure.

Both tabs paginate with page sizes of 50 (compliance) and 25 (MCP).

Provider Credential Helpers

src/lib/compliance/providerAudit.ts provides shaping helpers used by the provider-management routes when they emit credential events:

  • summarizeProviderConnectionForAudit(connection) — strips apiKey, accessToken, refreshToken, idToken, and providerSpecificData.consoleApiKey before the connection snapshot is written to details.
  • getProviderAuditTarget(connection) — composes a stable "<provider>:<name|id>" string for the target field.
  • extractProviderWarnings(...payloads) — scans provider responses for policy/safety warnings ([sanitizer], prompt injection detected, content has been filtered, safety filter, policy violation) and surfaces up to 5 hits, each truncated to 400 chars.

Best Practices

  • Flag API keys handling PII (legal, medical, etc.) with noLog: true.
  • Tune APP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS / CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS to meet your retention policy. The 7-day defaults are conservative.
  • Export the audit table off-platform (sqlite3 dump) on whatever cadence your compliance program requires — no built-in archival exists.
  • Track auth.login.failed and auth.login.locked counts for brute-force detection.
  • When adding new admin endpoints, call logAuditEvent({ ... }) with a stable domain.verb.outcome action string and pass the request context via getAuditRequestContext(request) so IP and requestId are captured automatically.

See Also